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After the end of Liberia’s brutal 14 year civil war, the process of rebuilding Liberia has 
focused on a number of interventions including reforming the criminal justice system. In 
the current study, institutional, policy, legal reform, and infrastructure development were 
the approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s Criminal Justice System. Thirty experts 
were interviewed, and their responses coded using NVivo 12.0. Seven themes and 25 
subthemes emerged from the data. It was that found that a top down internationally led 
approach with minimal involvement of local communities and the neglect of the 
traditional justice system characterized the decentralization process. Results also 
indicated that as a result of decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System, the system 
is showing basic signs of functionality, a situation which has contributed to Liberia’s 
peace and stability.  Participants recommended an inclusive, nationally led approach that 
blends the formal and traditional justice systems, an overhaul of the criminal justice 
system and changes in the attitudes and approaches of actors involved in decentralizing 
Liberia criminal justice system. Implications for positive social change include 
international actors treating the traditional justice systems and actors as important 
stakeholders in criminal justice system reform in postconflict peacebuilding and donors 
as well as international partners striking a health balance between their quest to realize 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new 
model that makes the existing model obsolete. 
R. Buckminster Fuller 
Introduction 
After the end of Liberia’s brutal 14 year civil war, the process of rebuilding Liberia has 
focused on a number of interventions including reforming the criminal justice system (Bacon, 
2015; Fyanka, 2014; & Nyei, 2014). One of the goals of the reforms is to make the criminal 
justice system accessible, particularly to the vulnerable (Bacon, 2015; Fyanka, 2014; & Nyei, 
2014). Most citizens in this category live outside the large cities and have been marginalized 
since Liberia’s independence in 1847 (Bacon, 2015; Fyanka, 2014). Liberia’s international 
partners have devoted attention and resources to the reform process to ensure that the 
peacebuilding process results in enduring peace (Bacon, 2015; Fyanka, 2014). The focus of the 
international community on reforming Liberia’s criminal justice system has become even more 
urgent following the coming into force of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on 1 
January 2016.  
Goal 16 of the SDGs seeks to provide access to justice for all and build effective, 
accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels of society (Jackson, 2017). These institutions 
include criminal justice system institutions. For criminal justice institutions to be accessible, 
inclusive and accountable they must, among others, be decentralized. This will enable citizens 





and/or hindrance. This holds true for every country, including Liberia, the site for this research. 
The SDGs have two targets that relate to local government and decentralization and stress the 
importance of decentralization for meeting the SDG Goal 16 (Jackson, 2017).  
The importance of decentralization in development has been affirmed by global 
institutions and frameworks such as the Global Alliance for Urban Crises, the Paris Agreement 
on Aid Effectiveness, and Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (Jackson, 2017). 
The Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness have made local ownership a key ingredient of 
effective development assistance (Jackson, 2017). In this regard, Liberians across the various 
geographical, social, economic and political spheres must be actively involved in identifying 
how international aid earmarked for reforming their criminal justice system is used.  
Accordingly, in this dissertation, I ascertained the approaches used to decentralize 
Liberia’s criminal justice system and investigated the extent to which national ownership 
influenced decision making and implementation of interventions, supported by the international 
community, to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. I also assessed how the 
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system has been enhanced through the varied efforts to 
make the system’s services accessible.   
Problem Statement 
A major task in postconflict reconstruction is reforming the criminal justice 
system (Dursun-Özkanca, 2017; Nyei, 2014; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). The objectives of 
these reforms are to reestablish the supremacy of the rule of law and extend the presence of the 





countries not returning to conflict (Dursun-Özkanca, 2017 & Westernman, 2017). Many reform 
processes are set in motion to achieve these objectives (Nyei, 2014). They include (re)-
establishing and/or reforming institutions (Denney, 2014 & Nyei, 2014). Other examples are 
enacting legislation, developing and implementing new policies and developing the human 
resource capacity of criminal justice institutions (Gordon, 2014). According to Dursun-Özkanca 
(2017), reforms of the criminal justice system must benefit the population. However, the criminal 
justice system must be accessible for the population to benefit from its services (Dinnen & 
Peake, 2013). Schultze-Kraft, Valencia, and Alzate (2016) asserted that, in postconflict settings, 
a decentralized criminal justice system has the potential of engendering public confidence in the 
justice system and contributing to enduring peace and stability. The criminal justice system 
should also be functional (Dandurand, 2014). Local ownership of the reforms and its processes 
are essential condition precedents to achieving accessibility and functionality (Dursun-Özkanca, 
2017; Homel & Masson, 2016; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014).  
Despite the case made for local ownership in international development assistance, there 
is a paucity of literature on the extent to which the approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s 
criminal justice system was mindful of Liberia’s uniqueness and was championed by Liberians. 
There is also a gap in the literature on how decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system has 
affected the system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability. For effective 
decentralization of criminal justice systems, several considerations must influence the process. 
They include the need to ensure that the approach toward decentralization suits the 





distinctiveness of the context, in this case, Liberia include the resources available to reform the 
criminal justice system, triggers of Liberia’s civil war, Liberia’s history, and the culture of the 
Liberian people and institutions of the criminal justice system.  
Purpose of the Study 
My purpose in this qualitative study was to identify the approaches used in decentralizing 
services provided by Liberia’s criminal justice system, to ascertain whether these approaches 
were suitable for Liberia’s unique context and; how nationally owned and inclusive the 
decentralization process was. Second was to determine how international support could 
contribute to making the decentralization process nationally owned and inclusive. Another 
objective of this study is to establish the impact of decentralization on the criminal justice 
system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability as well as how to improve the 
functionality of the criminal justice system. The grounded theory approach and the case study 
research design were used to answer this study’s research questions.  
Research Questions 
The central questions that guided this qualitative research study were (a) RQ1: What 
approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017?; 
(b) RQ2: How nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system? (c) RQ2.1: How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive 
processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system? (d) RQ3: How has decentralizing 





stability?; and RQ.3.1: How can the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system be 
improved? 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Structural functionalism and realism are the theoretical frameworks used for this 
study. Ryan (2005) indicated that proponents of structural functionalism include Merton, 
Durkheim, Comte, and Parsons. The theory’s proponents asserted that social entities, whether 
they are communities, organizations, or other social groupings are organisms that are made up of 
different parts with each part playing a unique and important role that collectively contribute to 
keeping the organism alive and functional (Babbie, 2015). Babbie (2015) pointed out that should 
a part of the organism malfunction, the ability of the organism to function in the desired manner 
is negatively affected.  
Realism is a theory used in international relations to analyze the behavior of states in 
international affairs. Proponents of the realist theory indicated that states act in their national 
interest and power is used to back their actions aimed at furthering the pursuit of national interest 
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001), a state’s power 
is backed by varied capabilities some of which are economic in nature. Morgenthau is one of the 
foremost proponents of realist theory. Indeed, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001) asserted that 
“[No] twentieth-century writer has had a greater impact on the development of realist theory than 
Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980)” (p. 75). According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001), the 
following assumptions underpin the realist theory: first, that the international system is state 





this makes international politics anarchic hence requires states to deploy their capabilities in 
navigating their way through the international system; third, that though it recognizes that states 
are sovereign, they have varied capabilities and sizes; fourth, that in their pursuit of national 
interest, states are rational and unitary actors; and last, a state’s power is the predominate concept 
for explaining and predicting its conduct.  
Structural functionalism is appropriate for investigating decentralization of the criminal 
justice system and the effects of decentralization on the system’s functionality because, as 
previously noted, the criminal justice system is made up of various parts, including the judiciary, 
police, lawyers (prosecutors, defense lawyers and public defenders), and corrections officials. 
All these parts have unique roles to play to keep the system (i.e., the organism alive [Babbie, 
2015]). Where any of the parts fails to effectively play its individual role(s), the system becomes 
dysfunctional and the system’s purpose may be defeated, particularly when remedial measures 
are not taken timeously.  
With respect to realism, efforts to support reforms of the criminal justice system in 
postconflict societies, which include making criminal justice system services accessible, are 
often, if not always, supported and/or spearheaded by the international community. The 
international community is made up of states who do not always support such reform processes 
out of altruism. That is to say quite often there is a motivation (i.e. the pursuit of their national 
interest) that drives their actions. This is manifested, in part, in deliberate efforts to promote 
and/or replicate institutions and cultures that are akin to those that exist in the countries aiding 





honored practices in these war ravaged societies (Denney, 2014). Nationals of the countries 
supporting the reforms are employed by their governments to aid the implementation of the 
reforms (Denney, 2014). All these create the dominance and influence of the countries 
supporting reforms in postconflict settings.  
Nature of the Study  
The nature of this study was a qualitative method; the research approach was the 
grounded theory and the research design was a case study. Crawford (2016) asserted that 
qualitative research incorporates the voice of its participants in its findings and describes the 
experiences of individuals or groups. Researchers use this qualitative method to examine the 
partnership between the researcher(s) and the participants in generating knowledge, and 
qualitative researchers recognize the fact that knowledge is created through social interaction 
(Patton, 2015). The grounded theory approach to research results in the study’s report being the 
product of a collection of the perspectives of the participants (Patton, 2015). I used the case study 
format for this study because case studies are an effective tool to examine, in an in-depth 
manner, “persons, decisions, programs, or other entities that have a unique characteristic of 
interest” (O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner, & Taliaferro, 2017, p. 43).  
Case studies are preferred for investigating contemporary issues because there is 
relatively easier access to information sources to conduct the study (O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner, 
& Taliaferro, 2017). All the issues that investigated in this qualitative study to answer the 
phenomenon of interest are contemporary issues. (O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner, & Taliaferro, 2017 





research where the phenomenon of interest is of a contemporary nature. As earlier stated, the 
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system partly depends on the decentralization of 
criminal justice services and the approach to decentralization being tailored to suit the local 
context. Three research questions and two subresearch questions were answered in this study 
aided by the views of persons who are/were involved in policy making and implementation to 
make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible.  
Definitions 
 In this study, the following terms mean:  
Criminal justice services: Traditionally, these are services provided by the prosecution 
and defense, the police (i.e. law enforcement), the judiciary (i.e. adjudication), and corrections. 
For purposes of this study, mechanisms for oversight and accountability over prosecution, 
defense, adjudication, corrections, and law enforcement are part of criminal justice 
services/system. 
Decentralization: Rechts-Lexikon (n.d.) defined decentralization as the process of 
moving powers from government, at the central level, to lower levels of a country’s governance 
structure (Hamann, 2012). 
Nonstate actor: “Non-state justice and security (NSJS) systems [actors] refer to all 
systems that exercise some form of nonstate authority in providing safety, security and access to 
justice. This includes a range of traditional, customary, religious and informal mechanisms that 
deal with disputes and/or security matters” (United Kingdom’s Department of International 





Local ownership in the context of criminal justice system reform in postconflict settings 
is the term used to describe a situation/process where international efforts to support processes to 
reform the criminal justice system adopt an approach that is tailored for the local context and 
consults the local community when shaping the reform interventions and their implementation 
(Ansorg, 2017; Denney, 2013, 2014; Detzner, 2017; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gal, 2016; Gordon, 
2014; Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014; Westernman, 2017). 
Significance 
In this study, I identified the approaches used to decentralize criminal justice services in 
Liberia, the extent to which the approaches suited the Liberian context, the effects of 
decentralization on the functionality of the criminal justice system, and Liberia’s peace and 
stability. I also ascertained the extent to which the decentralization process was inclusive and 
nationally driven and how international efforts to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system 
could support inclusive and nationally owned/driven processes.  
Decentralizing criminal justice services, in a postconflict country such as Liberia, is an 
opportunity for the state to show its presence beyond the capital and the major cities (Edwards & 
Yilmaz, 2016; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; & Dursun-Özkanca, 2017). It provides an opportunity for 
citizens to seek redress from the justice system as opposed to taking the law into their own hands 
(Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016; Escobar-Lemmon & Ross, 2014; Dursun-Özkanca, 2017; Hamann, 
2012; & Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). A decentralized criminal justice system engenders public 
confidence in the justice system thus promoting the supremacy of law (Escobar-Lemmon & 





(Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016; Jackson, 2016). There is a gap in the literature on whether the 
officials/actors who championed the approaches used to decentralize criminal justice services in 
Liberia were cognizant of the Liberian context.  
The site for this study is a country that is more than 170 years old and has practiced a 
centralized system of government for most of its existence (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). As a 
result of this, the formal criminal justice institutions, though expected to have jurisdiction across 
the entire country, were practically, partially functional in the capital and one or two major cities 
and absent in the rest of the country (Nyei, 2014). However, after 14 years of a brutal civil war, 
peacebuilding efforts have prioritized decentralization of public services in general and criminal 
justice services in particular (Bacon, 2015 & Fyanka, 2014). The uniqueness of the research site 
provided a rich source to study how criminal justice services have been decentralized and the 
extent to which the approaches used were suited to Liberia. It also provided an opportunity to 
know how the criminal justice system’s functionality has been affected by the decentralization of 
its services. Therefore, this study is contributing to filling the gap identified in the literature on 
the phenomenon of interest and gives academics, practitioners, policy makers, donors and other 
actors the opportunity to learn from my findings.  
Most important, the results of this study have the potential to inform the ongoing efforts 
to decentralize criminal justice services in Liberia and in similar efforts in other postconflict 
societies. These should lead to a better and more efficient decentralization of criminal justice 
services and the judicious use of resources. Also, citizens and civil society organizations will be 





and other actors accountable for, their demands for the provision of criminal justice services 
(Callahan et al., 2012). An enhancement in the decentralization of criminal justice services will 
create an environment for enduring peace in Liberia. This is aligned to this study’s problem 
statement, in which I asserted that decentralization of criminal justice services contributes to 
making the criminal justice system accessible and functional. Both attributes are conditions 
precedent for enduring peace and respect for the rule of law in Liberia.  
Positive Social Change 
 This study has the potential to effect social change. First, I ascertained the extent to 
which, if any, decentralization of criminal justice services in Liberia was tailored to fit the 
Liberian context and found that little consideration was to local ownership in decentralizing 
Liberia’s criminal justice system. This partly explains why the criminal justice system is 
dysfunctional. Both findings provide an opportunity for informed corrective measures to be 
taken to make the criminal justice system accessible and functional thus contributing to 
engendering peace in Liberia and other postconflict countries. Also, because decentralization is a 
process and not an event, my findings and recommendations will inform the process going 
forward and aid the process of building enduring peace (national reconciliation and social 
cohesion), foster public confidence in the criminal justice system, ensure the adherence to the 
rule of law, and making the world, in general, and Liberia, in particular, a better place. This is 
because an effective criminal justice system will extend the legitimate authority of the state to all 





lives. The logical consequence of this is that citizens, no matter their age, gender, socioeconomic 
status, or sexual orientation will be able to engage in their normal business in freedom.  
Further, private business operators will have confidence in Liberia and so will invest in 
the economy; this will generate employment and income for citizens and taxes for the 
government and, ideally, bring equity and development to Liberia. Most important, the outcome 
of this research empowers various actors including citizens, civil society organizations, the 
Government of Liberia, and the international community involved in the enterprise of 
peacebuilding in Liberia, with information to aid their policy choices. This is because in the case 
of citizens and civil society, this study’s findings arms them with information/data for their 
advocacy and in their efforts to hold the government accountable (Callahan et al., 2012). Policy 
choices of the Government of Liberia will be informed by scientific research, thus strengthening 
the its bargaining strength in its engagement with its international partners hence increasing the 
chances of Liberia and its citizens maximizing the benefits of the resources that are being 
channeled into peacebuilding particularly from international sources. These will all increase the 
chances of promoting national ownership. Finally, international partners stand to be informed, by 
my findings.  Consequently, in theory, they should improve in balancing their quest for 
designing and implementing interventions that suit the Liberian context vis-a-vis promoting their 
national interests/agenda. All these will cause positive social change in Liberia for Liberians and 
the international community with respect to international development assistance thus making 






In Chapter 1, I presented the importance of access to justice, particularly in postconflict 
countries, and the emphasis placed on access to justice by the United Nations in Goal 16 of the 
SDGs. I also presented the importance of national ownership in efforts to decentralize criminal 
justice services in postconflict countries and identified the paucity of literature with respect to 
national ownership in decentralization of criminal justice services in Liberia as a gap in the 
literature related to the problem statement that this qualitative study will contribute to fill. I have 
introduced structural functionalism and realist theory as the theoretical frameworks for this 
study. I identified three research questions, two subresearch questions for this study and provided 
definitions of some words or phrases used in this study. I have also indicated what positive social 
change can be created, in Liberia and more broadly the world, by undertaking this research. In 
the next chapter i.e., Chapter 2, I identified the literature that I used to illuminate my 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
“Promoting a rule of law culture is a work in progress all over the world” 
Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu 
Introduction 
The criminal justice system is made up of several connected parts that collectively make 
up the criminal justice chain. Traditionally, these services are the police, the judiciary, 
prosecutions/defense, and the corrections service (Denney, 2014). The police are responsible for 
investigating alleged criminal conduct and for law enforcement (Nikolayevskyy & Endziņš, 
2017). Generally, the judiciary is charged with adjudicating cases/disputes and, in the case of 
criminal justice, which is my focus in this study, the judiciary is responsible for determining the 
guilty or otherwise of an accused person. The judiciary is aided by the prosecutions and/or 
defense lawyers. The corrections part of the chain is mandated to keep, in safe and humane 
environments, persons whose right to free movement has been curtailed by a competent 
authority, either through the imposition of a custodial sentence or a temporary detention order 
pending the completion of investigations or some other conditions that are lawfully set out by 
that competent authority and/or the applicable law (Denney, 2014). Rehabilitation of those 
serving custodial sentenced is a key component of a corrections part of the criminal justice chain.  
In addition, a number of oversight mechanisms, both external and internal, including 
courts, are established to ensure that the criminal justice system and its officials do not abuse the 
rights of the citizens that they are required to protect, while performing its fundamental role of 
being a tool for positive social control (Bangura, 2018). These oversight mechanisms include 





2013; & Schroder & Chappuis, 2014), parliament (Bangura, 2018), and civil society 
networks/organizations (Denney, 2013; Nall & Mamayek, 2013).  
Reforming the justice sector and, for that matter, the criminal justice system, is often 
deemed to be contributing to reforming the security sector (Denney, 2014; Dinnen & Peake, 
2013; Homel & Masson, 2016; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014; 2016 & Swenson, 2018). Therefore, 
in the literature, reference to security sector reform frequently includes reform of the criminal 
justice system/sector (Denney, 2014; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Homel & Masson, 2016; Schroder 
& Chappuis, 2014; 2016 & Swenson, 2018). Accordingly, in this dissertation, unless the context 
suggests the contrary, phrases such as security sector reform, reform of the justice and security 
sectors, criminal justice system reform, and any other similar phrases are used interchangeably to 
refer to, and include, reforming the criminal justice system. I used the ensuing review of the 
existing literature on the phenomenon of interest of this dissertation to illuminate the stated 
objectives of this study. 
Criminal Justice Reform in Postconflict Societies 
Rationale for security sector reform in postconflict countries  
Security sector reform has become a visible part of external aid particularly in 
postconflict reconstruction (Corradi, 2010; Nyei, 2014; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). Schroeder 
and Chappuis (2014) stressed the point that security sector reform takes various forms including 
strengthening oversight of the security sector and professionalizing the various institutions of the 
sector. This has made the security sector reform in general, and criminal justice system reform in 
particular, one of the foremost, if not the foremost, issue to be addressed in postconflict settings 
by various international actors supporting the recovery of war ravaged countries (Denney, 2014; 





2018). This is because the failure of the criminal justice system to impartially discharge its 
mandate contributes to the breakdown of law and order which, in some cases, degenerates into a 
full-blown civil war (Nyei, 2014). Therefore, in postconflict environments justice sector, reform 
is also seen as a tool for stabilization (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014).  
Chappuis and Heiner (2009) observed that within Western liberalism, security sector 
reform seeks to provide the basis for statehood as a means of creating a “people-centered 
security” (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014, p. 134). As part of the postconflict reconstruction phase, 
the justice system in general, and the criminal justice system in particular, have a fundamental 
role to play in assuring citizens and other actors, including the private sector, that peace will 
endure, hence encouraging investment of resources to develop the country (Schroder & 
Chappuis, 2014). The World Bank (2011) asserted that reforming the criminal justice system 
also encourages citizens to resort to the appropriate institutions of the country to seek redress for 
their grievances as opposed to resorting to self-help to address disputes that arise among them 
(Denney, 2014).  
Resolving disputes without recourse to recognized/official institutions or actors becomes 
an entrenched culture prior to a civil war and gets more entrenched during the period of the war 
(Denney, 2014). The negative aspects of this culture need to be reversed to build enduring peace 
and a culture where the rule of law is upheld (Denney, 2014).  
Conditions for a viable approach to reform the criminal justice system in postconflict 
settings 
 Organizations such as the United Nations have asserted that reforming the criminal 
justice system contributes to sustainable peace and development (Gordon, 2014). For this to 





Peake, 2013). In this context, access includes physical location (i.e. geographical accessibly), 
affordability, and an adherence to and/or adoption of processes that are not alien to the users of 
the system’s services (Denney, 2014). For instance, the language of communication within the 
criminal justice system should not alienate persons who have come into conflict or contact with 
the law (Denney, 2014 & Dinnen & Peake, 2013), particularly in postconflict settings where 
discrimination and social cleavages prior to the war may have left people without formal 
education. Moreover, Jackson (2013) stressed that expanding formal justice across a country 
does not necessarily mean that the services that the system provides will be of a high standard or 
similar in terms of reach and quality across the country. The services may vary; hence, questions 
of quality and access will arise in the process of reforming the criminal justice system (Jackson, 
2013).  
Outcome of security sector reform in postconflict settings 
  Prominence has been given to security sector reform in postconflict reconstruction. This 
is because of the logic associated with making security sector reform the center of postconflict 
reconstruction. However, Schroder and Chappuis (2014) citing Schroeder (2010) assert that the 
success of security sector reform programming has not been encouraging, particularly in 
postconflict settings. Schroeder (2010) attributes this to the fact that, in some cases, security 
sector reform programming has rather created conditions for the country to slide back into war 
(Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). Other authors affirm this view. For instance, according to Gbla 
(2007), security sector reform processes in Liberia produced mixed outcomes (Schroder & 
Chappuis, 2014). Sedra (2006) highlighted that, in contexts like Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
outcome of security sector reform interventions has raised the question of the viability of security 





general point, Jackson (2013) indicated that reforming the legal system takes time and a lot of 
investment hence those spearheading the reforms and the intended beneficiaries must be 
measured in their expectations.  
Decentralization of Criminal Justice Services in Postconflict settings 
Decentralization of the criminal justice system and its services is part of the reforms 
and/or processes undertaken in postconflict countries (Dinnen & Peake, 2013 & Nyei, 2014). It 
is one way of making the criminal justice system accessible, particularly with respect to 
geographical accessibility. In this regard, criminal justice reform in postconflict settings has 
emphasized decentralization of criminal justice services (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016 & Nyei, 
2014). To maximize the benefits of decentralization, the approach to decentralization must be 
sustainable (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018 & Nyei, 2014). There are several ways of ensuring that 
criminal justice system reform is sustainable. These include ensuring that they are nationally 
owned/driven and tailored to fit the context within which they are being implemented (Bacon, 
2015 & Dinnen & Peake, 2013) and that the necessary resources are dedicated to the 
decentralization process (Nyei, 2014).  
Advantages of decentralizing the criminal justice system 
 Effective decentralization of the criminal justice system has a number of potential 
advantages, especially in postconflict countries, where, for example, it results in the 
government’s authority being extended to parts of the country where, hitherto, they were absent 
(Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). Dinnen and Peake (2013) note that the absence of such services 
makes citizens feel marginalized by the government, thus decentralization provides an 
opportunity for citizens to begin to feel the presence of the government in their lives. 





engendering peace, reconciliation and respect for the rule of law and human rights (Edwards & 
Yilmaz, 2016; Escobar-Lemmon & Ross, 2014; Hamann, 2012 & Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). 
Importantly, decentralization of the criminal justice system also promotes accountability in 
government and results in the citizenry taking an active part in making decisions on issues that 
affect their lives (Dinnen & Peake, 2013).  
Search Criteria 
The literature presented in this review is drawn from the following database: Political 
Science Complete, SocINDEX, GreenFILE, SAGE Journals (formerly SAGE premier), Social 
Sciences Citation Index, International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 
Complementary Index, Academic Search Complete and Taylor and Francis Online. Keywords 
used individually or conjunctively include decentralization, criminal, justice services, 
postconflict, security sector reform, justice sector reform, police reform, judicial reform, access 
to justice, criminal justice system reform, national ownership, local ownership, justice planning, 
justice administration, community policing and access to rule of law. 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Structural Functionalism and Realism are the Theoretical Frameworks that were used for 
this study. Ryan (2005) indicated that proponents of the Structural Functionalism theory 
include Robert Merton, Émile Durkheim, Auguste Comte and Talcott Parsons. The Theory’s 
proponents assert that social entities, whether they are communities, organizations or other social 
groupings, are organisms which are made up of different parts with each part playing a unique 
and important role that collectively contribute to keeping the organism alive and functional 
(Babbie, 2015). Babbie (2015) pointed out that should a part of the organism malfunction, the 





Realism is a theory used in international relations to analyze the behavior of states on the 
international plain. According to Realist theory, states act in their national interest and power is 
used to back actions aimed at furthering the pursuit of this national interest (Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff, 2001). According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001) a state’s power is backed by 
varied capabilities. Some of the power available to a state is economic in nature. Hans J. 
Morgenthau is one of the foremost proponents of the realist theory. Indeed Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff, (2001) assert that “[No] twentieth-century writer has had a greater impact on the 
development of realist theory than Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980)” (p. 75). Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff (2001) inform their readers that the following assumptions underpin the realist theory: 
- first, that the international system is state centric, and second, that conflict is an essential 
feature of the conduct of international politics, which makes international politics anarchic and 
requires states to deploy their capabilities to navigate the international system. The third 
assumption is that states are sovereign and have varied capabilities and sizes. Realism takes the 
position that, in their pursuit of national interest, states are rational and unitary actors. The final 
assumption is that a state’s power is the predominant concept for explaining and predicting its 
conduct.  
Structural Functionalism it is appropriate for investigating decentralization of the 
criminal justice system and its effect on the system’s functionality because, as previously noted, 
the criminal justice system in made up of various parts who have unique roles to play to keep the 
criminal justice system alive (Babbie, 2015). Where any of the parts fails to effectively play their 
individual role(s), the system becomes dysfunctional and its purpose will potentially be defeated, 
particularly when effective remedial action is not taken. With respect to Realism, efforts to 





criminal justice system services accessible, are often, if not always, supported and/or 
spearheaded by the international community, comprised of states who do not support such 
reform processes as philanthropic acts. That is to say, there is always a motivation (i.e. the 
pursuit of their national interest aspirations) that drives their actions. This is manifested, in part, 
in deliberate efforts to promote and/or replicate institutions and cultures that are akin to those 
that exist in the countries driving the reforms in postconflict societies (Denny, 2013 & Denney 
2014). These approaches usually ignore time-honored practices in these war-ravaged societies 
(Ansorg, 2017). Undertaking such reforms also serves as a source of employment for nationals of 
the countries supporting the reforms. All these factors create the dominance and influence of the 
countries supporting the reforms.  
Principles of Security Sector Reform 
Certain principles influence the approach adopted towards reforming the security sector, 
particularly in postconflict settings. The following are the applicable principles:  
First, actively engaging with local actors. Nathan (2007) asserted that where the approach 
adopted to reform the justice and security sectors is deficient in its engagement with local actors, 
the chances that this results in local actors resisting or resenting the reform intervention(s) are 
high and this will affect the pace of peacebuilding efforts and potentially prolong aid dependency 
by the country who is receiving international development assistance to reform its security sector 
(Gordon, 2014). To yield the desired results, engagement with the community should be 
“anchored on a nationwide security transformation process” (Homel & Masson, 2016, p. 323). 
The natural tendency by designers and implementers of security sector reform programs to 
consult only persons with expertise on security issues must be resisted. As Donais (2009) pointed 





peculiar challenges of the setting for which the program is being designed and implemented 
(Gordon, 2014).  
Closely related to this point is the need to ensure that security sector reform priorities cut 
across all levels of the society’s structures (Gordon, 2014). A similar point is made by Jackson 
(2013) as the researcher found, that in Sierra Leone, the absence of such an approach resulted in 
an uneven development of the criminal justice chain. This is because where the priorities are 
limited only to the central level, there is the tendency to ignore priorities of members of the 
community who belong to the marginalized and/or vulnerable sections of the society, particularly 
women (Gordon, 2014). It must be recognized that security sector reform processes are interest 
driven. This is typified in comments made by Narten (2009) who asserted that the willingness of 
actors at the national level to agree to commitments to reform the justice and security sectors is 
not a sufficient condition precedent to enhance the governance of these sectors (Gordon, 2014). 
As Narten (2009) puts it, such commitments could be out of a desire to keep such actors at the 
national level in office (Gordon, 2014).  
Most importantly, as acknowledged in the literature, reforms within the justice and 
security sectors must be tailored to fit the context, in other words, the reforms must be context-
specific and not a replication of blueprints that have been applied in other contexts (Ansorg, 
2017; Bacon, 2015; Bent-Goodley & Smith, 2017; Denney, 2013; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; 
Gordon, 2014; Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014 & Westernman, 2017). Bacon (2015) and Fyanka 
(2014) both asserted that in order to have an effective postconflict peacebuilding process, the 
interventions to build peace and the associated processes must be structured to suit the context. 
To illustrate this principle, Fyanka (2014), studying Liberia, asserted that the lack of democratic 





should be tailored to establish and operationalize effective civilian oversight over the sector. 
Other challenges identified by Fyanka (2014) in Liberia are a lack of effective policing, a 
disconnect between efforts to reform the police in particular and the criminal justice system in 
general, inadequate human resources to support the operations of the criminal justice chain and 
the absence of the criminal justice system across Liberia especially in the rural parts of the 
country. Fyanka (2014) makes the point that these challenges should influence programming to 
reform Liberia’s criminal justice system. It is only when the local challenges are correctly 
identified, and appropriate measures put in place to address them, that there is an enhanced 
chance of sustainable peacebuilding (Fyanka, 2014) 
Related to the need for reforms to be designed to suit the context is the apparent 
unanimity in the literature that reform must not be imposed by external actors since in many 
instances, the direction of the reforms pushed by external actors often seek to further their 
national interests (Ansorg, 2017: Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gordon, 2014; & Westernman, 2017). 
Nyei (2014) also observed that there are cases where “… policy prescriptions from donor 
organizations in exchange for development aid have driven some of the reform programs”. 
Where reform processes do not take on board the local context but are spearheaded by 
Western/donor priorities, some reforms have died a natural death after donor support ended 
(Ansorg, 2017 & Bacon, 2015). Gordon (2014) supports this position as the author stated that 
“Efforts focusing on building state institutions and structures, without sufficiently paying 
attention to developing relations between the state and its people, will not, it is argued, benefit 
peacebuilding in the long term” (p.126). To further buttress this point, Gordon (2011) argues that 
without interventions to reform the security sector being locally owned, the likelihood that the 





outcome and/or quality of the results of the programmatic interventions (Gordon, 2014). 
Oosterveld and Galand (2012), in illustrating the effect of not carrying the population along in 
the design and implementation of reforms of the justice and security sectors, cited the example of 
the failure of a project to reform the formal court system in Timor-Leste. Another example is 
provided by Blease and Qehajia (2013) who informed their readers that in the preparation of 
Kosovo’s National Security Strategy the need to uphold the virtues of national ownership was 
ignored and this affected the process and eventual product that was designed (Gordon, 2014). A 
third example is provided by Jackson (2010) who indicated that the United States support to 
reform the security sector in Iraq resulted in the formation of institutions that were considered 
alien by the local population and unreflective of the history and culture of the context, these 
interventions had very minimal impact on the reform process (Gordon, 2014).  
The common thread that runs through the principles cited above is the need for 
national/local ownership to influence programming to reform the justice and security sectors in 
all settings including postconflict countries. 
National Ownership and Reform of the Criminal Justice System 
Benefits of national/local ownership in reforming the justice and security sectors 
The process of reforming the justice and security sectors, particularly in postconflict 
settings is an interest driven enterprise between and amongst donors and recipients of donor 
support (Gordon, 2014 & Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). As a result of this, local ownership 
has been identified as a pillar around which security sector reform should be delivered in 
postconflict settings (Homel & Masson, 2016 & Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). Homel and 
Masson (2016) cited documents like the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to 





sector reform aids the process of making the respective institutions accountable and engenders 
public trust and confidence in the sectors institutions and the State (Gordon, 2014; Homel & 
Masson, 2016).  
What is national/local ownership?    
National ownership, within the context of criminal justice system reform in postconflict 
settings, is the term used to describe a situation/process where international efforts to support 
reform of the criminal justice system adopt a methodology that involves consultation of the local 
community when shaping the reform interventions and how to implement them (Ansorg, 2017; 
Denney, 2013; Denney, 2014; Detzner, 2017; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gal, 2016; Gordon, 2014; 
Schroder & Chappuis, 2014; Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018 & Westernman, 2017). There is 
consensus among international actors that national ownership should be the pivot around which 
international assistance revolves (Denney, 2013; Denney, 2014; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gordon, 
2014; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). However, this consensus may only be because it is 
politically expedient to be publicly associated with such a commitment. The reality is often the 
complete opposite. It is worth emphasizing that sometimes the desire by international donors to 
uphold national ownership may be genuine, just imperfectly implemented, or for other reasons 
other than being political expediency.  
Who or what constitute(s) “local?”   
Unsurprising, there are divergent views on the answer to this question. For instance, Gordon 
(2014) posited that the wider public and civil society should constitute what “local” means and 
they should jointly own the reform process. Nathan (2008) posits that local ownership, 
particularly in the context of security sector reform, implies that recipients of international 





and implementing interventions to reform the security sector and not external actors (Homel & 
Masson, 2016). Donais (2008) augured that the acknowledgment of local ownership as a 
cornerstone of security sector reform creates challenges as it assumes that who or what is “local”, 
and what constitutes “ownership”, are known by the external partners (Schroder & Chappuis, 
2014). To support this view, Schroder and Chappuis (2014) emphasized the vagueness associated 
with these concepts because of the lack of clarity on whose interests should influence the 
analysis. Krogstad (2013) shares Schroder and Chappuis (2014) opinion as the researcher 
indicated that there is still an absence of consensus on what constitutes local ownership (Gordon, 
2014).  
The United Nations (2008) stated that national ownership should involve “nationally led 
and inclusive processes in which national and local authorities, parliaments and civil society, 
including traditional leaders, women’s groups and others, are actively engaged” (Gordon, 2014, 
p. 128). However, authors like Krogstad (2013), argued that local ownership has been reduced to 
the consultations that occur after a few likeminded members of the society’s political elite have 
accepted the priorities for reform of the justice and security sectors determined by external actors 
(Gordon, 2014). Mobekk (2010) stressed the point that it is important to note that what 
constitutes local actors is not a homogenous group and common security concerns are therefore 
not necessarily shared. Accordingly, limiting the scope of consultations may defeat the 
imperative of making security sector reform processes inclusive to make them effective (Gordon, 
2014). Gordon (2014) argued that such an approach will undermine the principle of local 
ownership and the ensuing benefits (Gordon, 2014).  
Gordon (2014) further suggested a broadening of the definition of what constitutes local 





supported by Krogstad (2013), who asserted that this is even more important in postconflict 
societies where the political elite may have been discredited and/or lack the will to reform the 
security sector because the reforms may result in a circumscription of their power (Gordon, 
2014). It is worth stating that the approach advocated by Krogstad (2013) has the potential of 
neutralizing or reducing the efficacy of the activities of spoilers of the reforms (Gordon, 2014). 
From the foregoing, it is submitted that, in postconflict settings, an amalgamation of the 
definitions provided by Gordon (2014), Krogstad (2013) and the United Nations provide the 
basis for identifying a wide range of actors across a society to aid the process of identifying and 
implementing interventions to reform the criminal justice system.  
Challenges associated with operationalizing local ownership as a concept 
  A number of challenges arise when conceptualizing local ownership to broaden the 
number and categories of actors to be involved in deciding the nature of the required reforms and 
their mode of implementation. These include a lack of consensus on the impact of civil society 
engagement on security sector reforms processes in postconflict countries. The reason being that 
there is a view that empowering civil society to be involved in security sector reform activities 
could have a destabilization impact on the reform process (Gordon, 2014), although Cubitt 
(2013) holds a contrary view, asserting that involving civil society serves as a check on possible 
abuses of power on the part of the state and its agents (Gordon, 2014).  
Coordinating civil society is another challenge. As pointed out by Donais (2009), it is 
important to be mindful of the fact that an increase in the number of actors involved in security 
sector reform processes comes with challenges arising from the need to coordinate them 
(Gordon, 2014). Again Cubitt (2013), sees no problem with this as the author noted that this is 





consensus forged (Gordon, 2014). Gordon (2014) cautioned against not involving civil society in 
security sector reform processes, arguing that it is shortsighted and may fuel a prolongation of 
the reform process. 
Challenges associated with making security sector reform context specific  
For reasons already cited, tailoring security sector reform interventions to suit the context in 
which they are to be implemented has proved to be a challenge and this has resulted in a situation 
where implementation of security sector reform programming has been hindered (Schroder & 
Chappuis, 2014). Chanaa (2002) referred to this challenge as the “conceptual-contextual divide” 
(Schroder & Chappuis, 2014, p.135). The apparent inability to tailor security sector reform 
processes to be context specific has been seen, in some cases, as seeking to satisfy parochial 
objectives (Ansorg, 2017; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gordon, 2014 & Westernman, 2017). The 
neglect, failure and or refusal to tailor security sector reform interventions to suit the context is 
often the norm, that has led Ginty (2010) to assert that security sector reform is an imposition of 
Western ideas (Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014).  
It must be noted that tailoring peacebuilding interventions to suit a particular context 
requires that each part of the geographical area affected by the conflict is treated as distinct, in 
other words the application of a “one size fits all” approach to peacebuilding may defeat the 
quest to adopt a context specific approach (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). This is the 
reason why the parties to Colombia’s armed conflict adopted the territorial peacebuilding 
approach (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Inherent in the territorial peacebuilding 
approach is a recognition that peacebuilding efforts must be context specific and that this 
requires, inter alia, that the entire geographical location which is affected by armed conflict is not 





identified (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Put differently, each region within the 
geographical area where peacebuilding activities are being designed and implemented must be 
evaluated and peacebuilding interventions tailored to suit that specific area (Schultze-Kraft, 
Valencia & Alzate, 2016). 
Secondly, blueprints designed to address challenges in a particular postconflict context 
are often blindly replicated across other postconflict contexts whether their implementation was 
successful or not (Denney, 2014). Denney (2014) made the point that one of the reasons why 
there appears to be a standardized approach adopted by donors towards reforming the justice and 
security sectors is that there is a small pool of experts, (e.g., former police officers and lawyers) 
whose services are engaged to undertake these reforms and these experts are more at home with 
how Western justice and security systems are designed and function. Furthermore, Baker and 
Scheye (2007) indicated that international approaches to justice sector reform mistakenly assume 
that the absence of a formal justice system necessarily means a lack of access to justice; that 
citizens in postconflict settings prefer the formal justice system rather than the customary justice 
system and that the formal justice system is more sustainable compared to the customary justice 
system (Jackson, 2013).  
Other reasons have been advanced for the imposition of externally driven models for 
security sector reform in developing countries. These include perceived and actual limitations in 
human resources and institutional capacity and a lack of credibility on the part of the leaders in 
developing countries (Gordon, 2014). Also, Nathan (2007) stated that funds used to implement 
reforms are from sources external to the settings whose justice and security systems are being 





associated with implementing such reforms makes it difficult to engage in extensive public 
consultation (Gordon, 2014). 
Another reason cited by Heupel (2012) is the fact that, in some cases, local actors may 
lack the political will to implement reforms (Gordon, 2014). It is worthy of note that the lack of 
political will on the part of national actors extends to the possibility that local actors may refuse 
to accept fundamental principles of security sector reform such as the need for affordability 
(Gordon, 2014).  
Gordon (2014) indicated that the events of 9/11 have also had an impact on the 
willingness to engage with nonstate actors in reforming the security sector, with civil society 
organizations being viewed with suspicion. Afghanistan is one postconflict context where it is 
perceived that the international community has disregarded civil society in the reform process 
(Gordon, 2014). The fact that civil society is also perceived as weak in postconflict environments 
has resulted in the preference for a top-down state-centric approach to reform the justice and 
security sectors (Gordon, 2014). This approach deprives countries who are benefiting from 
security sector reform processes from taking advantage of the wisdom from the larger 
community. As found by Homel and Masson (2016), with respect to the Jenin Community 
Project in Palestine, using a bottom-up community approach yields a number of benefits 
including effective mapping of the community’s needs and involving the community in decision-
making on their security.  
The limited nature of the resources to reform the justice and security sectors also hinders 
the ability of relevant actors, particularly local actors, to insist on local ownership (Fyanka, 
2014). For instance, in Liberia, Fyanka (2014) noted that the challenges and solutions to 





available to reform the police. As a result, the Liberia National Police was restructured and 
police officers deployed outside the capital with very limited or, in most cases, no resources to 
work (Fyanka, 2014). Fyanka (2014) also found that there was a disconnect between the reform 
of the police, which is an essential part of the criminal justice system, and the justice system as a 
whole, and this created challenges for peacebuilding efforts. It is instructive to note that these 
and other factors led Denney (2014) to conclude that a focus on reforming only the state police 
will not result in an improvement of the justice and security situation in any society. In Liberia, 
the lack of human resources (i.e. lawyers, judges, corrections officers) is affecting the 
peacebuilding process and limiting access to justice for the citizenry (Fyanka, 2014). Related to 
this, Fyanka (2014) also found that the lack of access to the criminal justice system had resulted 
in a surge in violence arising from the activities of informal policing and community justice 
processes and actors.  
Whereas the challenges of the Liberian context were correctly identified, it is clear from 
Fyanka (2014) that conducting a correct situational diagnosis is not sufficient for successful 
reforms of a criminal justice system. To reap the desired benefits, it is equally important that 
resources are available to undertake the reforms and that the process of implementing the 
reforms is holistic and well-coordinated to ensure that the entire criminal justice chain is evenly 
strengthened. Jackson (2013) noted that in Sierra Leone the postconflict reconstruction focused 
more on security (i.e., the police) and less on justice and this has negatively affected reforms of 
the justice part of the criminal justice chain at both the local level (e.g. the local courts and 
prisons) and at the central level (e.g., the development of the Ministry of Justice) a situation 





This reality highlights the need for a holistic and well-coordinated approach to reforming the 
criminal justice system. 
Finally, there is overwhelming evidence that almost all donors drive reforms of the 
criminal justice system in a manner that seeks to replicate Western justice and security systems 
and institutions (Gordon, 2014). However, Denney (2014) made the point that it is not the case 
that the attempt to build or rebuild the criminal justice system in war-shattered settings is the sole 
prerogative of donors (i.e., local actors have an immeasurable contribution to make). 
Consequently, Denney (2014) noted that, in some cases, the leaders of countries receiving donor 
support opt for the Western model and the donors have no option other than to support the host 
government’s wishes. The truth, however, is that decision makers in countries that receive donor 
support are often the elite who have been socialized in Western culture and have little or no 
regard for processes and structures that are specific to their context (Denney, 2014). To support 
this assertion, Collier (1970) noted, about Sierra Leone, that the elite in Freetown treated the 
traditional justice system with contempt as in their view it was backward (Denney, 2014).  
Alternative Approaches to operationalizing Local Ownership 
As evidenced from the foregoing, there is a wide gap between the consensus to have local 
ownership principles inform efforts to reform the justice and security sectors and what happens 
in practice. Therefore, Murdoch (2015) advocated for a middle path that upholds the practice of 
allowing programming to reform the criminal justice system in postconflict settings to embrace 
local ownership, while, at the same time, imbibing standards, principles and practices from the 
West. The reason being that this approach enhances the impact of the reforms. Donais (2009) 
also indicated that whereas there is a strong case to be made for upholding the principle of local 





2014). This means that, for the benefits of local ownership to be manifested, local actors need 
not, and may not, own the process from the beginning and/or overnight. Put differently, 
operationalizing local ownership may be delayed; hence all actors must be cognizant about this 
and this reality should influence their expectations.  
Dursun-Özkanca (2018) evaluated the extent to which local ownership considerations 
influenced programming from resources provided by the international community to create a rule 
of law culture in Kosovo. The researcher found that the European Union and United Nations 
used a top down approach and focused on addressing only serious crimes and that this resulted in 
the local community being overlooked. Local ownership was restricted to certain aspects of the 
reform process. This is not to suggest that adopting a top-down approach is necessarily bad. 
Jackson (2011) and Caparini (2010) are of the opinion that a hybrid between the top-down 
approach and the bottom-up approach is critical to operationalize security sector reform in a 
substantive and inclusive manner (Gordon, 2014). Mac Ginty (2011) is of the view that the 
hybrid approach fulfills other imperatives of security and justice reform in postconflict settings 
such as “local ownership” “participation” and “sustainability” (Gordon, 2014, p. 133). Therefore, 
there should be an intersection between the top-bottom approach and the bottom-top approach, 
and this can be found in the legal and institutional change processes that ensue during the 
peacebuilding phase (Homel & Masson, 2016). For instance, according to Homel and Masson 
(2016), a partnership arising from the need for external capacity to support such processes and 
local decision-making and implementation of community security needs could be forged. The 
quest for a middle path on the approach to reforming the security sector in postconflict settings is 





interests of security sector reform actors. Donors would be able to push their national interests 
and at the same time accommodate the needs and concerns of the recipients of their assistance. 
National Ownership in postconflict Criminal Justice System Reform  
Since national and/or local ownership have been identified as the fundamental principle 
to guide security sector reform, this part of the chapter devotes attention to how national 
ownership can be, or has been, made an essential part of undertakings to reform the criminal 
justice system particularly in postconflict environments. This is not to discount suggestions of 
alternative approaches advocated by Murdoch (2015), Donais (2009) and Dursun-Özkanca 
(2018). All the alternative approaches identified above make the point that local/national 
ownership should influence security sector reform programming. The only point of departure 
between the advocates of making national ownership central to criminal justice system reform 
and those for the middle path is the extent to which local ownership should influence the 
program as well as at what stage (i.e. timing of the reform process) should local ownership 
influence decision making.  
There are several approaches that could be used to promote national or local ownership in 
postconflict reform of the criminal justice system. These include - 
Engagement with Nonstate Actors 
Background  
Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016), highlighted the fact that there is an 
increasing trend for recognizing that involving local actors in postconflict reconstruction is a 
condition precedent to building enduring peace. Mac Ginty and Richmond referred to this 
phenomenon as the “local turn in peace building” (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016, p. 





environments is to promote national ownership and legitimacy of the work of the international 
community in that setting (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Security sector reform 
programming, particularly in postconflict environments, is part of state-building (Gordon, 2014 
& Homel & Masson, 2016). Kostovicova (2008) opined that this process is both a technical 
exercise and creating relationships between the governed and the government (Gordon, 2014). 
Consequently, “it relies on the governed having a stake in the reform process by having a “say” 
in it” (Gordon, 2014 p. 132). Peake, Scheye & Hills (2007) posited that in spite of the fact that 
the literature is awash with knowledge that points to the fact that implementing security sector 
reform is a political process, programs are drafted in purely technical terms without attention 
being paid to the political context in which they are to be implemented (Schroder & Chappuis, 
2014). Jackson (2013) informed readers that, at the local level, there is a complex network of 
actors in the justice sector who have an influence over decentralized structures. The researcher 
therefore concluded that persons with resources are in a better position to negotiate their way 
through this maze of actors and power whereas those without resources are incapacitated.  
Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan (2008), made the point that in postconflict countries 
like Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan, state and nonstate actors work together to provide public 
goods and services under a framework, described “as hybrid or non-Weberian political 
formations” (Podder, 2014, p. 215). Jackson (2017) shared this stance, stating that “… in post-
conflict environments the relationship between these formal local government organizations and 
nonstate providers – that may include armed actors - is critical in terms of providing services like 
security” (p.751). Where the state is absent, nonstate actors may fill the existing lacuna, therefore 
engaging them in efforts to reform the security sector is logical, as opposed to avoiding them and 





Podder, 2014). As previously noted, the question of whether the Weberian model of security 
sector reform should be applied in areas where the state is not present has yet to find prominence 
in the debate over implementing security sector reform in postconflict settings (Schroder & 
Chappuis, 2014). The point must be made that the involvement of nonstate actors in providing 
justice and security services in postconflict societies is not without difficulties. For instance, 
Bangura (2018) noted that in Sierra Leone, the lack of access to services provided by the 
criminal justice system resulted in a surge in violence perpetrated by the activities of informal 
policing and community justice processes.  
Involving nonstate actors in reforming the criminal justice sector 
Nonstate actors are prominent actors in almost, if not all, facets of life in postconflict 
settings (Ansorg, 2017; Denney, 2014; Jackson, 2013 & Podder, 2014). Several researchers and 
development organizations such as the United Nations have hailed the use of nonstate actors to 
support and/or implement interventions to reform the justice and security sectors (Denney, 2013; 
Dinnen & Peake, 2013 & Swenson, 2018). However, it is worth emphasizing from the onset, that 
authors like Migdal (1988) hold a contrary view (Swenson, 2018). Migdal (1988) observed that 
the quest to build a country bound by the rule of law whilst at the same time engaging nonstate 
actors to implement the needed reforms appears to be a contradiction, the reason being that 
nonstate actors are bound by separate values (Swenson, 2018). Baker (2008) made the point that 
it is widely accepted that the presence of multiple justice and security actors is a common feature 
in the global South in general, and particularly in conflict-affected countries (Denney, 2014). 
Though this view is held by many, Denney (2014) lamented over the fact that the greater 
majority of donors who are supporting efforts to reform the justice and security system engage 





strong desire to reform institutional structures in fragile settings to conform to the Weberian 
notions of the state (Denney, 2014).  
Additionally, Denney (2014) asserted that where there are efforts not to engage with 
nonstate actors, security sector reform programs are designed in a manner that fails to recognize 
the interconnectedness between the state and nonstate actors/systems but rather affirms the 
notions that they are distinct. To facilitate the process of acknowledging the interconnectedness 
of both state and nonstate actors, Byres (1995) advocated for a reconceptualization of how these 
actors are seen in the services they deliver (Denney, 2014). When a deliberate decision is taken 
not to involve nonstate actors in processes to reform the justice and corrections sectors in 
postconflict countries it is an indication of an unwillingness to recognize the dynamics in such 
settings, a desire not to find interventions that are sustainable, and an intention to prop up the 
ruling elite to the neglect of ordinary citizens. It also signifies a desire to defy all principles of 
good governance and democracy which recognizes civil society as an important factor in 
political governance.  
Nonstate Actors and Postconflict Criminal Justice System  
The prominent role of nonstate actors in the justice and security sphere is evidenced by 
statistics provided by Albrecht and Kyed (2011) who informed their readers that “80 per cent of 
disputes in the global South are resolved by nonstate means'' (Denney, 2014, p. 253). Only 2% of 
cases in Liberia go to its formal justice system while 45% are resolved through the customary 
justice system (Bacon, 2015). Furthermore, Isser et al, assert that in Liberia, with respect to 
sexual related offenses, only 50% are reported, of which more than half i.e.28%, are reported to 
informal settings (e.g., family heads, traditional leaders, elders and secret societies [Bacon, 





80% of Sierra Leoneans and 85% of crimes and conflicts in Sierra Leone are first reported to 
traditional authorities (Denney, 2014 & Jackson, 2013). 
Scheye and Andersen (2007) posited that the presence of a plurality of nonstate actors in 
the justice and security space is due to the state’s weakness (Denney, 2014). Scheye and 
Andersen (2007) further asserted that as the state gets stronger nonstate actors will fade away 
(Denney, 2014). Whereas there is some truth in the view that the presence of a plurality of 
nonstate actors in the justice and security space is due to the state’s weakness, the same cannot 
be said about the fact that, in developing countries, nonstate actors will become extinct when the 
state’s capacity to provide justice and security services increases (Denney, 2014 & Jackson, 
2013).  
Denney (2014) posited that efforts by development partners to support reforms of the 
justice and security system in fragile settings have been geared towards building institutions and 
systems that are a replica of Western institutions and exclude nonstate actors. Examples of these 
reforms are building courthouses, police stations and prisons and training personnel to work in 
these agencies (Denney, 2014). Egnell & Halden (2009) suggested that this approach prevents 
any other practical and potentially more effective possibilities of reforming the justice and 
security sectors in postconflict settings (Denney, 2014). Explaining this, Denney (2014) 
indicated that the strongly held ideological view in the West, that the role of the Weberian state 
model in the lives of its citizens is ideal for every state, is what is fueling the natural willingness 
of donors to focus on supporting state actors to the neglect of nonstate actors. This view about 
the role of the state can be equated to transplanting cultural practices from one context into 
another and expecting it to flourish in the new context as well as it does in its previous setting. 





providing justice and security, British Government funded programs to reform the security sector 
failed to actively engage chiefs. The researcher ascribed this state of affairs to the fact that the 
United Kingdom’s Department of International Development (DFID) did not deal with nonstate 
or informal state actors. Other reasons advanced by Denny (2013) for DIFD’s approach in Sierra 
Leone include the organization’s “political, bureaucratic and statist nature” (p.15), the impact of 
Western values on programming and the nationality of technical staff hired to implement such 
programs. 
The point must be made that this view held by donors and persons who are socialized in 
Western values of the state fails to recognize the fact that developing countries in general, and 
postconflict countries in particular, are unique contexts, different from the West. A fundamental 
feature of their uniqueness is the involvement of multiple actors, including nonstate actors, in 
providing justice and security services (Podder, 2014). Nonstate actors are steeped in the culture 
and religion of the people and often the formal state structures are alien and not trustworthy by 
the citizenry (Denney, 2014). Scheye (2009) opined that the legitimacy that nonstate actors enjoy 
when providing justice and security services in developing countries is essentially because they 
are sanctioned by culture and tradition (Denney, 2014), an attribute that interventions supported 
by external actors’ lack.  
Other reasons given for the prominent role of nonstate actors in the lives of citizens in the 
developing world is their geographical accessibility, cost and other intangible attributes like the 
language of communication used in such forums (Denney, 2014 & Jackson, 2013). The issue of 
cost does not only relate to how much those accessing the services pay but also, in the case of 





Further, under investment in state provided justice and security services, which is a 
common situation, limits their effectiveness. Koroma, Turay and Saddiqi (2012), found that in 
Sierra Leone, the justice sector was allocated 1% of the national budget (Denney, 2014). This is 
woefully inadequate given the total national budget and the needs of Sierra Leone’s justice and 
security sectors (Denney, 2014). 
Denney (2014) suggested that the inability of the formal justice system to deliver the 
“locally valued currency of justice” (p. 254) is another reason for the popularity of the nonstate 
actors who provide justice and security services. To support this assertion, the author refers to 
excerpts from an interview conducted during a survey in two districts in Sierra Leone, which 
indicated that women who were victims of domestic violence preferred compensation from their 
predators as opposed to incarcerating them. One reason for this is because jailing the perpetuator 
results in a loss of family income which has negative consequences for the entire family 
(Denney, 2014). The sentencing processes in the local courts is another feature of the processes 
of nonstate actors in the criminal justice sector that makes them popular. Jackson (2013) in 
describing the processes of local courts in Sierra Leone explains that local courts are governed 
by the Local Courts Act and apply customary law which varies across chiefdoms. They hear 
family matters, debt, land and petty fraud issues and the sentencing processes are open to 
negotiation. This makes them attractive to a population whose primary objective can be seen as 
obtaining restorative rather than retributive justice. 
Partnering Nonstate Actors in Justice and Security Sector Reform 
Due to their prominent role in the criminal justice system in postconflict settings, 
nonstate actors cannot be ignored when reforming the justice and security sectors. Consequently, 





mechanisms at the community level which serve as forums for information sharing about 
security and safety at the local level, address security challenges and build the relationship 
between the citizenry and public officials including those working in the criminal justice system 
and the local government (Gordon, 2014). Denney (2014) argued that even where there is 
evidence that donor programs to reform the justice and security system in postconflict settings 
target nonstate actors such as customary justice providers, the programs drew a dichotomy 
between state and nonstate actors thus neglecting to recognize how nonstate justice and security 
actors operate on the ground (Denney, 2014). Interestingly, in practice, the distinction between 
state and nonstate actors is not as neat as it is made to look (Denney, 2014). In the justice and 
security sectors there is a lot of overlap between state and nonstate actors and citizens oscillate 
from one category of actors to another seeking justice and security services either on their own or 
upon the direction of persons responsible for providing a particular service (Denney, 2014). For 
instance, a judge may refer a matter to the customary justice system for arbitration whilst a chief 
may refer an electoral related matter, which may have come before him or her, to the police 
(Denney, 2014). Consequently, Denney (2014) and Jackson (2013) campaigned for abandoning 
the dichotomy between state and nonstate actors in terms of who should be engaged in reforming 
the justice and security sectors in postconflict settings.  
Jackson (2013) observed that, on the ground, the situation is more complex than having a 
dual system of justice. Therefore, Denny (2014) advocated for an approach that focuses on the 
end user of justice and security services. This approach acknowledges the interconnectedness of 
the various justice and security service providers (Denney, 2014). Similarly, Knight (2009) 
advocated for security sector reform processes to have a Social Contract element where they 





situation where there is a shift in focus from structures created by the state and formal civil 
society organizations to a relationship between the citizens and the state, thus increasing the 
chances for a successful security sector reform program (Gordon, 2014). Denney (2014) 
indicated that the first step towards seeing that all actors are interconnected is to use the justice 
and security mapping approach to identify all actors (both state and nonstate) providing justice 
and security services. Homel and Masson (2016) associated themselves with this view.  
Denney (2014) opined that adopting this approach will also help move the discussion 
away from the current approach where academics and practitioners slavishly adhered to a 
dichotomy between state and nonstate actors to one that encourages an integrated approach to 
justice and security sector reform. The end user approach to security sector reform is akin to 
advocating for a people centered approach to security sector reform which Gordon (2014) 
suggested results in a bottom-up approach to security sector reform. It also deals with the 
challenges associated with the concentration of power in the hands of the elite and the associated 
criminal conduct such as corruption and organized crime that ensues (Gordon, 2014). The call 
for the abandonment of the dichotomy between state and nonstate actors in security sector reform 
programming is a step in the right direction; it is a practical approach to dealing with what 
actually exists on the ground as opposed to the current approach that is grounded in theory and 
immersed in Western liberal ideology. When the dichotomy between state and nonstate actors is 
forsaken, it will provide a better opportunity for relevant stakeholders in the justice and security 
sector reform processes, even in postconflict settings, to work in the interest of citizens who are 
the primary beneficiaries of their programming. Also, it will engender interest amongst the 
citizenry and garner the desired support to implement programmatic interventions as well as 





Swenson (2018) highlighted the importance of engaging nonstate actors in reforming the 
security sector in postconflict settings and the ensuing benefits of such engagement. Swenson 
(2018) cited Kyed (2011), who asserted that nonstate actors who are connected to the population 
by custom, religion, ethnicity or tribe are very effective in dispute resolution in developing 
countries. Swenson (2018) also cited Menkhaus (2007) to strengthen the author’s advocacy for 
making nonstate actors prominent in security sector reform. Menkhaus (2007) indicated that 
nonstate actors have a vital role to play in dispute resolution in conflict prone settings where 
formal state institutions have proved to lack the requisite legitimacy (Swenson, 2018). Swenson 
(2018) noted that the progress made by nonstate actors in dispute resolution has resulted in some 
experts calling for the formation of coalitions with actors that are beyond the formal institutions 
to implement justice sector reform activities. Bacon (2015) shared this view in the context of 
Liberia. Dinnen and Peake (2013) indicated that, in Sierra Leone, policing services and other 
formal government institutions/services are concentrated in the urban centers and citizens in the 
rural areas rely on the customary law/justice system to resolve their disputes. 
Denney (2013) further explained that the neglect and/or refusal of international actors, 
like DFID, to engage with nonstate actors is because they are interested in building security 
systems/institutions that promote equality, justice and human rights according to Western 
standards. Denney (2013) noted that, unfortunately, the state of the chieftaincy institution makes 
Western development agencies conclude that chiefs fall short of the standards that the 
development partners are promoting. Baker (2010) made the point that involving national actors 
in security sector reform interventions in postconflict settings would naturally result in the 
involvement of actors like traditional authorities whose processes and activities offend 





note that the institution of chieftaincy is undergoing significant reforms, and this is resulting in a 
situation where their role as partners in reform efforts cannot be ignored (Jackson, 2013). 
Denney (2013) observed that the closeness of chiefs to the community makes them natural 
partners for development. Baker (2005) supported this stance and advocated for engaging with 
chiefs as a condition precedent to comprehensive reform of policing and justice services in Sierra 
Leone (Denney, 2013). Jackson (2013) shares this view positing that, in Sierra Leone, chiefs are 
entrenched in local politics and that this makes them important players. However, Jackson 
(2013) advocated for development actors to resist any temptation, during their efforts to promote 
access to justice, to support initiatives that have the potential of resulting in an unintended 
consequence of entrenching the power of chiefs. The point is also made by Denney (2013) that 
finding the values that are propagated by institutions from the West in formal state institutions is 
relatively easier hence the preference, by donors, to deal with them. Denney (2013) however, 
questioned the sincerity of external development assistance actors when they insist on working 
with national actors who uphold and/or espouse values like international human rights standards 
and principles. According to Denney (2013) there is evidence to suggest that DFID has engaged 
with actors with questionable human rights records. This apparent double standard led Denney 
(2013) to observe that:  
“The distinction made between the human rights abuses committed by states and  
those committed by informal actors is further indicative of the prism of political  
liberalism and bureaucracy through which DFID understands the world and  
models its development assistance. Justice, security, democracy and human rights  
thus, become most effectively served by a centralized state authority, properly  





unaccountability and a lack of oversight, rendering them unmanageable forces” 
(p.20). 
Denney (2013) also quotes Anderson (2007) who notes that:  
“The donor’s choice is not between supporting a human-rights-respecting state  
system and an illiberal nonstate system. If only that were the case, the choice  
would be simple. The complexity and the predicament arise when faced with a  
state system that provides very few services and a nonstate system that proves  
some - albeit in a less than perfect manner” (p.20).  
Researchers like Golooba-Mutebi (2011) pointed out that in some societies, chiefs are the 
primary service providers in rural communities and Fanthorpe (2005) asserted that in some 
contexts the community is very loyal to the institution of chieftaincy (Denney, 2013). Sawyer 
(2008) affirmed this view, informing readers that chiefs play various leadership and governance 
roles (Denney, 2013). Despite these positive and important roles played by chiefs in the African 
context, the illiberal nature of the chieftaincy institution runs contrary to the liberal principles 
that development agencies, like DIFD, promote, hence their refusal to engage chiefs when 
undertaking critical reforms. This attitude, according to Denney (2013) is an application of 
Western principles that do not suit the African context and is yet to yield the desired results. 
International actors like DFID neglect and/or refusal to design programmatic interventions to suit 
the context for which they are designed and implemented runs contrary to Kelsall (2008), who 
advocated for “going with the grain” of African development (Denney, 2013 p.7) and concludes 
that the imposition of externally driven approaches for Africa’s development has yet to yield the 





Denney (2013) who concluded that, as a result of DFID’s approach to security sector reform in 
Sierra Leone, the outcome of the reform interventions is limited. 
This is not to suggest that the institution of chieftaincy is perfect and not blameworthy. 
To illustrate the potential downsides associated with chieftaincy, Denney (2013) posited that, in 
Sierra Leone, chiefs contributed to the state of affairs that eventually took the country into the 
civil war. Conteh (2014) shared this view, asserting that the nature of Sierra Leone’s chieftaincy 
institution made the institution a conflict driver. This assertion is supported by Homel and 
Masson (2016) who made the point that in some cases the conduct of nonstate actors who 
provide justice and security services was itself a conflict trigger. Denney (2013) informed 
readers that in adhering to the concept of “going with the grain” (p.7), it is important to bear in 
mind that there are several practical implications associated with this decision. These include 
having to deal with oppressive and discriminatory security, justice and governance actors 
(Denney, 2013). Therefore, Leonard noted that “The challenge is not to terminate existing local 
and informal social contracts for the sake of Western models of security, but instead to make 
local governance more responsive and effective in a manner that accommodates the legitimacy 
of local institutions” (Ansorg, 2017 p. 141).  
Cubitt (2013) advocated for a more prominent role for national actors in justice and 
security sector reform processes, asserting that the West does not have a monopoly over 
understanding how to build peace. Therefore, whilst principles such as equal treatment of 
citizens by security institutions are useful, they are not of sufficient strategic importance to delay 
the transfer of decision making to national actors (Gordon, 2014). Fortunately, the passage of 





in turn, resulted in a shift in approach so that DFID is working with chiefs to design and 
implement its programmatic interventions (Denney, 2013; Denney, 2014 & Jackson, 2013).  
It is evident that the reluctance by international development actors to engage with local 
nonstate actors like chiefs is borne out of a number of factors. These include the overemphasis of 
Western solutions for development challenges in contexts that are totally different from the West 
and the fact that dealing with only state actors is relatively easier and has relatively fewer 
practical challenges for them. It is also clear that there is a deliberate effort to promote Western 
values, with development assistance to recipients of donor funding being used as a tool for 
achieving a particular foreign policy or national interest objective. These factors point to the 
politics that influence the decision-making processes of implementing programmatic 
interventions to reform the justice and security sectors in postconflict countries. As long as the 
standards/ideology that the international development community uses is not contextualized, the 
possibility of success is limited, and this is evidenced by the outcome of most development 
programming in Africa.  
The stance taken by Denney (2013) of getting nonstate actors involved in security sector 
reform in postconflict societies is supported by Ansorg (2017). Ansorg (2017), cited authors like 
Bagayoko, Hutchful & Luckham (2016), points out that as a result of implementing reform 
programs that are not context specific, security sector reform approaches are at odds with the 
realities in Africa where state authority and governance is, and can be, exercised by nonstate 
actors such as traditional leaders. In Africa, nonstate actors are often external to the formal state 
institutions, so the reform efforts exclude them (Ansorg, 2017). A 2007 report by the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative holds a similar view. In the report, the Commonwealth 





traditional authorities) is provided by some ethnic/local communities in Ghana, police reform 
interventions, which are mostly foreign supported, have never involved non state actors in the 
reform process (Ansorg, 2017).  
Ansorg (2017) also pointed out that in most postconflict environments non state actors 
are not actively involved in security sector reform processes, the reason being that such 
processes are often elite undertakings. This view is shared by Ansorg and Haastrup (2016) who 
indicated that the Western approach to security sector reform in Africa’s postconflict settings are 
elite and male driven and neglects females and organizations that champion female rights 
(Ansorg, 2017). Interestingly, Angola and Rwanda are two postconflict settings that Ansorg 
(2017) cited as exceptions to the general view and practice that security sector reform is an elite 
driven endeavor. Ansorg (2017) also lamented over the refusal by international development 
agencies to recognize local/traditional institutions as partners in their programming. According to 
the researchers, this is negatively affecting efforts to create security in postconflict settings.  
Ansorg (2017) also argued that local institutions may have the potential of securing the peace 
and stability (i.e., the ultimate object of security sector reform programming in postconflict 
settings. Westernman (2017) shared this view, positing that the goal of security sector reform in 
postconflict situations is to create a workable and sustainable security system that has a 
democratic relationship with the legitimate authorities of the country charged with creating a safe 
and secure environment.  
Mac Ginty (2015) pointed out that focusing on the local community to serve as the source 
of justice and security in the absence of strong state institutions is not a solution to address the 
root causes of conflict, arguing that in most cases, the conduct of these local structures fueled the 





Masson, 2016). Gordon (2014) counseled that in the long term both local and state centered 
approaches should be used to provide mutually reinforcing solutions to justice and security 
challenges in postconflict settings (Homel & Masson, 2016). Interestingly, Homel and Fuller 
(2015) made the point that the approach advocated by Gordon (2014) is already being 
implemented as there is an emerging phenomenon where interventions to reform the security 
sector are increasingly being built around local government structures (Homel & Masson, 2016). 
Mac Ginty (2010) is realist in commenting on the debate on local ownership and the 
place of traditional authorities in operationalizing it, as the researcher observed that, donor 
assistance creates a patron-client relationship, a situation that hinders efforts to promote local 
ownership in international development assistance  programs (Homel & Masson, 2016). To 
address this, Mac Ginty (2010) advocated for an approach adopted by the Australian Institute of 
Criminology, where interventions for crime prevention and community safety were implemented 
within the framework of partnerships between donors and the local community (Homel & 
Masson, 2016). Mac Ginty (2010) cited the Jenin Community project, in Palestine, as an 
example where all actors, formal and informal, local and international, women and youth groups, 
were brought together to work in partnership to improve community safety (Homel & Masson, 
2016).  
Nonstate Actors implementing Security Sector Reforms in postconflict societies 
Traditional and religious leaders 
 From the foregoing, it is obvious that traditional leaders have a crucial role to play in 
postconflict reform of the criminal justice system. Dinnen and Peake (2013), reported on the 
approach and outcome of New Zealand supported police reforms in Bougainville, a postconflict 





brought peace to Bougainville gave the region an autonomous status and an opportunity to 
establish its own public services including courts, police, criminal law and human rights 
protection. The researchers further noted that Bougainville’s constitution calls for the inclusion 
of traditional leaders in governance, stating that “the clan structure and customary leadership of 
Bougainvillean communities shall be recognized and strengthened and the roles, responsibilities 
and authority of traditional leaders shall be recognized at all levels of government” (p. 575).  
Dinnen and Peake (2013), asserted that the criminal justice reform project in 
Bougainville has two distinct approaches which produced fundamentally opposite results. 
According to the researchers, one approach supports the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP), 
which operates in Bougainville rural areas (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The CAP is made up of 350 
sworn police officers of the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) who in addition to performing 
policing duties, offer services such as mediation and work with traditional authorities to support 
community/traditional governance structures (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The second approach 
supports about 200 BPS officers based in the urban centers (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The CAP 
uses local concepts of authority to resolve disputes and Bougainville’s young local government 
system to discharge their functions. Dinnen and Peake (2013) asserted that this is an example of 
a hybrid policing approach that connects central authority to local authority. The village chief 
nominates potential officers of the CAP and the Council of Elders, comprised of traditional 
leaders, approve these nominees (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Following this, the BPS conducts 
background checks on the approved nominees (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Social and local 
structures are actively involved in the recruitment process as they determine who serves in the 






Dinnen and Peake (2013) concluded that the second approach follows the orthodox 
methodology to reforming the justice and security systems in postconflict settings. As previously 
noted, an essential feature of the orthodox approach is that the services of international experts 
are engaged to build the capacity of criminal justice institutions (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). These 
experts’ mentor the national actors/institutions, develop handbooks, transfer skills, and train 
them on intelligence gathering and investigations (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Dinnen and Peake 
(2013) indicated that in Bougainville, the orthodox approach is limited to officers of the BPS 
operating in the capital. Dinnen and Peake (2013) also noted that instead of just blindly building 
the public services, the Bougainvilles incorporated the positive aspects of their customary system 
of government to create hybrid institutions, policies and laws. For instance, chiefs were given 
roles in dispute resolution (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The peacebuilding efforts created local 
government structures including a Council of Elders, which is responsible for maintaining 
security, dispute resolution and facilitating reconciliation (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). For Dinnen 
and Peake (2013), the new political architecture, which gave traditional leaders a prominent role, 
was designed to have a socially embedded approach towards policing and justice. The 
researchers further opined that the reform of the justice system in Bougainville is a deliberate 
effort in the area of policing to depart from the discredited policing approach that predated the 
conflict (Dinnen & Peake, 2013).  
To operationalize this new approach, the report of the Bougainville Constitutional 
Commission enjoined the police to work closely with the Council of Elders, village courts, chiefs 
and other traditional leaders with the ultimate objective of the police becoming an integral part of 
the justice system which is made up of traditional leaders (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The justice 





“customary” in local Bougainville language) practices of restorative justice (Dinnen & Peake, 
2013). Is it instructive to observe that although focused on the rural community and local culture, 
international assistance was solicited to support the CAP, and New Zealand developed a syllabus 
to train the CAP in local conflict resolution methods. As noted earlier, in evaluating the outcome 
of both policing approaches, Dinnen and Peake, (2013) found results that fundamentally differed 
from each other. The researchers found that the approach adopted in connection with building 
the CAP yielded positive results in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy as opposed to the 
approach adopted to reform the BPS. Dinnen and Peake, (2013) also found that issues such as 
lack of professionalism, effective management, accountability and resources plagued the BPS, 
and these negatively affected the public’s perception about them. Interestingly, Dinnen and 
Peake, (2013) found the direct opposite in the case of the CAP. The researchers found that the 
CAP has multiple layers of accountability including the Council of Elders and the community 
members, which the authors referred to as horizontal oversight. Dinnen and Peake, (2013) also 
found that there is also a noncommissioned officer within the CAP who exercises vertical 
oversight in conjunction with an expatriate staff. Involving expatriates in oversight and 
accountability has some benefits as they are insulated from local social life and hence generally 
not susceptible to the local influences that nationals will ordinarily be susceptible to (Dinnen & 
Peake, 2013). 
Dinnen and Peake, (2013) found that CAP is the source of 86% of crime statistics. It is 
worth mentioning that since the CAP operates in the rural areas, where the population is higher, 
its contribution to the national crime statistics is natural. The fact that the CAP is present in the 
community contributes to the support that they enjoy (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). On the other 





old order. A very significant finding made by Dinnen and Peake (2013) is that the CAP has 
evolved over time and in the process, has been aligned to local structures. Significantly, Dinnen 
and Peake (2013) found that the CAP is also an early warning mechanism to prevent crisis in the 
community. Dinnen and Peake (2013) also found that, in some cases, the legitimacy of the CAP 
officers has been used to reinforce the work of other local justice actors. For instance, the 
presence of a CAP officer in the village court boosts the magistrate’s authority. CAP officers are 
members of other local committees and this enhanced local governance structures.  
Dinnen and Peake (2013) also highlighted the importance of building on local strengths 
as opposed to using conventional approaches that are preoccupied with identifying local 
deficiencies and fixing them. Secondly, the authors indicated that reforms should not follow 
orthodox approaches that have no bearing on the context and that where the intervention is 
tailored to suit the context there is a higher chance of it being successful and sustained. It is 
refreshing to note that Dinnen and Peake (2013) commended New Zealand for their non-
prescriptive approach to police reform in Bougainville and asserted that New Zealand should 
take part of the credit for the success of the project. 
Challenges associated with involving traditional structures in providing security and 
justice sector services 
 Dinnen and Peake (2013) reported that during their study, they answered the question: 
whether in the light of the pluralistic policing approaches and the justice system in Bougainville, 
the BPS was fit for the context. To this question the researchers made the point that while a case 
can arguably be made for strengthening the formal justice system to deal with serious offences, 





Dinnen and Peake (2013) asserted that in spite of all the strengths of the CAP approach 
towards reforming the justice system, there is the need for a professional police service to deal 
with urban related crime and the impact of socio economic development in Bougainville. The 
CAP, according to Dinnen and Peake (2013), can be an effective link between the central 
government and the local community. This approach affirms earlier suggestions by Mac Ginty 
(2011) for an approach that involves both state and nonstate actors in justice and security sector 
reform in postconflict settings (Gordon, 2014). 
Paralegals 
Paralegals are another category of nonstate actors that can aid the justice and security 
sector reform in postconflict countries. Swenson (2018) referred to paralegals as barefoot 
lawyers and observed that the United Nations has endorsed interventions that involve paralegals 
in enhancing access to justice and that this is demonstrating a lot of success. For instance, in 
Sierra Leone, several nongovernmental organizations, led by lawyers with the support of 
paralegals, offer advice, mediation services and representation in court at the national level 
(Jackson, 2013). Denney (2014) found a rise in the number of actors providing paralegal services 
in Sierra Leone and the prominent role they were playing in dispute resolution. Golub (2003) 
informed readers that paralegals provide a wide range of services including providing 
information and advice through representing their clients in administrative forums (Swenson, 
2018). Maru (2006) asserted that paralegals provide cost effective and sustainable services 
(Swenson, 2018). This is a view shared by Jackson (2013). Additionally, paralegals offer legal 
literacy skills (Jackson, 2013 & Swenson, 2018). Baker (2010) asserted that in postconflict 
settings paralegals play several important roles including bringing state and nonstate justice 





Condition precedents to effective paralegal schemes 
For paralegals to be effective in supporting efforts to reform the criminal justice system a 
number of conditions must exist. These include adequate training. This position is shared by van 
Rooij (2012), who indicates that paralegals need adequate training (Swenson, 2018). van Rooij 
(2012) also asserted that paralegals need to maintain an effective relationship with the 
community, the state and donors (Swenson, 2018). Thirdly, Swenson (2018) indicated that, to 
enhance national ownership, funders of paralegals programs must align their programs to that of 
the national government (Swenson, 2018). Maru (2006) added that paralegals must be connected 
to lawyers and must have the goal of providing concrete solutions to the justice related 
challenges confronting their clients (Swenson, 2018).  
Swenson (2018) conducts a study of two paralegal programs in Timor-Leste; the 
Advocates Sans Frontiers (ASF) Grassroots Justice Project 2005-2007 and the Asia Foundation’s 
Access to justice program 2008-2012. For both programs, paralegals were selected from within 
the community they served, from respected village youth, women, church and traditional leaders. 
Whereas all the paralegals in both programs were described as neutral and independent, the truth 
is that they drew their influence from being strongly rooted in their community (Swenson, 2018). 
That is, they used their social capital to discharge their duties as paralegals. Consequently, 
Swenson (2018) argued that the fact that the paralegals in both programs were deeply rooted in 
their community facilitated their work as paralegals and their role as paralegals bolstered their 
standing in the society. These findings suggest that the dual roles played by the paralegals i.e., as 
paralegals and their respective roles/positions in their various social networks in the community 





in the communities in which they serve (i.e., paralegals should have some authority within the 
community where they provide their services). 
Challenges of running a paralegal scheme 
Despite the positive views held about paralegal schemes, Swenson (2018) found 
challenges confronting the paralegal programs evaluated, challenges which may plague any 
paralegal scheme. These include the blurred lines of accountability (e.g., donor, local/traditional 
authorities and state authorities). Related to this challenge is the multiplicity of potential lines of 
accountability. Also, decisions of the paralegals were not binding, hence unenforceable, which 
could result in delayed justice particularly for the vulnerable in society, like women (Swenson, 
2018). This defeats one of the principal objectives of a modern justice system, upholding the 
rights of women (Swenson, 2018). Related to this is the fact that Swenson (2018) also observed 
that paralegal programs provide another forum for dispute resolution, however the presence of 
multiple forums for dispute resolution could lead to forum shopping which arguably is 
detrimental to less powerful disputants.  
Further, there are human resource challenges associated with running any paralegal 
program, particularly in postconflict settings, the reason being that, many of the roles or services 
in paralegal schemes are performed or provided by lawyers, so they cannot be provided by 
paralegals (Jackson, 2013 & Swenson, 2018). This is because most of the services that people 
seek from paralegal programs are those provided by lawyers and are inaccessible due to the cost 
of engaging the services of a lawyer and the financial status of beneficiaries of paralegal 
schemes. There is also the challenge of sustaining the project/program when donor funding has 
run out (Swenson, 2018). There is also the challenge of the quality of the services provided by 





and sustainable way of enhancing access to justice in developing countries, Swenson (2018) was 
unable to confirm from the study that the quality of the services provided by the paralegals, 
especially in remote locations, was high, thus questioning the quality of the paralegal services 
provided by the schemes studied as well as making a case for effective oversight over paralegal 
schemes. It must be noted that Castillejo (2009) argued that, in Sierra Leone, the presence of 
non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations who were providing access to 
justice services at the local level served to enhance oversight over paralegals (Jackson, 2013). 
Swenson (2018) also made the point that whether or not paralegal programs will make an impact 
in enhancing access to justice depends on how the scheme is perceived by powerful actors in the 
society. Importantly, whereas Swenson (2018) found that the paralegal programs the author 
studied were human rights friendly, there was no evidence that the programs succeeded in 
reforming the customary justice system to make it meet international human rights standards.  
It is worthy of mention that paralegals are not the solution to addressing challenges 
associated with access to justice, but they have the potential to make a significant impact in the 
quest to enhance access to justice particularly in postconflict settings (Swenson, 2018). The rate 
of success in using paralegals is attributable to a number of factors. According to Stomseth, 
Wippman and Brooks (2006) one of them is that “Paralegal assistance seems to offer that ever-
elusive commodity: a do-no-harm intervention with capacity to improve both the state and 
nonstate justice sectors in almost any setting, including post-conflict societies” (Swenson, 2018, 
p. 52).  
Women and Postconflict Criminal Justice System Reforms 
When involving non state actors in reforming the justice and security sectors it is 





the population particularly women and youth) must be actively involved in deciding the direction 
and approach of implementing the reforms (Gordon, 2014). Actors in the postconflict 
reconstruction process must ensure that they do not perpetuate discriminatory practices that 
existed prior to and during the conflict (Jackson, 2013). For instance, Dinnen and Peake (2013) 
found while studying the reform of the police in Bougainville, that recruitment drives to fill 
positions in the CAP gave priority to females. This resulted in an increase in the number of 
women working within the CAP (i.e., from 5% in 2008 to 21% in 2012 [Dinnen & Peake, 
2013]). Dinnen and Peake (2013) argued that the presence of a higher number of women in the 
CAP is aiding the reporting of sensitive gender related criminal conduct perpetuated against 
women and that this is strengthening the rule of law.  
However, it is important to situate the progress made in Bougainville within context as in 
Bougainville, women played a very active role in peace efforts (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). It is 
instructive to note that Dinnen and Peake (2013) posited that the CAP project has been, and can 
be, a social change agent, as including women is changing the notion that justice and security 
institutions in postconflict settings are the preserve of men. Involving women also addresses 
human rights concerns and promotes inclusiveness (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). As this is helping to 
address discriminatory practices against them and making them feel a part of the security and 
justice systems.  
Involving women in efforts to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system 
Numerous initiatives were put in place in Liberia to make the criminal justice system 
gender friendly (Bacon, 2015). These interventions include increasing the number of females in 
the Liberia National Police to 20% by 2014 and decentralizing the criminal justice system to 





were also efforts to improve the criminal justice system’s responsiveness to sexual and gender-
based offences (Bacon, 2015). In 2005, a Women and Children Protection Section (WACPS), 
dedicated to respond to sexual and gender related offenses, was established within the national 
police and the roll out of establishing WACPS units across the country commenced immediately 
(Bacon, 2015). The creation of these specialized units contributed to public education on sexual 
and gender related crimes (Bacon, 2015). However, Bacon (2015) noted that as at 2011, out of 
71 female officers of the WACPS, only 5 (7%) were in rural communities.  
Liberia’s criminal justice system’s response to gender related criminal conduct 
Generally, according to Bacon (2015), Liberia’s approach to gender-sensitive police 
reform to enhance responsiveness and representation was an innovation with positive outcomes. 
However, Bacon (2015) noted that the overall impact of these interventions was hindered by the 
broken justice system, poor infrastructure, weak technical capacity, the police’s poor reputation 
and low reportage of sexual and gender related crimes. According to Bacon (2015), in most cases 
sexual and gender based criminal conduct are resolved out of court (i.e., privately, through 
traditional or customary structures).  
 Another factor leading to the limited outcome of the interventions to improve the 
responsiveness and representation of women in the criminal justice system in Liberia is that these 
projects were donor driven and donors supported only ‘pet projects’ and adopted approaches that 
did not consider the local context (Bacon, 2015). For instance, donors were unwilling to work 
with the customary justice system and concentrated their interventions in the capital even though 
most of the citizens lived in villages outside the capital (Bacon, 2015). Jackson (2017) echoes 
this point when noting that the international community working in postconflict countries fails to 





country where the state lacked legitimacy. In Liberia, these locations were difficult to reach, 
particularly during the raining season when it takes long hours and in some cases days, often on 
foot, for some communities to reach representatives of the formal justice system (Bacon, 2015). 
Bacon (2015) observed further that all these factors had an impact on the sustaining the reforms 
as well as local ownership. On the issue of sustainability, Nyei (2014) informed readers that “… 
that most of the reform programs have been financed through foreign aid, and in most cases, 
government has proved incapable of assuming financial responsibilities when donors withdraw” 
(p. 11).  
Community safety mechanism 
Incorporating community safety mechanisms in security sector programming is another 
approach towards security and justice sector reform (Gordon, 2014). As the name suggests, 
community safety mechanisms are mechanisms at the local level that are established by or in 
consultation with local actors to promote safety and security in the community. Various 
jurisdictions label these mechanisms differently (Gordon, 2014). For instance, Gordon (2014) 
citing various authors, informed readers that in Sierra Leone they are referred to as provincial 
and district-level security committees (Kunz & Valasek, 2012), and in Afghanistan they are 
referred to as security and justice subcommittees (Stabilization Unit, 2014). In Kenya, an 
independent international organization known as Saferworld supported communities to 
participate in decision making processes on issues related to their security such as community 
policing (Gordon, 2014). Conteh (2007) informed readers that in Sierra Leone the district and 






Benefits of incorporating community safety mechanisms in security sector reform 
programming  
Community safety mechanisms must be designed to suit the context within which they 
are to operate (Gordon, 2014). Local ownership of reforming justice and security institutions in 
postconflict societies can be enhanced through establishing community safety. Effectively 
implementing this approach has the potential of addressing one of the challenges of the top-
bottom approach to security sector reform (i.e., the lack of inclusion) which was absent in donor 
led security sector reform interventions in countries like Kosovo and Timor Leste (Gordon, 2014 
& Homel & Masson, 2016). When community structures are incorporated into security sector 
reform processes there is a chance of getting members of the community, including marginalized 
groups, taking part in decisions relating to their security needs and priorities, which has the 
advantage that the resulting policy choices reflects the will of the people for whom they are 
designed and implemented (Gordon, 2014). Additionally, Gordon (2010) made the point that 
adopting a community safety approach towards security sector reform promotes efficient, 
transparent, effective and accountable security sector institutions and improves the relationship 
between the government and the governed (Gordon, 2014).  
However, Gordon (2014) noted that despite the strengths of this approach, community 
structures are rarely incorporated into security sector reform programming. According to Gordon 
(2014), not incorporating persons at the community level into security sector reform processes 
could have the result of turning potential champions of security sector processes into spoilers, as 
Arnusch (2010) warned would have happened in Liberia (Gordon, 2014). According to Arnusch 





state justice and security institutions, were not incorporated into the processes seeking to reform 
the justice and security sectors (Gordon, 2014).  
Challenges incorporating community safety mechanisms in security sector reform 
processes 
 Gordon (2014) pointed out that there are limitations associated with using this approach 
to make security services accessible to the community. Hence electing to incorporate this 
approach in reform programs should be done with caution. For instance, the author pointed out 
that incorporating community safety structures into security sector reform programming may 
result in an institutionalization of these community structures and has the potential of resulting in 
the structures losing their very essence and character (i.e., a wide range of community concerns 
that community safety mechanisms are designed to address risk being securitized [Gordon, 
2014]). Another limitation identified by Gordon (2010) relates to the bottom up approach to 
security sector reform that community safety structures facilitate. According to the researcher, 
incorporating these structures into security sector reform programming may result in these 
structures supporting the state centric approach towards security sector reform, thus defeating the 
purpose for which they were established (Gordon, 2014). Donais (2008) argued that when 
community safety structures actively support state centric approaches the result is that they end 
up implementing externally driven agendas (Gordon, 2014).  
Donais (2008) also indicated that when community structures are incorporated into 
security sector programming, donor support for the operations of the structures may undermine 
the quest for the activities of these structures to be locally owned (Gordon, 2014). This negates 
the very reason for establishing them (Gordon, 2014). Most importantly, Donais and Knorr 





actors and those at the state/national level may result in a cooptation of community level actors 
(Gordon, 2014). Homel and Masson (2016) shared similar views. This reality led Gordon (2014) 
to argue that the unequal power relations will transform the bottom top approach to security 
sector reform associated with involving community structures in security sector programming 
into a top-down approach. Williams (2018) made similar observations with respect to the African 
Union Mission approach in Somalia.  
Jackson (2010) argued that sight should not be lost over the fact that community safety 
structures may affirm the power dynamics in the community, hence this may marginalize 
vulnerable groups in the community (Gordon, 2014). Consequently, their activities may not 
reflect the concerns of all the demographic groupings within the society (Gordon, 2014). Where 
this is the case, using them to implement security sector reform processes may not translate into 
improving the lives of all sections of the community (Gordon, 2014). To buttress this point, 
Jackson (2011) asserted that being labeled a community based organization does not 
automatically mean that the group is inclusive, more legitimate or accountable (Gordon, 2014). 
To illustrate this Gordon (2010) further stated that in Kosovo women were underrepresented in 
community safety structures (Gordon, 2014). This meant that security challenges that were 
peculiar to women like domestic violence were rarely discussed in such forums (Gordon, 2014). 
Also, the dominance of males in these community safety structures made it almost impossible to 
discuss organized crime and corruption as these crimes were mainly perpetuated by men 
(Gordon, 2014). These realities led Salahub and Nerland (2010) to admonish persons engaged in 
justice and security sector reform in postconflict settings to ensure that their programming 





The prospects of ordinary citizens actively influencing the direction of the security sector 
reform agenda may be the reason why the elite, who dominate affairs in postconflict settings, 
resist efforts to incorporate community structures into security sector reform processes (Gordon, 
2014). It is worthy of note that where incorporating community structures is insisted upon, the 
elite may disengage from the process and this creates new challenges, including the possibility of 
sacrificing engaging at the community level to keep the elite at the state level involved in the 
reform processes (Gordon, 2014). Donasis and Knoor (2013) identified the huge resources 
required to roll out community safety structures as another limitation associated with this 
approach particularly in postconflict environments (Gordon, 2014).  
Lawrence (2012) also identified the cultural and security concerns in postconflict settings 
that officials of international organizations have to deal with, particularly in the initial phase of 
their engagement with community safety organizations, as a challenge (Gordon, 2014). 
Furthermore, community level dwellers may be unwilling to engage in security sector reform 
processes that are externally driven (Gordon, 2014). Donnelly, Nikolla, Poudel and Chakraborty 
(2013), posited that a limitation associated with incorporating community safety structures in 
security sector reform processes is the expectation that these processes may create in the 
community (Gordon, 2014). According to Donnelly, Nikolla, Poudel and Chakraborty (2013) 
members of the community may conclude that, by incorporating community safety mechanisms 
into justice and security sector reform programming, all their challenges will be or have been 
addressed, a fact that the authors point out may not be the case, at least in the short term 
(Gordon, 2014).  
Kunz and Valadek (2012) asserted that incorporating community safety structures into 





the society (Gordon, 2014). However, this creates many voices which may be conflicting, hence 
Kunz and Valadek (2012) pointed out that a challenge that emerges in such a situation is 
determining which voice reflects the reality on the ground and should matter (Gordon, 2014). To 
address this challenge, Kunz and Valadek (2012) emphasized the importance of capturing 
heterogeneous voices in security sector reform programming as a necessary condition for a 
successful security sector reform program (Gordon, 2014). Gordon (2014) is of the view that 
these conflicting views can subsequently be negotiated amongst relevant actors at the community 
level to arrive at a collective determination of the community’s priorities. It must be noted 
though that, taking on board the interests and concerns of all actors is time consuming and costs 
a lot of money (Gordon, 2014). It may also hinder the pace of carrying out the needed reforms 
which quite often is urgent, a situation Hendrickson and Kasongo (2010) noted obtained in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Gordon, 2014).  
Lawrence (2012) observed that, in postconflict societies,  finding civil society 
organizations is challenging and this is further worsened by the fact that where such 
organizations are identified, they may feel incapable and/or unwilling to engage in security 
sector reform programs and this reduces the opportunity for incorporating community safety 
organizations in security sector reform processes (Gordon, 2014). Additionally, in postconflict 
settings, the persistence of grievances and animosities from the conflict may make the 
development and implementation of an inclusive community safety structure an illusion 
(Gordon, 2014).  
 The limitations identified above illustrate the point that incorporating community safety 
mechanisms in security sector reform processes is an extremely political process. Schroder and 





support, there are many interests at stake in security sector reform interventions. This makes 
security sector reform a highly contested issue between the actors involved (Schroder & 
Chappuis, 2014). Authors like Cubitt (2013) and Caparini (2010) surmised that these limitations 
account for why designers and implementers of security sector reform processes appear not to be 
enthusiastic about incorporating community level structures into security sector reform processes 
(Gordon, 2014), a fact that leads Gordon (2014) to conclude that the focus of security sector 
reform processes will remain at the state level for the foreseeable future as this is relatively easier 
to operationalize.  
Adopting a local needs approach to policing 
 Ansorg (2017) asserted that there is the need for institutions to be reformed as part of the 
peacebuilding process in African countries affected by violent conflict. However, this cannot be 
effectively undertaken when international reform efforts ignore the local needs of the population 
(Ansorg, 2017). Ansorg (2017) also noted that to ensure the acceptance and sustainability of 
reforms initiatives in postconflict settings, the needs of the local population should inform the 
reforms. This obvious and logical suggestion notwithstanding, Ansorg (2017) noted that security 
sector reform processes, especially in postconflict settings, are externally/foreign driven, laced 
with heavy doses of Western ideology and follow generalized blueprints that are or were 
implemented in other settings. Burundi, Somalia, South Sudan and Liberia are some of the 
postconflict countries cited as having suffered from this approach to security sector reform 
(Ansorg, 2017). Consequently, the reforms in these countries lack local participation and so were 
not accepted by the local community (Ansorg, 2017). Lack of local ownership creates issues of 
trust between the local population on one side and the police and the judiciary on the other 





Westernman (2017) called for the development of a democratic relationship between the 
legitimate authority of state and the forces of state as a means of securing the buy-in of citizens 
into interventions to reform the security sector in postconflict settings. Westernman (2017) 
referred to this relationship as civil-military relations. The concept of civil military relations is 
steeped in Western liberal thinking which shapes security sector reform programs in postconflict 
settings (Westernman, 2017).  
In Sierra Leone, a Local Needs Policing approach was used to reform the police 
(Bangura, 2018). Bangura (2018) noted that this approach sought to enhance the interaction 
between the police and the community; its objective was to ensure that the security needs of the 
community were addressed whilst the community took an active part in matters that related to 
their security (Ansorg, 2017 & Bangura, 2018). A similar approach was adopted in South Africa 
after the end of the Apartheid era (Ansorg, 2017).  
Benefits of adopting a local needs approach toward policing 
 Ansorg (2017) highlighted the benefits of the Local Needs Approach to policing and 
how it works. The researcher stressed the point that this approach takes into cognizance local 
actors; it promotes national ownership and increases trust between the population and their 
institutions. It also takes on board the history of the institutions that are undergoing reform 
(Ansorg, 2017).  
Operationalizing the local needs approach 
In order to operationalize the Local Need Approach to policing, Bangura (2018) asserted 
that in Sierra Leone a number of structures were established. These include Local Police 
Partnership Boards and Community Policing Partnerships Committees (Bangura, 2018). External 





National Security Council and the Complaints, Disciple and Internal Investigation Department of 
the Police were also established (Bangura, 2018). Bangura (2018) studied the impact of adopting 
the Local Needs Approach towards policing and other interventions to reform Sierra Leone’s 
police. The researcher found that an overwhelming majority of the interviewees acknowledged 
the improvement in the attitude and practice of policing by the Sierra Leonean police. Various 
reasons, including the capacity building received by the police, the oversight mechanisms 
established, and the system of government in place in Sierra Leone, were given for the change 
(Bangura, 2018). Almost 70% of respondents held the view that the involvement of the 
community in policing made the community feel the police were interested in addressing their 
needs (Bangura, 2018).  
Situations where International efforts to Reform Postconflict Criminal Justice System 
upheld National Ownership 
As demonstrated above, the literature is replete with instances where the international 
actors did not follow the principles of local or national ownership in crafting interventions to 
reform criminal justice systems (Gordon, 2014). However, there are a few exceptions; for 
instance, Dinnen and Peake (2013) commended New Zealand for not being overly prescriptive in 
its support to police reform efforts in Bougainville. This willingness to depart from the 
orthodoxy of postconflict criminal justice system reform in which international experts, while 
adopting a top-bottom approach, impose reforms from textbooks and blueprints that they have 
implemented in other jurisdictions, often with little or no success, is positively unique and 





Why less attention is paid to the Local Context in Programming 
 Ansorg (2017) and Westernman (2017) inform their readers that the local context 
includes the history of the postconflict setting. Ignoring the local culture and history in security 
sector programming especially in postconflict settings results in the design and implementation 
of flawed interventions (Westernman, 2017). Therefore, in designing programmatic interventions 
to reform institutions in the criminal justice system, all actors, particularly external ones have to 
ensure that they are well versed in the history of the institutions that they are reforming and this 
should influence the nature of the interventions they develop (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Ansorg 
(2017) found that in Sierra Leone, internal approaches towards security sector reform failed to 
consider the local context. Ansorg (2017) asserted that reform efforts in Sierra Leone continue to 
promote the Weberian paradigm as well as generalized blueprints and approaches.  
Ansorg (2017) also made the point that Western institutions provided a considerable 
amount of funding for security sector reform programs in postconflict African settings and that 
this had an impact on the approach adopted towards institutional reforms and the outcome of the 
reforms. For various reasons, including the fact that Western approaches to security sector 
reform seem blind to traditional approaches and institutions which might work better for Africa, 
Ansorg (2017) and Samuels (2006) asserted that the Western approach results in a focus being 
placed on building Western inspired institutions, enacting unenforceable legislation and 
appointing criminal justice officials who have little or no commitment to protecting the rights of 
the citizenry (Gordon, 2014). Ansorg (2017) concluded that relying on the West to fund security 
sector reform processes creates dependency and defeats the need for local context to influence 
programming. Ansorg (2017) identified a number of practical challenges that may hinder 





reconstruction. One such challenge is the urgent need to provide security in postconflict societies 
(Ansorg, 2017). Ansorg (2017) made the point that a quick and easy approach is usually adopted 
to reform the justice and security sectors in postconflict countries. However, as institutions are 
the product of their local context, a phenomenon referred to as the path dependent nature of 
institutions, this approach produces short-lived outcomes (Ansorg, 2017). Pierson (2004) 
supporting this point, indicates that reforming the security sector without factoring in the local 
context is New Institutionalism (Ansorg, 2017).  
An interesting reason for international interventions ignoring the local context when 
designing security sector reform programs in postconflict settings is the absence of literature on 
non-Western approaches to security sector reform (Westernman, 2017). Hence, there is no 
incentive to warrant a gravitation away from prowestern solutions. Except for the Economic 
Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) intervention force in Liberia and perhaps in 
Guinea Bissau the closest examples of the few quasi non Western military operations to bring 
peace, the international community established a peacekeeping operation in Somalia led by 
troops from selected Africa countries with funding and other logistical support from the West 
(Williams, 2018). However, this operation in many respects adopted the classical approach 
towards bringing peace for this and other reasons Williams (2018) discouraged this model for 
peacekeeping.  
Decentralization of Public Services 
 Rechts-Lexikon (n.d.) defines decentralization as the process of moving powers from 
government, at the central level, to lower levels of a country’s governance structure (Hamann, 
2012). From this definition, decentralization seeks to create access to government and its 





in the affairs of the citizenry at the local level is increased and it provides opportunities for 
ordinary citizens, particularly those at the local level, to contribute to policy making on matters 
that affect them (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Woodward (2002) makes the point that there is 
significant politics associated with decentralization (Jackson, 2017). There are various types of 
decentralization; these include fiscal, administrative and political decentralization (Krawczyk & 
Muhula, 2018 & Tang & Huhe, 2016). The World Bank claims that administrative 
decentralization results in local government authorities being given the discretion to satisfy the 
needs of citizens at the local level and concurrently making local government accountable for 
how the discretion is exercised (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). This led Krawczyk and Muhula 
(2018) to describe administrative decentralization and the ensuing discretion as being two sides 
of the same coin. Jackson (2017) asserted that, in contemporary times, decentralization has a 
prominent place in many peacebuilding interventions across the globe (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia 
& Alzate, 2016). Local government structures are directly and indirectly affected by postconflict 
reconstruction interventions (Jackson, 2017). Decentralizing public services is a common feature 
of many peace agreements (Jackson, 2017 & Nyei, 2014) This is in spite of the fact that, in 
countries ravaged by war, local government structures are hardly prepared to actively champion 
decentralization efforts (Jackson, 2017). The result of this reality is that decentralization is often 
discounted in postconflict settings (Jackson, 2017). Moreover, the role local government must 
play in decentralizing public services in postconflict communities is hardly discussed and the 
same can be said about involving local government in discussions to decentralize services in 
postconflict settings (Jackson, 2017). This is partly because local government is seldom in the 
right position to be actively involved in such discussions (Jackson, 2017). Decentralization is a 





Yao (2011), it can enhance democratic local governance (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018) or as per 
Khemani (2010), it can hinder it (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). In postconflict countries, 
depending on what triggered the conflict, decentralization can be a tool for stabilization thus 
engendering peace and reconciliation or it can be the reason why a postconflict country slides 
back into conflict (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016 & Jackson, 2016). The “quality, scope and pace of 
implementing a decentralization program usually depends on the history and experiences of the 
state involved (Nyei, 2014, p.4). For the purposes of this study, decentralization should result in 
criminal justice services being extended from the central (i.e., national) level to the local (i.e., 
subnational) level. It should result in the extension of state authority and an enhancement of 
access to justice and security across the country. 
There are several reasons for embarking on decentralization in postconflict environments. 
These include using decentralization to address systemic/structural challenges in the 
communities where peace agreements are unable to alter (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 
2016). Mac Ginty and Richmond contended that decentralization provides an opportunity for 
inclusive peacebuilding efforts (i.e., a bottom up approach) to peacebuilding (Schultze-Kraft, 
Valencia & Alzate, 2016). 
Decentralization as a Peacebuilding Intervention 
  There is no consensus on the nature of the link between conflict and decentralization 
however, there is unanimity on a strong connection between the two variables (i.e., 
decentralization and conflict [Jackson, 2017]). Bigdon and Hettige (2003) make the point that 
decentralization can mitigate conflict as it provides a peaceful approach “to manage inter-group 
tensions, increases representation and participation, and improves service delivery, all of which 





Markus and Morina (2014), posited that in spite of the fact that decentralization is a vehicle 
through which peacebuilding interventions are implemented in war ravaged countries, there is 
little evidence to suggest a positive correlation between decentralization and development, even 
in stable environments (Nyei, 2014 & Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Jackson (2017) 
supported this assertion, arguing that it is unfathomable to think that such a relationship exists in 
postconflict environments (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Schultze-Kraft, Valencia 
and Alzate (2016) asserted that there is a focus on involving actors at the local and subnational 
level in peacebuilding efforts as opposed to relying on decentralization as the peacebuilding 
approach. It will be demonstrated later on that there is a case for adopting a decentralization 
approach towards peacebuilding. Therefore, it is useful to mention that Jackson, (2017) 
highlighted an important caveat which must influence decision making as to which side of the 
debate one stands, on the utility or otherwise of decentralization in peacebuilding. Jackson, 
(2017) noted that there is no formula for a successful decentralization program in postconflict 
settings. Therefore, since Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) posited that actively 
engaging actors at the local and subnational level will result in creating access to public and 
social services and increase the state’s presence and Tang and Huhe (2016) asserted that there 
will be opportunities for ordinary citizens to contribute to policy making, there is a meeting of 
minds  on the objective for making public services accessible. 
Decentralization engenders public trust 
  Ligthart and van Oudheusden (2011) informed their readers that there is a link between 
decentralization and trust in public institutions (Esteller-More´, 2013). Dahl and Tufte (1973) 
support this position as they posited that citizens in a decentralized system actively contribute to 





(Tang & Huhe, 2016). Oates (1972) shared this view, asserting that the decentralization of public 
services is an acknowledgment of the preferences of the governed (i.e., the governed prefer a 
decentralization of governance structures [Esteller-More´, 2013]). Blind (2006), supported this 
assertion, indicating that decentralization is one way to build citizens’ trust in public institutions 
(Tang & Huhe, 2016). Hetheringoton and Husser (2012) acknowledged the importance of public 
trust for regime stability and Blind (2006) asserted that, because of this important link, various 
interventions have been introduced to either build or rebuild the public’s confidence in public 
systems and institutions (Tang & Huhe, 2016). According to Martinez-Bravo, Padró i Miquel, 
Qian and Yao (2011) decentralization can enhance the participation of the citizenry in policy and 
decision-making. (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018) and Linder (2009) indicated that decentralization 
enhances civic participation in government (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 
(2014), shared this view and concluded that decentralization is one of the surest ways of bringing 
government back to the people and building their confidence in government.  
Tang and Huhe (2016) conducted a multilevel analysis quantitative study with data from 
the World Values Survey and found that, generally, there is neither a direct nor uniform effect of 
decentralization on political trust. These researchers found that the impact of decentralization on 
public trust was dependent on what form the decentralization process took. For instance, fiscal 
and administrative decentralization has a positive impact on the public’s trust in the government 
while no positive impact was associated with political decentralization (Tang & Huhe, 2016). 
Also, Tang and Huhe (2016) found that decentralization could help indirectly shape the views of 
citizens on political institutions. Diaz-Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose (2012) asserted that for a 





should result in an efficient delivery of decentralized public services as this will enhance the 
wellbeing of the citizenry (Esteller-More´, 2013). 
Decentralization engenders distribution of resources 
 Nyei (2014) claimed that some academics and activists have asserted that 
decentralization results in increasing the number of persons who benefit from economic 
resources and creates opportunities for them. For persons who hold this view, Liberia, will 
witness socioeconomic development when “political, fiscal and administrative powers are 
decentralized” (Nyei, 2014, p. 4). 
Decentralization promotes oversight and accountability 
 Seabright (1996) highlighting the benefits of decentralization, informed readers that 
decentralization contributes to political accountability (Esteller-More´, 2013). Manor (2006) 
affirmed this view (Jackson, 2017). Tang and Huhe (2016) posited that citizens in decentralized 
systems are more likely to believe that they can exercise oversight over government officials in 
the decentralized structure compared to those in a centralized system. Martinez-Bravo, Padró i 
Miquel, Qian and Yao (2011) asserted that decentralization can increase accountability 
(Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Brancati (2006) and Sambanis and Milanovic (2014) affirmed this 
view as they suggested that decentralization results in political accountability and brings 
government closer to the people (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). de Mello and Barenstein (2002) 
argued that decentralization reduces corruption. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) confirmed this 
view as they asserted that one of the causes of political mistrust is corruption and that this can be 
countered by decentralization (Tang & Huhe, 2016). According to Tiebout (1956), 
decentralization enhances information flow between providers and recipients of public services 





accountability by indicating that decentralization promotes more accountability, inclusiveness 
and public institutions pay attention to the interest of the public (Tang & Huhe, 2016). 
Decentralization promotes democracy 
 Colino (2008) indicated that decentralization is institutional reform that takes place in a 
democracy (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Weingast (1997) noted that decentralization, as a democratic 
arrangement, is more likely to have a positive impact on political trust amongst democratically 
minded people (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Tang and Huhe (2016) supported this view as they found 
that the views people hold about their political establishment are dependent on their level of 
democratic orientation. People with a higher democratic orientation are more critical. Tang and 
Huhe (2016) investigated how decentralization affects the perception of ordinary citizens 
towards government and public institutions and asserts that decentralization has an indirect 
benefit (i.e., it has an impact on other democratic values). The fact that devolution of power from 
the center improves the relationship between citizens and government and makes government 
visible is an advantage of decentralization (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Consequently, Edwards and 
Yilmaz (2016) opined that effective decentralization results in organizing politics between the 
central and periphery. Furthermore, Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, (2016) asserted that, in 
Colombia, though factors like the conflict, corruption, organized crime and weak institutions 
across the structures of the state negatively affected the positive impact of decentralization, 
decentralization still proved to be an important catalyst for the development and democratization 
of Colombia’s state and political system.  
Decentralization promotes competition and efficiency 
Weingast (1997) argued that decentralization promotes competition amongst 





(Tang & Huhe, 2016). The reason being that the policies seek to attract investment (Tang & 
Huhe, 2016). Additionally, Barankay, Lockwood (2007) posited that effective decentralization 
promotes efficiency in government (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Martinez-Bravo, Padró i Miquel, Qian 
and Yao (2011) associated themselves with this point as they argued that decentralization can 
result in improved service delivery and enhanced development (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). 
Schou and Haug (2006) challenged this correlation by asserting that there is no consistent 
evidence to support the existence of a relationship between decentralization and efficiency in 
public service delivery (Jackson, 2017). Although the views held by Schou and Haug (2006) 
cannot be disputed, it can be argued that the researchers do not totally discount the link between 
decentralization and efficiency in public services delivery (Jackson, 2017). This is because at the 
heart of their contestation is the fact that the evidence supporting this link is not consistent, thus 
suggesting that there is some evidence, but their case lies in the inconsistency of the evidence 
(Jackson, 2017). From the literature, there is evidence to justify the presence of a linkage 
between decentralization and efficiency in public service delivery, but such evidence does not 
always manifest itself as the context has an impact on the extent to which such a linkage can be 
empirically proved (Jackson, 2017).  
Decentralization engenders local ownership 
 Local governments are considered partners of international actors in implementing 
peacebuilding interventions in postconflict environments (Jackson, 2017). 
Decentralization is a tool or process to institutionalize and/or build peace 
 Gutiérrez (2010) made the point that it is inconceivable to ignore “the structure of the 
state’s territorial power”, (p. 838) when engaging in peacebuilding exercises (Schultze-Kraft, 





nature of the war is internal, decentralization has been used for peacebuilding. This is because it 
offers a chance for sections of the community, particularly those outside the big cities, who were 
marginalized under a centralized system of government, to feel that they are being given an 
opportunity to participate in making decisions on issues that affect them. Romeo (2002) shared 
the view about the importance of decentralization in peace processes as the author posited that 
decentralization is a way of “demilitarizing politics in divided societies” (Jackson, 2017, p. 752). 
Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) believe that in postconflict settings there is, at best, 
very little of government structures remaining at the local level to prosecute an agenda that 
builds peace through decentralization. The reason being that local government is often among the 
first casualties of civil strife because they are easy targets for the government and/or nonstate 
actors involved in the conflict (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016).  
The inability of the state to exercise effective control over its entire geographical territory 
is one of the root causes of Colombia’s armed conflict (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 
2016). It is for this reason that the warring factions in Colombia adopted a novel approach 
referred to as “territorial peace” to build peace in Colombia (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 
2016). This is in spite of the conceptual and practical implementation challenges Schultze-Kraft, 
Valencia and Alzate (2016) found to be associated with operationalizing this concept in 
postconflict Colombia. Territorial peace is a peacebuilding approach that fuses elements of 
decentralization, access to justice and security as well as rural development (Schultze-Kraft, 
Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) inform their readers that 
rural development is at the center of the territorial peace approach to peacebuilding. Schultze-
Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) draw a distinction between decentralization and territorial 





while the later seeks to foster social cohesion and create conditions for development across the 
entire country. 
Conditions Precedent for effective Decentralization  
The following are some of the conditions precedent for effective decentralization:  
First, as previously noted, Tang and Huhe (2016) identified the level of democracy practiced in 
the context where decentralization is taking place as an important precondition for enjoying the 
maximum benefits associated with decentralization. There is a strong link between the overall 
political structure in a country and the extent to which political arrangements are decentralized 
(Jackson, 2016; Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016 & Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Therefore, 
the political structure in a context desirous of decentralizing must be designed to facilitate 
decentralization. Jackson (2017) puts this point in different terms when asserting that the 
political framework in which local government operates is very important for the success or 
otherwise of peacebuilding efforts. Secondly, the public needs to be educated on the benefits of 
decentralization and which tier of the governance structure i.e., central or local level, is 
responsible for providing a particular service. The reason being that, Esteller-More´ (2013) found 
that in Spain, the absence of knowledge by interviewees of who was responsible within the 
country’s governance structure for providing a particular public service may have contributed to 
why the researcher found a weakness in the impact of decentralization on the criminal justice 
sector. Thirdly, Hamann (2012) stressed the importance of national ownership, including the 
active participation of the local population in determining the targets of decentralization. It is 
worth underscoring the point that the peculiarities of the setting in which decentralization 
initiatives are being implemented should determine the approach to decentralization (Bacon, 





allocated to implement decentralization programs (Jackson, 2017). Closely linked to this is what 
Fontana (2017) referred to as the need for political will, especially support from the elite to 
devolve power (Jackson, 2017). Jackson (2017) stressed that the effectiveness of local 
government structures in decentralization efforts can be hindered by the activities of the elite. 
Further, there must exist, at the local level, a structure that the decentralization process devolves 
power to (Jackson, 2017). This structure could be the city or municipal council or a traditional 
authority (Jackson, 2017). Chemouni (2017) pointed out that putting in place a bottom up 
mechanism for decision making in postconflict societies was essential for successful 
decentralization process in Rwanda (Jackson, 2017). 
Hamann (2012) emphasizes the fact that “decentralization will contribute to establishing 
rule of law structures if the population is given a genuine possibility of participating in 
decentralization and if it contributes to strengthening the accountability” (p. 37/569). However, 
for this to happen, those in power must be willing to relinquish power from the central level and 
the population must be willing to take the responsibility handed over to them and build the 
desired structures at the local level (Hamann, 2012). This point is amplified by Krawczyk and 
Muhula (2018) who found that, in spite of strong demands among Liberians for decentralization, 
the reluctance of the central government to cede power to the local level has stalled the 
enactment of legislation seeking to decentralize public services. CMI (2004) argued that 
although decentralization seeks to extend public services across a country, it requires a strong 
central government to be effective (Jackson, 2017). Smoke (2015) argued that the design of the 
reforms that seek to decentralize public services and their implementation have an impact on the 
success or failure of decentralization efforts (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Cognizant of this 





imperatives of the pressures of time in decentralizing public services in postconflict settings and 
ensure that they do not recreate the local government structures that existed prior to the conflict 
(Jackson, 2017).  
Decentralization and the Criminal Justice System 
Esteller-More´ (2013) investigated determinants of trust in public institutions in 
administering justice in Spain, from the perspectives of the economy and decentralized public 
service. Esteller-More´ (2013) found that there is no positive relationship between 
decentralization of public services and public trust in the administration of justice. The author 
attributes this to either citizens not expecting authorities responsible for decentralized public 
services to perform better or that the citizens are unsure about which tier of government is 
responsible for delivering which services. However, Esteller-More´ (2013), found indirect 
evidence suggesting that the speedy resolution of disputes will result in enhanced public trust in 
the administration of justice civil matters more (i.e., by 25%) than in criminal matters. From the 
Esteller-More´ (2013) study, there appears to be a consensus on the positive effect of 
decentralization on public trust in government. However, the public should be educated on who 
(i.e., central authority or decentralized authority) is responsible for delivering which services 
(Esteller-More´, 2013). Support to reform the justice system should result in empowering local 
people to access justice within the existing legal and institutional framework (Jackson, 2013). In 
Liberia, the regional justice and security hubs were designed to provide an “opportunity for 
decentralization and efficient service in the security and justice sectors (Nyei, 2014, p. 9). 
Decentralizing Public Services in Postconflict Settings 
Over centralization of criminal justice processes results in inefficiencies in the criminal 





assertion, by highlighting the benefits of decentralization, particularly in postconflict settings. 
This position is echoed by Jackson (2017) who argued that actively supporting local government 
in postconflict settings engenders lasting peace. Manor (2006) shared similar views, suggesting 
that in adopting a decentralization approach in postconflict reconstruction there is the potential of 
reaching out to the poor, making public services accessible, governance inclusive and promoting 
national ownership and accountability (Jackson, 2017). Notwithstanding the views held by 
Edwards and Yilmaz (2016) on the benefits of decentralization in postconflict reconstruction, the 
researchers point out that there is no consensus on the benefits of decentralization in postconflict 
stabilization, with one theory positing that decentralization often deepens internal conflicts and 
another suggesting that decentralization mitigates conflict. Brinkerhoff (2005) affirmed this 
assertion, noting that there is a divergence in opinion over the benefits of an improved public 
service delivery system as a tool for forging lasting peace (Jackson, 2017). On the other hand, 
Siegle and O’Mahoney (2007) emphasized the point that factors like incompetence, corruption 
and partisanship, at local government level and amongst officials, defeat the purpose of 
decentralization and results in frustrations and exclusion thereby increasing the chances of 
conflict arising (Jackson, 2017). Schou and Haug (2006) argued that the evidence supporting the 
assertion that decentralization improves service delivery is inconsistent (Jackson, 2017). 
However, Edwards and Yilmaz (2016) asserted that between both schools of thought is the fact 
that the capacity of decentralization to prevent conflict depends upon the nature or reasons for 
the conflict. That is, where the conflict is driven by ethnic considerations, decentralization only 
exacerbates it (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). Edwards and Yilmaz (2016) cited a study by Bertrand 
(2004) who found that fiscal decentralization in Indonesia resulted in violence as the local elite 





is due to regional inequality (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). Generally, expanding participation of 
citizens in political processes aids in mitigating future conflict (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). 
Walter (2004) asserted that access to political processes by citizens increases the chances of them 
not resorting to violence to addressing conflict (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016).  
This stance is disputed by Bigdon and Hettige (2003) who claimed that almost all 
empirical studies indicate that where decentralization takes place amid political rivalry, conflict 
is exacerbated (Jackson, 2017). To buttress this point, the researchers cited the situation in Sri 
Lanka as an example of a postconflict setting where decentralization is yielding unintended 
negative consequences (Jackson, 2017).  
The need to be mindful of the potential impact of decentralization on peace in 
postconflict societies is justified. This is because postconflict reform processes must not 
perpetuate the conditions that triggered the conflict. As pointed out by Edwards and Yilmaz 
(2016), decentralization does not, on its own, result in conflict mitigation. It serves as a tool that 
signifies moderation on the part of the majority towards the minority (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). 
Lustick (2004) argues that decentralization provides an opportunity to give a voice to disgruntled 
groups in postconflict settings (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). To support this assertion, Edwards 
and Yilmaz (2016) in a study conducted in Sierra Leone, found that this postconflict society has 
progressed in its recovery partly due to the implementation of a decentralization strategy as a 
stabilization tool. Jackson (2017) also noted the positive impact of decentralization in Sierra 
Leone's stabilization. Sack and Larizza, (2011) informed their readers that decentralization in 
Sierra Leone is contributing to citizen participation in government (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). 
Progress in Sierra Leone confirms the assertion that, where the conflict was not ignited by ethnic 





because, as noted by Jackson (2007), in Sierra Leone the highly centralized system of 
government neglected other parts of the country outside the capital, Freetown, and this was one 
of the conflict drivers (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). In spite of the progress made, Edwards and 
Yilmaz (2016) made bleak projections about Sierra Leone’s future, noting that it is unlikely that 
decentralization in Sierra Leone will enhance the delivery of services.  
Conditions for effective Decentralization of the Criminal Justice System 
 There must be a collective and consultative diagnosis, by all stakeholders, of the 
challenges within the context for which the strategy is being designed and consensus reached on 
an approach towards reform (Kasali & Odetola, 2016; Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017). Put 
differently, the design of crime prevention policies must take a form that suits the context and 
local actors must be actively involved in making policy choices. Homel and Masson (2016) 
affirmed this claim as the authors indicated that there is a case for justice and security challenges 
to be dealt with at the local level. According to them, this is in conformity with the United 
Nations’ principle of subsidiarity, which indicates that issues should be dealt with at the lowest 
level at which they can be dealt with. Since crime prevention policies have an impact on the 
design, form and operations of the criminal justice system in every country, it can be argued by 
extension that the criminal justice system in every country must be designed to suit the context 
where the system is expected to operate.  
Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) indicated that there is a case for decentralization of 
policing particularly by using the community policing model. To be effective, the 
decentralization of criminal justice services requires the allocation of resources (Farris & 
Holman, 2017) and these resources must be efficiently used (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). 





depends on national laws. Recognizing and respecting the various interests at play when 
designing and implementing security related policy in every context in an imperative. In this 
regard, Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) stressed the point that security policymaking and 
implementation involves a lot of power hence more difficult to implement.  
Decentralization in Postconflict Liberia 
Liberia is divided into 15 counties (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Each county is headed 
by a County Superintendent, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Legislature 
(Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) suggested that the County 
Superintendent has little autonomy. Nyei (2014) shares this view. Krawczyk and Muhula, (2018) 
asserted that as part of Liberia’s post war reconstruction, all stakeholders have decided to use 
decentralization as a tool to rebuild the country and reduce the gap between Monrovia (i.e., the 
capital) and the rest of the country. As a result of this, Liberians are increasingly demanding 
better service delivery and accountability from their government (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). 
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) asserted that the demands for better public services by Liberians is 
a demand to improve the effectiveness of the state and decentralization is one way of achieving 
administrative decentralization as it gives citizens the opportunity to participate in governance. 
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) indicated that the draft Local Government Act seeking to 
restructure Liberia’s governance architecture to among others enhance accountability and 
improve service delivery is yet to be enacted into law (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018).  
To meet these demands and achieve the stated objectives, Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) 
observed that decentralization in Liberia has focused on “rudimentary activities” (p. 372) like 
rebuilding infrastructure at the county level. A lot of time has been spent on developing plans, 





Muhula, 2018). Within the justice and security sectors, these interventions include the 
establishment of a specialized court, with jurisdiction across the entire country to try sexual and 
gender based violence related cases, and the decision to establish units of the Women and 
Children Protection Section across Liberia (Bacon, 2015) and the program to create the regional 
justice and security hubs (Nyei, 2014). Another intervention is the creation of a specialized 
prosecution unit, the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Unit, dedicated to prosecuting sexual 
and gender related cases (Bacon, 2015). Also, additional police officers were recruited, trained 
and deployed outside the capital, although with almost no resources to work (Fyanka, 2014).  
These interventions are yet to yield the desired results as Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) 
observed that the results of decentralization remain weak. This is a view shared by Bacon (2015) 
who noted that between February 2009, when the specialized court was established, and July 
2011, only 34 out of the 200 reported sexual and gender based related cases had been prosecuted. 
The researcher also found that out of the cases prosecuted, only 16 convictions were secured. 
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) made negative prognosis about prospects of the local government 
bill being enacted as drafted because Liberia’s central government is reluctant to cede power. 
Challenges hindering Decentralization in Liberia 
 Several challenges are affecting Liberia’s quest to decentralize (Krawczyk & Muhula, 
2018 & Nyei, 2014). These include weak human resource capacity (Nyei, 2014). According to 
Bacon (2015) one of the reasons for the poor performance of the specialized court is because, 
although the law establishing it makes provision for the appointment of two judges to sit 
concurrently, only one judge was appointed (Bacon, 2015). This illustrates the point that 
decentralization of services must be accompanied by the requisite capacity/resources without 





poor infrastructure, the expansive geographical area to be covered by the decentralized services 
and Liberia being a unitary country with a highly centralized bureaucracy are challenges 
confronting decentralization in Liberia (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Nyei (2014) shared similar 
views. Weak coordination capacity amongst frontline ministries responsible for decentralization 
is also a challenge (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Most importantly, the elite is opposed to 
decentralization of political power and this elite capture may affect other types of 
decentralization in Liberia, as they are interlinked (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018).  
Way Forward for Decentralization in Liberia 
 Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) recommended that in view of the long history and practice 
of a centralized system of Government in Liberia, an incremental approach that builds on 
existing structures should be adopted while bearing in mind the absorptive capacity of the 
system. Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) advocated for the position of County Superintendent to be 
the “future hub of development” (p. 383) where he/she has more administrative authority for 
planning, budgeting and other relevant processes. Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) also 
recommended that line ministries in the counties must have dual reporting lines to the Country 
Superintendent to deliver on agreed targets and to their respective head offices, in Monrovia, on 
substantive/technical issues. Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) maintain that this approach will 
ensure service delivery. Another recommendation made by Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) is that 
accountability should be built at the local level. The researchers argued that this can be achieved 
by strengthening existing county structures by allowing them to make decisions at the local level. 
They will strengthen the county’s ability to deliver services and enhance the citizen’s demand 
and support for decentralization (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Thirdly, Krawczyk and Muhula 





the requisite technical and political authority to spearhead the decentralization process, should be 
established. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the research questions of my 
dissertation, Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) recommended the adoption of a bottom up approach 
towards accountability to engender citizen participation in local government and decision-
making, in Liberia. Nyei (2014) recommended that “Decentralizing an overly centralized state 
which is built on premises of patrimonial politics, as is the case in Liberia, requires a 
comprehensive and radical political reform process” (p.3). Nyei (2014) further noted, on Liberia, 
that: -  
… a strong ‘political will’ in support of decentralization as an integral element of  
postwar governance reform remains missing. Strong political will requires  
presidential or executive ownership and leadership of the process, including  
instructing government officials to drive the process from their various ministries  
and agencies. 
Some Approaches used to make Criminal Justice Services Accessible 
The following actors and approaches have been used in various settings to make criminal 
justice services accessible. Although not all examples relate to postconflict settings, I am of the 
considered opinion that, with modifications, the actors and approaches can be successfully used 
in postconflict settings.  
Local/municipal authorities enhance access to criminal justice services 
The existence of local or municipal authorities in a particular society is an indication of 
an intention, even if in theory, to make public services accessible. Access to the legal system is 
critical in every democracy (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). According to the United Nations, 





rule of law and they play a role in state building and sustainable development (Homel & Masson, 
2016). Homel and Masson (2016) asserted that communities that enjoy socio-economic progress 
and supremacy of the rule of law have lower crime rates and are therefore safer. Also, Sedra 
(2013), citing Van Dijk and De Waard (1991), claimed that there are indications that effective 
crime prevention can promote social cohesion in communities and development (Homel & 
Masson, 2016). Goal 11 of the United Nations’ SDGs targets making cities and human 
settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017). Gribanova 
and Vulfovich (2017) conducted a study of New York and St Petersburg and pointed out that the 
concentration of large populations and power in both cities contributes to creating conditions for 
the spread of criminal activity and the emergence of new urban crime. The types of crime in an 
urban context is different from rural areas (Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017). It is important to 
design policies that are geared towards creating safe, inclusive and just cities (Gribanova & 
Vulfovich, 2017). Gribanova and Vulfovich (2017) indicated that these policies require an 
efficient and nonviolent approach to achieving their objectives which should preoccupy city 
administrators. Gribanova and Vulfovich (2017) also informed their readers that, given the 
proximity of city authorities to the citizenry and their familiarity with the local context, city 
authorities are in a better position to develop crime prevention solutions. Accordingly, crime 
prevention policies must adopt a decentralized approach, because they require proximity of 
actors to implement them (Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017).  
Forging partnerships between police, community and local authorities 
 Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy and Endziņš (2017) conducted a review of the strategy for 
crime prevention and crime fighting in Lithuania. Whereas the authors acknowledged the fact 





the police, and the state, cannot combat/prevent crime without the society. Tumalavičius, 
Nikolayevskyy and Endziņš (2017) noted that the principles that guided the implementation of 
the crime prevention strategy in Lithuanian included respecting the rights and freedoms of each 
legal entity, a systematic approach towards combating and preventing crime and the involvement 
of all members of the society. Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy and Endziņš (2017) found that this 
resulted in a number of gains including a reduction in the crime rate and an enhancement of the 
population’s trust, in law enforcement institutions. The researchers also found that the approach 
has enhanced the opportunities for involving Lithuania’s municipalities in combating crime and 
making the society safe. 
In spite of the fact that the authors do not expressly use the term decentralization, the fact 
that the crime prevention strategy adopted a systemic approach, that involved the citizenry, 
municipalities and coordinating the activities of relevant institutions, there are sufficient pointers 
to the fact that decentralization was an essential part of Lithuania’s crime fighting strategy. 
Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy & Endziņš, (2017) argued that using an inter-institutional 
approach is important to enhance decentralization of criminal justice services and to make 
society safe. This is because the local government is an important ally and actor in combatting or 
preventing crime. Partnerships are important for creating access to the criminal justice system. 
These can be formed either through creating new ones or exploring existing ones. Consequently, 
criminal justice institutions can take advantage of an existing relationship between one part of 
the criminal justice chain and the public to carry out its operations. Such partnerships occurred in 
Liberia where the Women and Children Protection Section of the Liberia National Police (LNP) 
collaborated with the community policing unit of the LNP to undertake public outreach on issues 





Establish a community policing program 
 Another means of enhancing access to the criminal justice system is through community 
policing. This is a means through which the community and the police forge a partnership to 
combat crime. When properly designed, and effectively managed, community policing enhances 
the population’s access to the criminal justice system. The concept of community policing is 
practiced in postconflict settings like Sierra Leone and this led to the decentralization of security 
structures (Bangura, 2018). Malochet (2007) describes community policing as “decentralized 
police, accepted by the population, which intervenes under a mandate in order to better deal with 
the plurality of security demands” (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016, p. 336).  
Despite this definition, Kasali and Odetola (2016) acknowledged the conceptual 
challenges associated with defining community policing. The authors attribute this challenge, 
partly to the fact that, conceptually, community policing continues to evolve. This led Kasali and 
Odetola (2016) to conclude that defining what community policing should depend on the 
context. Community policing must solve the problems for which it is designed and implemented 
(Kasali & Odetola, 2016). Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) asserted that community 
policing is the form of policing that the citizens can easily evaluate. Governments around the 
world are recognizing the fact that they cannot monopolize security hence the need to collaborate 
with local communities to deliver security (Gibbs & Ahlin, 2013; Kasali & Odetola, 2016 & 
Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy & Endziņš, 2017).  
Mac Ginty (2015) observed that increasingly, international interventions are using 
community safety initiatives to bring safety to unstable contexts (Homel & Masson, 2016). 
Examples of such interventions are: - the decentralized multi-stakeholder public consultations in 





security councils in Kosovo, Bangladesh and Nepal, and various mediation initiatives between 
local government bodies and gangs in Latin and Central America (Homel & Masson, 2016).  
As is evidenced below, community-policing strategies have been used in many 
jurisdictions to combat crime, including Liberia (Bacon, 2015), South Africa (Super, 2014), 
Nigeria (Kasali & Odetola, 2016), Lithuania (Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy & Endziņš, 2017) 
and in the United States (Bent-Goodley & Smith, 2017).  
Community policing in South Africa 
The Government of South Africa involved the community, through community policing 
forums to address overcrowding in prisons (Super, 2014). Through this approach, the community 
has a say in what happens to a person accused of a crime (e.g., whether to grant bail or banish the 
accused person from the community and even the duration of a jail sentence [Super, 2014]). 
Super (2014) indicated that the partnership between the community and the police in crime 
prevention goes as far as the community mobilizing to oppose the granting of bail. An 
amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act in 1997 gave the victim and the community in which 
the crime occurred a say in bail decisions (Super, 2014). The South African police considers the 
communities as so important that they (i.e. the police) measure the impact of their social crime 
prevention strategy in terms of the number of crime awareness programs they have held and the 
number of street communities or neighborhood watch groups it has established. This role given 
to the community led Super (2014) to predict that the community is going to get active in the 
recruitment of police officers in South Africa.  
 The involvement of the community in crime related issues has resulted in a vengeful 
community playing a major role in the criminal justice system (Super, 2014). However, this 





Super (2014) acknowledged the fact that, in South Africa, the involvement of the community in 
criminal issues is historically associated with marginalized communities. The researcher insisted 
that this historical fact coincided with the transition from minority rule in South Africa, which 
also coincided with a peak in crime and the need for the government to combat the crime wave.  
 Super (2014) cited Lacey and Zedner (1995) who asserted that using the community in 
crime prevention is attractive not because it reduces crimes but because it gives an indication the 
government is combating crime. A contrary view is held by De Klerk who, according to Super 
(2014), argued that engaging in the ideology of collectivism results in vigilantism. This is 
because the partnership between the community and the police do not result in the desired 
results. Super (2014) cited a number of examples from South Africa that demonstrates the role of 
the community in making pronouncements on the fate of suspects, including banishing them and 
pulling their houses down, without the victims or their relatives questioning this. However, Super 
(2014) noted that in spite of the perceived partnership with the police the fact that the police are 
under resourced will result in situations where they cannot intervene and this leaves the 
community to act on their own, thus creating a situation where community watch forums 
members sometimes take part in mob violence. De Klerk and Lacey and Zedner (1995) views in 
Super (2014) on the pros and cons of an active involvement of the community in policing are 
justified, hence designers and implementers of community policing programs must bear this in 
mind and adopt a model of community policing that addresses the said concerns.  
Community policing in Nigeria  
Kasali and Odetola (2016) affirmed the utility of adopting a community policing 
approach to policing. The researchers insisted that community policing is a viable alternative 





Odetola (2016) evaluated the impact of community policing in Nigeria and found a negative 
image of the relationship between the police and the community. Oversight and accountability 
within the Nigerian police were lacking (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). There was also a lack of trust 
between the police and the community and this was affecting the performance of the police 
(Kasali & Odetola, 2016).  
Kasali and Odetola (2016) found that, in Nigeria, the impact of community policing as an 
alternative policing approach has been poor. This is in spite of the fact that a Community Safety 
Partnership Forum, bringing together the community, the police and local government officials, 
to work together on community policing, had been piloted in Lagos. Nigeria, Kasali and Odetola 
(2016) found that several reforms had been implemented to orient the police in Nigeria on 
community policing. However, in spite of the resources committed, the impact is yet to be felt 
(i.e., police officers remain steeped in traditional policing strategies [Kasali & Odetola, 2016]). 
Several factors including a misapplication of the concept of community policing and poor 
implementation account for this (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). Kasali and Odetola (2016) 
recommended decentralizing the structure of the police department to allow better police 
deployment in the community to respond to citizens needs and build a trustful relationship. 
Kasali & Odetola (2016) also recommended that civilians should be deployed into auxiliary 
positions to perform liaison functions as this will generate closer ties between civilians and the 
police. These recommendations of the researchers are insightful as they point to the fact that 
putting in place a community policing program does not, in itself, result in decentralization of the 
criminal justice system or access to criminal justice services. It also points to the important role 






Community policing in the United States 
 Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017) advocated for community policing as a law enforcement 
tool. Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017) encouraged designers of community policing programs to 
tailor community policing initiatives to suit the context in which it will be implemented. Kasali 
and Odetola (2016) shared this view. Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017) conducted a study on 
community policing within the framework of Afro centrism. Afro centrism is rooted in equity 
and justice with interconnectedness of the policy and the community, language, self reliance, oral 
tradition, communalism, fundamental goodness, and spirituality as some of its elements (Bent-
Goodley & Smith, 2017). Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017) are convinced that applying these 
elements to community policing increase the chances of combating crime and improving the 
relationship between the police and the black community in the United States. This is because 
factors like race and economic status affect the citizen’s perception of police legitimacy (Gibbs 
& Ahlin, 2013), a fact which has led researchers such as Gibbs and Ahlin (2013) to advocate for 
the police to improve their relationships with minority groups. 
Conditions for effective community policing 
 As previously noted, partnership between the police and the community does not 
automatically guarantee successful community policing (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). Kasali and 
Odetola (2016) argued that the success of community policing depends on the effectiveness of 
the engagement between the police and the community. Flynn (2004) supported this point 
asserting that trust is important for a positive outcome of an engagement between the police and 
the community on community policing (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). Kasali and Odetola (2016) 
stressed the fact that community policing alters the power dynamics in police institutions hence 





understand the community policing philosophy (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). This means that the 
philosophy of community policing must be incorporated even into recruitment processes for the 
police. Most importantly, police departments have to reform their relationships with local 
communities and the community’s views must be solicited in making policies that impact on 
their security and safety. Gibbs and Ahlin (2013) subscribed to this view. As previously noted, 
Super (2014) cautions against the over involvement of the community in the criminal justice 
process, as their over involvement in combating crime takes away the neutrality that should 
characterize the criminal justice system.  
As previously pointed out, community policing must involve the community and be 
designed to suit the context. This point is supported by the findings of Bent-Goodley and Smith 
(2017) who, while, recognizing the challenges in the relationship between the police and the 
African American community in the United States of America, advocated for a community 
policing approach that is African centric. By this approach, the community and the family are 
involved, and efforts should be made to understand the culture of the people (Bent-Goodley & 
Smith, 2017). This suggests a partnership between the private citizens and public institutions, in 
this case a partnership between the police and members of the community. This partnership is an 
important condition precedent for effective decentralization of criminal justice services. Another 
condition identified by Kasali and Odetola (2016) is that policing institutions must be structured 
in a manner that supports the implementation of community policing. Finally, oversight and 
accountability are key elements for successful community policing (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). 
Impact of community policing on the legitimacy of the police institution 
Gibbs and Ahlin (2013) asserted that there is a direct relationship between the citizen’s 





This means that a police officer/agency that is perceived by the public as legitimate, including 
being fair and consistent in discharging his/her/its functions, will receive the public’s 
cooperation and this will positively impact their work (Gibbs & Ahlin, 2013). In other words, in 
spite of the case made for decentralization of criminal justice services, in this case the police, if 
citizens question the legitimacy of the police, their presence across the community is of little or 
no significance. 
Implement the proximity concept of internal security 
Access to the criminal justice system can be enhanced through the implementation of the 
Proximity Concept of Internal Security (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). This is an approach 
to security adopted in Switzerland and manifests itself by the police maintaining close contact 
with the population at the local level (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). This results in the 
police gaining a proper understanding of local security challenges (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 
2016). This enables security policies to be formulated according to the preferences of the local 
community (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016).  
From its description, the proximity concept of internal security is in many respects like 
community policing, though Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) made no such reference to 
these similarities. Being likened to community policing suggests that the merits and demerits 
associated with community policing can arguably be said to apply to policing approaches that 
involve the Proximity Concept of Internal Security. However, Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus 
(2016) highlighted the fact that the Proximity Concept of Internal Security has limited 
application, as even in Switzerland it is not applied to all crimes. For instance, new security 
challenges like cybercrime are not dealt with at the local level hence the concept does not apply. 





financial pressures confronting Switzerland and the duplication of efforts and wastage of 
resources arising from using this concept have resulted in police reforms (Jacot-Descombes & 
Niklaus, 2016). According to Sheffeler (2012), the reorganization of the police has resulted in a 
policing approach that tilts towards recentralization (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016).  
Whereas the challenges associated with implementing the Proximity Concept of Internal 
Security have resulted in reforms that have led to a near recentralization of the police in 
Switzerland, it is inappropriate to conclude that implementing the Proximity Concept of Internal 
Security is inappropriate for Liberia. This is because the challenges associated with this concept 
are peculiar to Switzerland (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). In this regard, it could be 
argued with some success that the findings may be applicable to contexts that practice a federal 
system of government. Therefore, for a context like Liberia, which is a unitary state, there is a 
higher probability that the results of applying the Proximity Concept to Internal Security will 
yield the desired positive results of enhancing access of the citizenry to the criminal justice 
system.   
Third party policing 
Third Party Policing is another approach that can be used to enhance access to the 
criminal justice system (Mazerolle, 2014). Consequently, Mazerolle (2014) asserted that, “Good 
policing requires the police to foster and sustain collaboration in ways that galvanize social 
action against crime without either extending the reach of police or overriding  
 
the purposes of other agencies” (p. 361). Mazerolle and Ransley (2005) indicated that Third 
Party Policing involves a partnership between the police and an external entity (the third party) 





are used to prevent or control crime (Mazerolle, 2014). Mazerolle (2014) claimed that policing in 
general requires a partnership between the police and third parties. Furthermore, Mazerolle 
(2014) indicated that there is increasingly a shift from encouraging relevant actors to establish 
such partnerships to making such partnerships a requirement in policing models. The Police and 
Fire Reform (Scotland) Act (2012) is one example cited by the author as evidencing this shift.  
Mazerolle (2014) informed readers that in operationalizing Third Party Policing the 
police indirectly target problems associated with crime through partnerships with third parties. 
Mazerolle (2014) observed that, in Third Party Policing, partnerships are formed for enhanced 
capacity to control crime. Third Party Policing focuses on individuals, groups and locations that 
are crime prone (Mazerolle, 2014). Third Party Policing can occur within single or multiple 
partnerships (Mazerolle, 2014). Mazerolle (2014) asserted that where there are multiple partners 
the partnership may be complex. However, the multifaceted approach that ensues from the 
presence of various partners increases the chances of a successful approach to control or prevent 
crime (Mazerolle, 2014).  
Conditions for effective third party policing 
 Mazerolle (2014) made the point that, although it is not the preferred approach, there are 
instances where the partnership is forced as the third party is unwilling or less willing to enter a 
Third Party Policing relationship. Where there is collaboration or a willing partner, there is a 
potential for sustained and positive impact (Mazerolle, 2014). Effective communication and 
mutual respect amongst the partners are important conditions precedent for successful Third 
Party Policing (Mazerolle, 2014). For Third Party Policing to be effective the third party must 
have a legislative mandate granting them the powers required to control or prevent crime 





Third Party Policing purposes (i.e., there should be other reasons for granting these powers to the 
third party, such as licensing or regulation [Mazerolle, 2014]). Mazerolle (2014) asserted that 
third parties are better crime control partners. In Third Party Policing, these powers are referred 
to as legal levers (Mazerolle, 2014). Mazerolle & Ransley (2005) define legal levers as “legal 
powers possessed by third parties that create a crime control or crime prevention capacity that is 
otherwise dormant, under-utilized, or unavailable to police” (Mazerolle, 2014, p. 351).  
Mazerolle (2014) observes that in Third Party Policing, the existence of partnerships is 
not enough to generate the desired result (s) especially over the long term. However, such 
partnerships backed by the third-party with access to clearly articulated legal levers (i.e. by law) 
will increase the chances of achieving the desired results of the Third Party Policing (Mazerolle, 
2014). The ability and willingness of third parties to initiate and escalate sanctions is another 
conditions precedent for effective Third Party Policing (Mazerolle, 2014). Bond and Gittell 
(2010) stated that the lack of formal systems for fostering partnerships is a possible reason for 
Third Party Policing to fail (Mazerolle, 2014). Lastly, Third Party Policing partnerships must be 
sustained to create the desired impact. To support this position, Mazerolle (2014) conducted a 
longitudinal study of the ABILITY Truancy Trial in Australia, a Third Party Policing between 
the police and schools, and concluded that, when sustained over a long period of time, Third 
Party Policing is a cost effective approach to crime control.  
Design and implementation of paralegal programs 
 Implementing paralegal schemes is another way to enhance access to the criminal justice 
system. Swenson (2018) studied two paralegal schemes in Timor-Leste and found that the 
paralegals helped resolve disputes in a relatively shorter time compared to the state justice 





was unable to access (Swenson, 2018). For instance, Graydon (2011) claimed that, in the 
Oeccussee District, the paralegal scheme was the only link between the local population and the 
formal justice system (Swenson, 2018). Paralegal programs are also a relatively cheaper way of 
providing access to justice. Swenson (2018) also found that even when the state used paralegals 
to enhance its capacity and bore the cost, it was relatively cheaper for the state compared to the 
state using its legal aid lawyers.  
Legal aid schemes 
 Legal aid schemes are a variant of paralegal programs. Swenson (2018) indicated that 
running legal aid programs is an effective way to decentralize criminal justice services, 
particularly to rural communities. Mayo (2013) asserted that the right to justice is a fundamental 
right in the modern state. However, poverty and other challenges make assessing this right a 
challenge for a section of the population (Mayo, 2013). Given the place of the right to justice in 
the governance of the modern state, governments have in place social interventions like legal aid 
schemes for persons who are unable to afford professional legal advice to enjoy their right to 
justice (Dandurand, 2014; Mayo, 2013 & Watson, Rukundakuvuga & Matevosyan, 2017). 
Dandurand (2014) indicated that a report of a public commission on legal aid in British 
Columbia captured the importance of legal aid schemes for the criminal justice process in a 
modern state. The report notes that timely and appropriate criminal legal aid results in a 
significant cost savings to the criminal justice system. Dandurand (2014) indicated that the 
authors of the Commission’s report noted that “inadequate criminal legal aid costs society in 
addition to court appearance, longer trials, extended jail times and increased recidivism, all of 





Mayo (2013) however laments over the fact that the rise in neo liberal ideology has 
resulted in dwindling public funding allocated for legal aid services. Lippman (2014) shared 
similar sentiments as the author expressed worry over the lack of adequate public funding to 
support legal aid services for the poor. Davies and Worden (2017) made a similar assertion to the 
effect that there is consensus amongst scholars that public defender programs for indigent 
persons are underfunded. This development is creating ethical challenges for legal aid service 
providers as in some cases they have to do the bidding of their funders which may not 
necessarily be how they (i.e., the service providers) would ordinarily want to conduct the affairs 
of their indigent clients (Mayo, 2013). Mayo (2013) also found that this and other factors had 
resulted in a reduction in morale amongst persons working to enhance access to justice for the 
indigent. This, according to Lippman (2014) is compounded by the absence of an adequate 
number of lawyers. Mayo (2013) expressed the conviction that without an increase in public 
funding for legal aid schemes, they have little chances of survival. Whereas Mayo (2013) 
expressed no aversion for securing funding from private sources to fund legal aid programs, the 
author maintained that this should not replace public funding, as the availability of public 
funding to support legal aid schemes is important for sustaining the schemes.  
Public defender programs 
 Davies and Worden (2017) conducted a study on funding for public defender programs 
in the United States of America. The researchers found that funding for public defense programs 
is linked to their ability to raise tax revenue. In the United States, counties are directed to fund 
legal aid services for indigent members of society in four different ways: - a public defender 
office, a conflict defender office, a legal aid society or assigned counsel (Davies & Worden, 





decentralized. Despite this, Davies and Worden (2017) found that counties with more 
disadvantaged persons spent less per capita on public defense and that the greater the need for 
public defense services, the lesser counties spent on each case.  
Lippman (2014) stressed the point that providing legal aid services yields generous 
results for public revenue mobilization. This is evidenced in the researcher’s assertion that for 
every dollar spent on legal services the return was up to 5 dollars to the public purse. Public 
defender programs are a form of legal aid service. Davies and Worden (2017) posited that the 
adequacy or otherwise of funding for public defense programs has had a direct impact on a 
number of indicators. For instance, Campbell and Christopher (2015) noted that:  
… in Houston, Brooklyn and Washington enhanced funding for public defenders’  
programs have resulted in improved service delivery, reduction of the caseloads of  
public defenders, speedy progression of cases, reductions in uncounseled guilty  
pleas, improved trial outcomes and an improvement in the reputation of public  
defenders amongst local judges (Davies & Worden, 2017, p. 314). 
Davies and Worden (2017) noted that public defender programs fall into the category of 
redistributive policies (i.e., a policy that draws from public resources to support disadvantaged 
members of the community) and criminal justice policy. Davies and Worden (2017) also argued 
that even though the right to counsel is a constitutional right, it is a policy problem that is subject 
to organizational, administrative and allocation decisions.  
Collaboration between the bench and the bar 
Lippman (2014) identifies other interventions that have enhanced access to the criminal 
justice system. The researcher asserted that the legal profession should support the judiciary in 





of interventions of the New York State judiciary to provide legal services for the poor. These 
included convincing the Governor and the Legislature to allocate funds to provide legal services 
to the indigent in society, and this has grown over time. Interventions used by New York’s 
judiciary include pro bono work by in house counsel, which allows lawyers who are in house 
counsel to employers in New York but licensed in other states, to appear in court in New York to 
represent clients in pro bono cases (Lippman, 2014). This intervention seeks to increase the pool 
of lawyers to increase the chances of poor members of society obtaining representation by 
counsel.  
Another intervention is the 50 hour pro bono bar association requirement (Lippman, 
2014). This seeks to build a culture of service amongst law students prior to becoming lawyers 
(Lippman, 2014). Law students are required to devote 50 hours of their time to provide pro bono 
legal services prior to being admitted to the New York Bar (Lippman, 2014). The pro bono 
scholars’ program is another intervention identified by Lippman (2014). This intervention 
requires law students to devote their last semester of law school to offer pro bono services 
(Lippman, 2014). Law students work under the supervision of a law firm or some other legal 
service provider in cooperation with the law school (Lippman, 2014). The students have the 
opportunity to sit for their bar exams and are admitted earlier than usual, as a reward for their 
services (Lippman, 2014). Lippman (2014) also mentioned the use of non-lawyers to provide 
legal services as another intervention. This intervention uses persons without formal legal 
training to provide poor people with legal advice and supporting them through the legal process 
(Lippman, 2014). Lippman (2014) argued that this is already done in the medical profession 
where midwives and nurses provide certain medical services for a lower fee. Persons providing 





that granting poor members of society legal representation is the surest way to adhere to the 
constitutional requirement of equal access to justice for all.  
Conditions to foster such collaboration 
 Lippman (2014) highlighted the importance of baseline data in order to determine the 
nature of the interventions and the opportunity to track implementation and progress of the said 
interventions. It is also evident from Lippman (2014) that for interventions seeking to give the 
poor access to legal services to be successful, a collaborative effort amongst multiple actors 
including the executive, legislature, judiciary, arms of government, the bar, citizens and the 
private sector is required. There must also be a culture of voluntary service amongst lawyers. 
Consequently, Lippman (2014) made the point that notwithstanding the various interventions to 
promote a culture of providing pro bono services, the potential impact of volunteerism in 
providing legal services for the poor is yet to be appreciated and harnessed.   
Using technology to aid decentralization of the criminal justice system 
Parkin and Wedeking (2016) argued that the prominent role of the internet and 
information communication technology (ICT) in the 21st Century is vital to enhance access to 
justice. Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017) advocated for using technology to 
enhance access to justice in postconflict settings, highlighting the processes, approach, benefits 
and impact of putting in place an electronic case management system for the justice system in 
Rwanda. According to Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017), the Government of 
Rwanda, aided by ICT, adopted a nationally owned, sector wide approach, which is centralized 
at the national level, to manage cases in the justice system. This capacity is extended across the 
country in partnership with the private sector, who have created e-kiosks across Rwanda, and the 





for a fee (Watson, Rukundakuvuga & Matevosyan, 2017). Watson, Rukundakuvuga and 
Matevosyan (2017) noted that there are automated reminders that are sent to all actors including 
litigants and the case management system is the only entry into the justice system.  
Advantages of using technology in case management in the justice system 
Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017) found that Rwanda’s technology based case 
management system is also used as an oversight and accountability tool. This has helped 
improve justice delivery. Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017) attributed the success 
of the program to the fact that it is national owned and has a centralized management approach. 
Rwanda’s approach has several features and advantages that transcend the criminal justice sector 
and, with the necessary modifications, could be replicated in other postconflict settings. These 
features and advantages include a partnership between the private sector and the government to 
enhance access to justice which creates jobs, especially for the youth. Also, it is nationally 
owned. 
Other criminal justice system services that can be provided with the aid of technology  
 
Technology can be used to provide the following criminal justice services: -  
(a) Policing: - Holmberg (2014) and Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) 
advocated for policing functions that can be performed with the aid of technology to be 
taken over by technology to free human resources to perform policing duties that require 
human beings. 
(b)  Incarceration: - Technology can also be used to incarcerate persons found 
guilty of criminal conduct (Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017). Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf 
(2017) advocated for a fundamental but gradual shift from traditional forms of 





crime, noting that incarceration, particularly for long periods, does not necessarily 
prevent persons from reoffending (Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017). Technological 
incarceration entails electronic monitoring of the location of the offenders, conducting 
electronic surveillance of offender’s actions and remote immobilization of the offender 
(Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017). Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) noted the growth in 
using technology for incarceration and attributed this development to the confidence that 
courts and legislators have developed in this means of incarceration. 
Advantages of technological incarceration 
 Technological incarceration has the potential of being more effective in fulfilling all the 
objectives that sentencing seeks to achieve (i.e., specific and general deterrence, incapacitation 
and proportionality [Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017]). Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) also 
asserted that it is cost effective, so having the potential of reducing the cost of incarceration by 
one half or one third. Another advantage is that it increases the chances of persons being 
rehabilitated as they can take advantage of rehabilitation services that may not be available in 
prison but are accessible within the community where they are incarcerated (Bagaric, Hunter & 
Wolf, 2017). 
Disadvantages of technological incarceration 
As in the case of physical incarceration, technological incarceration does not completely 
prevent an incarcerated person from escaping (Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017). Consequently, 
Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) suggested a number of interventions to reduce the possibility of 
this occurring. These include limiting the movement of persons subject to this form of 
incarceration (i.e., limiting or concentrating movement to locations where there is the 





debunked by Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017), is the assertion that there is a possibility of 
technological incarceration breaching the human rights of convicts. The researchers argued that 
the potential of such rights being abused is higher in conventional prisons. It should be noted that 
Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) advocated for limited use of the physical form of incarceration 
(i.e., it should not be used to imprison persons accused and convicted of serious crimes such as 
sexual related offences).  
Whereas the use of technological incarceration may have advantages, it is clear that the 
infrastructure required to implement this form of incarceration is not well developed, even in the 
developed world. It must also be noted that to effectively deploy this method of incarceration 
there is the need for effective oversight. Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) do not equate the use 
of technological incarceration to decentralization of prisons, however, using technology to 
incarcerate has the effect of decentralizing prisons/corrections services and making this criminal 
justice service more accessible.  
Access to the judiciary 
 Another part of the criminal justice chain that can be decentralized by using technology 
is some aspects of the work of the judiciary (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). Parkin and Wedeking 
(2016) asserted that embedded within the phrase “equal justice under the law” is an 
acknowledgement and an expectation that access to the law and legal system must be equal and 
sufficient for all citizens. Open access to the legal system in the United States is a feature of the 
United States’ legal system, hence for the courts to enhance their legitimacy they should aspire to 
making transparency and providing information their hallmark (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). Well 
organized and better managed judiciaries promote access to online information (Parkin & 





to justice by looking at access to justice through the websites of 50 judiciaries in the United 
States. According to the researchers, the role of the internet in the current age has resulted in a 
phenomenon where people are visiting websites to get information. Parkin and Wedeking (2016) 
made the point that a critical link for citizens in the 21st Century is to connect them with their 
court system via the internet. Hence, provision must be made for this to happen.  
Benefits of making the judiciary accessible via the internet 
 Some benefits in the policymaking arena occur when the judiciary becomes accessible 
through the internet (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). Parkin and Wedeking (2016) referred to 
Lawrence (1990), who indicated that where poor people have access to the courts, the judiciary’s 
agenda is influenced, and this influences policymaking. Reviewing the said websites, Parkin and 
Wedeking (2016) found varied information on them. The researchers attributed the variance in 
information to factors like the complex nature of the court system and, to a lesser degree, internet 
penetration. Partisan political control of state institutions also accounted for the varied nature of 
the content on the websites (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). Parkin and Wedeking (2016) explained 
that partisan forces may influence the content and design of websites and this may result in the 
information on websites being skewed towards a particular group of individuals, such as lawyers, 
hence defeating or reducing the impact of websites on access to justice. Internet connectivity, 
penetration and sophistication have an impact on accessing information on websites (i.e., when 
there is the probability that citizens will access a judiciary’s website, more information will be 
provided online [Parkin & Wedeking, 2016]).  
Constructing buildings to deliver criminal justice services 
The most widely used approach to make the criminal justice system accessible is to 





buildings are prisons, courthouses and police stations. Criminal justice services will then be 
provided in or from these buildings.  
Positive consequences of building additional prisons in Brazil 
Silvestre (2016) investigated the consequences of the Brazilian Government to construct 
prisons across the country to deal with overcrowded prisons. The benefits of this include 
employment for the residents of the localities where the prisons were built, frequent visits by 
relatives of inmates to the prisons and by extension the communities where the prisons were 
located, which in turn boosted the local economy in areas such as transportation, accommodation 
and trading (Silvestre, 2016). Silvestre (2016) informed readers that due to this approach, an 
entire industry was built around prisons in Brazil. Silvestre (2016) findings highlighted the 
positive unintended consequences of decentralization on the community.  
Limitations associated with building additional prisons in Brazil 
Silvestre (2016) found that despite the positive impact of the prisons, there was a general 
dissatisfaction amongst residents with the prison projects. For instance, there was a feeling of 
insecurity amongst residents because of the presence of strangers in their midst and prisoners 
being allowed out of prison periodically to interact with the local population (Silvestre, 2016). Of 
significant note is the finding by Silvestre (2016) that the construction of additional prisons did 
not reduce the prison population but rather resulted in a surge in the prison population. It is 
evident from Silvestre (2016) that the efforts to decentralize prisons in Brazil created new 
demographics and new social, cultural and political challenges. The researcher asserted that the 
feeling of insecurity was because of the absence of adequate numbers of police officers in the 
communities where the prisons were located. The presence of prisoners and members of their 





profile of the cities and created additional demands on the police to provide security. This 
drama’s home the point that a holistic approach must be adopted towards decentralization, 
especially of the criminal justice system. Silvestre (2016) informed readers that the decision to 
decentralize prisons was not to deal with a criminal justice issue but to address unemployment 
(i.e., political and economic issues). This points to the fact that there may be other motives for 
packaging a policy as decentralization, thus highlighting the politics involved. Packaging an 
intervention in the clothes of decentralization may be relatively easier to sell to the public as the 
general benefits of decentralization are indicators that the ordinary citizen can readily identify 
with.  
Involve the customary justice system 
 Ubink and Weeks (2017) conducted a comparative review of how South Africa and 
Malawi adopted different approaches to use their customary justice systems to enhance access to 
justice for rural communities. The harmonization of Liberia’s statutory and traditional justice 
systems was identified in the National Plan of Action for Gender Based Violence as one way to 
enhance access to justice particularly for women (Bamidele, 2017). Dandurand (2014) also 
advocated for increasing the use of mediation as a dispute resolution approach. Whereas a 
reference to mediation is not conterminous with using customary justice mechanisms, in practice, 
mediation is an approach for resolving disputes within the customary justice system.       
Advantages of using the customary justice system 
Customary justice systems are effective mechanisms for enhancing access to justice in 
rural communities in Africa (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). This is because they are accessible, 
cheaper, use fewer formal procedures and speak languages that the local community speak and 





geographical hegemony hence the informal justice system will be the source of justice for a 
while.  
Challenges associated with using the customary justice system 
 A number of challenges arise from using the customary justice system to enhance access 
to justice. For instance, human rights like the right to legal representation are violated, (Ubink & 
Weeks, 2017). There is a need for oversight over these mechanisms to check these violations. 
Customary justice systems must be subject to the constitution and other fundamental human 
rights norms and standards (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). Bacon (2015) observed that to get Liberia’s 
customary justice system to uphold human rights a number of unintended consequences have 
occurred. These include the informal justice system being prohibited from hearing certain cases, 
so victims of those cases have no justice wherever the formal justice system is inaccessible. 
Ubink and Weeks (2017) found that, in Malawi, the issue of who appoints persons responsible 
for adjudicating in customary justice processes, and how this impacts the doctrine of separation 
of powers, was highlighted.  According to Ubink and Weeks (2017) at a certain time in Malawi’s 
history, people presiding in customary justice processes were appointed by the Executive even 
though they were performing judicial functions.  
Dealing with the associated challenges 
 To address the abuse that may occur in customary justice resolution forums, there is the 
need to create oversight and accountability structures to oversee customary justice processes and 
mechanisms (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). The need to make these forums subject to the constitution 
and the imperatives of upholding the doctrine of separation of powers translates into the 
regulating customary courts (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). However, Ubink and Weeks (2017) 





waters down some of the advantages associated with the system. Ubink and Weeks (2017) also 
found that the jurisdiction of traditional courts in both Malawi and South Africa were 
circumscribed. The Malawian traditional courts dealt with a limited number of civil cases with 
the formal courts dealing with criminal cases and certain civil cases (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). 
Furthermore, persons aggrieved by decisions of the customary courts could appeal against them 
in the formal courts (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). According to Ubink and Weeks (2017), South 
Africa has similar measures in place (i.e. customary courts deal with civil cases and minor 
criminal offences). It is obvious from the foregoing that these arrangements are intended to 
provide some degree of oversight over the customary justice system in Malawi and South Africa.  
Considerations for determining how customary justice systems should operate alongside 
the formal justice system 
 Ubink and Weeks (2017) opined that deciding on which model is adopted by a country 
when formalizing customary justice processes as part of justice system reform is a political and 
sovereign decision influenced by factors like the country’s history. This reality is evident in 
Malawi where, because the influence of traditional authorities was eroded due to the abuse of 
traditional courts by a previous dictatorial regime, a hybrid system, in which lay persons are 
made chairs of local courts and assisted by persons versed in customary law, has been 
established (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). On the other hand, in South Africa, because of efforts by 
the Apartheid regime to weaken the chieftaincy institution and the role of chiefs in the local 
community, the post Apartheid government tried to consolidate the place of chiefs in the 








Impact of legal pluralism on decentralization 
The coexistence of traditional and statutory justice systems at the local level reinforces 
the power structures and entrenches the position of the local elite while depriving the nonelite 
from having access to justice (Jackson, 2013). Consequently, depending on whose views are 
sought, legal pluralism is offering multiple forums for seeking justice or is seen as problematic, 
resulting in forum shopping and abuse of human rights (Jackson, 2013). The reason being that 
the elite manipulate the system for their benefit (Jackson, 2013). The political dynamics at the 
local level makes it very possible for chiefs, as the political elite at the local level, to influence 
local political institutions (Jackson, 2013). This creates varied negative consequences including 
making local political institutions maintain their biases against women and the youth (Jackson, 
2013).  
Sierra Leone, like many other postconflict settings, has a pluralistic legal system (i.e., a 
customary and formal justice system [Jackson, 2013]). Jackson (2013) investigated the political 
dynamics of legal pluralism in Sierra Leone to understand the interaction between both systems 
of justice and the significance of power relations at the local level as a result of decentralization. 
Jackson (2013) observed that there is a failure to see the link between reforms in the area of 
decentralization and those of the justice and security sectors, with issues relating to justice and 
security being deemed separate from those associated with political power. Jackson (2013) 
illustrates this point by noting that, in Sierra Leone, chiefs appoint the chairs and the four 
members of the traditional court. This according to Castillejo (2009) resulted in a situation where 
the courts become instruments of the chief (Jackson, 2013). The situation becomes worse 





the district level and there is almost no opportunity, in practice, to seek redress for decisions of a 
traditional court (Jackson, 2013).  
Use restorative justice processes 
Restorative justice processes are similar to customary justice processes. They are another 
approach that can enhance access to the criminal justice system. Nnam (2016) investigated how 
overcrowding in prisons in Nigeria can be addressed. The researcher argued that using 
restorative justice processes is the surest way to reduce overcrowding in Nigeria’s prisons and to 
ensure that lawbreakers are reformed and live as responsible members of the society after being 
punished. Countries whose criminal justice systems lack personnel and a presence across the 
country can use community leaders to employ restorative justice processes to maintain harmony 
in the society. Gal (2016) also advocated for involving the community in restorative justice 
programs.  
Nnam (2016) expressed concern over the overconcentration of the criminal justice system 
on keeping lawbreakers away from society as opposed to getting their victims and the 
community at large, actively participating in determining the punishment for offenders. Nnam 
(2016) grounds the research in the Reintegrative Shaming Theory. According to this theory, a 
way to maintain law and order in the community is to have lawbreakers to admit their guilt, show 
remorse and engage in attitudinal change (Nnam, 2016). This theory has a strong rehabilitation 
component (Nnam, 2016).  
Advantages of using restorative justice processes 
 Nnam (2016) made the point that restorative justice has advantages for the victim, the 
offender, the community and the country. It has the potential to reduce overcrowding in prisons 





challenge of congested prisons is not limited to Nigeria. Congested prisons come along with a 
burden on the public purse to care for inmates. Nnam (2016) found that in Nigeria, a significant 
number of inmates in the prisons are pretrial detainees. Their long periods of incarceration and 
the conditions in which they lived violate their fundamental human rights (Nnam, 2016). Also, 
prisons are known to be places where people often get exposed to more serious criminal conduct 
and, in today’s world, prisons have become places for radicalization (Nnam, 2016). The nature of 
the design and workings of the classical criminal justice system ignores the victim, a situation 
that may negatively affect the ability of victims to bring closure to the effect of a particular 
criminal conduct (Nnam, 2016). Since there is an increase in the chances of offenders being 
reformed under the restorative system of justice is instructive, the reason being that it makes a 
case for turning to restorative justice to promote public safety and access to justice.  
Disadvantages of using restorative justice processes to decongest prisons 
 Nnam (2016) advocated for using restorative justice in Nigeria’s criminal justice system. 
However, the researcher appeared to have advocated for restorative justice to be applied in all 
criminal cases. This creates challenges, particularly for a society that is yet to accept this form of 
justice. There are certain crimes that are too serious and complex so should be dealt with by a 
modern democratic state’s retributive criminal justice system and offenders incarcerated.  
Conditions precedents to maximize benefits of restorative justice processes 
To operationalize restorative justice processes a number of condition precedents must be 
met (Nnam, 2016). These include political will to implement this system of justice, that society is 
reoriented and accepts restorative justice as an effective and necessary crime fighting approach, 
that there are structures in place to ensure oversight and accountability and that negative 





2016). Gal (2016), in a study of a restorative justice program in Israel, found that members of the 
community were active in the program’s success. It must however be noted that active 
involvement of the community cannot occur without the presence of structures and systems that 
are capable and provide restorative justice services. These structures therefore need to be 
decentralized to make restorative justice programs successful.  
Improve communication and collaboration between criminal justice actors at the local level 
Dandurand (2014) acknowledged the fact that the criminal justice system is a complex 
system made up of many actors/parts that rely on each other to function. Where the various parts 
are not working effectively, it negatively affects the efficiency of the criminal justice system and 
creates doubts in the minds of the citizenry about the system’s ability to keep them safe 
(Dandurand, 2014). Dandurand (2014) argued that the lack of public confidence in the criminal 
justice system results in a situation where individual citizens resort to private security 
arrangements to protect themselves. Dandurand (2014) lamented over the inefficiencies in the 
criminal justice system in multiple countries and the impact of this on the capacity of the system. 
The researcher advocated for an improvement in how local criminal justice actors work and 
recommended that they work in a collaborative manner as this will positively affect the system’s 
functionality.  
Increase the use of diversionary programs and pretrial processes 
Dandurand (2014) noted that trials should not be the only place where disputes are 
resolved. The researcher advocated for the creation of pretrial processes in the criminal justice 
system. Dandurand (2014) also encouraged the use of diversion strategies to facilitate an early 
disposal of cases and the number of cases that the criminal justice system has to deal with. These 





authorities. For instance, traditional leaders or institutions can be responsible for supervising 
persons participating in diversionary programs. Dandurand (2014) further noted that mediation in 
the criminal justice process and various restorative justice programs have the potential of 
offering pointers on how diversion programs can be structured.  
Create and use specialized criminal justice institutions 
According to Dandurand (2014), creating specialized or problem solving courts, 
specialized prosecutors and police investigation squads are some measures that can be taken to 
make the criminal justice system efficient. Dandurand (2014) does not package this 
recommendation as decentralization, however, creating specialized parts of the criminal justice 
chain should enhance access to these institutions and, depending on the mandate of these 
specialized institutions, they will result in a decentralization of the criminal justice system. For 
instance, the creation of a specialized court to deal with sexual crimes in a postconflict setting 
may result in establishing this court in a geographical location where sexual and gender-based 
crimes are prevalent. All things being equal, this would immediately result in the 
decentralization of the courts. This will affect other parts of the criminal justice chain and, in 
theory, create access to justice for victims and perpetrators. As previously noted, in Liberia, a 
Sexual Offences Court, a Woman and Children Protection Section (WACPS) and a Sexual and 
Gender Based Violence Unit were established (Bacon, 2015). Units of the WACPS were to be 
established in all police stations across the country to improve the responsiveness of the police to 
deal with sexual and gender related offenses (Bacon, 2015).  
Augment police strength with a volunteer police reserve force 
This approach was used in Kenya, where the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) was 





(Agade, 2015). According to Agade (2015), the KPR was a state approved, poorly resourced and 
not well trained voluntary police force who augmented the Kenyan police and performed some 
law enforcement and policing duties. Agade (2015) noted that oversight and accountability 
within the KPR was weak and their mandate fluid. The KPR sometimes stood side by side with 
the Kenya police and discharged the same duties, but the police were better compensated 
(Agade, 2015). Agade (2015) found that the KPR were also involved in providing private 
security services for private individuals at a fee. Agade (2015) claimed that this is against the 
rationale for setting up the KPR. The researcher also found that the KPR are a source of criminal 
activity because they lacked oversight, accountability, adequate training, resources and 
remuneration (Agade, 2015). Agade (2015) also found that the KPR could be a source of conflict 
given the context in which it operates, namely ongoing oil exploration in the county and the 
potential for loss of land and livelihoods.  
Another significant finding Agade (2015) made is that the KPR is a potentially strong 
complement to the regular police if effectively organized. The researcher noted efforts to 
formalize the KPR and recent legislation has incorporated the KPR into the regular Kenyan 
police. In seeking to create access to criminal justice services by privatizing decentralized 
services, caution should be exercised to ensure that the purpose for decentralizing them is not 
defeated. Therefore, attention should be paid to management, accountability, resource allocation 
and equity in remuneration for all actors, (i.e., private or public), involved in providing criminal 
justice services. It is also important that such private arrangements are periodically reviewed.  
Switzerland also engaged the services of private security companies to perform certain 
policing tasks (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). In Switzerland, reforms of security 





implementation of a model of policing referred to as two-level policing (Jacot-Descombes & 
Niklaus, 2016). Overall, this model gives municipalities the freedom to determine how they 
approach policing, including whether to hire a private security company to perform some aspects 
of providing security like parking surveillance, as opposed to engaging cantons to provide these 
services (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) noted that 
whereas this model gives municipalities the freedom to determine the approach to providing 
security, it is complex and costly.  
Involve citizens in exercising oversight over criminal justice actors/institutions 
Effective oversight and accountability are critical features for every modern criminal 
justice system. It is a feature of all criminal justice systems in countries that are seeking to 
develop a democratic culture (Nall & Mamayek, 2013). Decentralization of the criminal justice 
system provides a more compelling reason to put in place effective oversight arrangements for 
the system. This is because decentralization of criminal justice services increases the contact 
between personnel working within the criminal justice system and the citizenry, which increases 
the chances of human violations occurring. Nall and Mamayek (2013) indicated that there are 
various models of civilian oversight mechanisms for the police. These include human rights 
commissions, anticorruption commissions, ombudsman and civilian oversight boards (Nall & 
Mamayek, 2013). It must be noted that sometimes the mechanisms identified above are a hybrid 
(Nall & Mamayek, 2013). Nall and Mamayek (2013) found this to be the case in Hong Kong. 
The researcher also found that apart from countries who adopted a dedicated civilian oversight 
board, other oversight institutions usually carry out multiple mandates.  
 Nall and Mamayek (2013) investigated the growing interest of Asians in the democratic 





police. The researchers found that many developed economies have recognized the importance 
of the involvement of citizens in handling complaints of police misconduct (Nall & Mamayek, 
2013). Nall and Mamayek (2013) observed that there is a correlation, though not sufficient, 
between the level of democracy that a country enjoys and the involvement of its citizens in 
providing oversight and accountability in the criminal justice system. The researchers further 
noted that in developed economies the description of a police institution as democratic is an 
indication that the police work as agents who protect and serve their community. The authors 
also found that countries that are ranked highly as democracies put in place policing systems that 
are “open, transparent and accountable to civilian oversight mechanisms” (Nall and Mamayek, 
2013, p. 121). However, Nall and Mamayek (2013) found no correlation between the democratic 
credentials of a country and the number of mechanisms in place that civilians participate in 
oversight. A case in point is China, which has a well developed civilian oversight board (Nall & 
Mamayek, 2013). According to Nall and Mamayek (2013), their study revealed that “democracy 
rankings are not good predictors of the existence of the values and elements of democratic 
policing in nations” (p. 127). Nall and Mamayek (2013) attempted to explain this finding by 
asserting that perhaps it is because democratic values and principles are so well assimilated by 
the population in advanced democracies that there is no need for civilian oversight. If this 
assertion is sustained, then there is a stronger case for postconflict societies to put in place 
civilian oversight mechanisms to get their citizens actively involved in holding actors within 
their criminal justice system accountable.  
Summary 
Criminal justice system is a tool for stabilization in postconflict countries (Schroder & 





implement these reforms (Gordon, 2014). This has influenced the direction of the reforms and 
contributed to mixed results hence resulting in questions about the appropriateness of the reforms 
for postconflict societies (Gordon, 2014). In Chapter Two the challenges associated with 
internationally led support to reform the criminal justice system in postconflict countries with an 
emphasis on local ownership was presented. I also presented approaches used to decentralize 
criminal justice services, including using technology to increase access to the system (Bagaric, 
Hunter & Wolf, 2017 & Mazerolle, 2014), designing and implementing community policing 
programs (Bent-Goodley & Smith, 2017) and operating legal aid schemes (Mayo, 2013). Further, 
I demonstrated the importance of decentralization for access to the criminal justice system. 
The outcome of reviewing the literature on the phenomenon of interest revealed, among 
others that, to improve the chances of internationally supported interventions to reform criminal 
justice systems in postconflict settings yielding the desired results, the interventions must be 
tailored to suit the context where they are being implemented (Ansorg, 2017). This requires 
engagement with the citizenry (Gordon, 2014). However, in practice, this has not been done for 
varied reasons, including the associated practical difficulties in adopting this approach 
(Murdoch, 2015), the lack of political will, by the elite in postconflict countries, to engage with 
ordinary citizens in security sector reform processes (Murdoch, 2015 & Williams, 2018) and the 
absence of known and viable non Western approaches (Westernman, 2017) to justice and 
security sector reform. To address these challenges, several recommendations have been made 
including the need for a middle path that combines the quest for local ownership with 
approaches/practices that are working in other societies like the West (Murdoch, 2015).  
 In Chapter three, I presented the research design and describe the phenomenon of 





sampling, data collection strategy, sample size, the analysis plan, instrumentation and highlight 






Chapter 3: Research Method 
“You sit on the old mat, to plait the new mat”. 
A Liberian proverb 
Introduction 
In this qualitative study, I investigated how (the approach) criminal justice services were 
decentralized in Liberia between 2011 and 2017 and the extent to which the approaches towards 
decentralization in Liberia were influenced by the uniqueness of the Liberian context. Also 
investigated, in this study, is the effects of decentralizing criminal justice services on the 
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system and Liberia’s peace and stability.  
Description of Approach 
I used the grounded theory approach to answer the research questions of this study. The 
grounded theory “. . . is an approach to qualitative research that attempts to develop theory that 
comes from data or the field” (Ravitch & Carl, 2016, p. 22). The principal objective of 
conducting a qualitative research adopting the grounded theory approach is to provide theoretical 
explanations of themes that emerge from data collected pursuant to the study (Barello et al., 
2015; Patton, 2015). Barello et al. (2015) indicated that a researcher conducting a grounded 
theory qualitative research collects and analyzes data simultaneously, making it possible for the 





Rationale for the chosen approach. Several factors inform the decision to use the 
grounded theory approach for this study. These include the following: first, the participants (i.e., 
the prospective sources of data for my study were persons who have in varied ways interacted 
with Liberia’s criminal justice system, hence are competent to make significant contributions to 
answer the research questions). Second, the choice of the grounded theory approach aids the 
process of arriving at findings and making recommendations from data collected from Liberia, 
the research site, that are tailored for Liberia’s postconflict reconstruction. Third, in a desire to 
increase the chances of the recommendations of this study being implemented, I counted on the 
participants of this study to champion the implementation of recommendations. This is because, 
in a grounded theory study, the findings emerge from the data collected and analyzed. Therefore, 
because the participants of this study were drawn from key actors in Liberia’s criminal justice 
system, there is a greater chance of this study’s recommendations being implemented because 
the recommendations will emerge for the data participants provided during data collection for 
this study.  
Role of the Researcher 
Personal and professional relationships I have with participants. For almost 10 years, 
I actively participated in international efforts to provide technical support and advice to support 
the Government of Liberia in its efforts to reform the country’s criminal justice system. Broadly, 
the reforms focused on institution, law, and policy reform. The government sought to enhance 
access to the criminal justice system by decentralizing the services provided by the justice 
system. My previous work in Liberia meant that a professional relationship existed between 
participants and myself. These relationships, in some cases, transcend a professional one because 





personal friendships with some of the potential participants. In my professional capacity, I 
supervised some of the participants of this study at work. This may have created an uneven 
power relationship with some of the participants. Most important, having actively participated in 
international efforts to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system, this study was an indirect 
evaluation of my work in Liberia, thus creating a potential conflict of interest situation.  
How I managed biases. In qualitative research, it is utopian to assume that a researcher 
can effectively distance himself or herself from the research process (Patton, 2015). This is 
because reports of qualitative research are laced with the researcher’s biases (Patton, 2015). 
Despite this reality, a qualitative researcher cannot throw his or her arms in the air and not take 
steps to mitigate the effects of these biases on the researcher’s report. Accordingly, I took the 
following steps to ensure that this study’s report substantially reflected participants' views. These 
steps included, first and foremost, acknowledging my biases as the researcher (Ravitch & Carl, 
2016). Second, a peer debriefer assisted me in reducing my biases; subjecting the data collected 
and the ensuing analysis to peer debriefing to affirm the collected data, its analysis, and the 
emerging findings (Spall, 1998). Lincoln and Guba (1989) encouraged researchers to identify a 
peer debriefer with whom they will work during the research (Spall, 1998). 
Participant Selection  
 
Description of the target group of interest. Participants were drawn from officials who 
worked in Liberia’s criminal justice system during the period under review (i.e., 2011-2017); 
staff of selected civil society organizations; and Liberia’s international partners who actively 
supported the process to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system. They public officials were 
responsible for policy formation and engaged with Liberia’s international partners in deciding 





answering the research questions. These public officials were also responsible for implementing 
the reforms and communicating with the population. Some of the participants worked within the 
system and so gained firsthand knowledge of the effects of the reforms. The international 
community supported the reform process. To a large extent this category of participants 
represented their national interest. In some cases, international development and 
nongovernmental agencies were also used to implement the reform. These agencies contributed 
to achieving certain strategic objectives of their principals. Interviewing them provided insights 
into the factors that influenced the choices made to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice 
system.  
Description of the sampling strategy and sample size. Creswell (2007) observed that it 
is important to select interviewees that possess the requisite knowledge and understanding of the 
phenomenon of interest of the research being conducted (Turner, 2010). I recruited and 
interviewed participants who were rich sources of information, to answer this study’s research 
questions. The theoretical sampling strategy was used to recruit participants who fit this 
description. As previously noted, this study is a qualitative study that is used the ground theory 
approach. Breckenridge and Jones (2009) stated that the “Theoretical sampling is a central tenet 
of classical grounded theory and is essential to the development and refinement of a theory that 
is ‘grounded’ in data” (p.113).  
Glaser and Strauss (1967) made the point that the theory that emerges from the data 
collected pursuant to investigating a phenomenon of interest is of more relevance to the study 
than any existing theory (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Based on this Breckenridge and Jones 
(2009) informed their readers that theoretical sampling seeks to generate and develop conceptual 





collection in theoretical sampling is focused on, amongst others, identifying gaps in data 
collected that must be filled (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009 & Patton, 2015). Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) made the point that theoretical sampling is an iterative process in which data collection, 
coding and analysis are undertaken by the researcher for purposes of influencing the researcher’s 
choice of what data to collect next and from which source to collect the data (Breckenridge & 
Jones, 2009). Glaser and Strauss (1967) also stated that the ultimate objective of this exercise is 
to develop a theory that emerges from the data collected (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). 
Breckenridge and Jones (2009), citing Hood (2007), described theoretical sampling as being in 
many respects akin to purposeful sampling. Morse (2008) made the point that the rationale for 
selecting particular participants in studies using the theoretical sampling strategy change as the 
theoretical needs of the study evolves (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Glaser (1978) asserted that 
data analysis and coding that occurs in the initial stages of the study that is using the theoretical 
sampling strategy is done in a rapid manner (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). However, through 
further theoretical sampling and memo writing, there is an opportunity to continuously refine 
codes to fit the data collected (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Glaser and Strauss (1967) posited 
that the process of theoretical sampling continues until a core category emerges after which the 
researcher focuses on collecting data that is relevant to the identified core category 
(Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Patton (2015) indicated that in studies using the theoretical 
sampling strategy, “sampling becomes more selective as the emerging theory focuses the 
inquiry” (p. 289). Boychuk-Duchscher and Morgan (2004) admonished researchers to be careful 
in collecting data when using theoretical sampling as the sampling strategy (Breckenridge & 
Jones, 2009). This is because there are chances of the researcher manipulating the data collected 





Jones, 2009). This creates the danger of the actual nature of the data collected eluding the 
researcher (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). It is instructive to note that Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
divided the theoretical sampling process into three stages (i.e., “open sampling, relational and 
variational sampling and discriminate sampling” [Breckenridge & Jones, 2009, p. 116]).  
 Breckenridge and Jones (2009) indicated that since data collection in studies using the 
theoretical sampling strategy is done to ensure that the data collected supports an emerging 
theory, the researcher must, to start with, have tentative ideas of a theory upon which the study 
will build. To achieve this, the researcher will have to use the purposeful sampling strategy to 
identify information rich sources after which the theoretical sampling strategy will kick in for 
purposes of feeding the emerging core categories from the purposeful sample (Breckenridge & 
Jones, 2009). My prior knowledge of Libera’s (i.e., the research site) aided the process of 
deciding where to start data collection from, however, the strength of the evidence gathered 
determined the weight I placed on the emerging theories (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). As 
previously noted, I worked in the research site for 10 years and so know the actors in the 
phenomenon of interest. With this knowledge and the tentative ideas on the phenomenon of 
interest, I identified 5 information rich participants as the starting and based on the emerging 
theory from the data collected, through the codes generated and memo writing, other information 
rich sources were identified to support the emerging codes. 
Several considerations influenced the sample size for this study. These considerations 
include the fact that the study was undertaken with the grounded theory approach. Creswell 
(1998) and Morse (1994) informed their readers that for studies using a grounded theory 
approach, the ideal sample size must range between 20 and 30 or 30 and 50 participants 





the fact that, according to Mason (2010), the sample size for qualitative studies are relatively 
smaller in comparison to quantitative samples. This is because, in qualitative research, the fact 
that a piece of data or code occurs in the data collected is sufficient reason for it to form part of 
the analysis. Put differently, the frequency that a piece of data occurs in the data collected is not 
a necessary and sufficient condition for it becoming part of the analysis in qualitative research 
(Mason, 2010). However, Mason (2010) cautioned that the data size should be large enough to 
provide different but germane viewpoints on the phenomenon of interest of the study. Rubin and 
Rubin (2012) made the point that persons recruited to participate in a study must be 
knowledgeable in the phenomenon of interest. Thirdly, Charmaz (2006) asserted that the 
objectives of a study are a key influencer of a study’s sample size (Mason, 2010). The objective 
of this study is to partially fulfill the requirements for obtaining a doctorate degree from Walden 
University, so the number of interviewees were kept within the limits provided by the experts 
above. An important consideration is the background of the participants recruited. As noted 
earlier, most of them are professionals who have work/worked in supporting criminal justice 
reform in Liberia and a few are private citizens familiar with Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
As pointed out by Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) experts generally tend to share similar views 
on issues that are within their professional competence. Consequently, a researcher does not 
require a large sample size of experts to make original discoveries. The resources available to me 
as a doctoral student also informed my decision on this study’s sample size. Ritchie, Jane, Lewis, 
Jane, Elam and Gillian (2003) indicated that the resources available to a researcher influences the 
sample size (Mason, 2010). With the constraints on time and money, as well as my inexperience 
in conducting research, the sample size for this study is 30 participants, including the 5 





source from which I should collect data. The imperatives of the theoretical sampling strategy 
provided the signposts that determined whether data collection had reached saturation. These 
include, Glaser and Strauss (1967) admonishing that when using theoretical sampling, data 
collection must cease when the core category is “considered dense and data collection no longer 
generates new leads” (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009, p. 116). When this point is attained, Glaser 
(1992) claimed that the sampling and the study are over (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). 
Conversely, Glaser and Strauss (1967) made the point that where the theoretical sample is 
inadequate there will be a lack of integration and gaps in the emerging theory (Breckenridge & 
Jones, 2009). The sample size of this study and the fact that the emerging theory influenced the 
decision on the nature and sources of the data collected resulted in me attaining saturation from 
the data collected.  
Describe the criterion for sample selection. To facilitate data collection, the following 
criteria was used in determining who will be selected to participate in the study. The participant 
was:  
● at least 25 years old (at age 25, participants would have acquired at least a high 
school certificate and gained some experience/knowledge in the phenomenon of 
interest of this study).  
● involved in policymaking and implementation to reform Liberia’s criminal justice 
system. 
● a professional in the criminal justice system. 
● an advocate of decentralization of criminal justice services. 
Description of how participants were contacted and invited. Conducting interviews is 





were drawn from persons in both public and private sectors who were involved in reforming 
Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017. Based on this criterion, and employing 
the theoretical sampling strategy, 5 information rich sources were identified and informed about 
the study (i.e., its objectives, methodology etc.). These participants were cautioned that though 
they participated in identifying other information rich sources, the prerogative to decide who 
participates in the study rested with me. They were also informed that participating in the 
interview is voluntary and they could withdraw their participation at any time. After the initial 5 
participants orally agreed to participate in the study and aid in identifying other information rich 
sources, I sent an invitation (i.e., electronic and/or hard copy) to participate in an interview to 
collect data for this study. The invitation reechoed the purpose of the research and the voluntary 
nature of their participation. It also indicated the expected duration of the interview and the 
timeframe within which the interview had to be conducted and gave the, then, potential 
interviewees another opportunity to indicate their willingness and availability to be interviewed 
for this study. The invitation also indicated that should they agree to proceed with participating 
in the study, a consent form will be sent, via email and/or in hard copy, for their information. 
Hard copies of this consent form were made available to the participants on/at the day and venue 
of the interview and they signed it prior to the commencement of the interview (i.e., for 
participants who I physically met to collect data). Where the interview was conducted virtually 
i.e., via technology, the participant was asked to electronically sign the consent form or indicate 
their consent via email. A similar approach, with the requisite modifications, was adopted in the 






This study’s theoretical frameworks, its research questions, and the themes and issues 
emerging from the literature review, influenced the interview guide/questions. These informed 
my preparation of an interview guide that aided me conduct the interviews to collect data. The 
guide consisted of questions that were broadly phrased to allow me to tailor the interview 
questions to fit the profile of the interviewee and to pose follow up questions. A number of 
measures were put in place to ensure that this study’s findings are valid and credible. The 
measures ensured the credibility of the study’s findings and a conclusive link between the data 
collected and my findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Anney (2014) indicated that there should be 
coherence between the data collected and the researcher’s interpretation of the data. Member 
checking was another activity used to ensure content credibility and validity. According to Guba 
(1981) member checking is a process in which “data and interpretations are continuously tested 
as they are derived …” (Anney, 2014, p. 277). The efforts at securing informed consent during 
the recruitment of participants were additional steps taken to enhance the credibility and validity 
of my findings in this study. As previously noted, every opportunity was seized to remind 
participants that participating in this study was voluntary.   
Description of other Data Sources  
 Data was collected from varied sources. The primary source was from interviews 
conducted with participants selected for this study. Peer reviewed journal articles was the second 
source of data consulted for this study. Liberia’s legal framework was also invaluable source of 
information. Reports prepared by various institutions (i.e., Liberia’s public institutions 
particularly those within the criminal justice sector, civil society organizations and Liberia’s 





Procedures for Data Collection  
Data for this study was gathered from participants through conducting individual 
interviews. Where possible, interviews were conducted with the aid of technology, particularly 
with interviewees who had reliable internet connection and agreed to dispense with face to face 
interviews. All the interviews were conducted at times and venues convenient for the 
interviewee, provided the interviewee’s preferences promoted collecting data in a conducive 
atmosphere and within the timelines for completing this study. All interviews were recorded 
using both an audio recorder and a mobile phone application called Rev Voice Recorder. Notes 
were taken to complement the audio recording. There interviews were conducted in 2019 after 
Walden University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval (i.e., 04-04-190668917). Follow 
up interviews were conducted with the aid of technology in 3 cases. Permission was sought from 
interviewees whose interviews are conducted face to face for follow up interviews to be 
undertaken using technology e.g., telephone, WhatsApp, email and Short Message Service 
(SMS). Interviews lasted an average of 90 minutes.  
After each interview, the participant was debriefed. During the debriefing session, the 
purpose of the study was reiterated, and the contact details of the researcher provided to the 
participant. I encouraged participants to seek clarifications on any concerns they had in 
connection with this study.  
Several measures were taken to protect the identity of the participants from the period of 
recruitment, through to the interview and debriefing stages, as well as during follow up 
interviews. Each participant was assigned a unique numeric code which was electronically 
stored, and password protected. Also, the names of all the participants were stored electronically 





selected based on information provided by the initial 5 information rich sources, I collected their 
contact details and personally contacted. This ensured that those who eventually participate in 
the study are not known to the participant(s) who recommended them.  
Data Analysis Plan 
To enable me to answer this study’s research questions, a data analysis plan was 
prepared. As pointed out by Smith and Firth (2011), data analysis is not an event, it is an iterative 
process which ceases when the researcher is satisfied that there is coherence emerging from 
analyzing the data collected.  
Research Questions  
 This qualitative study has three research questions. They are:  
RQ1: What approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system 
between 2011 and 2017?  
RQ2: How nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize Liberia’s 
criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017?  
RQ2.1: How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive 
processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system?  
 RQ3: How has decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system affected the system’s 
functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability?  
RQ.3.1: How can the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system be 
improved? 
Description of the Approach that Fits the Plan  
The framework approach is the approach that is compatible with the data analysis 





framework approach to data analysis, the following steps must be observed. First, the data 
collection interviews should be transcribed, then coded (La Pelle, 2004). According to La Pelle 
(2004), coded for the framework approach can be done either manual or with the aid of 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software. The next step is to review the formulated codes having an 
eye on the research questions to ensure coherence between the research questions and the codes. 
I used NVivo 12 coding software to code the transcripts. La Pelle (2004) stated that in addition to 
reviewing to ensure alignment between the research questions and the codes, the researcher is 
also required to review the codes to ascertain if there are errors and correct them. An important 
step for a researcher using the framework approach is to conduct a credibility test of the 
formulated codes. This is done by submitting the formulated codes and the transcripts to a 
debriefer for review (Sutton & Austin, 2015). The debriefer’s task is to determine the extent to 
which the codes formulated by the researcher are in harmony with the views of interviewees 
(Sutton & Austin, 2015). In keeping with this, I submitted the transcripts and the codes to a 
friend who holds a doctorate degree for review. He provided very useful feedback which I took 
onboard.  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness, in qualitative research, is a concept that describes the processes that are 
engaged in to ascertain the rigor that a particular study has been subjected to by the researcher(s) 
(Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Shenton (2004) informed readers that the test of trustworthiness is 
passed when a qualitative research is found to be confirmable, transferable and credible.  
Transferability. Transferability, as an element of trustworthiness, refers to the extent to 
which a qualitative research’s finding is applicable to other contexts (Shenton, 2004). To 





articles selected mostly from postconflict countries were used for this study. This influenced the 
study’s research questions and my interview guide/questions.  
Dependability. Dependability evaluates the extent to which another qualitative 
researcher who elects to research into the phenomenon of interest of this study, within the same 
research site and with the same participants, is likely to arrive at findings similar to what I 
arrived at (Shenton, 2004). The objective of ensuring that a study passes this test, is to make it 
possible for other qualitative researchers to employ the same research processes that I used in 
this study (Shenton, 2004). To increase the possibilities of a particular study meeting the 
dependability criteria, the researcher must document each of the processes that were undertaken 
during the research (Shenton, 2004). To increase the chances of this study meeting the 
dependability test, I accurately captured, in this study’s references section, the citations of all 
reports, peer reviewed articles and other sources of information that I consulted for this research. 
Also, the entire research process, including details of the data collection process and analysis as 
well as coding, has been set out in detail.  
Confirmability. Confirmability is the third test that every qualitative research is required 
to pass. To ascertain if this test has been passed or failed, those reviewing this study’s research 
report seek to find evidence that conclusively suggests that my findings emerged from the data 
collected and that that the findings are not a product of my idiosyncrasies (Shenton, 2004). 
Submitting the codes generated from the interview transcripts and the steps taken to ensure 
dependability, especially providing citations of the peer reviewed articles used for this study, 
were all geared towards making this study meet the confirmability test.  
  Credibility. Lincoln and Guba (1985), in defining credibility, described it as a process in 





phenomenon of interest as lived through the experiences of participants (Shenton, 2004). To 
meet the credibility test, in the data analysis chapter of this dissertation, I ensured that relevant 
quotations/statements made by participants were lifted from the transcripts and incorporated into 
the chapter. Additionally, I gave the codes and transcripts to a peer debriefer to ascertain the 
extent to which the codes reflected participants' views. The fact that different methods were used 
to collect data also contributed to strengthening my claims that this research report is credible 
(Shenton, 2004). Finally, Anney (2014) recommended that member checking contributes to a 
study meeting the credibility requirement. As previously noted, I engaged in member checking 
during data collection and analysis for this study.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I restated the objectives of this qualitative study, the research questions 
that will guide this study and identified the grounded theory approach as the approach that will 
be used for this study. My role as a researcher, particularly my relationship with the potential 
participants was also highlighted. My possible biases and ethical issues that may arise during this 
study and how they will be managed were also identified. Also, the sampling size and strategy 
were highlighted, and justification provided for the choice. The criteria for selecting participants 
and how participants will be recruited as well as how interviews will be conducted and recorded, 
were also set out in this chapter. Further, the plan to analyze the data collected was laid out. 
Finally, the processes to ensure that this study’s findings pass the trustworthiness test were laid 






Chapter 4: Data Collection and Analysis 
“I don’t think anyone who’s been in Liberia in 2003 and came back again in 2018 could 
doubt the progress made, in terms of the functionality of the justice system … by and 
large the police are able to respond, not the way that will be expected for them …, but … 
there is a better perception of the security that the police can provide”. 
Participant 024 
Introduction 
In this qualitative grounded theory case study, I investigated efforts to decentralize 
Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017. Insights shared by participants on what 
approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system, the extent to which 
context specific interventions were designed and implemented to make Liberia’s criminal justice 
system accessible, how decentralization has affected the system’s functionality and Liberia’s 
peace and stability as well as what can be done to ensure locally owned processes to decentralize 
Liberia’s criminal justice system are presented in this chapter.  
An interview guide of 26 questions aided me in gathering the view of participants to 
answer the following research questions on this study’s phenomenon of interest: 
RQ1: What approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system 
between 2011 and 2017?  
RQ2: How nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize Liberia’s 
criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017?  
RQ2.1: How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive 





RQ3: How decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system has affected the system’s 
functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability?  
RQ3.1: How can the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system be 
improved? 
In this chapter, I describe the research setting, the participants, the data collection and 
analysis processes, and provide evidence of trustworthiness in this study. Following this, the 
results of this study are presented by highlighting the themes and the subthemes emerging from 
the data collected. Quotations from statements made by participants in the interviews are 
reproduced to support the themes and subthemes. A summary of this chapter is provided before 
proceeding to the final chapter of this dissertation.   
Research Setting 
 As earlier stated, the theoretical sampling approach was used to identify 30 information 
rich participants for this study. With this sampling strategy, the theory that emerges from the 
iterative process of data analysis enables the researcher to answer the research question 
(Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). I drew participants from persons who worked in Liberia’s 
criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017, civil society organizations, and from Liberia’s 
international partners who were involved in reforming the criminal justice system during the 
same period. 
Demographics of Participants 
 As previously noted, 30 information-rich participants were interviewed for this study. Of 
this number, 6 were female and 24 were male. Of the 30 interviewees, 22 were Liberians and 8 
(i.e., 2 female and 6 male participants) were foreigners. All the participants were actively 





years old, involved in policy making and implementation to reform Liberia’s criminal justice 
system, professionals in the criminal justice system and/or civil society advocates of 
decentralization of criminal justice services. Table 1 presents the demographics of this study’s 
participants. 
Table 1  
Demographics of Participants 
 
Gender Foreigners Liberians 
Males 6 18 
Females 2 4 
Total (N=30) 8 22 
 
Data Collection 
Walden University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the procedure that was 
used to collect data for this research. The approval number is 04-04-190668917. Informed 
consent was secured from each participant ahead of collecting data from them. Because this 
study was qualitative and used the grounded theory approach, the theoretical sampling approach 
was used to recruit participants. As previously noted, the theoretical sampling is a tenet of 
traditional grounded theory research (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Through an iterative process, 





Initially, I identified 5 information rich participants based on my knowledge of the 
research site. These participants were contacted via email and invited them to participate in the 
study. A consent form was attached to the email with a request to the potential participants to 
indicate their consent. After their consent was secured, face to face interviews with them were 
scheduled. I recorded the interviews and had them transcribed and then I coded them.  My 
knowledge of the research site, suggestions from these participants and the ensuing gaps in the 
data collected informed my recruitment of the remaining 25 participants. The 25 participants 
received emails from me in which I informed them about this research and sought their consent 
to participate. After procuring their consent, we agreed on dates, locations, and times for the 
interviews. Twenty eight interviews, including the initial 5 interviews were conducted in person 
and/or with the aid of technology (i.e., via telephone/WhatsApp calls). All interviews were 
recorded. Two participants opted to provide written answers rather than being interviewed. 
Walden University’s Institutional Review Board approved collecting data from these 2 
participants.  I spent 5 days at the research site during which 16 participants were interviewed. 
Unique numeric codes were assigned to each participate to protect their identity and the codes 
saved electronically and protected with a password. Participants were interviewed from/in 
various locations across the globe including Australia, Ghana, Italy, Liberia, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Somalia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Almost all participants 
answered all the interview questions which were tailored to suit each participant. There posed 
follow up question(s)/interviews in 3 cases to seek clarification. I made notes during the 
interview and this assisted me in data collection and analysis. Interviews lasted between 40 






Data analysis is an iterative process that ceases when the researcher is satisfied that there 
is coherence in the theory emerging from analyzing the data collected (Smith & Firth, 2011). A 
commercial entity was contracted to transcribe the interviews. I reviewed each of the transcripts 
against the corresponding audio recording to ensure they accurately reflected participants’ views. 
Transcribing, data collection and coding continued simultaneously, with the themes emerging 
from the coding exercise determining the data I collected (i.e., the profile/perspectives of the 
participant recruited). 
The framework approach was used to analyze this study’s data. According to Sutton and 
Austin (2015), when using the framework approach for data analysis, interviews must be 
transcribed. A Qualitative Data Analysis Software (i.e., in vivo 12.0) aided me to code the data. 
After coding the interviews/transcripts, the formulated codes were reviewed to ensure coherence 
with the research questions and to identify errors and correct them where they existed (La Pelle, 
2004).  
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
In qualitative research, trustworthiness describes the processes used to ascertain the rigor 
that a researcher subjects a study to (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). A qualitative study passes this test if 
it is found to be confirmable, transferable and credible. As noted earlier, the following steps were 
taken to ensure that my findings are trustworthy. 
Credibility 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) indicated that, to prove credibility, the findings of a qualitative 
study must be positively linked to the phenomenon of interest as experienced by the participants 





provided in this chapter to confirm the credibility of my findings. Additionally, a peer debriefer 
reviewed the codes and transcripts to determine if they emanated from the views expressed by 
participants. Thirdly, the quotations reproduced in this chapter evidence recurring themes and 
trends shared by different participants on the same issues and this affirms this study’s credibility. 
Member checking was also employed to meet the credibility requirement (Anney, 2014).  
Confirmability 
All conclusions arrived at in this study are supported by direct quotations from 
participants to ensure that this study’s findings are confirmable. The link between the 
conclusions and the supporting quotes were verified and confirmed by the debriefer. In addition 
to this, the citations of all peer reviewed journal articles used for this study are provided.  
Dependability 
Every process engaged in during this study is documented in this report. This is to ensure 
that the findings of this study meets the dependability criteria. In this regard, the citations of 
reports, peer reviewed articles and other sources of information consulted for this research are 
accurately captured in the references section of this study. An accurate description of how data 
was collected, analyzed and coded for this study is also laid out. With all these, any person who 
decides to conduct a qualitative study on the same phenomenon of interest, in the same research 
site, using the same participants, will arrive at my findings in this study.  
Transferability 
In qualitative research, the transferability test seeks to prove the extent to which the 
researcher’s findings are applicable to similar contexts (Shenton, 2004). I investigated local 
ownership of efforts to make the criminal justice system accessible in a conflict affected setting 





Liberia’s peace and security. The processes engaged in while conducting this study have met this 
criterion by using/consulting peer reviewed articles on postconflict countries. Also, this study’s 
research questions, the theoretical frameworks and the interview questions were formulated 
based on insights from the literature reviewed for this study. These were all geared towards 
ensuring that this study’s findings are valid in similar settings. 
Presentation of Findings 
Several codes and categories emerged during the process of analyzing the data collected. 
After examing the codes and categories 7 themes and 25 subthemes were generated. For ease of 
reference, all the themes, subthemes and their corresponding Research Question (RQ) are 
identified below, before presenting participants views in support of each theme and subtheme. 
  
RQ1: What approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system between 
2011 and 2017? 




● Law and policy development and reform 
● Infrastructural development 
● Institutional reform and development. 






Theme One: Decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system somewhat nationally owned 
and inclusive. 
Subthemes: 
● Actors involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
● Reasons for involving nonstate actors in the Decentralization. 
● Decentralization was elite driven local population rarely consulted. 
● Decentralization process was elite driven as ordinary citizens and local 
communities seldom consulted. 
● Some consideration given to the Liberian context.  
● No consideration given to the Liberian context; foreigners drove it 
● Decentralization process was nationally driven. 
 
Theme Two: Combination of homogenous and non-homogenous approach adopted to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
Subthemes: 
● Decentralization process was a combination of context specific interventions 
and externally driven. 
● Interventions to decentralize were a hybrid i.e. national and internationally 
driven efforts. 
RQ 2.1: How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive processes to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system? 
Theme One: International actors supporting processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice 
system must understand Liberia, design and implement interventions specific to the Liberian 






● Foreign/international actors were knowledgeable about Liberia and its 
criminal justice system. 
● Foreign/international actors were not knowledgeable about Liberia and its 
criminal justice system. 
● Foreign/international actors were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and 
its criminal justice system. 
● Design and implement Liberia-specific interventions. 
RQ 3: How has decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system affected the system’s 
functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability? 
Theme one: Traditional Justice System was the Primary Source of Justice for Majority of 
Liberians Particularly in Rural Communities  
Subtheme: 
● Prior to Liberia’s civil war, criminal justice services were available to few 
inhabitants mostly in Monrovia and the county capitals. 
Theme two: Decentralization has made the Criminal Justice System Manifest Very Basic Signs 
of Functionality and contributed to Liberia’s Peace and Stability 
● Criminal justice system has inadequate capacity and is yet to be functional. 
● Decentralization has made the criminal justice system functional. 
● Criminal justice chain working together. 
● Criminal justice chain not working and/or partially working together. 
● Decentralization has contributed to peace and stability. 
● Decentralization is helping to address root causes of Liberia’s civil war. 





Theme One: Develop criminal justice institutions and change the approach to making the 
system accessible. 
Subthemes 
● Institutional reform and development.  
● Change in attitude and approach required. 
 
After highlighting all the themes and subthemes gathered from the data collected to 
answer each research/sub question, I now present the views participants shared in support of 
each theme and subtheme. In the rest of this chapter, for ease of reference, each of the Research 
Questions and sub questions will be chronologically reproduced and in every case, followed by  
a Table and/or Figure presenting or depicting the findings/themes/subthemes then, the detailed 
views expressed by participants in support of the respective themes and subthemes will be set 
out. 
Research Question 1: What Approaches Were Used to Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal 
Justice System between 2011 and 2017? 
As earlier noted, for ease of reference and presentation of the findings emerging from 
data collected to answer Research Question 1, Table 2 presents, and Figure 1 depicts, the 
approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system and the number of responses in 









Table 2  






Institutional reform and development 24 52 




Forging partnerships 7 15 
Law and policy development and reform 5 11 
Total responses (N) 46 100 
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Theme One: Forging Partnerships, Law, Policy, Infrastructural and Institutional Reform 
and Development 
This theme emerged from coding answers to the research question: “What approaches 
were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017?” “Forging 
partnerships, law, policy, infrastructural and institutional reform and development” is the theme 
that emerged. This theme means that, during the period under review, efforts to make Liberia’s 
criminal justice system accessible created partnerships, reformed legislation and policy, 
improved infrastructure and developed the capacity of criminal justice system institutions. Now, 
I will proceed to isolate each part of this theme in a subtheme and present participants’ 
perspectives in support of both the theme and subtheme. 
Subthemes 
 The following subthemes emerged from the theme under consideration: 
Subtheme One: Partnerships 
There were several actors involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system and 
these actors forged partnerships to make criminal justice services accessible. I will identify the 
actors involved later on in this chapter. Participants shared the following views in support of this 
subtheme:  
According to Participant 006, “… in all we were looking at a partnered approach and 
strengthening the criminal justice system. … they certainly saw the benefits of working 
together”. Participants highlighted the roles played by private and public institutions to make 
Liberia’s criminal justice system assessable. Some of these institutions are not classical criminal 





institutions. To some extent these arrangements are akin to Third Party Policing and this 
contributes to making the criminal justice system accessible (Mazerolle, 2014). For instance, 
there is an arrangement between the Government of Liberia and the private sector, especially 
large multinational companies, where these companies have their own private security 
arrangements, including policing in the geographical area where they operate. In this regard, 
Participant 010 stated that: 
Prior to recent years, there were no private security companies. There were  
concession agreements to have private security in certain areas. And I recall that  
LAMCO had a private security company that was even armed and trained by the  
National Police Academy. That assisted, to a very large extent, the community in  
that particular location/county. That helped the criminal justice system to a large  
extent. In those places where you could not have the police, the private security  
companies provided security. But they had to coordinate with the national security  
institutions like the police who would have them processed in those areas. But  
they were not prosecuting themselves. As the population grew, the ratio of the  
police to the population could not match. And so, we encouraged people to open  
private security companies. But of course, with strict orders, rules and regulations  
through the national police, to be trained by professional security officers. 
Participant 012 said the following on using private security companies to support the criminal 
justice system: 
They are an extension of the criminal justice system. … they have defined  
parameters; they do access control. … to control access to the parameters they are  





important that we collaborate because they provide private law enforcement  
services. 
Partnership between the Liberia National Police and individual members of the community was 
also identified by participants. They referred to this as community policing initiatives. According 
to Participant 006: 
... so, protecting life and property is the primacy of policing. … We have seen  
issues of people taking justice into their own hands, or people just looking to the  
traditional justice system to get some quicker solutions. So, in community  
policing … we worked very passionately; successfully negotiating and helping  
them devise a community policing strategy and a community policing plan which  
was owned centrally by the State. We also, as part of our community  
capacity building and development mandate, looked to try to equip people at the  
headquarters and the local level, … to use the community to be part of  
the crime solution. In order to up the security transition, it was important that all  
the security agencies in Liberia would invest in community policing, and to  
strengthen the partnership between the community and the police; building a  
trusting confidence, and hopefully, looking to transcend that into the criminal  
justice system. 
Participant 010 also indicated that, “… we had the Community Watch team, which was 
established in Monrovia as a pilot program, and when it became very successful, we decided to 
take it to the counties." This Participant further stated that: 
The Community Watch Forum was there to assist the citizens, in educating the citizens 





was difficult to enforce these things because of the level of education in the various 
counties. So, we developed these Watch Teams to work along with the community. It 
was the same as community policing. In fact, after a while, the watch teams became the 
community policing.  
To a lesser degree, participants noted that partnerships were established with integrity 
institutions like the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC), the General Auditing 
Commission (GAC) and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR), and 
the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). 
Participant 013 said the following on collaboration between the criminal justice system and the 
LACC:  
In a sense, yes there was collaboration. But the way they operate, mostly except  
where the issues that arise has some national significance. Then maybe the LACC  
acts. But mostly they looked at the following issues that have to do with integrity  
…   
This participant also stated that “the people who use the LACC are mostly the Government. 
There has been collaboration … between the LACC, the police and other government 
institutions”.  
Partnerships were also established with women and the traditional system in the community to 
resolve disputes. This is captured by Participant 019 who notes that: 
The Women Peace Hut is using the traditional system to resolve conflict. So, they  
were established in parts of Liberia. In terms of decentralization, they reached  
down to the innermost parts of these counties. So, in these counties they had the  





when they met from time to time. Just in case of any conflict, these women  
brought issues to light. So, for example, Sexual and Gender Based Violence …;  
part of their work has been to help to notify the police about these issues. And for  
most parts of the country they speak to the Town Chief.  
Participant 029 identified efforts to educate the population about the criminal justice system as 
one approach adopted to make the system accessible. In the words of this Participant: 
Another thing we were doing was awareness raising, I think, especially from the  
justice end in terms of increasing people’s awareness of justice services so that  
people can access the justice system. Because there is very little information in  
terms of the activities and services that are there. So that awareness is also  
increasing the demand of the judicial services. 
Participant 023 shared this view, according to this Participant; “… so what we are doing as an 
organization is first to create awareness that there is justice and that the justice should be for all.” 
Subtheme Two: Law and Policy Development and Reform 
Law and policy development and reform is another subtheme of the theme under 
consideration. Under this approach, amendments and/or enactment of policies and pieces of 
legislation were undertaken to make the criminal justice system accessible. According to 
participants, issues addressed through law and policy reform included legal aid and recruiting 
Public Defenders to provide legal services to indigent members of the community. Participant 
016 noted that “... moves were made by the Judiciary where they began to recruit law school 
graduates as Public Defenders and deployed in the counties.” Additionally, Participant 009 stated 
that: 





Defender … assigned to each county outside of Monrovia, which made the  
processing of cases absolutely impossible and a backlog that was impossible to  
deal with. But with the institution of the hubs, we then had the idea where we  
could increase the number of Public Defenders in the counties where the hubs  
were established to improve access to justice for those people in those areas.  
Participant 011 affirmed this by stating that “… one specific service was the public defense 
system; to the extent that you had Public Defenders in all of the counties.” 
Demand for the services of Public Defenders exceeded the resources available. A legal aid policy 
and legislation was required to address this. However, efforts in this regard proved to be a 
challenge. This is evidenced by the following statement made by Participant 016: 
The legal aid is still something that we are grappling with. We don’t have a fully  
functioning legal aid regime. With the assistance of the United Nations Mission in  
Liberia and the Ministry of Justice, we drafted a legal aid policy; up till now, they  
are still trying to validate it.  
Participant 016 also stated that: 
The services of paralegals and a variety of legal aid schemes have been used in  
Liberia. However, this has proved to be a huge challenge as some lawyers and  
judges have resisted introducing paralegals to create access to Liberia’s criminal  
justice system. … we have a lot of institutions in Liberia providing legal aid  
services and there have been challenges. We have had some Presidents from the  
Bar Association who have accepted the work of paralegals; some have not  
accepted it. Some people feel that these are people that are going to take jobs  





Despite this, this Participant noted that “… there are a lot of institutions who have been engaged 
in paralegal activities, but we want to standardize it. For instance, some civil society 
organizations have collaborated and appointed Community Legal Advisors outside the capital.” 
This Participant further noted that:   
The Carter Center has worked with the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission  
and they have paralegals which they call Community Justice Advisors. What they  
do is that they go into the field and they create awareness on several law issues.  
For example, they will take the law on rape to the marketplaces and towns in the  
communities. And when you create awareness then people will begin to bring  
issues. So, when they bring the issues, some of the Community Justice Advisors  
are able to handle them through mediation. So, they conduct mediatory services.  
Where they are unable, they will forward it for Pro Bono services; an  
arrangement with the Bar where they do Pro Bono services. 
As previously noted, legislation was enacted to deal with several issues within the criminal 
justice system. Participant 008 noted: 
There were laws made … to address some of the immediate challenges that we  
were having; either dealing with cases of rape, domestic violence … a  
considerable amount of work had been done to decentralize the police in terms of  
reforming the law itself. A new Act was passed, the Immigration Act was also  
amended in that process; a new Act was passed to address the issue of drugs. The  
Drug Enforcement Agency was created to deal with that. 
This Participant also states that: 





Naturalization; we changed the name to a service so that the impressions will be  
created that these institutions are not colonial institutions … but, they are  
to serve the population.  
Participant 013 also mentioned “a New Police Act, Immigration Act, the National Security 
Reform and Intelligence Act, a new Drug Enforcement Agency Law” as examples of legislations 
that were enacted to make the criminal justice system accessible. 
Participant 009 indicated that: “… we had the jury law passed”. Participant 011, this by stating 
that “… the jury management system was also decentralized.” 
Subtheme Three: Infrastructure Development  
  Providing infrastructure for criminal justice institutions is another intervention used to 
decentralize the criminal justice system. Participant 011 highlighted the improvement the 
system’s infrastructure has witnessed by stating that, “… go around the country; there are 
facilities in the localities.” In relation to infrastructure Participant 001 stated that: “… improving 
infrastructure particularly in areas where the correction system was non-existent.” This was 
supported by Participant 005 who noted, “one of the big changes was the construction of prisons 
… magistrate courts across the country with Quick Impact Project funding.”  Participant 003 
indicated that, “… we started looking at decentralization to a point where we had to build 
regional jails.” Participant 002 noted that: “Basically the attempt was to decentralize the courts, 
the prisons, the police and creation of a probation and aftercare service that in my opinion was 
not well thought out.” Participant 004 listed infrastructure support provided to make criminal 
justice services accessible: “an office, a telephone, transport and in a few cases even 





Participant 012, who noted that “… police stations were built in the counties; thus, there has been 
infrastructure in the counties. But primarily in the county capitals.” Participant 005 noted that: 
It seemed to be in the end infrastructure based, but my personal viewpoint will be  
that in part, this happened because of extreme resistance of the Judiciary and the  
legal professionals more generally to any form of real substantive reform during  
the period. The general view of the Judiciary was that there was no need for  
reforms. 
To improve the criminal justice system’s infrastructure, Participant 006 stated that: 
“… there was the use of Quick Impact Project funds through the United Nations  
Mission in Liberia. … these were projects designed to cost between $25,000 and  
below depending on the nature of specific projects. It may go as far as $50,000.  
Now, these projects were designed to have quick impact in areas of need and …  
the rule of law sector was a priority. And so that looked at the creation of police  
stations, for instance across counties where there was an absence …. We also saw  
some court buildings being built; there were also vehicles purchased; so, there  
was a range of either building institutional capacity in some aspects or looking  
into equipping resources of the criminal justice system not only in the capital but  
also, beyond the capital. 
Participant 024 shared this view and indicated that: 
… there were, through different programs for infrastructure: quite a number of Quick 
Impact Projects with the UN mission which was relatively small amounts of funding 





few or very small amounts. In terms of infrastructure with police stations, courthouses, 
prisons or correctional facilities and so on. 
Participant 029 also identified that several buildings have been constructed for criminal justice 
institutions. According to this Participant “… besides the hub approach, the government has been 
constructing courts in some of the counties, police stations in some of the counties, prison 
facilities also in some of the counties.”  
Participant 013 appeared to downplay how much improvement has been done to criminal 
justice system infrastructure, despite the impression given by some participants that 
infrastructure development received a lot of attention. This Participant said that “one or 
two infrastructures; few magisterial courts being built. Few correctional institutions 
upgraded and updated; few police stations being built.”  
Subtheme Four: Institutional Reform and Development  
Institutional reform and development is the fourth subtheme under the theme being 
discussed. Several interventions were undertaken to develop Liberia’s criminal justice 
institutions. Human resource development (i.e., training/capacity building) is one such 
intervention. According to Participant 001 “capacity building was undertaken for the systems to 
become functional.” Participant 003 highlighted training as one of the actions taken to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. According to this Participant, “training was an 
approach to develop criminal justice institutions.” This is supported by Participant 004 who 
noted “training of judges, training of lay persons as magistrates, … training of police officers, the 
training of correction officers, …” In the same vein, Participant 013 stated that “the Judicial 





judges, magistrates and defense attorneys.” Participant 014 indicated that “there has been police 
training, which was done between 2005/2011 ... The law school is training more lawyers.”  
Another approach emerging from the data is recruiting qualified personnel to work in criminal 
justice institutions. According to Participant 016: 
… within that period, they were recruiting a lot of qualified lawyers to enter the  
justice system. All the County Attorneys in the country except for the County of  
Montserrado were non law school graduates while the law required that you  
needed to be a law graduate before you can practice law in Liberia. So, there was  
a move to replace most of the unqualified people to bring in trained lawyers and  
we organized a lot of training on a quarterly basis. 
Participant 008 supports this assertion by stating that “… the problem within these kinds of 
institutions is staffing. So, we had to go in and look at appointments, the issue of tenure …” 
According to Participant 012, “… there was a reinforcement of officers; men and women in the 
service to beef up support to the officers in the respective counties.” Participant 024 stated that 
“… UN funding was used to hire … Liberian lawyers as prosecutors and defense counsel and 
they were deployed out to the counties. Subsequently, funding was secured for that in a more 
permanent way” Participant 004 noted that there was a “physical presence of men and women 
trained according to international standards as police officers.” Participant 018 mentioned 
“Deployment of County Attorneys.” Participant 029 stated that: 
So, the Liberia National Police … they are decentralized. We have  
the immigration service, security and management also decentralized, prison  
rehabilitation is decentralized, of course not fully, but we have them across the  





report and look at their cases; there were magisterial courts and circuit courts  
across the different areas.  
 Participant 020 stated that there “have been more prosecutors out there.” 
Participant 024 asserted that: 
There was a large-scale recruitment of the police from the very beginning … the  
police were ... recruited from scratch pretty much. And so … more and more  
police officers were recruited and sent out to the counties …. Same as prison  
officers; there were specific programs to recruit and train and deploy them and  
that was quite successful overall.  
Participants identified the creation of new criminal justice offices/institutions within the criminal 
justice system as another category of interventions to decentralize the criminal justice system. In 
this regard, Participant 013 stated that “I think for the police, we have the Women and Children 
Protection Section which has been decentralized. We also have the Professional Standards 
Division for complaints which has been also decentralized.” Participant 009 stated that: 
The Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit for example now works with the 
Criminal Court E to ensure the prosecution of sexual violence everywhere. Now, before 
the war, it was mostly done in magisterial courts. …  Because of the new law now, you 
have the SGBV Crimes Unit, which is not only in Monrovia. Now we have one in Nimbi 
County. 
Participant 015 identified “restructuring of the security apparatus”. Participant 004 stated that 
“every county in Liberia had to have a functioning police system.” 
According to Participant 006: 





responses and information exchange around what was happening. So, the County  
and District Security Councils were established. … We set in place  
representatives of typically the security agencies, which also had representatives  
from the broader criminal justice system coming together and … trying to have a  
better understanding of what the crime and security in the counties were like;  
trends that were recurring and perhaps looking at what best responses were  
required…, advocate or a sharing of different approaches. That will then cascade  
down to the county level and then once again making sure that the local actors got  
together with those that were in the position to make a difference. Exchanging  
interaction, and looking at problem solving approaches, … to know what the  
crime and security situation at the county level. And once again using  
that to lobby through their own administrators, back to ministers or back to the  
President to give the necessary support; whether there will be funding or  
otherwise to address what was community concerns. 
Participant 007 stated that “… the County and District Security Councils were set up … to get 
the local people involved.” Participant 008 supported this assertion and stated that: 
The statutory system itself did not really involve the natives. In other words, the  
judge goes there, sits behind his desk waiting for a case to come before them.  
They did not link the criminal justice system to the whole concept of establishing  
peace and stability in the various political subdivisions in a harmonious way. But  
the whole idea is that, if you get people involved, that could support the system,  
then not only will it create that comfort in their minds and that they are part and  





crimes. So those were the ideas for the integration of County and District Security  
Councils ... to see how they could provide support to the system itself. … They  
could not sit to investigate and find someone guilty and sentence them. There  
were levels, they could play at their own communities so that the information  
flow can then help move the system through the statutory mechanism …. 
Participant 010 also mentioned the County Security Councils and the objectives for establishing 
them. According to this Participant: 
The County Security Council came in later. ... we had what we call ‘the Joint  
Security Council’, which functioned in Monrovia. So, the Minister of Justice said,  
we cannot function as a Joint Security Council only in Monrovia. So, let’s have it  
extended to the county level. And so, we tried to establish that. It worked a little  
bit but just in a few counties that were nearby. But most of the counties that were  
very far and were not accessible did not enjoy the benefit of the operations of the  
County Security Council administration.  
Participant 011 also mentioned the County Security Councils and stated that: 
The establishment of the County and District Security Councils came out  
of consultations. That was part of the efforts aimed at inclusiveness. One issue  
that was raised by the locals was that they wanted to have a say in the governance  
of the security sector …. in fulfilment of what was required, the government put  
in place a council. Those councils were meant to bring on board locals from  
different sectors from the counties to be able to contribute to the provision and  





This Participant further states that “… it was mandatory that they had to come together on a 
regular basis, that is, local government operatives or officials, the Paramount Chiefs, the clans, 
District Commissioners … sitting with the heads of security in those counties to discuss.” 
According to Participant 013: 
… the National Security Reform and Intelligence Act … talked about creating  
County and District Security Councils. … . When there are issues and the Council  
meets, and a justice institution is supposed to take that up, they are then mandated  
by those County Security Councils to act. For example, if it is a correction issue,  
overcrowding of the correctional facilities, the issue is brought up … 
Participant 013 also stated that the County and District Security Councils are serving as dispute 
resolutions and early warning mechanisms: 
… the feedback that we are getting is that that initiative is well placed. Because  
disputes that have created frictions in past years are being resolved as a result of  
the County and District Security Councils bringing the people together. And areas  
where the conflict will erupt … and create insecurity, they are able to resolve it. 
Participant 030 indicated that:  
Complaint mechanisms are established in the justice system where aggrieved  
persons can complain against judges and police and the complaint is forwarded to  
Monrovia in the case of a judge. In the case of a police officer, the complaint is  
forwarded to the Professional Standard Board of the Liberia National Police in the  
regional headquarters for investigation and appropriate recommendations to the  






Justice and Security Hubs Project     
The Justice and Security Hubs project is one intervention that all participants mentioned 
in one way or another. This intervention cuts across infrastructure and institutional development. 
According to Participant 024: 
… the Justice and Security Hubs project was an initiative from a Joint Program  
which started in 2011, coming out of Liberia’s Priority Peace Building Plan which  
was putting a focus on decentralization of services or provision of services at the  
local level. And a large degree of funding, comparatively speaking, in terms of  
making funds available in Liberia at that time … coming in from Peacebuilding  
Fund which was put specifically to support decentralization in terms of criminal  
justice … in addition to the various actors and infrastructure it was talking about –  
things like the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit which was a  
centralized office working for Monrovia for a number of years initially was also  
extended to … certain counties to provide some support for survivors of SGBV. 
Participant 002 affirmed this by stating that:  
One effort that I am aware of is the creation of hubs; where physical  
infrastructures were put up to provide criminal justice services to the people and  
personnel from within those areas were recruited, trained and deployed within  
those hubs … 
According to Participant 026, the Hub project covered the following counties: “Region 1: Bong, 
Nimba and Lofa, Region 2 being: Maryland, Grand Kru and River Gee Region 3: Grand Gedeh 
and Sinoe Region 4: Bomi, Grand Cape Mount and Gbarpolu and Region 5: Rivercess, Grand 





… the significant improvement between 2011/2017 was the establishment of the  
criminal justice hubs in 5 areas in the country. The hubs were supposed to be  
criminal justice centers all over the country. This included the police, prosecution,  
corrections …. So, the idea was to have the mobile police attached to a hub but to  
oversee security in other counties that are covered by the hub.  
Participant 007 stated that “the whole idea was the hub; and to build 5 different ones in 5 
different counties to provide full criminal justice services just as we were doing in Monrovia”. 
Participant 015 indicated that: 
with respect to access to justice, of course the concept of the hub was also developed. 
Where construction took place and officers were assigned to different hubs. Where they 
afforded people the opportunity to bring complaints. So, it was a holistic approach that 
we had over the period 2011/2017. 
Participant 010, stated that: 
the concept of the hub came up to help the police and the immigration to  
decentralize. And when that concept came up, it was born to a very large extent  
by our international partners. They were involved in the concept of the hub. The  
first one was developed in Gbarnga, with the intention of building other ones in  
other counties. 
In the words of Participant 020: 
The hubs were set up to host all the actors within the criminal justice system to  
provide access to just. So, within the setting of the hubs, all of the actors were to  
be right there so that we could be able to get things moving faster than how it’s  





justice services within the different regions so as to improve the delivery of those  
services. The concept was a very beautiful one. The intended purposes were  
excellent but there were unintended negative consequences … 
 According to Participant 025: 
… the challenge was that Liberia was so broken after the conflict and there was  
such lack of trust and conflict in the society. And further linked to that was a lack  
of government presence, security institutions and governance around the country.  
And I think that the idea of the hubs came up in order to make sure that there is a  
presence of rule of law institutions around the country as the peacekeeping  
operations eventually will wind down. To ensure that there is a government  
presence, there was this idea to create 5 hubs. 
Participant 021 stated that: 
the justice and security regional hub; initially the plan was to have 5 in place. And  
out of the 5, each hub will cater for 3 counties. As you know Liberia has 15  
counties. So, the first one was the Gbarnga regional hub, and that accounts for  
Lofa, Bong and Nimba counties. And the second should have been in Harper  
Maryland, and the third in Zwedru and fourth and fifth Grand Gedeh and  
Maryland.  
According to Participant 006: 
The Justice and Security Joint Program … was the agreement between the United  
Nations mission and the government represented by the Chief Justice and the  
Minister of Justice. And it was really geared towards decentralizing access to  





had a presence. But this was really designed to try and make sure that those  
services were extended beyond the capital. The first hub was in Gbarnga,  
it was designed to look at all the elements of the criminal justice system;  
from policing, right through the criminal justice system to prisons and it was done  
on a regional basis. But it was set up and designed so that it would provide a  
decentralized service in three counties. 
According to Participant 009, in the Gbarnga hub, “… we built a courthouse; we built housing 
for policing and for immigration …”. In the words of Participant 030, “The establishment of the 
justice and security hub in Liberia has been the driving force behind decentralization of the 
formal criminal justice system.” 
I now proceed to present data collected to answer the second Research Question of this 
study which is, how nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize Liberia’s 















Research Question 2: How Nationally Owned and Inclusive was the Process to Decentralize 
Liberia’s Criminal Justice System? 
For ease of reference, Table 3 presents, and Figure 2 depicts, participants' responses 
indicating how nationally owned and inclusive the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system was. 
Table 3 
Participants’ Responses Indicating How Nationally Owned And Inclusive the Decentralize of 
Liberia’s Criminal Justice System Was  
 




No consideration of the Liberian context; decentralization 
was foreign driven 
24 28 
Decentralization process hybrid local, national and 
international driven 
17 20 
Civil society organizations and traditional leaders involved  15 17 
One-size-fits-all approach adopted across Liberia to 
decentralize criminal justice services/system 
12 14 
Non-homogenous approach adopted to decentralization 9 10 
Consideration given to the Liberian context 6 7 
Decentralization process was a combination of homogenous 
and non-homogenous approaches 
3 3 







Figure 2. Participants responses indicating how nationally owned and inclusive the 































Theme One: Decentralization of Liberia’s Criminal Justice System was Somewhat 
Nationally Owned and Inclusive 
 Subthemes under this theme are: 
Subthemes 
Subtheme One: Actors Involved in Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System  
Participants identified countries, international development cooperation agencies,  
supranational organizations, civil society, non-governmental organizations, the Government of 
Liberia and its agencies as the actors involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
The countries involved could be divided into Developed or Western countries and Developing 
countries. In some cases, the Developed countries supported the decentralization process through 
their respective international development cooperation agencies. 
Countries. As previously noted, this category included both Western countries and 
countries from other parts of the developed world. Australia, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America were the Western countries 
identified by participants. This assertion is supported by the following statement made by 
Participant 005 that “Sweden and the US were providing assistance to the criminal justice 
sector.” Participant  007 stated that “… from my own experience, it was the Americans that we 
got the biggest support from … Germans funded the probation; the Americans trained the 
Emergency Response Unit of the Liberia National Police; the Swedish people helped with 
improving our forensic capacity and helping us take people abroad to be trained as pathologists 





International development cooperation agencies. As previously noted, participants 
also pointed out that some of the Developed countries provided support through bilateral 
cooperation and through their development cooperation agencies. These agencies included the 
United States Aid agency (USAID), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and 
Irish AID. 
Developing countries. A few African countries through bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements supported the process of making Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible. 
Participants identified Cameroon, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe. 
Supranational organizations. Intergovernmental and or regional organizations were 
involved in decentralizing criminal justice services in Liberia. Participants mentioned the United 
Nations and its agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the 
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. 
According to Participant 014: 
The UN is the number one. The United Nations Mission in Liberia’s (UNMIL) Quick 
Impact Project ... they were monitoring the prisons, and they were doing training; UNDP 
helped the Ministry of Justice with the procedure to find out how the law can be amended 
to sort of help the decongestion in the prisons. 
This was corroborated by Participant  015 who, in identifying actors stated: “UNMIL, UN with 
respect to capacity building, Peacebuilding Fund …UNDP …” Participants also identified 
regional/intergovernmental organizations like the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the African Commission on 





major role. I understand that even before the coming in of the UN, ECOWAS played a critical 
role.” Participant 005 stated that “ECOWAS concentrated on the police and training …” 
Participant 007 also stated that: “Yes, ECOWAS was involved. In fact, they provided us with 
funding … for the border between Liberia and Ivory Coast. … to build houses for immigration 
and police because most of them were at the border sleeping on the ground.” Participant 029 
listed the international actors involved in the process of making Liberia’s criminal justice system 
accessible: 
… basically, we have the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),  
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United States government, the  
Swedish, Irish Aid, EU, ECOWAS, the British government also supports, Ghana  
also provides support in different areas. … So, we had a lot of support from  
Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon and Senegal so all of those countries that came from  
Africa to help revitalize our security sector and to provide training for our men  
and women. 
Participant 002 identified “The United Nations, the Peacebuilding Fund and the national 
government.” 
  Government of Liberia. The Government and people of Liberia were another category of 
actors that participants identified. Participant 009 stated that, “… the Government of Liberia 
through the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry Justice and her agencies including the Liberia 
National Police (LNP), and the Judiciary”. Participant 012 noted that, “… the Legislature based 
on their oversight function also provided services; making sure that the laws are adequate and 
predictable” Participant 029 also stated that: 





have seen the government’s development plan. There is a whole lot that is dedicated in ensuring 
that the services are decentralized. And it is being coordinated by the Chief Justice and Minister 
of Justice along with the partners and supporters for the process …. They are ensuring that, that 
same structure at the national level is duplicated at the county level, we have local authorities 
sitting to ensure that the services are decentralized.  
International nongovernmental organizations. Examples of international 
nongovernmental organizations include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Republic Institute, The Carter Centre, the Geneva 
Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), as well as faith-based organizations like 
Lutheran World Service and the Catholic Relief Services. According to Participant 001, “… 
international partners including ICRC, who are very good partners particularly for the 
corrections sector.” Participant 024 stated that “The broader UN family international actors plus 
international NGOs such as Norwegian Refugee Council was doing a lot of work in the criminal 
justice system in the early days and organizations such as the American Bar Association.” 
Local nongovernmental organizations. There were also local nongovernmental 
organizations or civil society groups including Prison Fellowship Liberia, Foundation for 
International Dignity, the Liberia National Bar Association, the Liberia National Law 
Enforcement Association, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the Peace Resource 
Centre, the Community Watch Forum and the Trial Judges Association involved in the 
decentralization process. According to Participant 014 “… there is an organization called Prison 
Watch that goes all over the country; along with the justice ministry monitoring the condition of 






Local communities and individuals and civil society. Participant 017  
identified “Foundation for International Dignity (FIND), The Carter Centre, and Catholic Justice 
and Peace Commission”. Participant 021 identified “the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission; 
the Foundation for International Dignity, the Peace Resource Centre.” According to Participant 
024:  
I will say that Justice and Peace Commission by being active in the counties, was  
monitoring and seeking to ensure that cases brought before the formal justice  
system would be processed, so that people working or people living in the  
counties ended up being more familiar with the system and being supported and  
engaging with it. So that would be one way. I will say that … The Carter Center   
educated about the justice system but also their willingness to focus outside of the  
formal justice system with other actors assisted in bringing criminal justice  
services although not necessarily formal services to the population of Liberia. 
Participant 030 indicated that “Local partners such as the Catholic Justice and Peace 
Commission, the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) …” 
Participant 029, identified the following local civil society organizations as being involved in the 
decentralization process: 
… we have one association called PDP I think, they are engaging in human rights  
programs, NAYMOTE providing services that involves tracking of government  
services and ensuring that the government delivers all those promises. We have  
the Foundation for Human Rights and Development that does human rights  





In addition to non-governmental and civil society groups, local communities and individuals 
were involved in the decentralization process. According to Participant 025,  
… we tried to engage the civil society organizations and local actors. We had a  
number of talks and engagements with civil society organizations in Monrovia  
and also, at the first hub in Gbarnga. And then we also engaged locally with the  
Peace Huts and had conversations with civil society organizations in most parts of  
the country on issues relating to human rights, issues relating to justice and land  
issues and other things. 
Participant 023 stated there “are a couple of us civil society organizations that are working not 
too many.” Participant 003 stated that “... local NGOs, the traditional groups; everyone was 
involved in the decentralization process.” On the involvement of local communities and 
nongovernmental organizations, Participant 024 stated, “I would say yes but few and far 
between.” Participant 015 also stated that “… we had them from all sectors. We had professional 
institutions, we had religious groups, and cultural groups involved in the process.” Chiefs and 
other traditional leaders are important actors in Liberia’s local communities. In this regard, 
Participant 016 highlighted the interaction between criminal justice officials and traditional 
leaders. According to this Participant, “… there are some instances where some magistrates work 
with chiefs in matters that are strictly traditional. So, there is a lot of cooperation and 
respectability.” Participant 027 opined that:  
There have been some major interruptions and interferences in the jurisdiction of   
traditional leaders and chief priests. The court doesn’t have jurisdiction to say that  
this is a matter for traditional authorities, high priests. So, I cannot say  





lot of interference.  
Participant 014 also highlighted the challenges associated with the jurisdiction between the 
traditional justice and the formal criminal justice. According to this Participant:  
Most of the time, traditional leaders talk about their role. They want a bigger role.  
They believe that much of the power has been taken away by extending the  
criminal justice system. … They tend to feel that their importance is diminished  
by the criminal justice system. For example, tribal courts have been used to  
resolve crimes committed in the local areas. So much awareness has to be done in  
terms of what their jurisdiction is in dealing with domestic issues, customary  
marriages, and tradition led issues. And these are large areas. So, matters  
involving secret societies, those are matters that the local traditional leaders and  
chiefs can easily handle. They have been told they cannot handle the other matters  
because there are rules and matters must go through due process … so that is still  
a sticky area. The local leaders feel their powers are diminishing … 
Participant 026 indicated that, during the implementation of the second and third justice and 
security hubs, efforts were made to understand the interaction between the traditional justice 
system and the criminal justice system:  
I do know that at the second phase of setting up hubs 2 & 3, working to  
understand the interface between the criminal justice system and the traditional  
justice system was one of the activities that was done. Because at that time it  
became apparent that inasmuch at the criminal justice system was working, the  
traditional justice system was having a lot of impact. For example, when it  





rape cases at home instead of taking it to the police, an intervention was required.  
So, I think Carter Centre or one of these institutions was asked to work in that  
direction to see what method they would use to harmonize the criminal justice  
system and if there were any grievances that needed to be addressed. 
Also, Participant 004 indicated that traditional leaders are very important stakeholders in Liberia 
hence the decentralization of the criminal justice system cannot take place without their active 
involvement. According to this Participant:  
And then also on the cultural side, all the secret societies, you know the United  
Nations tried to engage them, train them and to remove some for the obnoxious  
things that they were doing like burning of people’s fingers; those cruel practices  
that were in the system. So, they also played an important role. One cannot deny  
that. More specifically in rural Liberia, outside Monrovia. … It was a deliberate  
effort because you cannot talk of decentralization without involving them.  
Because the other partners were found in Monrovia and the county capitals. But  
these people were found everywhere; from the southern, western and central parts  
of Liberia. If we didn’t make a deliberate policy to involve them, we weren’t  
going to succeed. We weren’t going to achieve what we wanted to achieve ... 
Participant 026 stressed the efforts made to involve the local community in the decentralization 
process. 
… we had public outreach officers on the ground who were having regular  
meetings with people on the ground and informing them about their rights to  
justice and security. And we also had a complaint mechanism, where the local  





abused by justice and security actors, they would be able to write complaints back  
to us and we were able to forward it to the Judiciary and Ministry of Justice. 
Participant 020 set out some of the work that was done with the local community and how this 
engagement enhanced access to the criminal justice system: 
So, we had to work with the Community Watch Forum, setting up community  
initiatives in all of those communities. Working closely with the district and  
county setups. We worked with local NGOs, we worked with human rights  
groups, in order to carry out all those other functions. One of the groups that we  
did partner with was the Press Union of Liberia. I think it was quite effective  
bringing them in as stakeholders. Beyond that, it depended on what we were  
doing, we identified all our stakeholders. We had the local community, we had  
youth groups, and we had the motorcyclist’s union, which we found to be quite  
effective, even though other law enforcers may disagree, believing that they were  
a distraction due to their recklessness. So, when we identified them as  
stakeholders, what we did was that we had to provide training for them to see how  
they could reduce the number of accidents. There were times that there would be  
accidents down the road. If we didn’t have motorcyclists along that way to bring  
the wounded to the hospital or bring the information to the police, we would not  
get it for a very long time. So, they were a major stakeholder. And there would be  
issues going on in the villages that we will not be aware of. They would bring the  
information to us. We also worked with women’s groups who proved to be very  
effective because whenever there was a situation regarding the women, they  





Participant 029 stated that, “to a larger extent, some consultation took place. That is why the 
justice system has those working at the grass root level to do awareness raising and to be able to 
address some of the critical issues at the community level.” 
Participant 009 pointed out the importance of engaging with the local community and how this 
had improved over time especially in the hubs project:  
Because in the beginning …, we realized that outreach, engaging the community,  
ensuring that they were a part of those things, was important, so we taught the  
concept as it was and what we had done in Hub 1 and we carried that to hubs 2  
and 3. And we met with every Tom, Dick and Harry and we hired local NGOs,  
and local CSOs and had meetings with the county leadership with the traditional  
leaders, and faith-based leaders. We said, ‘hey, this is what is coming’.  
Subtheme Two: Reasons for involving nonstate actors in the Decentralization  
Table 4 presents, and Figure 3 depicts, participants views on reasons for involving civil 
society, local organizations and traditional leaders in the process of decentralizing Liberia’s 













Table 4  
Participants’ Views on Reasons for Involving Civil Society, Local Organizations and Traditional 
Leaders In Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System  
 
Reasons Number of Responses (n) Responses in percentages (%) 
To promote national 
ownership and inclusiveness 
11 37 





To promote oversight and 
accountability over the 
criminal justice system and 
the decentralization process 
6 20 
To provide criminal justice 
services 
4 13 
To implement projects on 
behalf of donors 
1 3 
To promote sustainability 1 3 









Figure 3. Participants Views On Reasons For Involving Civil Society, Local Organizations And 
Traditional Leaders In The Process Of Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System 
 
As evidenced in Table 3 presents, and Figure 2, Participants assigned several reasons for 
involving non-governmental organizations and civil society groups in the decentralization 
process. This is captured in the following statements that they made:  
To promote oversight and accountability. According to Participant 015, “… civil 
society has been involved. By raising concerns in respect of law violation, giving reminders as to 
what should be done, involved in our discussion at different levels. Making contributions with 
respect to how the restructuring should be done ...” 




































Because if you leave it only with the government, sometimes there is a tendency that 
people will quickly forget some of the issues that they are supposed to do. And 
sometimes, those who are the head of those institutions are human beings and there is a 
tendency that they will forget some of the issues so civil society serves as the watchdog. 
So, they come in to give reminders.  
Participant 029 shared similar views: 
So many reasons: first thing is to deal with accountability and oversight issues. To be able 
to ensure that people have access, to ensure that there is a fair and transparent process. So 
being an independent person in the society, it serves as a link between the government and 
the community. And so, they have a good niche in accountability, transparency, and so 
involving them is an added value to the process. 
Participant 025 stated that: 
… it was also a way to get actors involved and there would be checks and  
balances of the presence of the police and every local institution. Because one  
concern was that if you build hubs and create a strong presence of police and law  
institutions then you need to have checks and balances of their presence and make  
sure, that there are those who are watching and can bring issues and problems to  
the knowledge of decision makers.  
Participant 019 explained why civil society organizations (CSO’s) were involved, stating 
that: “…, the way Liberia is … and also because of government’s bureaucracy and corruption, at 






Participant 002 stated that “They provided the needed oversight mechanism and strengthened 
national ownership”. 
To provide criminal justice services. Participant 008 stated that: 
I think Liberia has been blessed with a multitude of national and international  
partners. At the local level, NGOs who are involved in human rights; NGOs who  
are involved directly in projects; the Liberia National Bar Association, who  
provided legal aid; the Justice and Peace Commission, and a few other institutions  
who were there. Some were also involved in working with our partners to identify  
areas of support, where they can play that role. 
Participant 005 stated that “we did have NGOs being there in terms of service provision. You 
have had a number of NGOs over the years in partnership with UN agencies like the UNDP 
providing support in different aspects of the criminal justice system.” According to Participant 
013: 
For example, the Community Watch Forum, which is really helping the police in  
many districts where the police are few; they are there to collect information and  
pass it on to the police. … female lawyers association, who also support or assist  
in terms of gender based violence, … faith based organizations, because you have  
the churches all over, the traditional people all over; they were solving criminal  
cases even though their powers have been drastically curtailed. They still hear and  
try minor cases. 
Participant 021 also stated that “… the civil society organizations, … have been involved 





know the government cannot provide for the entire country and so civil society players are there 
to support the Government's efforts.” 
To promote national ownership and inclusiveness. Participant 014 stated that “… there 
has always been some portion of civil society involvement. Sometimes, civil society 
organizations are invited. Whenever they have a criminal justice conference, the civil society is 
invited.” Participant 016 asserted that civil society organizations invited themselves to the 
process because of the stake they had in it, “they (CSOs) have not been scouted for. I think that 
they see a need and they try to help.” Participant 006 stated that “there were a number of charity 
minded organizations that … were trying to make a difference wherever they were …” 
Participant 012 stated that: 
… they are playing a pivotal role in making sure that the reforms don’t just take  
place in Monrovia. It has to take place where the people are; the local areas. So,  
the counties, districts, and even the border towns also need to be looked at in a  
critical way. 
Participant 008 stated that: 
If an international NGO gets a contract to deal with things like prolonged pretrial  
detentions. … they get to Liberia; they don’t know the ground. They need to have  
one or two renowned or known groups to work with. So, they benefit from the  
process and the Liberian group that is also struggling, it is a welcoming  
opportunity for them, and they will get some money in the process. So, there is a  
marriage there; everyone benefits.  
According to Participant 007, the population was involved in the decentralization process 





doesn’t make sense for the government to want to decentralize a system and impose it on the 
people. So, the idea was to get all these people involved so they could reach out to the people.” 
According to Participant 009 it was for “others to come on board to take ownership of some of 
these projects”. Participant 011 stated that: 
One key thing was the issue of ownership. The fact that we had our local institutions and 
people involved, showed the extent of ownership; it showed that they had their voice and 
could make decisions and could find solutions to issues. 
Participant 009 noted that “civil society organizations are invited because they represent the 
ordinary people.” Participant 010 stated that: 
One of the reasons is to get more institutions to participate in the decentralization 
process. Because the criminal justice system should not be restricted to the implementing 
institutions, and for community purposes and taking the criminal justice system to the 
people, we needed the churches and the local NGOs to do this. They had direct contact 
with people in these communities and districts. And initially, when the police cannot 
reach in terms of crimes these organizations stepped in. If we had to investigate, we 
relied on witnesses who live in the society in order to have a successful investigation. So, 
it was very important to have these nonstate actors involved. 
Participant 007 stated that, “… when we decided to harmonize both the formal and informal 
system we consulted with the people. When we decided to have the hub in Gbarnga we went to 
the people and had a dialogue with them.” Participant 013 stated that “I am sure before the process 
began, there were a series of meetings both at the national level and grass root level. So, the views 
of the community were brought in and absorbed in the decision-making process.” Participant 015 





Security Strategy. According to this Participant, “… when we were writing out the National 
Security Strategy, we decided to include the arrangement where they could participate”. 
Participant 030 indicated that “To make the system work, both state and nonstate actors must form 
partnerships on decentralization of the criminal justice system.” 
Participant 015 also stated that the reason “is to have a wider participation, because the wider the 
scope in the participation, the wider the process will become.” According to Participant 026, 
It was because they were on the ground, they knew the terrain, they had  
physical touch with the people on the ground and because they knew the terrain,  
they were able to understand the vernacular easily so such things as raising the  
awareness and training were easy for them to do as compared to program staff. So,  
they had that advantage as compared to the program staff who didn’t know the  
terrain and could not speak the language and those kinds of things. 
To promote public outreach and awareness. Participant 019 stated that “We worked 
through various civil society organizations to provide awareness in about 6 counties.” Affirming 
this stance, Participant 021 stated that: 
When it comes to the civil society, they have been involved because there is a legal aid 
service ... They give support by providing security awareness and some training to 
residents in hub counties so that they could access the formal justice system rather than 
going to the informal justice system. Because most often, people choose the informal 
justice system because they feel that it is faster. Oftentimes, the formal justice system 






Participant 009 stated that “there were civil society organizations involved in outreach especially 
… Carter Centre, Prison Fellowship, and national and international NGOs.” According to 
Participant 009: 
… for hubs 2 and 3 which is rural Liberia, and trying to get the information out to  
people, it was very important that those civil society organizations who were  
already based in those areas would help. It was to ensure partnership and to  
encourage them to get the citizens involved. 
According to Participant 023: 
… what we are doing as an organization is first to create awareness that there is  
justice for all. … we are creating awareness and we try to bring the two systems  
together so that there can be commonality to work together. In that way, we  
will be able to decentralize the services. Because once you are bringing dialogues  
to the traditionalists, in the form of customary laws and what have you - and then  
the formal justice system, you tend to create a framework that both can work. And when 
they can work together, that can be a way of decentralizing the services. 
According to Participant 018 “… we worked more on awareness; making people aware of their 
rights to enable them to exercise them and to ensure their enforcement because when you are not 
aware you have these rights, exercising them will be difficult.” Participant 021 stated that “… 
civil society created awareness in the different counties. So, the rate at which people are now 
choosing to go to the formal justice system is gradually increasing as compared to the informal 
system.” According to Participant 027: 
I think the rationale was that for communication. As we know, for it to be  





communicate the message. And so … that was the criteria that … made it all the  
more relevant to involve civil society actors in the local communities. 
To implement projects on behalf of donors. Participant 008 observed that the  
unwillingness of some donors to fund projects to decentralize the criminal justice system by  
contributing to the Government of Liberia’s budget and/or the absence of local capacity to  
implement such projects resulted in donors contracting international non-governmental  
organizations (NGOs) to implement projects on their behalf and this resulted in the involvement 
of NGOs in the decentralization process: 
Well, I think that in postconflict countries you … don’t have that much local  
capacity on the ground, in terms of institutions that can provide some of those  
services. So, if the Americans or the Europeans want to support the hub for  
for instance, they must do it through institutions. And some of them want to do  
it but they don’t want to give the money to the government. You see, that is  
another problem. They don’t want to put that money into the national budget so  
that the government can do it. No! so, they put these up for companies and  
institutions to apply and the most capable people at that time based on their  
criteria are the international NGOs.  
Participant 030 also noted that “Local partners such as the Catholic Justice and Peace 
Commission, the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) … have by and large been 
implementing partners of international partners …” 
To promote sustainability. Participant 011 stated that “… by virtue of you being a part 
of a process even helps to bring about some form of sustainability.” Despite this objective, 





Local partners such as the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the Foundation for 
International Dignity (FIND) … who have by and large been implementing partners of 
the international partners are now hindered in how much they can do because many, if 
not all, of the international partners have pulled out.  
Subtheme Three: Decentralization was elite driven local population rarely consulted 
Despite the views held by participants about the involvement of individuals, local 
communities and traditional leaders in the decentralization process, there were other participants 
who held contrary views on the involvement of these segments of the Liberian community in the 
decentralization process, in fact some described the process as driven by the political elite. This is 
evidenced by the following statements made by participants: 
Decentralization process driven by elite. The following participants held the view that 
the process was elite driven: Participant 010 stated that “… the elite had the idea and the idea 
was implemented in Monrovia and taken into the counties. But for it to be implemented, we had 
to encourage the locals to get involved.” Participant 029 stated that “yes, it was an elite driven 
approach.” Participant 014 affirmed the fact that the decentralization process was an elite driven 
process: 
… because letters are written to the organizations for representation at these  
meetings. And most times, it is the leaders that will come. They will not take  
anyone from the village or street to come. But it is the leadership or the chief …  
that will come; …. So yes, it is a proxy arrangement where ordinary people are  
represented by leadership. 
Participant 013 agreed that the process was elite driven: “… For example, where you had the 





represented by their leaders.” The local community’s minimal involvement in the hubs project 
was also highlighted by Participant 027: 
Some of the feedback we got was that they weren’t engaged with that much. The  
local community had very little or no information even though the process around  
building the hub was quite systematic. But it seemed more that the  
decentralization of criminal justice services focused more on the hardware side of  
the projects that infrastructure development and later the social communication  
side. 
Participant 001 indicated that literate members of the society were involved: 
Some of them were involved, especially the literate members who were involved  
in the decentralization, but some were not. Issues of ownership came in. Because  
even the representation in terms of partisan politics was not good in some of these  
areas. 
On the participation of the local community and ordinary citizens in the decentralization process, 
Participant 002 indicated that there was “not much involvement.” 
Participant 004 lamented over the minimal involvement of the local community and the elite 
nature of the process: 
Sitting back, I think the local communities played an important role in the  
decentralization process, but it wasn’t at a massive and higher level. When I say  
massive, I mean that, say thousands and thousands of people are being involved.  
It was a few hundred here and there. Mainly the leaders of the secret societies, the  
leaders of healers, some of the rebel leaders who turned into local lords ... It  





population. It should include provision of resources that will enable an impact that  
you can physically see. An impact that leads to the decolonization of the mind of  
the people. It wasn’t done. The content of the training was good, but it didn’t  
reach as many people as it should. 
Participant 018 confirmed the minimal involvement of the local population - “… the concepts are 
crafted in Monrovia and we go to the counties for validation.” Participant 021 stated that: 
“we forget that Monrovia is not Liberia. We need to go back to the rural areas. Yes, it 
was an elite process. So, we need to go back to the rural areas. In fact, there were 
different perceptions about the hub. Some thought it was a camp for the police to detain 
people”. 
According to Participant 023 civil society organizations were involved but have to ensure that 
the Government does not see them as competitors. In this regard, the Participant stated: 
Well, the government itself has their own setup and mindset about certain issues,  
especially those issues that they think can promote them most. Those are the  
things they go after. Now, as a civil society organization, in an attempt to buttress  
the effort or criticize it, they think that you are competing with them. So, it  
becomes a competition. So, what do we do to get rid of that challenge? We create  
dialogue; so that they see civil society as a partner not as a competitive  
organization. So, in terms of a smooth ride; no, it hasn’t been a smooth ride. 
Participant 002 indicated that “I would say they were not involved; they may have been invited 





Local population not involved. Participant 010 acknowledged the need to involve the 
local population and the fact that the inadequate engagement with the local population was due 
to lack of funding for this purpose: 
… what we wanted to do was to be able to have an outreach program to the locals  
to sell the idea of the hub. But all those things needed funding. And honestly, we  
did not have the locals involved much because we did not have the financial  
capacity to do a total orientation. 
Participant 023 blamed the international community for the level of involvement of the local 
population. According to this Participant, “the international community came with funding. They 
needed to showcase to their donors that the government is willing to accept the hub concept. So, 
they meet behind closed doors and whatever they talked about nobody knows.” Affirming this 
view, Participant 009 indicated that: 
In the beginning in Gbarnga, it took us a while to get people to understand because there 
was no outreach. There was construction before outreach. … there was no outreach to the 
people, so the people were not excited about it and it was only because towards the end, 
when we were constructing the Circuit Court, that people started to understand the 
concept. 
The fact that ordinary citizens were informed and not consulted is stressed by Participant 024: 
I think that we put a focus on this on paper and if you read the joint program, the  
narrative of that and the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan or the Priority Plan, that was  
the focus; about reaching out to ordinary citizens and having them involved in the  
process; the outreach side of things … that people are aware of what the system is  





informing citizens rather than listening to citizens. 
Participant 020 affirmed the fact that the involvement of the local community was mostly to 
inform them about what was being done to make the criminal justice system accessible: “… they 
were well informed. They participated in workshops as to how the new system was going to 
work. They were welcoming and accommodating. These were local people at the grassroots 
level.” Participant 021 shared similar views. According to this Participant, the engagement with 
the local community was to: 
... create awareness. We were telling them what we have done not what should be  
done. We have this big building here; this is what we have done; these are the  
services we provide; these are the people you will meet, and this is what you  
should expect from them. This is what we were telling them. 
Participant 030 confirmed this, claiming that: “Prior to the establishment of the Gbarnga 
Regional Justice and Security Hub, public outreach officers created awareness in the various 
communities.” 
Traditional leaders and by extension the traditional justice system not involved. 
Participant 019 highlighted the resistance the police had for giving traditional leaders jurisdiction 
in some criminal matters. This Participant observed that “when I did this work with the Women 
and Children Protection Section, the first impression was, we cannot do this thing. These 
traditional people are not well trained. … Because they are not trained, cases cannot be referred to 
them.” According to Participant 003, traditional leaders felt that they were being dictated to as 





One of the things here is that, traditional authorities wanted to have a say within the 
system. They didn’t like the part of the system where they were being dictated to. They 
wanted to be able to resolve certain issues … 
According to Participant 005 there was a recognition that the traditional justice system is an 
important part of Liberia’s justice system so must be involved in the decentralization process, 
however the structure of Liberia’s government resulted in a disjointed approach:  
I think it should be noted that there were sound human rights concerns about some 
aspects of the criminal justice systems as practiced in parts of Liberia, like Trial by 
Ordeal which was practiced. But as I said, I think one of the failures in terms of a holistic 
approach is the fact that the Ministry of Internal Affairs which was responsible to 
traditional authorities found itself dealing with criminal justice issues which were under 
the Ministry of Justice. And therefore, the legal framework that focused around 
customary justice remained unreformed and unchanged. 
Although the traditional justice system was used by many outside the capital, Participant 004 
indicated that “it wasn’t given enough attention, and it reflected the reality of the state of Liberia; 
that there is discrimination against the rest of Liberia, and everything is in favor of Monrovia.” 
Participant 005 shared the view that not much attention was given to the customary justice 
system because it was looked down upon by the elite: 
I don’t think very much consideration was made because of the justice system. I  
think partly due to the elite’s dislike of it. The impression I got frequently from  
many Liberians when I spoke about the customary justice system was  
embarrassment. Whether that was justified or not was another matter. But I think  





minor crimes. They could not deal with serious crimes. I think they could have  
been better used in dispute resolution.  
Participant 004 described the engagement with the traditional justice system as part of the 
decentralization process as one that was not sustained and elite driven: 
There were several meetings held across Liberia, but the process was once more driven 
from Monrovia. The process did not consider that it was a process and not an event that 
you go to any of the counties and hold an event or seminar, do the training and you bring 
the radio people to report it. You get one or two journalists to report it. And then we do 
the reports … and add the pictures, in certain cases add the names. 
Participant 008 shared the view expressed by Participant 004 about the importance of the 
customary justice system and admitted that little attention was paid to the customary justice 
system in the decentralization process. This Participant identified several challenges hindering 
the active involvement of the traditional justice system in the decentralization process: 
In my opinion, I don’t think the criminal justice system, or the extent of the  
customary justice practices were a factor in the decentralization process. I think  
the overriding concern was political. Firstly, in fulfilment of such obligation that  
each county is supposed to have XYZ facilities. And if the government were to  
consider the presence of the traditional and customary practices, it means that the  
the government has accepted those practices as accurate or adequate … There is a  
tendency to believe that in the customary setting, you take a particular county;  
most of the people belong to one tribe and therefore they all accept a particular  
custom. But in that society also, because of people moving out or because of  





who don’t belong to that particular customary practice, who do not believe, who  
do not accept that customary practice. And therefore, if the government were to  
turn around and say, ‘well as far as we know, there is a traditional court in that  
area and so we are satisfied with that’. Now for you to make that decision, you  
have to do an assessment and this I believe has not been done. You need to assess  
not only in terms of the substantive customary or traditional law that they are  
trying to interpret but the procedure that they use to support those cases. And I  
I think it is the Government's responsibility if you want to make a choice or  
decide and say look, we don’t have adequate resources, and clearly, we cannot  
institute statutory courts in all places around Liberia. So that those areas where  
there are traditional courts, we let those traditional courts operate or we create a  
linkage between them and maybe the statutory system, so they could be the first  
point of intervention and if you are not satisfied, then you can take your appeal to  
the statutory court. And that is one way of looking at it. Or to say, well look, we  
need to have an assessment. How are those courts run? And so, these are the types  
of assessment we need to do. I mean there are positive values, even maintain the  
cohesiveness of the community themselves; people go in and come out smiling as  
opposed to the statutory courts where after a hearing people become enemies ….  
So, there needs to be an assessment done and then thinking about how we can link  
them to the statutory system. 
The inadequate attention being paid to the customary justice system has created challenges, 
especially challenges relating to jurisdiction. According to Participant 027 this has resulted in a 





… we realized that the advancement of the criminal justice system was happening  
in tension. There was a lot of tension with the traditional justice system, with the  
elders of the communities. So, some of the feedback was that, some of the cases  
that were brought before the court, resulted in conflict over jurisdiction.  
Traditional leaders were saying no, this is a matter to be determined by the chief,  
this is a matter to be determined by the high priest and this is not a matter for the  
Monrovia court. … the criminal justice system is encroaching on major territory  
that for a long time has been occupied by the traditional elders, by high priests  
and where the customary system of the Liberian tradition has been the prerogative  
or has been presumed to have the prerogative to handle the matter, matters that are  
now coming under the jurisdiction of the formal justice system. So, there is a lot  
of tension; a lack of understanding on the part of the traditional leaders, in terms  
of where does their authority end? And where does the court begin? … That is a  
major problem. 
Participant 023, in admitting the tension between both systems of justice, noted: “... government, 
like I said, they think that the formal justice system and customary justice system fight, so, they 
prefer the formal.” Participant 017 held a contrary view on the relationship between the 
customary and statutory justice systems: “I will not say it is tense. There are times they 
collaborate. And that is why when normally there is a meeting where they discuss issues and 
right the wrongs.” Participant 027 argued that “the fact that there are lawyers and court sittings 
are held in the rural areas on a recurrent basis seem to suggest that the traditional authorities have 
had very little role in the design of this very important project.” In the words of Participant 001 





the locality and tell him my problems and it would be solved together. That is the “Palava Hut.” 
But now we are creating a wall around to jail criminals.” 
Partial involvement of civil society organizations. Some participants held the view that 
civil society organizations were partially involved in the decentralization process. Participant 005 
stated that “civil society organizations took part in the consultation process especially if they 
were very significant in their local area. Otherwise, I think that they were really on the advocacy 
side and some service provision.” Participant 009 stated, with respect to the involvement of faith 
based organizations, that: 
No. They were not involved. The only time they probably would have been involved is 
when we were doing a perception survey and we were asking everybody questions and 
they would give their opinion, but they were not involved in carrying the message or in 
the implementation of particular projects. And having said that, not in the security and 
justice system per se, but on the other hand, when we were trying to institute the 
probation and parole system, yes, we did use more traditional leaders and more faith-
based leaders because it is about the reform of the criminal; you know to ensure that they 
were a part of the process. 
On the involvement of the local community, Participant 008 stated that “I think the involvement 
has been minimal.” Participant 006 described the engagement of the local population as “very 
little.” Participant 019 indicated that “I think the local community was involved in some cases 
but in many cases, they may not have been involved. And even if they were, it was in a minimal 
sense.”  
Reasons for an elite driven process. Participants assigned the following reasons for the 





local community in the decentralization process was deliberate due to the associated financial 
implications:  
Some of the local population including traditional leaders have roles to play but we have 
been slow in recognizing those roles that they played and therefore we have not given 
them that stamp or imprimatur so to speak; to say look, these are major partners, and we 
need to recognize them, because that recognition will come along with financial 
commitments. You cannot recognize without providing support. And so sometimes it is 
deliberate. 
The structure of Liberia’s Government was the reason provided by Participant 010 for the 
minimal or noninvolvement of traditional authorities: 
the reason why they were not active in the first place in the beginning was  
because the cultural group was directly working with the Ministry of Internal  
Affairs. And the Internal Affairs was not properly established at the time to be  
able to carry on the function to decentralize the system in all the counties. 
Subtheme Four: Some Consideration Given to the Liberian context 
Participant 011 insisted that: 
One thing we must understand is that there has been a number of discussions 
amongst the government. Some of these approaches that were needed to be taken 
did not come from the international community. It actually came from the  
consultations. And I told you that the next thing was to ascertain the affordability.  
So, there were times that when we found out that the things that we want to do,  
probably the cost was too high, we had to adjust to make sure that what we  





Participant 025 stated that: 
Yes, I think they were very much aware of Liberia’s history and culture. The  
problem was that there is both a long-term history and culture and you have the  
more recent past with the civil war. And I think the persisting problem of Liberia  
was the very strong focus on Monrovia and the presence of good governance and  
absence of the rule of law around the country. And of course, during the war, a lot  
that was destroyed. So, I think we were very much aware of this, but that  
awareness is very difficult to translate into one single conclusion because it makes  
the challenge very complex. And I think this is part of a problem in a country like  
Liberia coming out of a conflict … and having to deal with the peace and state  
building challenges in a postconflict country … then you have the long-term  
effects of history and culture, that also needs to be factored in, which makes  
things very difficult. … trying to deal with all that is of course extremely  
challenging. 
Participant 004 asserted that: Yes, it did influence the decision. The point about influence and 
implementation is the challenge. You influence the decision, you plan what you want to do, and 
in the implementation process, you don’t do it with the strength of the influence. 
Participant 008 stated that: 
I will say to some extent, yes. The civil war in Liberia taught a lot of people 
a lot of lessons. People were able to identify the shortcomings in the criminal 
justice system. So, while the structure may not have changed, how those  
institutions work informed the players and authorities in reforming them. Like  





not the poor and that if you are a poor man and you are caught in the criminal  
justice system, you will never win. So, the new decentralization said, ok, we will  
create Public Defenders. That was in the law, but I never saw it materialize. So, if  
you don’t have a lawyer; we provide you with Public Defense. That’s a response  
to some of the shortcomings in the criminal justice system. We expanded the  
jurisdiction of the magisterial courts. But there were still areas that had no courts.  
The only ones were traditional courts, and these were not rendering full justice to  
them. So, the new decentralization created additional areas where magisterial  
courts were established and not only establishing them but training people as  
magistrates. … the law says you must be a lawyer to be a magistrate so, we  
decided to train people who are not lawyers to become Associate Magistrates  
because in many of the areas you cannot find full magistrates.  
According to Participant 011: 
There was priority given to the customary justice system. As part of our entire reform, it 
was factored in and what was now being mentioned was that the customary justice 
system is seen as equal, compared to the statutory justice system. And it is accepted by 
all.  
Participate 011 also stated: 
Definitely! A committee was established after identifying and making sure that  
the customary system is supportive of the system and there was a need to weed  
out practices that had no connection with the formal system. The customary  
system … are still dealing with minor cases …. They are still fining people. The  





you can leave and come to the formal justice system. 
Participant 014 stated that, “… the view was that, it was the absence of the criminal justice 
system working that contributed to conflict in this country. … so yeah, it was factored in, in 
order to sustain peace and stability in the country.” 
Participant 029 articulated similar views: 
  Of course! For example, after the war, we had almost everything being damaged. 
… The police stations were all destroyed so the funding that came from international 
partners we took into consideration that we will rebuild those facilities. So, they made it 
more specific to address specific needs of the current situation in Liberia. So those were 
the things that were taken into consideration to ensure they addressed the peculiar needs. 
 Nonhomogenous approach to decentralization in various geographical areas. 
Participants were asked if a homogenous approach was adopted to determine how the criminal 
justice system/services were decentralized in the various geographical locations in Liberia. This 
was to test the extent to which interventions at the macro level were influenced by conditions 
specific to the context at that level. Where this was the case, it could be concluded that local 
ownership principles were upheld and where this was not the case, the conclusion is that it was 
driven by external influences either at the national level, by international actors or both. 
Eight participants indicated that each geographical area in Liberia was seen and treated as 
unique in the decentralization process. For instance, Participant 020 stated “No! I think it was not 
a one size fits all thing. It was carefully thought of and all the factors were taken into 
consideration.” Participant 006 indicated that “I think it certainly wasn’t homogenous.” 
Participant 009 stated that: 





area and tried to look at one of the things that came, especially when we looked at  
where we would be after we had implemented hub 1. When it came to the  
decision where to situate hub 2 be, we had to ensure that we were looking at the  
security elements of things, looking at, for example, the previous war in Liberia,  
and how were these societies and communities affected? And which was affected  
first? And where did the intrusion come from. So, all of those things were  
considered before deciding … Hub 1 which was mostly central Liberia, was to  
look at the South-East to ensure that we augment the criminal justice system in  
that area especially when it comes to the police and the Bureau of Immigration,  
because those are border towns. So that is one of the reasons why hub 2 being in  
Maryland was so important. …. if you look at hub 2, …. We were focusing on  
ensuring that we deployed officers to the towns and areas. We were focusing on  
the Bureau of Immigration for protection of border security which was important.  
So, providing those two services I would say were the reasons why we went into  
Maryland, River Gee and Grand Kru.  
Participant 010 said: “They were not treated the same …” Participant 021 noted that: 
Yes. Prior to even decentralizing the whole system, they were informed by a number of 
participatory assessments, engaging with the different geographical/social structures in 
the counties, by that you will know some of the issues and challenges and how to craft a 
way forward. So that process of information gathered informed what services that are 
more needed to a particular area. In Bong county for example, you have 16 -17 services 
being delivered. In the South East, which is very difficult, it is challenging because of the 





inadequate social services there, sometimes they come to Monrovia …, So, all of that was 
taken into consideration. 
Participant 029 held similar views: 
No, I think each part was treated as unique. So, the needs in Bong are different  
from the needs in Margibi or probably in Lofa. So, it was dependent on the  
individual circumstances of a specific geographical area. … And also, not only  
that, beside the structures, services for example in some other counties, you will  
have health services attached. In other counties, you will not have that. And so,  
you have to provide those services there, again, depending on the geographical  
location. 
Participant 025 noted that conceptually, the hubs approach to decentralization did not adopt a 
homogenous approach: 
I think the idea with the hubs was that they would adjust the presence and form  
based on the need to prioritize the various parts of the country. At least, if we had  
succeeded in doing the hubs quickly, then it would have been possible to ... and  
then from the hubs, the idea was that they will be able to move around and have  
access to the areas around. So, I think that it was probably part of the efforts. 
Participant 002 indicated that “I would say each part was treated as unique as advised by the 
historical and existing geographical boundaries.” Elaborating further, this Participant stated that 
“Partly yes for example the historical background of the location of the first hub was advised by 
the civil war historical happenings and the people’s culture.” 
Participant 030 also noted that:  





example, given the size of some counties in the southeastern part of Liberia, they  
do not have the same number of police officers and other criminal justice actors  
assigned there as bigger and more accessible counties. 
Participant 020 stated that: “… it was not a one size thing. It was carefully thought of and all the 
factors were taken into consideration”. … Like for the South-Eastern region, because we could 
not reach all the places, the difficulty in reaching some of these places, infrastructure difficulties, 
made it impossible to have been able to build special locations, county by county. But rather the 
decentralization had a regional approach.  
Subtheme Five: No Consideration of Liberian Context; Foreigners drove it.  
As previously noted, some participants held the view that the process to decentralize 
Liberia’s criminal justice system was driven by the international community. This is reflected in 
their responses captured in following statements when asked if the process and interventions 
were nationally or externally driven. Using the hub concept as an example of the context concept 
divide, Participant 005 stated that: 
… there was a disregard for the existing structures of local governance in Liberia.  
Liberia has a very structured system which is based on counties. The hub concept  
was fundamentally regional or multicounty structures. So, the initial  
conceptualization was somewhat ignoring the actual reality on the ground ... So,  
we had an attempt to put a square peg into a round hole; ... probably the worse  
example. I am not sure whether to term it local ownership or they were just not  
considering the localized system. Every county has its own systems of  






In the words of Participant 002, “I do not think there was any consideration given to the context 
it appeared the need to meet the spending deadlines and to satisfy donor requirements prevailed 
over the actual national needs.” This Participant also observed that “A very hurried 
implementation with little consideration of what the people needed or how sustainable it would 
be is what I saw.” According to this Participant, the decentralization process was “More external 
driven with poor nationals who were very dependent and a President who wanted to leave a 
legacy hence very little national ownership, if any.”  
According to Participant 006: 
    The building blocks for the criminal justice system were not equitable. In 
       a lot of ways they were biased in their development because that was what 
was geared towards what the United Nations brought, what the international  
community wants, so, there was a range of complexities. It was never about what  
is best for Liberia… This is not mini United States of America, it is a Liberia  
problem; let’s give it a Liberia solution. 
Participant 014 stated that: 
I think it is a combination of the need for national ownership and support from the  
internationals. … I think with the hub; some ideas came from abroad, yes, the hub  
and the Magisterial Sitting Programme ... The Magisterial Sitting Programme for  
example, initiated by the United Nations, was something that nobody knew here.  
But in terms of trying to decongest the prisons... something that the Government  







Participant 018 stated that: 
… the local context was not fully understood; you know, how Liberians approach  
things. The sense of ownership, the international community didn’t get it. They  
were just checking lists. Everybody was rushing to complete deliverables so you  
look nice on the surface and that was ok. 
According to Participant 020: 
Law enforcement cannot be devoid from the culture. You can bring the  
international best practices and look at the culture of the people and see what is  
quite applicable. I believe that one of the mistakes that were made was to  
implement international practices without consideration of the Liberian culture ... 
The traditional justice system is one that is utilized by many ordinary Liberians. Therefore, 
context specific efforts to decentralize the criminal justice system should not ignore this system 
of justice. However, most of the participants indicated that efforts to decentralize Liberia’s 
criminal justice system did not factor in the prominent role of the traditional justice system and 
how this could hinder or facilitate the decentralization process. For instance, Participant 027 
stated that: 
I don’t think much thought was given to it. And I think it’s been overlooked … customs 
and traditions … they are perceived to be less superior. And so again it was the arrogance 
from Monrovia that anything out there is not written down is less superior. That has been 
the way of life for the last 200 years of people out there. That is how they have lived. 
These are the decisions that kept the level of social cohesion and it is these decisions that 
have been passed down from generation to generation, but they are not written down. 





whatever the case is, I don’t think there was a lot of thought given to traditional leaders 
and giving them if not a central role, but a significant role. Everyone needs to understand 
the level of inclusion; the level of complementarity required to have a more robust 
criminal justice system and a level of clear understanding on the separations of power in 
the rural areas. And that the criminal justice system has to function in a way that the 
traditional justice system cannot function. So, I don’t think there was a significant room 
to allow that level of understanding to prevail. 
Participant 009 asserted that the prominent role of the traditional justice system was inadequately 
considered in the decentralization process. According to this Participant: 
It was considered. But it was not considered in depth because if you look at the  
terminology that was used, it was the decentralization of the criminal justice  
system. So, in essence, the informal justice system does not deal with criminal  
matters. So, the focus was on strengthening the criminal justice system because  
people would usually go to the informal justice system to deal with simpler  
matters … But another argument was made that if the formal justice system was  
decentralized to the point where in each town and village, we had a police station,  
a magisterial court, and all of those things, people would then have the choice to  
go to the formal justice system. However, the results of that showed that people  
preferred going to the traditional justice system. The reason why people go to the  
traditional justice system is because it is more accessible. They are there, they are  
easy. You get up in the morning and you have a problem, like someone stealing  
your goat, you can go to the Town Chief … in your village. However, to go to a  





was on strengthening those areas. 
Participant 024 shared similar views:  
… because the support given to them in Liberia was very much provider driven,  
meaning that those people who were working to support the system would bring  
in their own understanding and knowledge of criminal justice, not in all cases but  
they largely didn’t have the knowledge of the customary justice system. And  
therefore, I think there was a little more focus on the formal justice system … I  
think we were looking at how can we ensure that they are working better, how can  
we ensure that they’ve got equipment and facilities ... But I don’t think that we  
were looking at the environment in which they were working. And because we  
weren’t looking at that environment, we didn’t pay attention to the customary  
justice system. And I also think that not only were we not paying enough attention  
in that way, we were also somehow undermining it in other ways by saying you  
shouldn’t go to the customary justice system for X, Y and Z cases/subject matter  
(i.e., you should go and use the formal justice system with certain matters). Even  
though we knew that even in those situations, the formal system was failing. So, I  
think that we perhaps failed on more than one account in terms of paying attention  
to the customary justice system. 
Similar views were shared by Participant 029 because this Participant stated that “no attention 
was given to that. Though they recognized those traditional justice systems that were in place, 
but then there was caution to try and refine or reform the processes around that …” Participate 
008 explained why attention was not given to the traditional justice system: 





find different cultural practices and traditional values. … The criminal justice  
system has standard rules. It is not influenced by cultural and traditional practices.  
So, if it is access to justice, if it is investigating crime, charging a crime,  
prosecuting a crime, sending someone to jail, if you cannot find the bail, those  
things are standard as you go around the country. The real challenge remains the  
impact of the traditional and cultural practices on the statutory approach on the  
criminal justice system. So, if you were in Grand Kru and someone is arrested for  
rape and the people who are resident there don’t consider rape as a major crime,  
and they want you to release the person, even when the law says the person is not  
entitled to bail …. Now if you go to another county, maybe for them, rape is  
treated as a major thing that they cannot tolerate. … In some counties for instance,  
they may want to do Sassyewood (i.e., Trial by Ordeal) to extract a confession.  
But should we use that as a basis now? Now that we have a unitary government,  
we have a justice system and we want to be homogenous.  
Participant 001 stated that “I will say it was externally driven. … because it was forced to take 
place, Liberians were influenced to go where they went.” A similar view was shared by 
Participant 027: 
I will say it was largely influenced by the United Nations. To the extent where it  
bordered on the path of what has been done elsewhere - it was influenced more  
about lessons learnt elsewhere rather than understanding the Liberian culture,  
Liberian context and grounded specifically in that. So again, I will say that it was  
modelled on expediency rather than a deliberate approach to grounding the  





Participant 004 stated that key functionaries of the justice and security sectors in Liberia were 
initially not supportive of the hub projects: 
I think that it was titled externally. You know in any African country, if you have  
a few millions, you can tilt anything to your advantage and that was what it was.  
And that is the reason why if you look at the hub, it was fully externally driven …  
They themselves in government were not united on the hub project. So, these are  
some of the things. …. but at a certain point in the implementation, it was center  
stage now by the government through the Minister of Justice, Christiana Tah. 
Participant 021 pointed out how only a few people were convinced about the hub project and it 
became a national project:  
There are just 2 or 3 persons and once they get convinced, that is all. One  
was taken to America and spent some time there. We forget that Monrovia  
is not Liberia. We need to go back to the rural areas. 
Participant 005 pointed out that the decentralization process in Liberia was not voluntary: 
There was an enforced decentralization caused by external intervention, which  
was resisted by the established elite structures around the criminal justice system.  
So, you had a centralized situation where it really depends on what you call local  
ownership or decentralization; ... you had a Judiciary that was highly resistant to  
any form of decentralization and ... the international community wanted to  
decentralize but the locals wanted to control the process themselves. What you  
rather had was a judiciary system which was elite based and was trying to possess  
power for the narrow elite group and did not want to devolve power. And you had  





process, which was not actually being appreciated at least by the judicial actors in  
the process. … I mean there was obviously some consultation going on. But I  
think the general approach from the government side was … a lot of cash being  
offered, and we can’t afford to spend ourselves so let’s get the infrastructure. So  
that reflected the general priority across the entire criminal justice system in  
Liberia. It was unsustainable infrastructure such as the hub, were built. There was  
this general approach, where favoring let’s say infrastructure ... and this was  
certainly, something that the judiciary was guilty. The judiciary was not very  
happy with small courts built with funds from UNMIL’s Quick Impacts Project.  
They thought that they were not sufficient for the majesty of the judicial process,  
but on the other hand, when we ended up building, the infrastructure that fits the  
majesty, then we had the problem of unsustainable infrastructure given the  
economy of Liberia. 
Participant 008, explaining how the process was externally driven, highlighted how the hub 
project was alien to Liberia: 
… what the United Nations decided to do was to divide the country into regions  
and concentrate those services in these regions and then divide the counties  
amongst those hubs. … The idea of the hubs was not a Liberian idea. I am not too  
sure, whether there was a replica somewhere that has been done in other areas, but  
it may have been a very good idea elsewhere, that was introduced by any one of  
our partners. 
Participant 013 assigned figures (i.e., percentages) to how much of the ideas for the hub project 





More or less the internationals were responsible for 60% and the locals 40% of  
the hub project idea. I think the idea came from an international. It was debated  
and found that it was ok. But later on, it was realized that why build a courthouse  
several miles away. When the existing courthouse is in ruins. Why not rehabilitate  
the existing structures and build new ones around the same place? 
Affirming the fact that the process was externally driven, Participant 016 also identified the 
international actors who drove the decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system: 
… I feel that it was more or less externally driven. Because there was a lot of  
support and influence from external actors, UNMIL, USAID, UNDP; these were  
key people that drove the system that made it functional. They were giving a lot  
of material and financial support. In fact, in certain instances, if they did not call a  
meeting it would not be held. There were a lot of issues, so you didn’t see a clear  
cut willingness on the part of national actors at the time. 
Participant 018 stated that: 
No doubt that it was led by the international partners. UNMIL has always been at  
the forefront making recommendations. They gave prescriptions on how society  
moved and developed. And so, all the prescriptions came from the international  
community, and that is where the money went. So, we didn’t have money, the  
country didn’t have money, so with all these programs crafted in Washington and  
Accra probably so there was no money. 
Participant 019 said the process was externally driven and this has had a negative impact on the 
Government of Liberia’s commitment to the process: 





… To some extent, it has been beneficial. There are still challenges. Again, in  
everything there would be benefits. But for me, in my work, I have found more of  
the challenges because this was internationally driven in my view; the  
Government’s commitment has been very little. And because the Government’s  
commitment has been little to nothing, people who are charged to carry out their  
responsibility are faced with so many challenges. 
Participant 023 cited the fact that international partners decided which parts of the criminal 
justice system to strengthen as being the reason why some parts of the criminal justice chain are 
strong and others weak, hence adversely affective the entire system: 
In my mind, I think that it was internationally driven because there was a bit of  
exclusivity from the internationals. If you have a good idea, that you want to see  
everybody benefits, I think it is to bring people on board. People you want to see  
on board who you think are good practitioners. But for example, UNMIL and  
other international organizations, ECOWAS, USAID, invested so much into  
prosecutions. And they overlooked even the public defense. The investment in the  
prosecution was higher than the defense counsel. On the other hand, the  
traditional justice system, how much support went there? So, it was  
internationally driven, because when these internationals including UNMIL  
withdrew their support, it became a challenge. 
Participant 026 argued that the United Nations as the lead in the hubs project undermined the 
Government’s decentralize efforts as the project was not completed:  
The United Nations had its own role in the design of the program, which  





going to build five justice and security hubs. ... and when the Government asked  
them to … build the remaining four hubs after they had built the first hub, the UN  
now came up and said, ‘You know what, we cannot build the remaining hubs  
because we no longer have the interest in dealing with any huge infrastructure’,  
which I think undermined the Government’s ability to also decentralize justice  
and security hubs as planned. So, in some cases, the donors themselves have their  
own role to play in the situation, they do have their own interests and … once  
they no longer have interest; they try to play around using different kinds of  
politics. The Government can make justice and security a priority and really  
understand what is required to decentralize justice and security … I know justice  
and security is expensive, but they can do it in a more prudent way at their own  
level … I think it is going to help. Instead of working with the UN and saying,  
‘we want this program and start a big program that the Government cannot  
sustain, it becomes a problem. Sustainability is a key issue in the whole sector. 
Participant 011 stressed how some international actors failed to align their interventions with 
national plans: 
The Government of Liberia had established a Plan of Action to decentralize the  
criminal justice system. The United States will come and say, ‘Yes you have your  
specific actions and goals; we not supporting your specific actions, we will  
support the goal in a different way’. But yet at the end of the period, we will come  
and say this is how much we have spent on decentralizing your system ... and  
sometimes, for example, the European Union will come and tell you I am going to  





action, but you must prefinance it. 
Participant 021 cited the fact that officials of the criminal justice system were often trained 
abroad as evidence to back a claim that the process was externally driven: 
I think it was externally driven. I say that because if you look at the police that are  
being trained, where are they being trained? And what training are they  
acquiring? Take for instance you send our police to China, America, or the sub  
region, you confuse them. Training in each of those countries are based on a  
different context. And also, if you look at some of the requirements for you to  
become a police officer and looking at the Liberian context, our level of education  
and all of that, I think it is too high. So, all that affects the decisions that we take.  
I think to a larger extent it was externally driven based on lessons learnt from our  
partners in other contexts. 
Homogeneous approach to decentralization across Liberia. The following statements 
made by participants support the opinion that a homogenous, hence potentially externally driven 
approach, was adopted to decentralization across the various geographical locations in Liberia. 
Participant 001 stated that “… Liberia is a homogeneous country; everything was the same.” On 
this question, Participant 003 stated that: 
… it was a universal approach, because if you say you want to do things  
differently in each county, the whole thing will not come together smoothly. So,  
what happened is that, everything was done on a pilot and that pilot was done  
from one county to the next then to the next. So, you find that everything was  
uniform. And because it was uniform, it was easy to follow. As you know in  





that whatever was used in one county should be the same in other counties. 
Participant 004 stated that: 
we had a fair approach. Every county should get A, B, C, D criminal justice  
services or facilities. But that should not have been the case. We should have done  
some form of positive discrimination to bring the counties that were at the lower,  
lower level up to a certain level … 
Participant 005 notes “I will say I saw very little sensitivity in terms of local cultures and 
situations in any of the reformed processes.” Participant 006 stated that:  
I think to a large degree, what was done was replicated across but not necessarily  
in equal fashion. So, for instance it is not that every county got a prison. It is not  
that every county got a courthouse at the same time, it was not that there was  
some planning in relation to where best to have a police station, immigration.  
… So, there was the thinking that, ‘we need to have the following’ and then there  
was a whole lot of debate and negotiations towards who is going to support the  
development. 
According to Participant 013 “a one size fits all approach was being used across the 
board.” Participant 019 stated that: 
So, for the most parts, they are only designing a one size fits all approach that  
does not really put the nitty-gritty of the issues into consideration. … I think the  
decentralization process was mainly internationally driven. It was not well  
thought out to take into consideration some of these issues. Looking at every  
county in Liberia is a unique place even though there are similarities. Yes, some  





have their unique way of thinking. 
Participant 014 indicated that: 
In my view, it has not taken into consideration the uniqueness of the areas. I think  
it has been a lot of thinking of the people in terms of how to make the criminal  
justice system like you said in a homogeneous way. … because you know, you  
cannot design a system or laws that don’t work. So, I don’t think we considered  
the peculiarities of the various groups or areas of the country. You know it is a  
tough society to go through, to do one law for one set of people and another law  
for another set of people. 
Participant 018 stated that “… there was no uniqueness. … There were no variations in terms of 
security.” Participate 008 affirmed this view by noting that: “I think they treated them as 
homogenous.” Participant 024 stated: 
… it was a homogenous approach. Basically, there was Monrovia the capital city  
and everything outside. And therefore, it is as if you do something in one county,  
you do it in another county without necessarily looking at the specific needs of  
each county. … I think that in retrospect we should have utilized the data that we  
had to inform the discussion a bit more. … understanding of how things worked  
in each county … Also, the approach of actors who were already there; I don’t  
think we ever really took that time to consider the knowledge that we had or tried  
to get the knowledge from national actors, (i.e., what they had and what worked  
within the system from one county to another or bring people together from the  





Reasons for a homogenous approach. Participants provided the following reasons for the 
one size fits all approach adopted in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
Nature of the legal framework and structure of Liberia. Participant 022 stated that:  
Liberia is one country. It is also a small country. The legal framework applies to  
the country as a whole and the same laws apply to people everywhere. And that is  
not a bad thing especially if you limit the jurisdiction of the formal justice system  
to those very serious cases … The institutions that we are supporting are also  
national institutions. The Liberian National Police has police personnel in every  
county; … But I think these police officers, prosecutors and judges should be  
bound by these same rules that apply in other counties. 
To promote unity and equality as well as due to the fear/possibility of entrenching 
ethnicity. Participate 008 stated that: 
I think they treated them as homogenous because if you look at it being unique,  
then we have to now dig deep into the cultural and traditional aspect of those  
political subdivisions. Every county in Liberia is unique in a way. The cultural  
practices are different. And even in any political subdivision, you may find  
different cultural practices and traditional values. Now, in terms of the  
government, it is to promote unity. The criminal justice system has standard rules.  
It is not influenced by cultural and traditional practices. … So, all of these things  
are going into informing the type of structure you need to put there; perhaps I will  
even say the number of courts that you put there. … the cultural practices must  
not be the criteria in you determining what kind of structures that you should put  





put there; … To that extent, the Government has not done very well, because  
there are some of the courts in some of these counties and there is nothing  
happening there. I look at some for the returns; how many cases are being  
processed in the town... But the plan, the architecture remains the same; there  
should be a Circuit Court and there should be magisterial courts and lower than  
that, you will find traditional courts that deal with the issues in various areas. 
Participant 005 affirmed the assertion make by Participant 008 on the reasons for adopting a 
homogenous approach: 
I think there was a fear partially of enhancing tribalism, given the importance 
 of tribes or clans in the Liberian society and also in some cases strong, long 
 disputes between different groups. I think there was a fear that if you went 
down that path, you would end up concentrating on the Bassa group and not 
the significant other communities that lived in that county. And you just end up  
concentrating on the majority of ethnic groups in any one county. 
And I think this was especially important when you talk about the North-East of  
the country where you had a long term dispute between three very important  
groups who were intimately involved in the civil war. I think there was a real fear  
of trying to avoid any form of favoritism.  
Participant 014 stated that: 
In the cities, where you have members of the Masonic Craft, and if you are not a  
member, you cannot even discuss issues affecting the society. And the way people  
treat each other has implications for the criminal justice system. For example, if a  





members of the organization, the senior member is given preferential treatment.  
He is considered to be right over the nonmember. And so, a nonmember can be  
taken advantage of by a member because they do not consider you a full member  
of society. It is like being a nondocumented immigrant. How do you go to the  
law? Your rights have been violated but you are even afraid to go to and report. …  
in the Constitution, under Article 11, the law protects every citizen; there should  
be equal protection. 
Subtheme Six: The decentralization process was nationally driven.  
The following are views shared by participants in support of their assertion that the 
decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system was nationally driven: Participant 026 
stated: “I think that it was nationally driven”. Participant 021 stated that: “The court was built 
based on the principles of national ownership and leadership, …”. Participant 020 stated that: 
“the United Nations did not force everything down our throat.” Participant 007 indicated that:  
Decentralizing the criminal justice system is the Government of Liberia’s  
exercise. But external assistance was welcome; we needed their expertise; we  
needed their money. But the Government is responsible to own their services; not  
the NGOs, not the international governments, we were responsible for our own  
services and projects in Liberia. 
Consequences of not considering the context. Participants identified the 
following consequences arising from the decentralization process not being influenced by the 
context: 






… initially the plan was to have 5 Justice and Security regional hubs in place. …  
But unfortunately, in the middle of implementation, the infrastructure aspect was  
not taken forward because the lesson learnt from the first construction in Gbarnga  
is that it took longer than we expected. And so, our partners from the United  
Nations specifically, the Peacebuilding Commission Chair spoke with the  
Government and the Government bought into the idea and saw the need to  
prioritize service provision rather than the physical infrastructure. So currently we  
have not had infrastructure in all areas except for Bong County. 
Participant 022 noted that: “… the hub approach has come to a standstill. Originally, the idea 
was 5 hubs. But after the Gbarnga hub after the investments were made … the hub concept came 
to a standstill. But the decentralization itself continued.” 
According to Participant 006: 
The first hub in Gbarnga, it was designed to actually look at all the elements of  
the criminal justice system from policing right through the criminal justice system  
to prisons, and it was done on a regional basis. But it was set up and designed that  
it would provide decentralized services in 3 counties. … It came with mixed  
reviews but if we spoke honestly about it, we would say that the cost benefit  
analysis didn’t really deliver what it was intended to deliver. As we know, the  
sustainability of justice and security services was very hard on Liberians at the  
time. So, it had mixed results; whilst there was improved access to justice and  
security, it was really servicing a county as opposed to the design and the premise  
of having the ability to strengthen and extend to other counties, but it actually  





According to Participant 008:  
the Gbarnga project would have been the forerunner to all the other areas. First,  
there was an implementation problem in terms of the construction itself. And so,  
it did not proceed as planned. There was a delay in its completion.  
And it consumed a lot more money than it was originally intended. And because  
of that, it had an impact on the construction of the hubs in the other areas. 
Participant 010 stated that: 
… the whole idea was to decentralize the system around the country. …; we were  
able to set up hub 1 with the intentions of setting up hub 2 but it never happened,  
because hub 1 was not even getting the support and so we could not have  
established hub 2. 
Lack of planning. Participant 016 attributed the homogenous approach to the absence of 
planning. This Participant stated that: “Quite frankly, I don’t think there was a clear roadmap.”  
Nonjudicious use of resources and sustainability challenges. Participant 005 indicated 
that: 
I think the most important thing is the elephant in the room (i.e., the decision to use 
Peacebuilding Fund money … to construct hubs in the regions). That was the Gbarnga 
hub; where they completely ignored the fact that the system operated on a county basis. 
Similar views were shared by Participant 011 on the functioning of hub 1 in Gbarnga: According 
to this Participant, “Serious challenges. A lot of problems. It is not doing fine because the funds 
and support that used to go there is no longer going there; (i.e., funds from the Government of 
Liberia).” According to Participant 021: 





because they used substandard materials. In the court, they can be hearing a case  
and suddenly you hear a boom! Something falls off. All these should have been  
considered. … So, the hub is functioning, but it is challenged. Take for instance,  
you used to feed officers three times a day and now the money has diminished,  
just because the Government doesn’t have capacity to do so. So, you put a lot of  
strain on the officers. 
Participant 016 gave another example of a donor funded project that ceased to operate when 
donor funding ended:  
… the World Bank decided to fund the Human Rights Office in the Ministry of  
Justice for 5 years. When the World Bank funding lapsed, the Ministry of Justice  
did not put any money in it. Equally is the ADR office. It was a trial period which  
run for 3 years, I guess. After the international funding stopped, the ADR office  
closed completely, and they are no more there. These are important factors but  
then again if the priorities of the Minister or key financial decision makers are not  
in that area then there cannot be funding. I think there was an appreciable move  
on the part of the international community. They kept the fire blazing. They kept  
the Librarian's feet to the fire. My disappointment is the fact that since they left,  
there has not been any forward movement to enhancing the criminal justice  
system. I am not saying there is no action but there has not been any strong move.  
So, then I look at how did the international community prepare for sustainability? 
On the operations of the hub in Gbarnga, Participant 014 stated that “the Ministry’s budget has 






… what is really the situation which you cannot blame the international  
community is to do with the issue of sustainability. That should be ownership. We  
just have to work towards sustaining it and getting it running. And we have  
challenges like any other country around the world. We just have to be committed  
in the process. You know there is no process that is exempt from error. There will  
be minor errors, but those errors are not significant to really change the concept  
and meaning of what was done. 
Participant 017 indicated that: 
I will say yes; it is functioning but with a lot of challenges. It ranges from  
logistics; right now, the issue at hand is food for the people. Like I said we have  
about 100 officers and initially they were fed three times, but as we went along,  
the feeding has reduced to once a day. And right now, we have a challenge of  
even having food for the officers. … It started during the last month to the  
elections in 2018, the middle part and then up to where we are now. Initially, the  
budget allocated for the hub as far as we are concerned was $750,000 that was  
covering up for food for the officers, vehicle spare parts, fuel to run the generator,  
salaries for the workers, cleaning materials, agriculture materials and what have  
you. But as we went along the line, it dropped and kept dropping. Now, it is  
around $200,000/$300,000 or so. … Every month we are supposed to conduct  
three patrols because of a few challenges and not having spare parts to service the  
vehicles, we have stopped the patrol component. So right now, what is working is  






Designing and implementation of ill conceived projects. According to Participant 005: 
the rationale was to have one stop shop, where you had the police, immigration,  
and also, the prosecution; the Public Defenders, judiciary based in one location,  
and the courts. This was I think with hindsight an ill-conceived plan because  
it didn’t actually fix the local realities and the conceptualization of the  
international or external actors especially the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund. 
According to Participant 018: 
The just and security hubs are gathering dust because nobody is going there. They  
are going to their farms. You have got to find out why people do things and what  
will make them change. So, you say, ‘in Nigeria or Ghana, the chiefs do this or  
that; because we are all black, so we are supposed to think, alike right?’ They  
forget that Liberians are unique people. 
Participant 009 stated that: 
The problem we have is that, with the establishment of things, you do not have  
any financial support, so if you have an institution established but it has no  
support to carry out its work, then it becomes dead in a lot of ways. And the same  
thing with the laws. The laws are passed; like we had the jury law passed but what  
was never considered is how to roll out the jury law so that it becomes effective.  
So again, there was no funding provided to ensure that these good intentions were  
carried out. So, the same thing can be said with the Liberia Anti-Corruption  
Commission; to say that yes, we have an anticorruption system to prosecute  
people, but I can name on my two fingers how many cases have been handled by  





there. If they are not given the financial support and the political will to ensure  
that things are done; they will not make the desired impact. 
Theme Two: Hybrid approach used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system  
The following three subthemes flow from this theme:  
Subtheme One: Decentralization process was a combination of context specific 
interventions and solutions from abroad. 
There was a category of participants who indicated that the interventions which were 
used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system were influenced by internal conditions in 
Liberia and solutions from abroad that were unsuitable for Liberia. 
Participant 005 pointed out how the hub project was based on a regional structure akin to the 
decentralized police structure. This structure is different from how the Judiciary and the 
prosecutions are decentralized. In the words of this Participant: 
The structure of the reformed police was a regional structure, whereas the  
Judiciary retained the prewar county based structure. So, you had a little bit of  
disconnect between the chains of command; in the judicial process; the County  
Attorneys, the judges, and then the police structure which was semi decentralized. 
According to Participant 029: 
Driving this process was not just a Liberia thing. Remember, we had the UN  
mission here; we had the United Nations police working along with us. The setup  
was such that it was in a way that it supported the entire system in whichever area  
you are looking at it. They supported everything to make sure they built capacity  
to ensure that they left a working system. … Were there extreme sensitivity put in  






Participant 011 pointed out how, initially, there was an absence of a uniform concept of training 
the police, hence each country that trained the Liberia National Police trained them according to 
that country’s police training doctrine, thus confusing officers of the Liberian National Police. 
According to this Participant: 
… what we saw in the reform of the police, that in the initial stages, someone  
from Bangladesh coming to train the police with the Bangladesh police system.  
So, it became a mixture of so many other things to the extent that we had to sit  
down and outline what we do in the police so they can understand that we are  
doing …. Liberia is different and if we say we are going to follow what other  
countries do, it will not help us. 
Subtheme Two: Homogeneous and nonhomogeneous approaches used to decentralize.  
One participant indicated that a combination of homogeneous and heterogeneous 
approaches was used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system in the various geographical 
locations:  
According to Participant 026: 
I think that initially the idea was homogenous; it was a one-size-fits-all situation.  
But then after the establishment of hub 1, it became clear that even in Liberia, the  
infrastructure system could not allow for the program to be implemented as  
homogeneously as we thought. For example, in hub 1, construction alone took  
about 2 years and then trying to replicate the program in the South Eastern region  
was a bit difficult and then based of the difficulty of building the hub in the South  





informed the program that inasmuch as there was a need to construct the regional  
hub in the South Eastern region, the South East was in dire need of justice and  
security services so a two phased approach should be used. And one of those  
phases were to ensure that we first deploy men and women and while the men and  
women are working, we could build the hub later. Unfortunately, the construction  
of the hub didn’t happen. Participants were asked whether the decentralization  
process was nationally or internationally driven. Their responses were mixed with  
the most suggesting that the process was either internationally driven or both  
nationally and internationally driven. In a few cases, responses indicated that the  
process was solely nationally driven. 
Subtheme Three: Interventions to decentralization were national and international.  
Participant 011 stated that “it was a nationally driven affair with the support of  
our international partners … They said, Yes, I will put money there, but I require this and that 
before we invest our money. So, the only precondition was that the only way it can happen is 
when you go my way.” This view was shared by Participant 0025: “I think it was both. I think 
everyone realized that this was something that was needed. So, I think it was both.” Participant 
027 cited various factors to support the assertion that the process was nationally driven: 
Well, I think it’s a combination of factors. Part of it is that the whole rebuilding  
process or reform process was to build strong institutions grounded in the  
principles of the rule of law to ensure that the laws are being followed. So, you  
will see from the judiciary side; you have lawyers returning to their counties as  
County Attorneys. These were new features in the Liberian legal system or  





United Nations played a significant role in coming up with this particular module  
around the hubs. 
Participant 003 stated: “It was both ... if you would remember everyone came to Monrovia for 
criminal justice services and they were tired of coming to Monrovia every time.” In justifying the 
stance that the process was both internally and externally driven. 
Participant 005 stated: 
I think I will tend to favor both arguments. The reason being that undoubtedly, especially 
when the United Nations Mission was preparing for its departure ... Transition was the 
key issue. The United Nations provided many services in the counties than they did in the 
capital anyway. So, one of the most important features of the whole Transition process 
was deploying extra police to the counties, extra border guards, and also a process of 
professionalization of magistrate courts, infrastructure buildings but also ensuring the 
legally qualified magistrates will sit on the cases. But why I say both is because I think of 
the concentration by the Government, the moment they realized the United Nations was 
going and that they had a major problem if they don’t actually address decentralization 
rapidly … there was a strong Government driving it towards the end as well. 
Participant 006 stated “I think a bit of both.” Participant 008 indicated that: 
No, that one is nationally driven because of the architecture. The law requires that  
you have a Circuit Court. If there is a law in the Country commanding things to  
be done, the partners most often will provide support in that area. They will not be  
pressure for you to move away except if you do that in an amendment to the law.  
So that was nationally driven. Now in terms of what do you do to give effect to  





courts should be established but it doesn’t tell you how many judges you are  
supposed to have there, how many lawyers or prosecutors you are supposed to  
have there and whether they should sit every day from 8am-4pm those are  
decisions that are made by the Government with the support of their partners. This  
is driven by the financial support that you have. Most of our partners were a lot  
interested in issues relating to domestic violence. So, they provided money to  
expand the courts. So, for this decentralization, the architecture is nationally  
driven but in terms of those elements for that architecture where focus needs to be  
placed on, it is both nationally and internationally driven. Some of the  
international partners looked at the immediate causes of the conflict, or maybe  
their own interest. 
Participant 009 also indicated that the process was externally and internally driven: 
I think it was both. I think it was a good idea that came externally. Because I  
remember … going to a meeting where all these fantastic ideas were shared. And  
the reason why I think that it is both is that yes, the Minister at the time wanted  
reform; she was dying because she could see all the difficulties in ensuring that  
people in Liberia got access to justice. However, I think the development of the  
 concept was done without first a baseline being done. So, the development I  
figure was done by the United Nations or whoever it was at the time. 
Participant 010 cited the need for partnerships and adherence to law as the reasons why the 
decentralization process was driven from both angles: 
I will say both because we couldn’t function on our own. Our international partners had 





implement those projects. … I don’t want to say that it was all international ideas. It was 
like what we actually wanted as a country or for the criminal justice system. And we 
didn’t just sit there for all those ideas to be implemented in Liberia. Going by the 
Constitution or laws, and so if there were new ideas, we had to ensure that those ideas 
were in stream with the Constitution, of the Liberian law and once we did that, we were 
able to amend the laws in order to implement that. … if we had decided that we wanted 
to change anything, it would have taken a longer time for the project to come up. Even 
though we could not afford the hub concept, our Government bought the whole concept 
with the hope that the budgetary issues would have improved at that time to be able to 
support instead of saying no. You see the hub is a big concept and once it made sense, 
they embraced it with the hope that the economy will improve. So, I don’t think it was an 
imposition by our partners. 
Participant 012 also affirmed the fact that the process was externally and internally driven: “It’s 
both in a way because the external factors and parties saw some inadequacies in the delivery of 
the services that should make the criminal justice system viable.” Participant 013 indicated that 
there was a need for access to justice in Liberia and the international community facilitated the 
actions of government agencies in this regard: 
I could say both. You know initially when the reform started, the United Nations  
Mission in Liberia was here, and other donors came in with different ideologies  
but then at one point, the locals and citizens themselves felt that they need to get  
involved; for example, initially when the reform started the decisions made by  
government and partners were not coerced. But then after the civil society  





get involved. So, I could say both. Initially, it was the internationals but later the  
locals got involved. 
Participant 015 highlighted how experiences and practices from other African countries were 
accepted by the Liberian authorities: 
It was both; nationally and internationally because we resolved to practice  
international best practices. Because we live in a global world. Liberia is not  
different from Ghana or Sierra Leone. So, the process was driven under the  
arrangement that we had with respect to the restructuring …. Of course, the  
the international community played a role in the process so that both were  
involved. So, whatever was done was not done by the perceived imposition of  
international staff, but it was a concept that we all agreed that this was the best  
international practice and because we live in a global world and there was a need  
to conform to that. 
Participant 020 provided pointers to why the process was driven by both internal and external 
actors. According to this Participant, “We (i.e., Liberians) had lots and lots of meetings as it 
relates to how to make them functional and also participated in activities ...” Participant 012 
shared similar views: 
So, the process started by mobilizing and bringing together policy makers from  
the Judiciary, Legislature and Executive to brainstorm on the needs – first of all to  
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the justice and security system and then  





Participant 024 stated that there was a push from both external and internal actors: “I think it was 
an external push, but I think that it was also a push by national actors.” Participant 014 indicated 
that the process was not an external imposition: 
It was not imposed because they were accepted by the locals. … In some  
situations, … people were convinced about some of the things. ... So, the hub was  
a good idea but the problem was how to sustain it, but we will take it because the  
need is there. Even now, people are still considering decentralizing the hub idea  
the Judiciary itself. So yes, it is a good idea, but do we have the budgetary  
allocations for it? 
Participant 015 indicated that there were a number of challenges with Liberia’s criminal justice 
system and the international community was helping Liberians address the challenges hence the 
process was both externally and internally driven. According to this Participant: 
The international partners came to provide support and so the support they were  
providing was based on the concern of those different institutions. But  
again, before the war, there were a lot of systems that were not functioning.  
Take for instance the law that governs the police. If you look at the old law that  
governed the police, I think that it was a full page document. The law that  
controls the Police Academy in terms of what it is supposed to do is in two and  
half pages. So, an institution that has that kind of critical function in ensuring  
justice, in helping to enhance the rule of law will have a law that is supposed to  
speak in entirety what they are supposed to do in terms of professionalism is just  
defined on a full page document. You need to imagine what will happen. So, there  





sometimes officers of the law. So, when the UN came, there was a huge task.  
Putting a police system in place; doing capacity building, providing logistical  
support, looking at the issue of infrastructure that was broken down, so that was  
huge. So, what they did was that they were able to help us define the system in  
terms of how we should proceed. And what we needed in order to make this  
happen, they provided it to some extent. 
Participate 029 held a similar opinion: 
I will say both externally and nationally driven. Externally driven given the fact that most 
of the funding comes from international donors, they had their own objectives and what 
they wanted to achieve. And of course, the Government also has its own plan ... 
Participant 030 also noted that “With the coming of UNMIL, I believe that the process of criminal 

















Research Question 2.1: How can International Actors support Nationally Owned and 
Inclusive Processes to Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal Justice System? 
For ease of reference, Tables 5 present recommendations to Liberia’s international 
development partners on how they can support nationally owned and inclusive processes to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
Table 5 
Recommendations to Liberia’s International Development Partners on How They Can Support 
Nationally Owned and Inclusive Processes To Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal Justice System 





The international community should understand 
the context and avoid a pure legalistic approach 





Promote the traditional justice system 4 11.8 
The quest to advance national ownership and 
implement Liberia specific interventions must 















Adoption of a holistic approach to decentralize 
Liberia’s criminal justice system 
4 11.8 
International development actors, must have a 
long-term approach and be patient when 
supporting access  
to justice processes in postconflict countries 
3 8.8 
 
Need for conceptual clarity of distinction 





International development assistance actors to 
establish genuine partnerships 
2 5.8 
Development actors must support the design and 
implementation of geographic specific 
interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system 
1 2.9 
Priorities/approaches to decentralize Liberia's 
criminal justice system must be identified 
through a nationally owned process and 
international support must be channeled to 















The government’s ability to sustain 
internationally funded interventions when the 
support ends should inform the decentralization 
process  
1 2.9 
Liberia’s government to take the lead in the 
decentralization process 
1 2.9 
Build a professional criminal justice system 





Actors involved in making Liberia’s criminal 
justice system accessible must learn lessons 
from similar contexts 
1 2.9 
Government of Liberia to evaluate previous 
engagements with the international community 
and learn lessons 
1 2.9 
Promote South - South cooperation in Liberia’s 
decentralization process 
1 2.9 
Total Responses (N) 34 100 
 
I present the statements participants made in support of the recommendations 





Theme One: International Actors must Understand Liberia, Design/Implement Liberia 
Specific Interventions and be Patient 
Ensuring that interventions are context specific is one way of upholding national ownership 
principles. To increase the chances that this happens requires, among other things, that actors (local 
and foreign) working on processes like enhancing access to Liberia’s criminal justice system, 
understand Liberia. In this regard, participants were asked whether international actors who 
worked to decentralize the criminal justice system understood the Liberian context. From the 
answers provided below, participants held mixed views: 
Subtheme One: Foreigners were Knowledgeable about Liberia and its Criminal Justice 
System  
Only 2 participants held the view that foreigners working to make Liberia’s criminal 
justice system accessible knew the country and system they were working in. Participant 001 
believed that foreigners who had worked in Liberia for a relatively longer time eventually got to 
know Liberia better. This Participant indicated that “…for those who had stayed a little longer 
they got to understand Liberia and its people …”. Participant 002 indicated that “I would say 
they did as most of them had worked and stayed in Liberia for a good period of time since the 
inception of the mission and the mission had the capacity to keep records to ensure continuity”.  
Subtheme Two: Foreigners were not knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal justice 
system  
Most participants felt that most of the foreigners who worked on reforming Liberia’s 
criminal justice system had inadequate knowledge about the context in which they worked. 





most of them did not understand Liberians. They thought Liberians were not intelligent.”  
Participant 022 stated that: 
… you get to a Country and you are expected to hit the ground running. We often  
need a lot of time and space to really dive in and gain a proper understanding of  
what really happens. We talk in practical terms about what happens with police  
reports, prosecution files, courts and court cases etc. So, I will be self-critical and  
say that it will be good for us internationals to really try to get a good hand on the  
workings of the land in this justice system we want to strengthen or reform. In  
fact, when I arrived here … I found out that it was very hard to really get data  
needed to get a picture of how police officers work, how prosecution takes place,  
how many juveniles are in prison. ... That information is not available. If you  
were to ask the Chief Justice how many cases were heard in 2018, he will not be  
able to get it for you. In fact, if you even give him more days, he will not be able  
to get it for you. So, data collection is a problem for all of us. 
Participant 001 stated: “those of us who did not come from the American legal system on which 
the Liberian system is based, struggled with the American system, and were not able to make a 
big impact.” Participant 027 stated that: 
 I am afraid most of the approaches used after conflict are driven more by  
expediency than they are deliberately designed to understand the nuances of  
culture, tradition and ensuring that these mechanisms are in direct response to  
cultural nuances. No. I think it is more about how after conflict international  
systems especially UN systems tend to apply the same approach used in previous  





attitude of the UN to engage in an expedient fashion has undermined the  
effectiveness of most of the reform processes. 
Participant 004 stated that: 
… you know, when we come in, we want to be seen achieving concrete, positive  
results. So, because our minds are made up, some of the nuances, we don’t see,  
and we don’t challenge it, but we don’t make an attempt to understand and  
overcome it. … . If the Special Representatives of the Secretary General had  
made it a deliberate policy to spend at least two weeks every month or every other  
month in one of the counties; staying there, seeing to it that they resolve the  
challenges they faced; it would have brought more concrete results … Some  
foreigners understood but the vast majority did not understand. It is important that  
future … international support looks at how people are employed and the kind of  
people that need to be deployed to postconflict societies. It is extremely  
important. 
On the same issue, Participant 005 responded: 
No! Because every single … international tends to think that whatever they do  
back home, and it is just as applicable to Africans as it was to anybody else; we  
think that the system that we have grown up with is the way to do things. That  
tends to put a lot of reluctance. But when you also bear in mind, if you want, the  
existing structures were fundamentally based on inequality, they were correctly 
questioning whether national structures remained appropriate. And I think that  






Participant 006 stated that: 
I am sure some did. But I’ll probably say many didn’t. Using myself as an  
example, I had little appreciation or understanding of what had gone on in  
Liberia, and really what was needed for Liberia. I bring my training and  
international experiences into a Liberia context, but we never had a roadmap to  
say this is an agreed position between government and the international  
community saying, this is the agreed pathway; one pathway with a whole list of  
priorities and people arrived to support that ... and so we had a schedule of work  
ahead of us. People just had to listen; spend time observing to try and shape and  
influence at the right time about change and a lot of times that takes time. You  
have got to build trust and a lot of people looking for a quick and easy way and  
never really had a long-term goal. And I think that was a real problem for us 
Participant 007 stated: 
Our culture is a bit complicated and sometimes people don’t know what they are  
expected to do in everyday activities. These internationals came with their own  
experiences and culture from their own countries. And anytime you do that, you  
will be making a very big mistake. Liberia’s culture is complex, and the people  
are complex too. 
Participant 008 stated that: 
Honestly, I don’t think many of them fully understood the problems in Liberia,  
people who get into positions of authority feel that they know everything and  
have the answers to everything. And we really don’t listen that much to our local  





resources of the partners because we have not been able to really put our foot  
down; … in identifying national priorities and then telling our international  
partners that ‘these are our priorities. You came here to help us; these are the  
things we will need’. And you cannot blame them also because very frankly, most  
of these international players who are coming are civil servants in their own  
countries, they want to do something that can raise their own profile with the  
institution that they work for. But we have not really put our foot down  
concerning national ownership because that will change everything as opposed to  
listening more to the person that has the purse. 
Participant 009 stated that: 
No, I don’t think they did. You know, what I love about research and documents and 
stuff, people seem to think that this is a postconflict country, so issues that happen in 
postconflict countries need to be replicated here. So, they are failing to look at Liberia as 
an individual country with individual problems. They looked at Liberia as a postconflict. 
Participant 011 said that “no they did not understand Liberia.”  
In the words of Participant 013: 
I can say no. Because when you are coming on a mission, you should be prepared  
in all angles. And this is not in the case of Liberia, but I think that there are  
learning lessons for other missions. You know when you bring in soldiers and  
police and they want to reform ... most of these guys that are brought in they are  
not specialists; ... so when you are starting a mission, those who attended the  
Security Sector Reform Course at the Folke Bernadotte Academy have a very  





a pool of expertise, you are going to find it difficult. For example, a decision was  
made to dissolve the Armed Forces of Liberia completely and rebuild it. A  
decision was also made to revamp the police and to make everyone resign and  
start all over again. And that decision to us was not a very wise decision. 
Participant 010 stated that: 
I can recall when we were reforming the Police Act, a Ghanaian was contracted to  
come and help; we felt that that should have been done alongside a local partner.  
Maybe a lawyer or an officer who had experience. But it was fully handled by the  
Ghanaian partner. So, they tried to impose their own system; … Most of the  
things that were inside the document could not work with the kind of society that  
we have. 
Participant 029 held similar views about the knowledge of foreigners working to reform Liberia’s 
criminal justice system. According to this Participant: 
I don’t think they understood it fully. I hold this view because most of the international 
workers had different views and thoughts when it comes to the way justice and security 
services should be delivered. Some of them came from the British legal system. Some 
American, some French, so different views, the way things are done over there is quite 
different. So, most of them didn’t have a strong grip on the justice system and so they also 
had a problem in terms of how they were providing services. 
Participant 016 stated “I think they understood Liberia to a limited extent. I don’t think they 
understood the culture, history because they had a fixed solution approach.” Participant 021 





Subtheme Three: Foreigners were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal 
justice system.  
Participants who held the view that internationals who worked on decentralizing 
Liberia’s criminal justice system were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal 
justice system expressed this view in the following statements. Participant 002 stated “I wouldn’t 
think to the fullest. And in fact, this created some of the problems that we had.” Participant 015 
stated that: 
The truth of the matter is that there were some that understood it, there were some  
that did not understand it. The majority understood it. Because the thing about it  
was that, it was not that they operated in isolation. … there were times that there  
were confrontations behind closed doors; we spoke to those who did not  
understand it and we spoke to them that this is how it is supposed to be done.  
And, as time went by, some of those who did not understand it, understood it. 
Participant 012 stated that: 
Yes, I think they understood based on best practices and experiences that they had 
because the UN has been around for more than 50 years. And Liberia is not the only 
country that has experienced war. Liberia is not the only country that has experienced a 
failed state. There are other states that failed before Liberia and there are experiences that 
the UN or UNMIL has generated from these contexts that were brought to bear on 
Liberia. 
Participant 018 stated: 
I think they understood to a point. Like all other projects. … they understood the  





fill up those gaps there are major laws that needed to be passed to reform the  
society. They understood it but at the end of the day they had to show the  
deliverables. 
According to Participant 020: 
To a little extent they did. What they had as their advantage was the fact that they  
came with experiences of interventions in other areas and that gave them an urge  
as to how to intervene here in Liberia. I mean they didn’t really understand  
Liberia’s context 100 per cent but they understood how to engage and solve  
issues. 
Participant 014 stated that: “the thing is, most of the people that I know that worked with the 

















Table 6 presents, and Figure 4 depicts participants' views on the knowledge of members 
of international actors about Liberia and the criminal justice system they were decentralizing. 
Table 6 
Participants’ Views on the Knowledge of Foreigners About Liberia and the Criminal Justice 
system They Were Decentralizing 
   






Foreigners were not knowledgeable about Liberia and its 
criminal justice system 
16 64 
Foreigners were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and its 
criminal justice system 
6 24 
Foreigners were knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal 
justice system 
3 12 
















Figure 4 Foreigners/International Actors Knowledge Of Liberia And Its Criminal Justice System  
 
Based on participants' opinions on the knowledge of international actors supporting the 
reform of Liberia’s criminal justice system, participants made the following recommendations on 
how international actors can better uphold national ownership principles in decentralizing 
Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
Subtheme Four: Design and implement Liberia specific interventions 
 Participants recommended that the following principles and actions should inform the 
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The quest to advance national ownership and implement Liberia specific 
interventions must permeate all programming. According to Participant 004 national 
ownership principles should be central to the entire decentralization process: 
What I can say is that national ownership should be on top of the agenda at all  
meetings. It should be dear to the heads of organizations, the lower, middle and  
higher levels of government and of the UN system. And the idea should not just  
be that, we need to train, that if you bring in lawyers into the UN mission, can we  
make sure that when they are going, they have 30, 40, 50 or 100 other lawyers  
trained directly or indirectly to replace those who are going out. 
Participant 021 expressed reservations over Liberia’s partners’ belief in promoting national 
ownership principles in their support to the decentralization process. This Participant impliedly 
advocated for Liberia’s partners to demonstrate their support for such principles by ensuring that 
they do not approach the decentralization process with preconceived ideas. In this Participant’s 
words, “Ownership is tokenistic! Because someone will come, they already have a blueprint of 
what they want to do. And because they have their own money, they want to come and persuade 
you.” Participant 007 stated that “we had to determine what will work for us. ... Because nobody 
could impose their ideas ….” Participant 002 asserted that “Liberia is very complicated, and the 
goal must begin with the government and then fight corruption and other related hindering 
factors to get any success in the decentralization.” 
Clarify conceptual distinction between national ownership and local ownership. 
Participant 005 stressed the need for a clarification of the conceptual distinction between national 
ownership and local ownership in the design and implementation of all development activities, 





My feeling quite strongly is that, we in the international community and the  
global rule of law community still does not understand the difference between  
national ownership and local ownership. That is the difference between what the  
state and elite want and what the population wants. And frequently, we found  
ourselves satisfying the interest of the elite rather than satisfying the interest of  
the masses. And I think that conceptually, we have yet to get our heads around  
that. … I think we often mistook national ownership for local ownership. And we  
didn’t necessarily understand that they were potentially different. Sometimes they  
are, sometimes they weren’t. And I think that despite the fact that the topic of  
local ownership is about 15 years old, it is still not really well developed. Because  
local ownership should never be about supporting an elite per say. But on the  
on the other hand, we obviously need to bring the elite on board otherwise it  
won’t work. So, a hybrid; a holistic approach is what is required. 
Participant 024 made a similar observation: “I think that maybe the international community 
when it speaks of national ownership focuses very much on government ownership rather than 
national in a broader sense.” 
Understand the context and avoid an overly legalistic approach to decentralization. 
Participant 027 recommended that the international community should avoid a purely legalistic 
approach to decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system: 
I think the reform process was in the direction of legal experts and not expertise around 
anthropology, expertise around sociology, expertise around community development 
generally, these are the different expertise that in my view should be involved in rolling 





into the community with the full knowledge of what are the forces that you are dealing 
with. What are the local traditions? What are the local customs? But it was all about law. 
But these kinds of reforms, when you are dealing with the traditional processes, it is more 
than just law. You are dealing with a way of life. You are dealing with culture. You are 
dealing with tradition. And so, anthropology is a very important factor in trying to 
position the law, in trying to ground the justice systems in local beliefs and traditions and 
identity. So, I will say the United Nations skipped that, the UN didn’t involve that sort of 
thing and so all we have today is an abundance of laws that appear to be isolated in 
communities, a body of law that has no meaning to people. People are still embracing 
their local culture and tradition which they value and understand more. 
Participant 006 observed that: “when we went in … we should have put a handbrake on, and we 
should have looked at processing what was in place and also what were the issues in relation to 
the criminal justice system previously in the Liberian context? What were the development needs 
and priorities?”  
Similar sentiments were shared by Participant 029: 
… I think they should have spent time to understand how the system works in Liberia. 
And that would have been fair information that we could build on in terms of developing 
a program. And I know most of the programs were derived from other countries and so 
they were a little difficult to implement. And some of them reflected national issues but 
again some didn’t reflect national issues. 
Participant 016 stated that: 
… I am wondering, why would people be confident to go to the chief and not go  





even 20%. So how do you engage an illiterate population into a literate system?  
All the facts have to be considered. It needs to be brought to the table for  
discussion. 
Participant 016 said “tailor the Liberians to a Liberia solution.” 
Design a citizen centered criminal justice system and involve citizens in the process. 
Participant 020 advocated for Liberians to demonstrate an interest to adhere to national 
ownership principles from the onset of the process: 
… the internationals were the ones pushing Liberia to take ownership of the  
process. Liberia did not pay attention and did not take ownership until it reached  
the point where they knew for sure that the international community like the UN  
was pulling out, before they came around to start to correct some things that were  
needed to have been corrected, which of course if you had sufficient time to be  
corrected. 
Participant 006 recommended the involvement of trustworthy citizens/people who will work in 
the national interest: 
Had we brought in actors, Liberia’s representatives who were going to be there in  
Liberia’s interest and not just pushing agendas. … less about corruption,  
nepotism, crime conduct, and all these sorts of things. Had we actually got  
genuinely nationally interested people in building Liberia, without bringing in  
those individual biases. 
Participant 019 advocated for the creation of a citizen centered criminal justice system for 
Liberia, “the Legislature is making laws that they don’t understand. That is the challenge. 





advocated for the education of the population about Liberia’s laws and the criminal justice 
system:  
I think one other thing to do is public awareness. You know, teaching the local  
people about the laws. Even if you decentralize services and people don’t know  
about it, they will still practice the traditional justice system. An example is in  
Liberia, they have a limited number of police, limited number of magistrates, from  
my understanding, … they have a strong belief in the traditions over magistrates,  
over Circuit Courts. So, you have a low number of police reports coming from  
these areas. … For example, there have been cases where someone died of an  
unknown cause and they accused someone of being the murderer. Just  
because of their local traditions. Someone pointed out and they believed. … So,  
some people don’t take matters to court. They used the traditional justice system  
to deal with matters. But they use the traditional justice system to make a case that  
should not be made. And because some of the actors who are working in the  
criminal justice system actually believes in the traditional system, a police officer  
will charge someone of murder, and they do think it is right. 
Participant 023 recommended that the local community should be involved from the onset: 
Liberia is too small. So, if you are going to say people from the Central region,  
Eastern region, Northern region, bring them together and say to them, this is the  
idea that we have. Bring the leaders together and say this is something we want to  






Participant 005 made a similar recommendation by calling for early engagement with all levels 
of the Liberian society in the decentralization process. According to this Participant, “… the 
problem really was that there wasn’t an engagement by the various levels of the Liberian society 
in decentralization until it was too late, and many decisions had been made”. 
Design geographic specific interventions to decentralize the criminal justice system. 
Participant 014 advocated for geographic specific interventions to decentralize the criminal 
justice system and allowing the existing infrastructure to inform the decentralization process:  
… in some parts of the counties, it could take you 8 hours to get to a magistrate  
court because of no roads or poor roads. Or it is just bush paths. And where the  
motorway exists, they have not been rehabilitated for 10 or 20 years, some since  
the war. And when it comes also to the police going to a crime scene, it is also a  
problem. So yes, access to the criminal justice system is also inhibited by  
infrastructure development. And then in other parts of the country also, there is no  
detention facility, so people who commit the crime are actually allowed to roam.  
… They also don’t have access to medical facilities, they don’t have access to  
schools for the children of criminal justice officials to go to. It is sort of connected  
to other services. … So, there are too many challenges throughout the country.  
The logistical challenges and the human resource availability are linked. So,  
without a deliberate design, those who live in areas that have logistical and  







Priorities to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice system must be identified 
through a nationally owned process and Liberia’s international partners must support the 
process and implementation of the priorities. Participant 008 advocated for a nationally led 
process to identify priorities that international actors support: 
… there is a need for national ownership in dealing with our partners. So, when  
you know your problem, and you do not identify those problems as your priorities  
when you get international support, then the support that you get will become  
driven by external partners. And this is what happened mostly in Liberia. And  
these challenges were caused by those who could pump money into the system.  
And in the name of national ownership the government did not come up to say,  
“this is what we want. If you want to help us, put the money there. If you cannot  
help us, then take your money away.” No! It didn’t happen that way. 
Promote the traditional justice system. Participant 001 recommended support for 
processes that encourage the traditional justice system to resolve disputes. This Participant cited 
examples from the Maasai community in Kenya and stated that:  
..., in Kenya, they have the Masai in their communities and they are a bit  
traditional. They are very conservative. And when you go to their communities,  
they still maintain their culture. If you look at their statistics, in terms of the  
number of criminals from that place, they are very few. ... They can resolve  
their own issues in their own communities. Very few referrals, in cases like  
murder, instead of bringing to the court, they prefer for the person to pay with  





Participant 027 recommended the active use of the traditional justice system to resolve disputes 
including criminal cases: 
… I know Rwanda went on a reform with the Gacaca process. I don’t have details  
but I think it was Gacaca, it has come to shape Rwanda’s criminal justice system  
in a large measure. It might be good to see how they rolled out Gacaca courts to  
form the backbone of the criminal justice system in rural Rwanda. 
Participant 019 stated that:  
I think the whole system needs to be looked at again in the context of South-South  
cooperation, giving it a more local context, looking at the traditional system in  
Liberia. Once, I was in the Pacific, … we were in a conference and one of the  
natives said, ‘why are you using all your big knowledge against our traditional  
culture? Just understand that our tradition has been the keeper of the peace’. So  
sometimes this is the mistake that we make. We have a traditional system. Though  
there are lapses, it is also good to be measured. 
Participant 023 pointed out how the formal justice system is considered alien to ordinary 
Liberians and how there is a preference for the traditional justice system: 
So, you go and plant a court and people think that they can resolve their problems  
and that is ok for them. So, they sit down and solve their issues the traditional  
way. Because they think that when the court comes in, you will put them in jail.  
They don’t believe that the court provides fair justice. So, they will run away from  
the courts and you will see that in a day, the court will be empty, … the judge will  





Adopt a holistic approach toward decentralization. Participant 014 recommended the 
adoption of a holistic approach to decentralization. Evaluating the approach adopted by the 
international community in Liberia, this Participant stated, “I think that with the police they 
started well in terms of training the police, but it took time with similar intervention with training 
lawyers …, by now, we would have had more magistrates and lawyers”. A similar 
recommendation was made by Participant 025 who advocated for the adoption of a holistic 
approach that emphasizes service delivery as opposed to infrastructure and combines long and 
short-term objectives: 
…, for the immediate impact of the 5 hubs should have been implemented  
… focusing on services in the different regions rather than bricks and  
mortar. And with the holistic approach, making sure that you are not  
focusing only on the walls of the buildings but a focus on all the services  
and aspects needed for the rule of law chain in the criminal justice system.  
But also linking that to the whole long term approach to short term ones.  
… the international partners should have both a short term and a long term  
coordinated approach to support Liberia in doing that. An example of this  
is for police. You don’t need to do much to ensure their presence. You just  
need some cars and uniforms, but you need to do that in a way that it is  
sustainable. So, you just can’t give them cars, you need to ensure that  
there is a way to service the cars and all that stuff and have uniforms for  
the police, but then you need to link that to more long term measures in  
terms of police training and in terms of creating government institutions  





strengthening of institutions around the country. And that then of course  
needs to be put into the context of Liberian needs and conditions with the  
traditional justice system and all these things. I think we should have from  
the beginning tried to get a much more holistic approach both in the short  
term and for the long term. Now, we did that after, much later on, and it  
should have been something done from the beginning. 
Participant 025 also stressed the importance of emphasizing coordination among actors 
supporting the decentralization process from the onset “I think what one should have done at the 
very onset was a much stronger emphasis on the coordination”. Participant 006 also 
recommended that attention should be paid to all parts of the criminal justice system in the 
decentralization process. This Participant stated that “I don’t think the same level of attention or 
investment was made to all necessary areas. And like we mentioned earlier; the criminal justice 
system was only as strong as its weakest link hence the challenges”. 
Interventions must be sustainable with funding from the government. Participant 010 
was of the view that the Government must ensure sustainability of decentralized services: 
Well the whole idea of national ownership was with the Government’s willingness to be 
able to work on the progress of the decentralization program. But the Government is not 
willing to work along this line. And honestly, that is not national ownership. To have 
national ownership, you must be able to take over and just move with the program. You 
must be able to have the capacity to continue the program. But as the hub project stands 





International actors should support the government to take the lead in the 
decentralization process. Participant 025 recommended that to promote national ownership, the 
international community must support the Government to take the lead: 
… sometimes, we were waiting for the Government to take the lead rather than  
helping them, guiding them, to take the lead at doing things. And I think that the  
place where Liberia was, Liberia would have needed better, stronger support from  
the United Nations and from the international partners in terms of actually moving  
things forward. So, national ownership in a postconflict country, one has to look  
very carefully at what all the international community have, and we should have  
had a rather stronger role in that …”. 
Participant 002 recommended that: 
I think the answer lies with the nationals interrogating the whole criminal justice system 
on their own at the right time … Again, who is a Liberian is it the Americo-Liberian or 
the Liberian, because this too is an issue. The Americo-Liberian wants to bring in the 
American systems.  
Establish genuine partnerships (i.e., do not tell recipients what to do) and build 
trust. Participant 006 advocated for establishing trust and partnerships with ordinary citizens 
“so, you should actually make sure that you are working with the partners. Bringing people of 
trust that are really trying to work in the nation’s best interest”. Participant 007 called for 
“partnering with the actors in a comprehensive manner; fixing the system as a part of the whole 
system and having greater access to the people”. 
Participant 006 advocated for genuine partnerships between recipients of international 





partners. This Participant cited the Australian Government’s approach to supporting such 
processes in postconflict societies:  
Australia has a large bilateral development program, and … invests a lot in  
enhancing these partnerships to boost regional security. … the work ... done is  
a good model of working in partnership not necessarily telling them what they  
need but also trying to look at locally designed solutions to the local based  
problems, and how we can best support them.  
Have a long term approach and be patient.  Participant 021 admonished the 
international community to have a long term approach and be patient:  
I think that everything in terms of the international community, in terms of in  
postconflict environment, somehow in peacekeeping, is always just too rushed.  
Everything is also rushed it is always immediate and it is always short term even  
if you are looking at three years, the yearly plan within that. And I think that is  
damaging because you are not looking at what you are trying to achieve in a  
longer term. You are just looking at immediate needs and priorities, which don’t  
necessarily cumulatively add up to an overall result. 
Participant 018 called for a gradualist approach to decentralization “I think it should have been 
gradual. Decentralize city by city, service by service; test it, evaluate it; it shouldn’t have been a 
massive national rollout”. Participant 022 observed the lack of patience on the part of the 
international community supporting Liberia. According to this Participant, building a justice 
system does not happen overnight, hence the international community should be patient and stay 
the course: 





international community is nowhere to be seen, so we allow it to explode then  
there is a peace agreement then we get here then we come up with so much  
money because we don’t have any information and we have so much money and  
we don’t even know how to spend the money and before we know we are leaving.  
… to establish a proper justice system, it takes a generation. 
Build a professional criminal justice system insulated from partisan politics.  
Participant 006 indicated that insulating criminal justice system appointments from 
partisan politics and appointing competent people into positions within the criminal justice 
system will promote national ownership: 
We saw the influence and reach of the power of the President has, and so even  
then, you have got people who are heads of agencies who were not supposed to be  
there because they were not actually going to bring any significant  
transformation; that is why there was the need to have separation of powers so 
the criminal justice system would work without depending on the government. 
Learn lessons from similar contexts. Participant 004 called on the international 
community to learn lessons from similar contexts:  
For example, the lessons learnt in Sierra Leone helped us with the implementation  
in Liberia and I am sure certainly the same thing will apply in the future, the DDR  
process in Somalia or even in South Sudan and of course in the Central African  
Republic. The lessons learnt should be comprehensive; one shouldn’t see it as a  
defensive thing. One should be honest to admit mistakes because in this world,  
mistakes are made, and they are there to be corrected. And at the UN level, they  





offices will be in the know. When senior officials are being appointed to certain  
positions, as part of the interview processes, they must look at the lessons learnt  
so that they don’t come as greenhorns. You will need to read and understand the  
challenges that their predecessors had … 
The Government of Liberia should evaluate its engagements with the international 
community on decentralizing the criminal justice system and learn lessons. Participant 
008 recommended that going forward, the Government should evaluate it previous 
engagement with its international partners to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system to 
inform future the dealings between both parties: 
So, moving forward, I think that it is important firstly, to look back within the  
period under review; there are positive things that the Government did, there are  
positive things that the international partners did, but there are still remaining  
challenges. So why is it that we still have these challenges? It is those  
shortcomings that will provide the guide we need. 
Promote South-South cooperation. Participant 019 recommended that attention should 
be paid to promoting South-South cooperation in exploring options in decentralizing Liberia’s 
criminal justice system:  
We have better examples; Ghana, Nigeria. They may not have been super the way  
you want it but I believe that you have to start from somewhere. Because of the  
work that I do, I had to take Liberians on a work tour with some NGOs to the  
United States. I refused! I told them I cannot take these people to the United  
States. It will not make any sense. … Liberia is Liberia. And I said, ‘why don’t  





participants themselves didn’t like it. They benefited more from going to Ghana  
because they saw things and came to make things a little better. They could  
identify with what they were dealing with here. Subsequently we took them to  
Kenya, Uganda and some of the things were similar. 
Research Question 3:  How has Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System affected 
the System’s Functionality and Liberia’s Peace and Stability? 
For ease of reference, Tables 7 and 8 presents participants' views on how decentralization 
of the criminal justice system has influenced the system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and 
stability.  
Table 7  








Decentralization has made Liberia’s criminal justice 
system functional (but two participants said the 
benefits are yet to be felt) 
20 
69 
Criminal justice system has inadequate capacity and 
is yet to be functional 
9 
31 







Table 8  
Participants Views on the Effects of Decentralizing the Criminal Justice System on Liberia’s 
Peace and Stability.  
 
Findings Number of Responses (n) Responses in percentages 
(%) 
Decentralization of the 
criminal justice system has 
contributed to Liberia’s peace 
and stability 
2 50 
Decentralization is helping to 
address the root causes of 
Liberia’s civil war 
2 50 
Total Responses (N) 4 100 
 
 
 I proceed to present participants answers to interview questions that aided me to answer research 
question 3. Participants painted a picture of the state of the criminal justice system prior to the 
period under review. This contributed to answering this research question. In this regard, 






Theme One: The Traditional Justice System Primary Source of Justice for Majority of 
Liberians Particularly in Rural Communities  
  The following subthemes arise from this Theme: 
Subtheme One: Before Liberia’s Civil War, Criminal Justice Services Available in 
Monrovia and County Capitals 
 
  Very limited decentralized criminal justice system up to county capital. Participant 
021 indicated that prior to Liberian’s civil war, the criminal justice system was decentralized. This 
Participant asserted that: 
Yes, technically we will say it was decentralized. I am saying that because if you look at 
the criminal justice system; the police, immigration, courts, etc. were decentralized by 
having for example regional officers, regional commanders from the police placed in 
strategic areas. The courts and corrections system in a way were also decentralized, we 
had the justice and peace courts. And these were very low-level courts. 
Participant 011 indicated that, “… it was decentralized before the war; it was accessible. … So, 
far as you have Supreme Court reports as far back as the establishment, it suggests to me that 
that component was working especially in the counties”. Participant 009 stated that: 
The criminal justice system was decentralized, however, most decisions that  
affected the people in the rural areas were made in Monrovia. So, although we  
had the courts, the police and immigration and all those things there, they were  
not particularly working in collaboration with one another, nor were they able to  
sustain the workload that was required. Another reason why I say it was not  





de-concentrated but it was never decentralized although we used that word, for  
the term to say that the services are decentralized, they are not because they are  
still concentrated in the capital city of each county. So that means that people in  
the rural villages still had to travel many miles to come to get the services. 
According to Participant 010: 
Well, decentralized to a certain extent but not in total. Because at the time, if I can  
recall, there were 9 counties in Liberia. And all 9 counties had police officers.  
And others had the immigration officers. Like, there were districts in those 9  
counties. But there were sections that the criminal justice system could not cover  
at the time. And the criminal justice system could not have covered all sections  
because of accessibility to those particular areas. We had no roads at all or  
deplorable road conditions, and because of the culture in some of those  
particular areas. 
Participant 012 stated that: “By and large it was decentralized; it just needed to be strengthened 
… We used to have regional and district commanders, because wherever a police station is, that 
area becomes a decentralized area …”. Participant 015 stated that, “we had circuit courts in all 
the counties. We had magisterial courts in the counties and Justices of the Peace courts. The 
police were also across the entire county”. Participant 018 stated that, “we had magisterial 
courts. We had circuit courts. So, because of that we can say yes ...”. Participant 020 indicated 
that, “well, not to the extent to which the hub was seeking to address. But it ran in an effective 
manner then. They were able to dispense justice within the existing framework, …”  Participant 






Well, I will say in theory but perhaps not in practice. I mean, they have it on the  
books. They have the criminal justice system in principle rather than in, maybe,  
infrastructure. … There is the provision for courts in every county. … correctional  
facilities in every county; again, in theory and then police depots in the county  
offices; ... So, I will say yes in theory, the system was set out to cover the entire  
country. In practice, of course, it didn’t operate like that prior to the civil war -  
and also, subsequently after the civil war. But certainly prior to the civil war, there  
weren’t many functioning. The criminal justice system wasn’t functioning that  
way, either because of a lack of deployment of criminal justice actors or  
infrastructure or both. 
Participant 011 stated that: “decentralized up to the county capital”. Participant 013 stated that:  
I will say, yes in a sense because we have the various courts, police stations all  
over, correctional institutions all over; so, in a sense yes, we had structures in all  
the counties. Except you want to qualify what you mean by decentralization. In  
one sense, yes you have it but, in another sense, most of the decision making was  
centralized. … Well, in all the counties there were police, etc. There was an  
attempt to create the criminal justice system throughout the country, at least at the  
county level but not beyond that.  
Lack of infrastructure and human resources affected decentralization. Participant 008 stated 
that “prior to the war, accessibility to the justice system in Liberia was hampered because of the 
poor road conditions. And those poor road conditions also affected the government's response 






Participant 021 stated that: 
Well, for the courts in locations outside Monrovia, they were not strengthened  
especially when it comes to the human resource capacity, and when it comes to  
even logistical capacity there were challenges. And then some of those who were  
judges were like apprentices; … 
Participant 015 stated that:  
… we never had before the war the public defense system, where you have a  
Public Defender within the different courts in the different counties. Before,  
people were left alone to find lawyers to represent them. Those who did not have  
money to hire lawyers were at the mercy of the judge. 
Participant 010 cited the lack of logistics as a reason for the criminal justice system not 
functioning: 
... if a crime is committed and there is no vehicle to transport the police to the  
scene and they have to walk to be able to reach a particular village, it could take  
them days to get there. Even the judges are also faced with the same problem as  
well. Because I have heard that there are local judges walking for about 4, 5, 6  
miles to court to be able to judge cases. How is that possible? 
Decentralization of the criminal justice system is new to Liberia. Participant 023 
asserted that, “when it comes to decentralization of the criminal justice system, it is quite new in 
the sense that a bulk of activities have never been decentralized”. Participant 030 claimed that 
“Prior to the civil war and the intervention of UNMIL, I have not seen or noticed any 





The criminal justice system was dysfunctional. Participant 015 indicated that “before 
the war, there were a lot of systems that were not functioning”. Participant 021 stated that: 
Over the years, one of our serious conflict factors that led to the war was the weak  
and a dysfunctional justice system. So, citizens didn’t have trust in the system.  
They saw it to be corrupt. They thought the system was also expensive to engage.  
And then there was this common saying that there is no justice for the poor. So,  
unless you have money, you cannot have justice. So, there is not much confidence  
in the formal justice system. They prefer the informal justice system. 
Justice of the peace courts were established to operate outside magisterial districts. 
Participant 013 mentioned the role of the Justice of the Peace courts in providing criminal justice 
services in the local communities: 
… what happened is Justices of the Peace were commissioned by the President … They 
were just like magistrates, but they operated outside magisterial areas. They hear minor 
cases just as the magistrates, but they were not actually paid by the government. So, in 
order for them to survive, they have to pay themselves. And in doing so, they would 
come down with heavy fines, they would put people in jail, they would take on heavy 
fees. So, there were many things they were doing which the Chief Justice and other 
people felt that it was not good and so they had to stop. 
Legal framework not supportive of real decentralization. Participant 012 stated that:  
We didn’t have the structure in the law. The Act of the police was not too  
elaborate until after the war where we decided to make it more formal by putting  
it in the law setting out the structure of the Liberian National Police and that it  





The criminal justice system provided services only in Monrovia. Participant 008 
observed that: 
… there were a couple of other services which were more centralized in  
Monrovia. For instance, none of the counties had the capacity to handle a riot or a  
civil disobedience issue in other counties. Response had to come from Monrovia.  
Which means the process of investigation and prosecution was very slow. … We  
had about 8,000 police officers prior to the conflict.  
Traditional justice is a major source of justice in rural areas. According to Participant 
009: 
In Liberia, you have two justice systems. You have the formal justice system  
where you go through the courts and all that and then you have the traditional  
justice system where you have the chiefs and the elders, who manage the civil  
issues/non-criminal mostly in the counties; so, because of those two systems, you  
will then claim that in those villages, people had some kind of access to justice in  
those counties. And it can also be argued that because of the informal justice  
system, a lot of things were not done up to par. People were taken advantage of; it  
did not provide justice. Because if a murder for example happened, or a rape  
happened, you still had to seek justice which was miles away. Because those  
people were not equipped to handle those kinds of problems. 
Participant 023 stated that: 
Liberia has a dual justice system. You have the customary system (i.e.,  
customary laws) and then you have the formal system which is the formal justice  





then coming to the urban part, which practices the other part of the justice system  
(i.e., the formal justice system). So, there’s always been some kind of conflict  
between the formal and informal justice system. 
Now that I have established the state of Liberia’s criminal justice system prior to the civil war, I 
present participants’ views on the impact of decentralization on the functionality of the criminal 
justice system and peace and stability in Liberia. 
Theme Two: Criminal Justice System Showing Very Basic Signs of Functionality and 
contributing to Liberia’s Peace and Stability 
The following subthemes emerged from Theme Two of the Research Question under 
consideration. The subthemes and statements made by participants in support of the subthemes 
are captured below:  
Subtheme One: The Criminal Justice System not functional and its Capacity Inadequate 
many citizens yet to have access to the criminal justice system. Participant 004 stated that 
decentralization is yet to make the criminal justice system functional: “…  
it has brought justice to some people. But it is not as large as I would have  
expected it to be. So, there are challenges … and if it is managed, it can bring  
about a lot more benefits to the people and Government of Liberia”.  
Participant 022 highlighted the slow progress made in the system’s functionality “… some 
progress has been made but I think it is a slow process because you are coming up against self 
interest; people who don’t like changing things”. According to Participant 027 “… the human 
rights report on Liberia also reveals that there are still issues with the courts speedily looking into 





Criminal justice system lacks basic logistics. Participant 016, used a practical challenge 
encountered by people seeking criminal justice services to assess the impact of decentralization 
on the system’s functionality:  
You encourage people to take their cases to the police, but he gets to the police and they 
say give me LD 2000 (i.e., $20) to cover the costs of the transfer of the accused to the 
court and you know he doesn’t have it.”  
Participant 015 observed that the infrastructure deficit in the criminal justice system is affecting 
its functionality: 
… we still have challenges. We do not have the correction facility we should have in all 
the counties. Some of the counties right now do not have all the facilities. Even in those 
places where we have a facility the size of the inmate population … can no longer 
withstand the case load in terms of people who have been sent to prison after conviction, 
pretrial detainees, all of those are challenges. 
Criminal justice system ineffective despite decentralization (i.e., effects of 
decentralization yet to be felt). Participant 021 acknowledged the fact that decentralization has 
made the criminal justice system functional, but suggests that it remains ineffective: “Yes, it is 
functioning, but effectively functioning I will say no”. Similar views are shared by Participant 
020: 
… there have been lots and lots of structural development. There have been more  
prosecutors out there, with the hope that it was going to help the system, but not  





Decentralization has made the criminal justice system functional, but benefits are 
not visible. Participant 024 admitted that decentralization has improved the criminal justice 
system’s functionality however the benefits are not visible: 
… when I look at my own country, our criminal justice system is something that  
was and is a work in progress. And that is just because some things remain  
imperfect which is the case in Liberia; you have to have a starting point. And I  
think there was a successful starting point. I think the benefits of that are not  
necessarily readily available, but I think that perhaps in a way that the system  
might develop gradually over the years, it developed more quickly over a short  
period of years than it would otherwise have. But nevertheless, the impact of that  
is yet to be seen. 
Participant 027 shared similar sentiments:  
Well, at the very minimum I will say yes. The fact that these institutions didn’t  
exist before, people had to come down to Monrovia. So minimally I will say the  
fact that this system now exists; … In terms of reporting rape cases, they have  
gone up; ... It is because you now have the infrastructure in our court system there  
and so, I will say minimally, yes, they have been effective. 
Inadequate funding, human resource capacity and infrastructure affecting 
functionality of the criminal justice system. Participant 020 indicated that inadequate 
personnel and infrastructure are affecting the functionality of the criminal justice system: 
… the police should have had barracks built in other areas so as to hold more  
officers in those areas. Because if you look at the deployment right now, the  





that ratio further as per the demography, you will realize that it goes as high as 1  
to 2000 in some areas based on the lack of infrastructure for deployment or lack  
of support to sustain the deployment even though the infrastructure was there. So,  
there should have been more police barracks so as to decentralize the deployment. 
Participant 020 highlighted how factors such as the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease and the 
economic downturn of Liberia’s economy affected the decentralization of the criminal justice 
system: 
As you may be aware, the restructuring and reform process in the UNMIL  
Drawdown Plan called for support of about 8,000 police officers. However, Ebola  
and the economic downturn affected this ... up to 2017, the number still remained  
around 5,000 officers which was way below the threshold. So, it made it difficult  
to deploy … to cover most of the areas ... 
Indicators and Reasons for Criminal Justice System yet to be Functional  
This section captures the indicators participants used to support their views that the 
criminal justice system is dysfunctional, and the reasons they assigned for this state of affairs. 
Selective justice and impunity. Participant 023 asserted that justice delivery is selective, 
and impunity is rife:  
There are some people who are untouchable. They can commit a crime and you  
don’t touch them! But others, the very poor people on the streets that have no  
means even to hire a lawyer. But in our Constitution, such people must have their  
day in court and must also have legal representation. So, it is quite selective, and  
it makes it more difficult for the rural parts of the country to really experience full  





Participant 016 cited the inability of the criminal justice system to provide justice as an indicator 
of a nonfunctioning criminal justice system:  
Somebody’s daughter has been raped, your money has been stolen, someone has  
lost a relative and the institutions are not able to facilitate the next step. … It  
poses challenges. And besides that, when people are unaware of the next step,  
even aware of the processes, it creates mistrust in the system. 
Participant 022 described the entire situation in Liberia as fragile with adverse consequence for 
the rule of law: 
… for me the situation is still quite fragile politically, economically, socially, but  
also, when it comes to the rule of law situation. I mean there are clear indications  
from our civil society partners, especially outside Monrovia, that anybody can be  
bribed, that perpetrators can buy their way out of prison. Cases can be prioritized  
based on payments to judges, prosecutors, clerks, correctional officers, you name  
it. And obviously it doesn’t hold very well for any justice system ... 
Specialized criminal justice services yet to reach the vulnerable population. 
Participant 020 lamented over the fact that the Women and Children’s Protection Unit of the 
Liberia National Police, which was designed to be located very close to the vulnerable 
population i.e. women and children, to provide them with specialized services, continues to be 
centralized: 
Take for instance the establishment of the Women and Children’s Protection Unit  
within the police which should have been decentralized in all of the counties. Yes,  
they are at the headquarters level but when you start from the district level, it was  





been there in all of those areas. Unfortunately, due to the capacity problem, lack  
of support, that which was intended to be a benefit to the vulnerable in those areas  
is now being restricted. 
On the same issue, Participant 019 noted that: 
Most of these works were done in urban areas within these counties. From my  
own experience, it has not been really decentralized. It hasn’t gone beyond the  
county capitals for the most part. In one case though, it did. I had to devise a  
strategy that went into real deep villages. I went ahead to design a program for the  
Women and Children’s Protection Unit and the Liberian National Police, … they  
were able to go into deep villages. 
High levels of pretrial detainees. Participant 005 cited the high number of pretrial 
detainees as an indicator of a dysfunctional criminal justice system:  
In reality, there was a massive backlog of pretrial detention …. There was never  
an attempt to try and deal with bail. Liberia had a mechanism by which pretrial  
detention could be considerably dropped. In international criminology, the  
principle always is that if a crime is bailable, the principle should be that the  
accused should not be incarcerated, unless there is a strong risk of the offender  
fleeing or alternatively a security risk because they are violent and might  
intimidate witnesses etc. So even though the bail system actually existed in  






Participant 021 also cited the level of pretrial detainees as an indicator of the weakness of 
Liberia's criminal justice system “One of the key weaknesses has been too many pretrial detainee 
cases”. 
Poor citing of the hub in Gbarnga. Participant 013 described the Gbarnga Hub as a 
failure because of its location: 
Yeah it was a failure. If you look at the location of the Gbarnga hub, it is far away from 
the town. And security wise, you are to build the infrastructure close to the people where 
they can have easy access. 
Lack of coordination amongst criminal justice institutions. Participant 016 lamented 
over the absence of coordination amongst criminal justice system institutions. This Participant 
observed that “in most places, there is no proper coordination between the police and the courts”. 
Lack of public confidence in the formal justice system. Participant 022 observed that 
public confidence in the formal justice system is low: 
Public confidence in the formal justice system is low. This … system does not  
work for ordinary people; poor people. And if you compare it with the numbers  
for the informal justice system, approval ratings, of the informal justice actors and  
processes hit the roof 70+ and 80+ per cent across a wide variety of indicators in  
terms of stability, speed, the human rights record, in terms of executing decisions,  
rulings, judgement. So, they are the trusted ‘go to’ venue or forum. That is not a  
bad thing. Of course, we would like to see to it that the most serious cases (e.g.,  
rape, murder), are channeled through the formal justice system. That is happening  





Hub dysfunctional due to unsupportive legal framework and lack of human 
resources. Participant 008 felt that the hub concept was not working as planned and attributed 
this to the existing legal framework: 
So, if you wanted to use the idea of the courts, it meant that you had to go and  
amend the laws and create hubs at the regional level which meant that we do not  
emphasize so much on the counties. … if we had done that, it would mean that  
there will be a higher court at the regional level that would have in a sense added  
to decentralization. It means that, all the cases originating from the Circuit Courts  
in Gbarnga, Lofa and Nimba will come to Gbarnga for review. But it did not  
happen that way. 
Participant 004 indicated that the hub project has not yielded the desired results due to factors 
like inadequate human resources: 
… it didn’t have the desired impact that we wanted. I am being frank with you,  
because first and foremost we didn’t have the personnel … we never got that  
target police population ratio. And then the bulk of the resources, as you would  
know, was basically in the capital Monrovia, and a little bit of the resources  
trickled down to the capital of the counties. 
Participant 005 attributed the poor results of decentralization on the functionality of the criminal 
justice system to the process being policy oriented and Monrovia-centric rather than dealing with 
the situation on the ground. According to this Participant, “that also reflects the fact that the job 






Inadequate legal literacy amongst citizens. Participant 016 pointed to the population’s 
lack of awareness of their rights and how the criminal justice system functions as a reason for the 
dysfunctional criminal justice system. This Participant argued that: 
Because someone expects that when someone wrongs me and I go to the court, I  
expect that he will go to jail for 10 to 15 years; you find out that he does not even  
know that the accused person has the right to bail. … That is why we actually  
need paralegals that would help inform the people. 
Lack of constitutional and judicial reform. Participant 005 opined that the lack of 
constitutional and judicial reform has had an impact on decentralization and the functionality of 
the criminal justice system: 
I think in my personal opinion, although I may be tempted to be biased, the  
weaknesses in the criminal justice system in Liberia were largely due to the lack  
of a sustained and comprehensive reformed judiciary. But essentially as I said,  
that was prohibited or stopped at a point when the decision was made to retain the  
constitution rather than start off with a new constitution. 
Multiplicity of institutions established with duplicitous mandates. Participant 005 
noted the multiple institutions established by foreign organizations supporting the 
decentralization process. According to this Participant, establishing these institutions was 
uncoordinated and usually driven by the personal preferences of the officials and/or 
organizations involved in the process and this has resulted in a duplication of functions and a 
dysfunctional system: 
… one of the frustrations I think, was that lots of the institutions were created  





driven by internationals living in the capital. I remember we charted out all these  
pieces of institutions, and a number were functional across the whole country.  
Some would work in one place and not another place. Frequently, this reflected  
the enthusiasm of those internationals frequently rather than serving the needs of  
the locals who looked desperately for assistance and so would say yes to anything.  
… There was extreme reluctance to say no to anything that was offered. And  
there was a lack of sensitivity or common sense by any of the international  
institutions and the local owners. And creating these structures were not  
coordinated and reflected a nonholistic systemic approach. 
Lack of equity in the allocation of resources to decentralize all parts of the criminal 
justice chain. Participants expressed their views on whether, comparatively, there was a fair 
allocation of funding across the various parts of the criminal justice chain. This is an indicator of 
whether attention was paid to all parts of the criminal justice chain as this would affect the 
system’s functionality.  
Unequal treatment of the various parts of the chain. The majority of participants were 
of the view there was a deliberate policy to fund the police more than the other parts of the 
criminal justice chain, with the corrections being the part that received the least support. This is 
reflected in the statements below:  
Participant 029 noted that: 
… the government wanted to provide services across the counties so that the three  
parts of the criminal justice chain and their services are fully functional. But  
of course, with the limitation that comes with budgetary issues, they cannot. So, of  





Participants were asked which part of the chain reached the most attention. Participant 029 stated 
“I will say the police, the next one will be the courts and then you have the prisons and 
rehabilitation”. According to this Participant this is evidenced by the allocations made in the 
budget:  
If you have the chance to download the budget between 2011/2017, you will see  
for example, the allocations made for the judiciary, the allocations made for the  
police, the allocations made for the corrections and rehabilitation; you will see a  
big difference. 
Similar sentiments were shared by Participant 003: 
… the Judiciary did their own project. So, you find that they had built courts in  
several areas where they do not even have a means of transporting their own  
people that come in. How do you take the prisoner to such a faraway place? The  
courts, the police because they are upfront, people tend to pour more money into  
them. 
Participant 005 indicated that the police received the greatest attention: 
I think policing received by far the biggest amount of support. And I think that  
was largely focused on the need to ensure some form of physical security. The  
neglected area was the prisons. They were the poor child at the door. And the  
Judiciary was somewhere in the middle. They did get some significant support but  
not as much as they would have liked. … I think it came down to priorities. And I  
think that overall, in a peacekeeping mission, there is always going to be an  
emphasis both from the Government and the international community for  





leads to neglect of the judicial/justice side and I think one of the things you can  
say is that towards the end, the last few years, there was talk about the criminal  
justice chain and trying to look at the reform process in a holistic manner. I think  
had this happened in the beginning of the Mission, if there had been sustained  
engagements with the Judiciary right in the early days, and the understanding that  
you needed to reform the entire criminal justice chain in a coordinated manner, it  
would have actually been a more successful venture. 
Participant 006 also pointed to the police as the largest recipient of support: 
There was much more investment in the law enforcement agencies … One of the  
areas that did not get a lot of attention were the prison system … There wasn’t  
enough investment done in the prosecuting, public defenders so that there could  
be a robust criminal justice system and trial process … 
Participant 008 identified the police as the recipient of most of the support but also noted that the 
Judiciary received adequate attention: 
I still believe the Supreme Court received adequate attention in terms of funding.  
Below that, the judges in the various courts got regular attention. But from an  
institutional perspective, the police get more budgetary allocation simply because  
of their size …. But the bulk of these vehicles were kept in Monrovia. So, on  
paper, there may have been some budgetary allocation for the police, but the  
management of the resources was a problem because most of those resources are  
kept in Monrovia and they do not go to the various counties. … . The  
prosecutorial department of the Ministry of Justice has always had the lowest  





budget is grossly inadequate. … Corrections are also the same. The facilities, and  
in a way maybe people just seem to be less concerned about the prisons. People  
are detained and we forget about them; that remains a major challenge. The  
prisons are overcrowded and there is a lack of appropriate facilities. Even  
Monrovia Central Prison, it is congested; it was built to have a capacity of  
between 300 and 400 prisoners. But sometimes it goes to between 1200 and 1500  
inmates. 
Participant 010 rationalized the attention the police received: 
… you cannot say the police received more. Honestly, the only reason why it  
appears like the police received more support is because of the huge numbers,  
which required more. But individually, as a police officer in terms of salary and  
benefits, those are not there. 
This Participant also noted: 
Some parts received more. And that had a negative impact on the system also. If  
you take the Judiciary; lawyers etc., and then the police, immigration, the salary  
disparity was so huge. You pay a police officer very little and then you pay the  
judges and lawyers far more than the rest. For example, if you don’t have the  
appropriate budget, the police officers not wearing proper uniforms and they are  
not presented well, so their dignity is not protected, how do they function under  
those kinds of atmosphere? If they are not paid on time and are paid very little,  
how can they support their families? How can they send their children to school? 
Participant 013 noted that “for corrections, I don’t see much improvement to what obtained in 





Most of the attention was focused on the courts and the police components. By  
the police component we mean institutions of police power (i.e., Liberia National  
Police, … the Liberia Immigration Service … Drug Enforcement Agency). I will  
clearly say corrections received the least. 
Participant 012 noted: 
They were supposed to receive the same attention but, in many instances, it was  
not like that. For instance, the criminal justice system is between two branches of  
the state. It is between the Executive and the Judiciary. And the Judiciary controls  
its own budget. And so, they have their own control. …The amount you pay the  
Judiciary is far in excess of what you pay a police officer. 
Participant 013 noted “… but the police usually gets the bulk of it and maybe the Judiciary. The 
security components of the police had the highest. The corrections had the lowest. I cannot 
compare the rest because I do not have the figures”. 
Participant 014 stated: 
Corrections are always given low attention. The police get more attention because you 
know the needs of the police are seen by local and ordinary people and by the politicians 
… even the corrections people complain that even for example in the community, a 
police officer is more respected than a corrections officer. 
Participant 016 indicated that: 
No! They were not treated equally. Sometimes it depends on how best you can  
push your case to the Legislature. It also depends on the Minister of Justice’s own  
interests. We have had ministers whose key priorities have been the prisons. We  





Minister whose key priority was security. So, it depends where your interest lies.  
If your priority is security, you push more for security.  
Participant 018 affirmed the views shared by most participants: “in my opinion, as it stands, I 
don’t know the budget for those areas, but you talk about the police, I see more attention in that 
sense; the cars, patrolling. In terms of the courts; I see new structures being built …” Participant 
019 also noted: 
… the police are the number one thing that they focused on. And I think the next  
one is prisons; the Bureau of Corrections. And here is the tricky part. For the most  
part again, these things were internationally driven. Some of the divisions of the  
criminal justice system were created by our international partners. So, for example if you  
look at the police, the Women and Children Protection Unit, that was created by UNMIL.  
Bureau of Corrections, same thing. So even though you go and try to plant those  
things in the interior, you will notice they have one or two officers responsible for  
so many counties. Simply because the Government’s commitment to these things  
is not really there. They are actually still looking to the international community  
to feed the system. 
Participant 020 observed that: 
UNMIL was concerned about having a security presence in the areas that security  
was being withdrawn. … so, because the process was primarily to get uniformed  
men and women in those areas, primarily the police, more of the funding went  
more into getting the police in those areas. So, when you even consider the police  
presence in those areas, there was physical presence. The police could make more  





component strong enough to handle whatever there was? So, as a result, the  
system was not holistically strengthened. So, the police were dumping more on  
the court, the court was dumping more on the corrections. So, as a result, there  
was a disproportionate distribution of resources … 
Participant 021 stated that “I think the police, immigration, and the courts received the most 
compared to the corrections. Not in terms of preference but in terms of giving them priority. The 
most I think is the police and the least will be corrections”. Participant 024 corroborated 
assertions held by participants above, on the prominent attention the police received: 
Certainly not equal attention, no. If you look at the respective resources, 
personnel and financial, dedicated towards the police compared to the corrections  
system and compared to the justice system as a whole, you would see that would  
be significantly different. Within the Government also, I think this is common in  
most countries; the law and order part of the justice system is given greater focus  
than those accused of crime. I think that being a postconflict environment,  
certainly, there was a focus on maintaining peace and stability. There was quite a  
significant focus on the law and order side of things.  
Participant 007 noted that “…they did not receive equal attention. The police received the most 
attention”. In spite of the views shared above on which part of the criminal justice chain received 
the most support, Participant 015 departed from the general view held by the majority of 
participants and stated that:  
Well, I can’t really speak to equal support because I do not have the data in terms  
of statistics … But I think it was done to the extent where if you really want to  





terms of differences. Because as we were preparing the law enforcement  
component, which serves as the entry when it comes to criminal cases, we were  
also preparing the courts. And that is why there has been new courts constructed  
in places where we never had courts in response to the decentralization of the  
criminal justice system. 
Subtheme Two: Decentralization has made the Criminal Justice System Functional  
Participants shared divergent views on the impact of decentralization on the system’s 
functionality. 
Criminal justice system functional due to decentralization. Participant 009 observed 
that the criminal justice system “is functioning better because of two things; the access and the 
fact that I feel that more cases are being heard. So, justice is not as delayed as it was before”. 
Participant 026 cited the fact that police officers are seen across the Gbarnga Hub region as an 
indication that the criminal justice system is functional: 
… if you take hub 1 just as a case study, just by deploying police officers in to  
respond to criminal incidents such as mob violence and other cases, if you talk to  
people in the region, they will tell you that, the system has been really supportive.  
If you also look at the perception survey done by the Peacebuilding Office, the  
two perception surveys, they can tell you that people’s perception about  
the criminal justice system has actually changed from negative to positive. 
Participant 029 stated that: 
... The police have improved in terms of the response time for incidents. They have been 
very fruitful. We had a case last year where in the Lofa court facility was about to be burnt 





to deploy people from Monrovia. … because we had people in Gbarnga, they responded 
quickly to address that situation. So that’s one success story with the hub. … And so, 
because of that through the experience, the government decided to roll the program in the 
regions to ensure that services are closer to the people and that people can have unhindered 
access. 
Participant 017 affirmed this view: “… they respond to the regional counties, because they are 
based at the hub in order to shorten response time unlike before when they respond from 
Monrovia”.  
Decentralization has enhanced the rule of law, access to, and oversight of, the 
criminal justice system. Participant 015 stated that the County and District Security Councils 
have improved security sector governance, access to the criminal justice system and oversight: 
Their County and District Security Councils role is that they discuss issues that  
they face … So, for example, if a community does not have a police station and  
there is an issue of mob justice that continues to take place, people are being  
confronted with issues and there are no courts and no police stations so the people  
come together to see if that issue is of security concern, they elevate the matter to  
the appropriate institution. … some of the places, we have never had a police  
station, magisterial court. As a result of the County Security Council convening  
and making policy recommendations to the central government, the government  
was able to construct magisterial courts, police stations, deploy men into those  
places thereby bring the rule of law into those communities. 
Participant  027 indicated that, “if decentralization had not happened, we would still have been 





have lawyers, but I think there’s been a lot of progress …” Participant  011 shared similar views 
“… it has become easier and more accessible. But that was not the case yesterday. In fact, in 
some of the counties, they don’t even have the structures. Most of the counties never had 
correction facilities; now they do.” Participant 024 cited the deployment of criminal justice 
personnel and building of infrastructure for the criminal justice system across the country as 
evidence of some functionality, because there is a presence of the criminal justice system across 
Liberia: 
Well, let me take the functionality of the system in the basic sense. In terms of  
having actors deployed, in terms of having functionality, in terms of having a  
place for a court to be, a police station presence in a county or district and having  
a facility to take people securely and safely, … I mean I don’t think anyone who  
has been in Liberia in 2003 and came back again in 2018 could doubt the progress  
made in that, in terms of the functionality of the justice system in that way. I think  
that, by and large, the police are able to respond. Not in the way that will be  
expected for them to respond to individual cases and things like that, but I  
certainly, think that there is a better perception of the security that the police can  
provide. I think that the focus on community policing over recent years has  
improved. They are starting to improve the relationship between the police and  
the community; as providing a service to them. I think that the courts are more  
problematic, and I think they will continue to be … 
Participant 014 cited the fact that impunity is being addressed by Liberia’s criminal justice 
system as evidence of how decentralization has influenced the system functionality: 





of the local people that is a lot of achievement ... that the powerful now are under  
the umbrella of the law. So that is quite important. ... So, in most of the places,  
people who were acting with impunity are now careful of what to do because their  
people are going to jail and staying there for a long period. And so gradually it is  
serving as a protection mechanism for local people who were before powerless to  
say, ‘I will go to the police. 
Participant 010 indicated that, “yes, it has become more functional than before because the 
system did not reach out to certain areas. But now, they have reached out to other areas, far more 
than it used to be”. Participant 029 also indicated that decentralization of the criminal justice 
system had enhanced the presence of the criminal justice system across Liberia: 
Yes. … I will take the judiciary for example. Across the counties before, we had  
people who were serving as magistrates but were not lawyers. With the  
decentralization, they identified that as a critical problem and what they have  
done is to introduce a training program to ensure that these guys go through a 1  
year or 1 year 6 months training so that they get the basics of law before they can  
serve as magistrates. So that has enhanced the delivery of the service so that they  
can be delivered at the county or community level.  
Participant 017 cited the reduction in the number of cases on the court docket in the Gbarnga 
Circuit Court as evidence of the functionality of the criminal justice system arising from the 
Gbarnga Hub: 
Now what has happened is that; one, there has been more focus on the justice  
delivery system. So, there is great improvement in terms of how justice is  





Gbarnga Circuit Court has really reduced. 
Participant 008 stated that:  
Decentralization has also helped to hold the government to look at all of the  
counties in a way, because allocation may not be sufficient. … because of the  
political activity in Liberia, those representatives are now serving as a mouthpiece  
to address the legal challenges that they may have in their county. And the way to  
respond to their concerns is not to bring those people to Monrovia but to open  
other avenues to get redress so it has opened the eyes of many people. And mind  
you, the decentralization process has also gone with some level of advocacy, …  
so, people are demanding; they are not just sitting down as passive. 
Participant 016 indicated that the Gbarnga Hub has improved oversight and accountability of the 
criminal justice system: 
The County Attorneys, security, courts, have to give reports, and the  
establishment of the hub brought in special offices that allows for mechanisms to  
check judicial and security actors in the county. So, a police officer knows that he  
or she is not above the law. Citizens can complain to the hub manager and the  
case can be forwarded, and several disciplinary actions taken. 
In the words of Participant 030:  
… . The current structure of the criminal justice system has been the Women and  
Children Protection Section in the Liberia National Police. Prior to the civil war,  
the Liberia National Police did not have this Section. In Montserrado County,  
Criminal Assizes D and E were created by legislative enactments thereby  





the Supreme Court of Liberia, in exercise of its authority under Article 75 of the  
Constitution promulgated Judicial Canons that provide for the Judiciary Inquiry  
Commission that investigates complaints of impropriety against judges and  
magistrates and makes appropriate recommendations to the Chief Justice for  
consideration of the Supreme Court Bench.  
As an indicator of decentralization having made the criminal justice system functional, 
Participant 030 listed the services that have been decentralized in the Gbarnga Hub. According to 
this Participant: 
As a result of the establishment of the Gbarnga Regional Justice and Security Hub  
criminal justice services such as confidence patrol by the Police and Border Patrol  
Officers of the Liberia Immigration Services (LIS) have been extended to the  
towns and villages in those regions where the hub is established but this  
decentralization involves huge budgetary support. With UNMIL full presence in  
Liberia having ended, the criminal justice system in Liberia is as responsive as it  
was when UNMIL and other donors provided material and financial support.  
Participant 011 attributed the functioning of the criminal justice system to the new administrative 
structures created to manage processes within the criminal justice system. According to this 
Participant, “today, we have a different system of managing them. We now have court 
administrators, and looking at these people and their qualifications, that is a different ball game 
all together”. Participant 026 said, “yes, I think it has reduced some of the tension that was being 
placed at the central level, some of the areas never had magistrates, some of the areas never had 





trained. … outside of Monrovia, at least some people now have access to the justice system. 
Some are close to the courts and the police”.  According to Participant 029:  
… decentralization has been beneficial in a lot of ways because they are able to  
enhance the delivery of services across the country; and so, people can now access  
different services in different parts of the country. But it has also created  
challenges when it comes to sustainability of the projects and programs. … And  
the government in most instances is not able to match up and sustain those  
services … the Government didn’t roll out a plan to ensure that when the funding  
dried up, … So, it is actually a fault from the Government’s point of view. 
According to Participant 015, decentralization has engendered public confidence in the criminal 
justice system and promoted the rule of law: “it has developed trust in the formal justice system 
by our people. The second thing is, it has reduced mob justice because people feel now that they 
can go to court; the court is effective”. Participant 021 claimed that decentralization has educated 
citizens on how to access the criminal justice system “… to an extent yes. Because if you look at 
the whole consciousness. The citizens are conscious minded compared to before”. Participant 
008 indicated that: 
… there has been some form of justice simply because of decentralization. So,  
because of that access to justice, access to the players that are in that system,  
enables people to benefit a little bit more from those elements of the justice  






Participant 008 also asserted that, “so, when you talk about decentralizing the criminal justice 
system within the Liberian context, it reinforced the structure that was there before the war but to 
make it more functional …” Participant 014 stated that: 
Well, there are a number of buildings in Gbarnga and prosecutors as well. They  
have the County Attorney. This means that at all times, there will be prosecutors  
both at the circuit court level and at the magisterial level. … From what I have  
seen, visiting Gbarnga, there are cases being heard. And then maybe because of  
its proximity to Monrovia, they are a little bit monitored and those who manage it  
know they are being monitored. 
According to Participant 006:  
I will say in some parts of Monrovia, some of the courts were working well;  
functioning effectively more than others... a solid response, a solid investigation  
etc. Some trials were able to start … That is why I say aspects of it worked better  
than others. 
Participant 014 indicated that, “the hubs have been established but they are yet to be functional 
in all the other parts of the country. The Gbarnga Hub so far, I think, is the best functioning and 
that is for central Liberia. It is well functioning with courthouses, magisterial etc.”  
Reform of legislation has enhanced the criminal justice system’s functionality. Participant 
011 indicated that the enactment of legislation for the Liberian National Police had enhanced the 
criminal justice system’s functionality: 
Today, our Liberian police, which is the first component of the criminal justice system, at  
least have laws, unlike yesterday, when their jurisdiction was not spelt out. There are  





Subtheme Three: Criminal Justice Chain Working Together 
Participants were also asked if the various parts of the criminal justice chain were 
working together. This was to ascertain how functional the criminal justice system is, their 
responses were mixed. 
Participants expressed the following views in support of the opinion that the parts of the 
criminal justice chain are working together.  
Participant 005 stated that on a day to day basis the various parts of the criminal justice 
chain were working together: 
My feeling was that on a day to day basis, they worked relatively well together.  
But there were clear examples why some of the things were disjointed. For  
instance, judges were not considering the capacity of prisons to hold prisoners.  
This was especially important in Monrovia, where petty criminals will often  
be incarcerated and put in very unfavorable conditions. 
Participant 010 expressed the view that the various parts of Liberia's criminal justice chain were 
working together as there was coordination amongst them. According to this Participant, “there 
is now coordination between the police, immigration and the courts”. This view was also shared 
by Participant 012 who stated that “yes there is collaboration, coordination and cooperation 
among and between the justice and security institutions”. Participant 026 stated that: 
Yes, they are. If you went to Gbarnga for example and say there is a rape case, the  
SGBV Crimes Unit will go and do an investigation, then the police will go and  
arrest, then the police will turn the person to the court and the court will do the  
investigation and then if the person requires going to jail, then they will send them  





It is a critical challenge which has several factors. 
Participant 029 stated that the various parts of the criminal justice system are working together at 
the county and national level “Yes they are working. There is coordination between the various 
sectors both at the national and county levels. Yes, they are working”. Participant 015 stated that: 
  Yes, they are working together. The only issue as I speak to you are the challenges  
  that each institution faces. But with respect to the formal work, they have been   
  working together. Before the war, if someone was taken to court, or the police    
  station, the police conduct the investigation, and submit their findings with the  
  person. But right now, when someone is taken to the police station, they have to  
  ensure that you have a lawyer at the police station. So, it has improved. So that  
  coordination is there. Years back, you had to find your lawyer when you came to  
  court. But now once you get to the court and you do not have a lawyer, the  
  a defense attorney under the public defense arrangement provides you that. … I   
  agree there are issues. That is why I said, it is true the system is working but there  
  are still challenges. …, under the law, they provide for release, after two Terms of  
  Court, if you are not being brought before the judge for trial ... over the years,   
  lawyers have been invoking that law. So, the law is working, and it is being  
  applied. So, with respect to the full application functioning, I will continue to say  
  that once the system is established and it is working, there are still gaps that we 
  need to resolve. … All three parts have to be well functioning in order to be   
  effective. All the components have challenges. They have capacity, logistical   






Subtheme Four: Criminal Justice Chain not Working and/or Partially Working together  
Participant 022 stated that:  
They have to, they don’t have a choice. But I think the coordination and  
communication can be a lot better. If you look at the performance of the  
individual institutions, you will see some progress. But the performance of the  
chain as a whole has some gaps (e.g., lack of coordination and even the attitude).  
... The police investigation is done; prosecution does an excellent work and  
everything is ready but then the courts mess up. The case doesn’t appear on the  
docket for whatever reason. Maybe it could be corruption or whatever  
sluggishness. But that ultimately means that people who suffered as a result of  
this crime will still be disappointed. Lost files etc. that really have a direct bearing  
on the sector as a whole. There is still a lot of room for improvement. 
Participant 023 cited existing conflicts between various parts of the criminal justice chain as 
evidence that parts of the chain are not functional: 
We have tried to see how, as a nation, we could be promoting criminal justice  
practices. But you also see that they are in conflict with each other. The police and  
prosecution, there is always conflict. The police think that they are not getting the  
best of support because, for example, the lawyers are prosecutors, are to present  
evidence to the courts for a crime that someone will be charged with. Now they  
go to court without the real evidence. When a prosecutor loses a case, they think  
that it is as a result of the fact that the police did not do their work. Because  
assuming the police provides tangible evidence on that particular criminal case,  





courts and the prisons, there is also conflict between the two. The prisons think  
that the court is overburdening them. Budgetary allotment given them is quite  
limited.  
Participant 013 stated that: 
They are playing their role, but how effective they are playing this role is the  
issue. So, if you have overcrowded jails and prisons, it means something is  
wrong. That means either the courts are not functioning well or because some  
people just get lost in the system. So yes, they are working, individually per their  
mandate but then there is a need to have regular consultation meetings to  
exchange ideas. 
Participant 014 expressed frustration over the lack of implementation of the bail system in 
Liberia, because it was violating the rights of accused persons because they were being held in 
custody for an inordinately long period: 
… if someone comes to complain to the police that a crime has been committed,  
and the police arrest the person and the person is charged and sent to court, it  
happens that the person is in jail. So, the bailing system as it is now is not  
effective. The complainant doesn't come to the hearing; the person stays in jail for  
a long time without bail. To keep someone in jail for a long time, beyond 30 days,  
is a violation of the person’s rights. The rule of law should provide for that. 
Participant 001 indicated that the various parts of the criminal justice chain are not working 
together “I give a straight no! … Because if they were working together it means that processing 
the case would be easier. Because they are not working together, the cases are not completed”. 





… So, the police are doing one thing, the prisons are doing another thing. For  
example, you will hear from the police that the reason why many people are going  
to prison and are complaining is because of the prison being overcrowded. And it  
is because the court is sending people there for very minor cases. … So, you see  
the coordination is not there. 
Participant 020 also cited the existence of overcrowded prisons as evidence that the parts of the 
chain are not working together. “I just mentioned to you the issue of the overcrowded prison, the 
stuck up dockets. So, they are not working efficiently.” Participant 008, agreed that the various 
parts of the criminal justice are not working together and attributed the state of affairs to unequal 
budget allocation:  
… clearly, this is where the budgetary allocation comes in. The budgetary  
allocation into the system has not been uniform. Maybe, Monrovia receives a lot  
more because that is where the capital is, maybe counties where you have  
concessions will maybe receive a lot more. And there are counties where they are  
really suffering. … So, this is the problem, the architecture is there, if you look on  
paper, you will see that each county has a police post, has a court, it has a  
prosecutor but none of these institutions work very well. If the appropriate  
budgetary allocation is not given to them …this remains the challenge. Salaries  
are very low and in some of the areas it is not forthcoming; it is not coming in  
regularly, and some of them have nothing to work with. 
Participant 025 indicated that: 
… there was some problem with the justice system in itself because there had  





and there were strong sensitivities between different parts of the justice chain and  
all these things rather than us working towards the various government  
institutions and developing programs for the different parts of the rule of law  
chain, we never got the holistic approach to solving the issues of the different  
parts. 
Participant 009 observed: 
No. Not anymore. But we did through 2011-2017, until the Minister of Justice  
Christiana Tah left, we worked in harmony because we had one goal; to ensure we  
had an integrated system, a holistic system, looking at it in a whole. She loved  
that word, holistic system, where all the chains were connected, and all was  
working in harmony; that’s what she was aiming for. But is that what we got? No!  
Because when she left, and the acrimony set in, people then went back to thinking  
about their system, their institutions, so it became individual. But something that  
helped us again was UNMIL’s drawdown. That helped us again in trying to work  
together in a holistic manner, trying to reform the system. 
Participant 024 noted that the working relationship between parts of the criminal justice has 
improved even though the institutions/agencies see themselves as competitors:  
I think they are working together better than they had been. I think that there are  
still limitations like before in each of the institutions and understanding their  
responsibilities and seeing it as a joint responsibility. And I still think that they  
still see each other as competitors for their resources. I do think they are more  
aware of each other’s needs and limitations. I think that they are more aware that  





Participant 0021 also observed that “they are working together, but there is a need for 
strengthening coordination. They are working but may not be effective”. 
Subtheme Five: Decentralization has Contributed to Peace and Stability  
Participants shared varied views on the contribution of a decentralized criminal justice on 
Liberia’s peace and stability.  
Decentralization has ensured peace and stability. Participant 001 stated that citizens 
are resorting to the criminal justice system to resolve their disputes and this is contributing to 
peace in Liberia: 
Maintaining peace and security in Liberia, they have succeeded. Because the 
communities realized that they are able to solve some of their issues, but others can be 
solved through the criminal justice system. … they are able to solve it through the 
criminal justice court. 
Participant 026 affirmed Participant 001 assertion by stating that: 
Yes, it has. Because we were able to deploy more lawyers, judges, more cases are  
being heard at the local level, and now when people have issues, they are able to  
go to the court rather than put the law into their own hands. So, if you look at the  
issue of mob violence, even though it is still happening, it has reduced  
considerably. Most of the cases in the various courts are being dealt with in a  
faster way as compared to before. 
Subtheme Six: Decentralization is Addressing Some Causes of the Civil War.  
 According to Participant 008 decentralization is helping to address the root causes of the 
war: I think it has been beneficial to the Liberian people; the benefits that the people are entitled 





the root cause of the conflict. Participant 021 stated that “yes, for the purpose of stabilization; for 
the purpose of sustaining our peace and in the light of consolidating out peace and also for the 
purpose of meeting elements of the Sustainable Development Goals”. Participant 021 also stated 
that decentralization of the criminal justice system has helped to address the concerns of citizens 























Research Question 3. 1: How can the Functionality of Liberia’s Criminal Justice System be 
Improved? 
Table 9 below presents participants recommendations on how the functionality of 
Liberia’s criminal justice system can be improved. 
Table 9 
 
Recommendations and Actions to Improve the Functionality of Liberia’s Criminal Justice 
Institutions 
 
Recommendations  Actions required 
Undertake institutional 
reform and development of 
Liberia’s criminal justice 
institutions/system 
Provide adequate financial resources to 
implement the decentralization process 
Reform the criminal justice system’s 
legal framework 
Address infrastructure gaps but abandon 
the hub concept  
Increase number of court terms, police 
officers and judges and the use of the 
traditional justice system 
Enhance coordination and oversight of 
the criminal justice chain. 





Deployment of criminal justice officials 
outside Monrovia 
Use technology to make the criminal 
justice system accessible 
Improve logistics 
Overhaul the entire criminal justice 
system 
Improve communication, outreach and 
legal literacy of the population about the 
criminal justice system 
Change of attitude required  
Cultivate strong culture of integrity in 
criminal justice officials, ensure 
coordination and oversight of the 
criminal justice chain. 
Decentralization processes must be 
Liberian owned as well as sustainable 
and international partners should remain 
credible. 
Focus on the population who are the 








The following opinions were shared by participants on how the functionality of Liberia’s 
criminal justice system could be improved:  
Theme One: Develop Criminal Justice Institutions and Modify Approaches to Making the 
System Accessible. 
 Two subthemes emerged from this Theme. 
Subtheme One: Institutional Reform and Development  
Overhaul the entire criminal justice system. Participant 005 called for a fundamental 
reform of the entire criminal justice system:  
… infrastructure is fine but when infrastructure is not accompanied by a  
systematic reform process, inevitably the reform process is flawed. By  
concentrating on infrastructure rather than engaging in systemic reform issues, I  
think Liberia lost an opportunity to really see the comprehensive judicial reform  
or a wider criminal justice reform. 
Provide adequate financial resources. Participant 001 recommended “adequate 
resourcing for all the various parts or the criminal justice chain”. Participant 003 shared similar 
views: “I think in order to have a functional system in any way, you need to pour resources into 
it”. Participant 008 shared a similar “… provide adequate budgetary support”. In the words of 
Participant 017 “the only thing that can be further enhanced is the budgetary allocation”. 
Participant 006 advocated for an increase in funding to support the various decentralization 
processes “… we should have looked at funding support. We had to prioritize the building blocks 
and actually make sure that we are matching those capacity building and development 





Undertaking law reform. Participant 008 advocated for law reform “look at the laws, 
there will be a need to reform some of the areas; criminal procedure laws”. Participant 020 called 
for “law reform, increasing capacity and changing the existing law”. Participant 029 noted that, 
“some of the laws are archaic and so there is a need to look at it and ensure that they reflect the 
common reality”. Participant  019 called for legislation to strengthen coordination amongst 
criminal justice institutions: “One of the things I tried to do that we could not do was to look at 
the Ugandan example where they were able to do some kind of legislation that makes all the 
justice system chains work together”. 
Increase the number of court terms, police officers and judges as well as involve the 
traditional justice system. Participant 029 advocated for an increase in the number of court 
terms and judges as well as use of the traditional justice system for dealing with minor criminal 
offences:  
… increase the number of court terms or can we increase the number of judges in  
the court? Or is it possible to use the traditional justice system to address some of  
these petty or minor cases … we can use the traditional system to handle very  
petty cases that the chief in the town or elders can be able to settle. 
Participant 016 stated that “you need more police stations and officers”. Participant 030 noted 
that:  
The customary justice system as a parallel legal system is not well structured and  
given its rightful place in our justice system. There is a need to elevate the  
customary justice system by revising regulations, repealing and amending statutes  






Address infrastructure gaps but abandon the hub concept. Participant 008  
recommended the abandonment of the hub concept because it has been overtaken by the passage 
of time. This Participant said that; “I think we have passed that stage now.”. Participant 009 
identified the need to address the infrastructure gaps within Liberia’s criminal justice system: 
“we have infrastructural issues ... so it is not one thing that has to be addressed”. This Participant 
recommended that infrastructure of the criminal justice system must be located close to 
beneficiaries. This supports Participant 008 recommendation to abandon the hub concept which, 
conceptually, is large scale infrastructure. Participant 029 also advocated for “… smaller ones 
than a huge infrastructure that is unsustainable”.  
Deploy criminal justice officials outside Monrovia. Participant 018 also recommended 
that criminal justice system officers should be deployed outside Monrovia. According to this 
Participant, “pretrial detainees are still there but lawyers are not encouraged to deploy outside 
where the services are decentralized”. Participant 021 supported the call to deploy personnel 
outside Monrovia by indicating that the deployment must not be on paper but must result in the 
physical movement of criminal justice professionals. This Participant said, “you have got 
personnel in places on paper for instance you see that on paper about 102 police officers have 
been deployed to a location outside Monrovia but on the ground, they are about 4, and they are 
being paid …. They come back to Monrovia”. 
Improve communication, outreach of criminal justice institutions and legal literacy. 
Participant 027 advocated for an improvement in communication and outreach on the rights of 
citizens, the workings of, and services provided by the criminal justice: 
I think there is still a need for a lot of communication; a lot of outreach. In some  





People need to be aware of that. People need to understand their rights. There is  
still a lack of awareness on rights. 
Capacitate civil society, the criminal and; traditional justice systems. Participant 022 
advocated for an improvement in human resources and infrastructure for the criminal justice 
system and the strengthening of civil society and informal justice system: 
We should continue to support the employment of qualified staff for different  
counties. A lot of magisterial judges/lawyers are not well trained, so training is  
important in addition, beefing up of personnel should continue, but with  
sustainability in mind because ultimately the Government will have to absorb that  
cost (i.e., salaries and maintenance cost). There is the need to create a conducive  
environment for these people to work in. So of course, there is the need for  
infrastructure and office supplies, but at the same time, continue to invest in civil  
society and the informal justice system because civil society plays an important  
watchdog role and the informal justice system will continue to be the preferred  
choice for the overwhelming majority of Liberians, especially when it comes to  
the nitty gritty issues. 
Participant 023 also called for training of criminal justice system personnel: 
I think in my mind, even though they have done quite a number of crusades, there  
has to be more training for criminal justice practitioners; the police, prosecutors  
and judges. So now we are training judges and clerks because, in that way, the  
courts become more functional and people can begin to trust the courts and there  





Participant 029 also recommended that the authorities, “ensure that people are trained to deliver 
services”. Participant 004 advocated for the recruitment of qualified personnel to work in 
Liberia’s criminal justice system:  
… any criminal justice system in the world, no matter how you design it, if it has  
no qualified professional men and women of high integrity, it can’t work. … Most  
of the time in many postconflict societies which is what we find... you design  
something, and you don’t have the men and women qualified, with experience to  
run it. ... so, you bring in foreigners who simply don’t know the system, who  
simply don’t know the culture. Example, Liberia is one of the Anglo-American  
systems, and also, they have a traditional justice system which you find across the  
rural part of Liberia. Liberia has a dual justice system, and the dual system can  
only work if you have qualified professionals. 
Enhance coordination and oversight within the criminal justice chain. Participant 
008 recommended that attention should be paid to all parts of the criminal justice chain: 
It is not enough to strengthen prosecution if you cannot strengthen the judicial  
process. Say you want to eliminate prolonged pretrial detentions; what does that  
mean? The police have a role to play with that; the judges have a role to play with  
that; the prosecution has a role to play with that. So, we need to have a system  
that will look at all the various organizations and we bring them up  
simultaneously; all of them have to operate in a parallel way … 
Participant 009 highlighted the need to address institutional and systemic weaknesses of the 
criminal justice system: 





looking at the system in a holistic manner; starting from the police going all the  
way to the prisons, we have institutionalized blockages. And ensuring that they  
work together as one and trying to unblock the system in all of these parts would  
help or hinder the functioning of the system. 
Participant 008 recommended that criminal justice institutions should be strengthened: 
So, if you look at the police, more work needs to be done. It is more than just  
numbers. They need to work. I can tell you the whole investigative process of the  
police is very weak. So, you need to strengthen those institutions. And strengthen  
them at the national and local levels. And when I say national level, I mean  
Monrovia, but also throughout the country. 
 Participant 014 called for bail to be used to ensure suspects are not held in custody for prolonged 
periods because this violates their rights. According to this Participant, “to keep someone in jail 
for a long time is a violation of the person’s rights. The rule of law should provide for that”.  
Improve logistics. Participant 014 advocated for the provision of adequate logistics “I 
think providing logistical support. For example, if you have no vehicle for the Magistrate Sitting 
Programme ... there is a need for inclusion in the budgetary allocation”. Participant 029 called 
for the introduction of mobile courts in the justice delivery process:  
… in some counties, we can use the mobile court system - where we take the  
lawyers and judges and they go to specific circuits and sit there to handle some of  
the cases. So, there can be a mobile court that other counties use to enhance the  
justice system. 
Use technology. Participant 015 recommended using technology to make the criminal 





Law enforcement itself has major components; the individual components and of  
course the technological hardware that is needed to help you to be more effective.  
Take for example, officers are in this day and time doing manual traffic control at  
major intersections. It is supposed to be managed by traffic lights and cameras so  
that if someone violates traffic regulations, his license plate is photographed by  
the camera and his information is taken to a control center. So, we come to be  
professional in investigation, getting fingerprints, and developing the evidence for  
court. If you are challenged in those areas, it makes it difficult to do proper  
presentation in terms of evidence before the court. So, then you bring the  
prosecutor to a point where they have to go the extra mile in terms of proving the  
accused person’s guilt. 
Participant 029 advocated for technology to be used for record keeping and tracking cases within 
Liberia’s criminal justice system: 
… do we have a digital system where we can be able to track the cases across the  
country? For example, if a judge comes to a court; if we have a digital system that  
tracks the cases when they came in, and how they were defended, and you know  
basically, to know the cases that are overdue. 
Participant 022 cautioned against unbridled use of technology to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system: 
I am personally not in favor of pushing for some sort of digital revolution maybe  
also, because I have seen expensive attempts including in Timor Leste where  
millions were invested and didn’t really lead to any meaningful efficiency. …  





like offices are not there to accommodate expensive equipment. And again, I will  
also bring up the sustainability issue, we buy very expensive equipment for  
instance solar panels. So, what happens when the machines break down in places  
like Grand Kru. … You don’t need anything fancy. Mobile phones are a very  
important tool of communication in this country. Coverage is quite good and  
cheap. It is important that staff in the field will also have phones and that they are  
able to communicate; not that they are not communicating, they are with their  
superiors in Monrovia. … So, I think that it is a bit early especially outside the  
capital. I don’t see how this could work. 
Subtheme Two: Change in attitude and approach required 
Decentralization processes must be Liberian owned, sustainable and international 
partners should remain credible. Participant 008 called on Liberia to embrace local ownership 
of the decentralization process: “Liberia also needs to support local ownership”. Participant 018 
advocated for attitudinal change amongst criminal justice officials:  
You see most of the time people can change the law; you can reform it from  
different angles, but how are people going to abide by it? Legal education, more  
professional approach to work, everything is not politics. People must take their  
work seriously. How much does it take to do that? … So how can people take the  
job seriously? Be it a cleaner or a judge, you must play your part; do your best.  
Participant 010 stated that projects must be sustainable: 
… I don’t think the approach was balanced in terms of maintaining and sustaining the 
hubs. And that the international community did not focus on it properly. An appropriate 





see what the challenges are and let the commitment be real, otherwise there will still be 
problems. 
Participant 016 highlighted the inadequate attention that was paid to ensure that the various 
interventions geared towards decentralizing the criminal justice system could be sustained by the 
Government of Liberia after international support had dried up “… the international community 
should have discussed sustainability more. They should have conducted a lot of training for 
qualified personnel to be able to sustain those systems”. Participant 015 recommended that 
Liberia’s Government must ensure sustainability of activities to decentralize the criminal justice 
system. According to this Participant, “what is critical right now is the issue of sustainability. 
How can the government strategize to sustain what they themselves led to put in place”? 
According to Participant 008, the involvement of nongovernmental organizations in the 
decentralization process created challenges for sustainability of the projects after the 
international funding ended. This Participant also stated that: “I wouldn’t say the involvement of 
NGOs affected the legitimacy, but it did have an impact on sustainability, especially long term 
sustainability. Because when an international NGO comes, the time there is limited; they leave 
when their time comes”. Participant 022 explained the state of the Government’s finances: 
… we know that the government budget has gone down in recent years especially  
after the Ebola crisis and there was a standstill in the Liberian economy. After  
2014, it hasn’t really seen that 7 or 8% growth that was there prior to Ebola. So,  
let’s say $550 million a year. I mean it is a small country, but it is still not a lot  






Participant 004 disagreed with the assertion that maintaining the hubs is too expensive for the 
Liberian government to sustain from its resources:  
I don’t agree with that. Liberia has the resources to manage the hubs, ... The  
problem that we face as Africans is that, we simply don’t put in the resources to  
the right things … We need to have a culture whereby every year we put 5 pens  
down and out of the 5 pens, we say we will use 3 pens of that to do this and that  
and keep the remaining 2 and save it and use it when there is an emergency.  
Participant 027 identifies with the position that the Government of Liberia can fund the 
operations of the Gbarnga Hub:  
I think the question is, can the national budget maintain the hub? Yes, I think it  
can … I think we may be discussing the misallocation of resources, but I don’t  
think that we can talk about the insufficiency of the resources … 
Participant 020 talked about sustainability and recommended that Liberia’s international partners 
should not have undertaken a total overhaul of the Liberia National Police. According to this 
Participant, the restructuring of the police should have kept some of the old experienced and 
skilled hands: 
… there was certain expertise that is no more there in the police. We never got it  
back. There is an old adage here that says, ‘you sit on the old mat, to plait the new  
mat’. So, you cannot tear up the old mat and sit on the ground to plait a new mat.  
So, I believe that there was expertise that they threw away. 
Participant 011 recommended that Liberia’s international partners should remain credible and 
consistent: 





many instances where you see the goalposts being shifted in the middle of the  
game and the rules changing in the middle of the game, there is an issue that  
should be addressed. If it is not addressed, they become a problem with the  
partnership. 
Cultivate a strong culture of integrity in criminal justice officials, ensure 
coordination and oversight of the criminal justice chain. Participant 024 opined that the 
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system can be achieved by getting each part of the 
criminal justice chain to play its role and improving oversight and accountability within the 
system. According to this Participant: 
… ensuring that people have the system move, which is partly to do with  
everybody playing their role, the police doing their jobs better, the prosecution  
doing their jobs better, the judiciary doing their jobs better, ... But I think the only  
way that that happens is when there is effective oversight, accountability, and  
improved management in the system. 
Participant 016 also advocated for strengthening oversight and accountability measures within 
the criminal justice system: 
There are a lot of complaints that cases are brought to the police station and they  
charge money or else they will not. All of those have to be stopped. We need  
strong disciplinary measures against police officers that fail to abide by the law. 
Participant 013 recommended that “people working there must be honest; must be 
credible; and they must be professional. If we can get a high level of professional people, that 





Pay attention to the recipients of criminal justice services. Participant 024 indicated 
that too much attention was paid to criminal justice service providers to the neglect of recipients 
of criminal justice services, a situation this Participant recommends must change:  
I also think that our focus was so much on the providers of the service rather than the 
recipients of the service. … there was very little focus on their responsibilities as the 
police, as the judiciary, as the prosecution and much more focus on what their needs 
were. And I think that the international community facilitated that thinking and also 
encouraged competition between the different institutions of the criminal justice system 
rather than a communal responsibility. 
Participant 021 called for deliberate actions to build public confidence in the criminal justice 
system:  
Over the years, one of our serious conflict factors that led to the war was the weak and 
dysfunctional justice system. So, citizens didn’t have trust in the system. They saw it to 
be corrupt. They thought the system was also expensive to engage. And then there was 
this common saying that there is no justice for the poor. So, unless you have money you 
cannot have justice. So, there is not much confidence in the formal justice system. They 
prefer the informal justice system. In fact, there is a survey … that alone indicates that the 
population has more trust in the informal justice system. They prefer to go to the chiefs 
and the community leaders for justice. 
 Participant 025 recommended that the focus in the decentralization process should be on 
services rather than infrastructure “… in terms of the immediate impact of the 5 hubs, … the 





Participant 020 also recommended the adoption of a conflict sensitive approach to law 
enforcement: 
… I spoke about a conflict sensitive oriented approach to law enforcement ... You  
know elections the world over there are serious challenges. Even in Liberia, the  
international community was seriously concerned that our first election was going  
to be handled solely by the Liberia police. And we didn’t have time to theorize the  
whole concept, but we applied it and it worked. So, if this concept can now be  
theorized and officers can relate to it, I honestly believe that we can see a 100%  
delivery of criminal justice services as relates to law enforcement. 
Participant 023 recommended the introduction of a paralegal scheme in Liberia: 
I have visited for example, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa; one of the  
things that they have done is to empower the criminal justice sector such as using  
paralegals. For me, they stand as a bridge between the population and  
decentralizing the criminal justice system. Because in Liberia right now, we still  
have a challenge of formally recognizing paralegals. We are still pushing this, and  
we hope that it will come... Because lawyers are assuming that if you were to give  
a go ahead to, or license paralegals …; … lawyers are going to be out of job  
because cases are not going to come up for prosecution and paralegals will be  
assumed as lawyers. … So, we are still trying to persuade them. 
Participant 024 also recommended the establishment a paralegal program in Liberia:  
I think one of the principal things is the paralegal systems that have been used or  
established effectively in other parts of Africa but also specifically within West  





improving people’s access to the justice system and understanding of the justice  
system. I think there is obvious resistance to that in Liberia. But nevertheless, I do  
think that there is something that could be learned from that, there are similar  
problems across all of those systems and across other countries as well where  
there aren’t enough lawyers. You just don’t have enough in the formal system to  
process the kind of people that are coming into the system. And therefore, you  
need to go out. And I think there are some really interesting approaches in other  
places (e.g., Sierra Leone, Nigeria) … Liberia has got absolutely no real  
justification for refusing to take this stuff forward. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 In Chapter 4, I presented the data collected and the findings from 30 interviews 
conducted for this study. Through the interviews, participants shared their views on the 
approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system, the extent to which national 
ownership principles were upheld in the decentralization process, and how decentralization has 
affected the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system and Liberia’s peace and stability. 
Participants also made recommendations on what international actors supporting the 
decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system could do to ensure national ownership of the 
decentralization process. As previously noted, 7 themes and 25 subthemes connected to this 
study’s research questions and the relevant literature were identified. Overall, participants 
pointed out that actors supporting the decentralization process were both national and 
international. National actors included the Government of Liberia, civil society organizations and 
local communities. The international actors included the United Nations, the African Union, the 





States of America. Whereas participants acknowledged the role of ordinary Liberians and their 
Government, they believed the process was elite and foreign driven with local communities 
being informed rather than consulted on the process. Participants observed the lack of national 
ownership of the process and the challenges of sustaining the process after international support 
has ended had affected the outcome of the process to make criminal justice services accessible 
across Liberia. Participants were also critical about the neglect of the traditional justice system, 
which is the main source of justice for ordinary citizens particularly those residing outside the 
major cities.  In Chapter 5, I discuss the results of this study, draw conclusions, highlight the 





Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
“… building state institutions and structures, without … paying attention to developing 
relations between the state and its people, will not … benefit peacebuilding in the long 
term …” (Gordon, 2014, p. 126). 
 
Introduction 
My purpose in this grounded theory qualitative case study was to identify the 
approaches used in decentralizing criminal justice services in Liberia to determine how 
inclusive and nationally owned the decision making and implementation of the 
decentralization processes were. I also ascertained whether decision makers were 
cognizant of Liberia’s peculiar context (e.g., history, social structure, actors, resources, 
and legal framework) in deciding the approaches to be used to decentralize the criminal 
justice system. I also investigated the influence, if any, of decentralization on the 
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system and her peace and stability as well as 
identified homegrown and tailored recommendations to enhance access to Liberia’s 
criminal justice system. Further I was interested in knowing participants views on how 
international actors could support nationally owned and inclusive processes to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system as well as how decentralization of the 
criminal justice system had affected the way the system functions and Liberia’s peace 







The following Research Questions were answered in this study:  
RQ1. What approaches have been used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice 
system between 2011 and 2017? 
RQ2. How nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize 
Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017? 
RQ2.1. How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive 
processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system?  
RQ3. How has decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system affected the 
system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability?  
RQ3.1. How can the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system be 
improved?  
A semi structured interview guide was used for data collection to answer the 
Research Questions. Seven themes and 25 subthemes connected to this study’s research 
questions and the related literature were identified. 
  In this chapter, I discuss this study’s Research Questions, draw conclusions, 
highlight the implications of the findings for social change, and make recommendations. 
 
Interpretation of the Findings 
 
 Participants in this study identified the approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s 




whether the processes adopted were nationally owned and inclusive. They also shared 
their views and on the effects of decentralization of the criminal justice system on the 
system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability. Participants made 
recommendations on how the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system can be 
enhanced with homegrown solutions and interventions that are tailored to suit the 
Liberian context.  
 In the following section, I discuss and interpret this study’s findings. To facilitate 
this, the finding(s) for each Research Question is/are summarized in separated Tables 
which are presented under each Research Question.  
RQ1: What Approaches have been used to Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal Justice 
System between 2011 and 2017? 
Participants identified 4 broad approaches to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system. They are; building/forging partnerships, undertaking law and policy 













Findings - Research Question 1 
Research Questions Findings 
RQ 1: What approaches were used 
to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system between 2011 and 
2017? 
i. Institutional reform and development 
ii. Infrastructure development, including the Justice 
and Security hubs 
iii. Forging partnerships 
iv. Law and policy development and reform 
 
Forging partnerships 
  Seven participants, including Participants 006 and 013, indicated that several 
actors were involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system and that these 
actors partnered the criminal justice chain (i.e., the police, judiciary, and 
corrections/prisons) to provide criminal justice services across Liberia. According to 
Participant 006, “… in all we were looking at a partnered approach and strengthening the 
criminal justice system.” Thought situated in another context or society, this finding is 
supported by authors such as Gibbs and Ahlin (2013); Kasali and Odetola (2016); and 
Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy, and Endziņš (2017), who asserted that governments are 
increasingly recognizing the fact that they cannot monopolize security, hence are 
collaborating with local communities to deliver security. For instance, Tumalavičius et al. 




contributed to making the society safe. Lippman (2014) encouraged collaboration 
between the bench and the bar as one way of promoting access to justice. 
Participants identified a partnership between the Liberia National Police and 
members of the community. They referred to this partnership as community policing 
initiatives. Community policing is an intervention that is often used in postconflict and 
other settings to enhance security. For instance, community policing was used in Sierra 
Leone to decentralize security structures (Bangura, 2018), it has also been used in Liberia 
(Bacon, 2015), South Africa (Super, 2014), Nigeria (Kasali & Odetola, 2016), Lithuanian 
(Tumalavičius et al., 2017), and in the United States (Bent-Goodley & Smith, 2017). 
According to Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus, (2016) it is an approach to policing that 
citizens can easily evaluate. The context in which community policing programs are to be 
implemented by be considered in their conceptualization and implementation (Bent-
Goodley & Smith, 2017).  
Participant 013 indicated that there were partnerships with Liberia’s integrity 
institutions such as the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission, the General Auditing 
Commission, and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights, as well as 
other public institutions such as the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Financial 
Intelligence Unit. Arguably, these partnerships may qualify, to an extent, to be described 
as third-party policing because they contribute to making the criminal justice system 
accessible. Mazerolle (2014) identifies third party policing as an approach that can be 




According to Mazerolle and Ransley (2005), third party policing involves a 
partnership between the police and an external entity (i.e., the third party), in which the 
legal powers of the third party, which may ordinarily not be available to the police, are 
used to prevent or control crime. There is a shift from encouraging policing models to 
establish third party policing relationships to making such relationships a requirement in 
policing models (Mazerolle, 2014). Though used to a lesser degree, in Liberia, the 
partnerships between the police and integrity institutions like the Liberia Anti-Corruption 
Commission could contribute to making criminal justice services accessible. This is 
because it increases the number of institutions or forums through which criminal justice 
services can be accessed or provided hence potentially increasing the chances of citizens 
receiving criminal justice services.  
Ubink and Weeks (2017) asserted that customary justice systems are effective 
mechanisms for enhancing access to justice in rural communities in Africa because they 
are accessible, cheaper, use fewer formal procedures and speak languages that the local 
community speak and understand. Dandurand (2014) advocates for increasing the use of 
mediation as a dispute resolution approach. Though mediation is not synonymous to 
using customary justice mechanisms in dispute resolution, mediation is one of the 
processes used by the customary justice system in resolving disputes. Despite the 
prominent role the traditional justice system has in the lives of Liberians, particularly in 
the rural areas, no participant identified using the customary justice system as an 




I am of the view that this is an opportunity for a partnership between the 
traditional and statutory justice systems, an opportunity that has been missed in Liberia.  
Most participants criticized the non-involvement and/or consultation of traditional leaders 
in the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. Inherent in this criticism, 
is an acknowledgment of the role and place of the customary justice system in Liberia. 
The reason being that traditional leaders are charged with administering justice in that 
system of justice. Not mentioning the use of the customary justice system as an approach 
to make the criminal justice system accessible, confirms the fact that little or no attention 
was paid to the customary justice system’s role in access to justice in Liberia and/or that, 
even when it was considered, it was seen as a system which should not handle serious 
criminal matters. It also highlights the elite and Monrovia-centric nature of the 
decentralization process. Some participants confirm this assertion. For instance, 
Participant 004 indicated that “it (i.e., the customary justice system) wasn’t given enough 
attention, and it reflected the reality of the state of Liberia; that there is discrimination 
against the rest of Liberia, and everything is in favor of Monrovia”. Participant 005 also 
indicated that “I don’t think very much consideration was made because of the traditional 
justice system. I think partly due to the elite’s dislike of it. The impression I got … from 
many Liberians … about the customary justice was embarrassment”.  
In the words of Participant 027: 
… we realized that the advancement of the criminal justice system was happening  
in tension. There was a lot of tension with the traditional justice system, with the  




court, there were conflicts over jurisdiction. Traditional leaders were saying no,  
this is a matter to be determined by the Chief, this is a matter to be determined by  
the high priest and this is not a matter for the Monrovia court. … the criminal  
justice system is encroaching on major territory that for a long time has been  
occupied by the traditional elders, by high priests and where the customary  
system of the Liberian tradition has been the prerogative or has been presumed to  
have the prerogative to handle the matter (i.e., matters that are now coming under  
the jurisdiction of the formal system). So, there is a lot of tension; a lack of  
understanding from the part of the traditional leaders in terms of where does their  
authority end? And where does the court begin? … That is a major problem. 
 
The disinterest in making the customary justice system a forum for seeking justice 
in Liberia is confirmed by Bamidele (2017) who indicated that harmonizing Liberia’s 
statutory and traditional justice systems was identified in the National Plan of Action for 
Gender Based Violence as one way to enhance access to justice particularly for women. 
However, the researcher observed that this was yet to be done. Participant 008 explained, 
in the following statement, why attention was not given to the traditional justice system: 
… cultural practices are different. And even in any political subdivision, you may  
find different cultural practices and traditional values. … The criminal justice  
system has standard rules. It is not influenced by cultural and traditional practices.  
So, if it is access to justice; if it is investigating crime, charging a crime,  




those things are standard as you go around the country. The real challenge  
remains the impact of the traditional and cultural practices on the formal criminal  
justice system. So, if you were in Grand Kru and someone is arrested for rape and  
the people who are resident there don’t consider rape as a major crime, and they  
want you to release the person, even when the law says the person is not  
entitled to bail; …. Now if you go to another county, maybe for them, rape is  
treated as a major thing that they cannot tolerate. … In some counties for instance,  
they may want to do Sayyewood (i.e., Trial by Ordeal) to make you confess  
judgement. But should we use that as a basis now? Now that we have a unitary  
government; we have a justice system and we want to be homogenous.  
In rationalizing the reasons for the lack of attention being paid to the customary 
justice system to make the criminal justice system accessible, Participant 008 cited the 
human rights violations that occur in the customary justice system’s processes. This is 
acknowledged by Ubink and Weeks (2017) who identified violations such as the absence 
of legal representation. To address this, Ubink and Weeks (2017) advocated for effective 
oversight over the customary justice system and the need to subject customary justice 
systems to the constitution and other fundamental human rights norms and standards. As 
Ubink and Weeks (2017) pointed out themselves, implementing this recommendation 
may result in the customary justice system being formalized, hence losing its 
peculiarities. However, there is almost no other option in any modern democratic state. 
The fact that human rights violations occur in the customary justice processes is not a 




access to justice services, particularly in postconflict settings. After all, serious human 
rights violations also occur in formal criminal justice systems and are even worse in 
postconflict settings where there are other challenges that make the occurrence of such 
violations the norm. These violations include detaining suspects for prolonged periods, 
processes being affected by weak institutions, inadequate human resources and 
corruption. However, these violations in the formal criminal justice system have not 
formed the basis for not working with the criminal justice system to reform it and make it 
accessible. What has always been done is to work at improving the criminal justice 
system and making it human rights compliant. In any case, I think that involving the 
traditional justice system in making criminal justice services accessible has the potential 
of reforming the traditional justice system and making it a human rights complaint over 
time. Like the case in the formal justice system, it is only in actively using the customary 
justice system to dispense justice that the system evolves and improves. However, care 
should be taken not to steer the evolution process in a direction that results in the 
customary justice system losing its identity.  
A distinction has to be drawn between human rights violations perpetrated by the 
traditional justice system and the contempt that some people have for the customary 
justice system as a system or source of justice. Such a distinction will result in the 
customary justice system not being neglected as a partner in enhancing access to justice 
or relegating it to the background, as appears to be the case in Liberia. It is also important 
that challenges associated with using the customary justice system as a source of, or 




system of justice, to cover their real intentions. In postconflict societies, a refusal or 
failure to use the customary justice system as an avenue for seeking justice results in a 
violation of the right of the citizenry to justice. This is because of the inadequate 
capabilities of the formal justice system in postconflict settings. Indeed, Bacon (2015) 
observed that to get Liberia’s customary justice system to uphold human rights, some 
unintended consequences occurred (i.e., prohibiting the customary justice system from 
assuming jurisdiction over certain categories of cases resulted in no justice for victims of 
those cases because the formal justice system is inaccessible in certain locations). These 
claims are shared by Participant 024 who claimed that: 
 I don’t think that we were looking at the environment in which they were  
working. And because we weren’t looking at that environment, we didn’t pay  
attention to the customary justice system. … we were also somehow undermining  
it in other ways by saying you shouldn’t go to the customary justice system for X,  
Y and Z cases/subject matter (i.e., you should go and use the formal justice  
system for X, Y and Z cases/subject matter). Even though we knew that even in  
those situations, the formal system was failing. So, I think that we perhaps failed  
on more than one account in terms of paying attention to the customary justice  
system. 
To deal with possible human rights violations perpetrated by the customary 
justice system, Malawian traditional courts deal with a limited number of civil cases and 
the formal courts deal with criminal cases and certain civil cases (Ubink & Weeks, 2017).  




appeal in the formal courts (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). South Africa has adopted a similar 
approach where customary courts deal with civil cases and minor criminal offences 
(Ubink & Weeks, 2017). Determining these jurisdictional issues are highly political and 
contentious discussions, as well as sovereign decisions that must be informed by the 
history and culture of the context (Ubink & Weeks, 2017).  
In addition to the possible human rights violations that are associated with having 
a pluralistic justice system, it is important to highlight some consequences that have 
occurred in other postconflict societies and may also occur in Liberia if the customary 
justice system is actively engaged to deliver justice. For instance, Jackson (2013) claims 
that coexistence between the statutory and traditional justice systems at the local level 
reinforces the power dynamics at that level, entrenches the position of the local elite and 
deprives the nonelite of having access to justice.  
Law and policy development and reform 
  Participants indicated that law and policy development and reform is another 
approach used to decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. According to 
participants, legislation was amended and or enacted and policies were formulated with 
the objective of making the criminal justice system accessible. Issues addressed through 
law and policy reform include legal aid; a public defense program; legal frameworks for 
the national police, immigration service and drug enforcement agency; and reform of the 
jury system. These initiatives are reflected in the following statements from participants: 
Participant 008 indicated that “there were laws made … to address some of the 




violence …”. Participant 013 also stated that “a new Police Act, Immigration Act, the 
National Security Reform and Intelligence Act, a new Drug Enforcement Agency Law 
…” were enacted. Participants 009 and 011 respectively indicated that: “… we had the 
jury law passed” and “… the jury management system was also decentralized”. 
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) confirm that, in Liberia, policy and law reform were 
undertaken to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible. According to these 
researchers, a considerable amount of time was spent to develop plans, policies, 
legislation and projects to set the stage for decentralization in Liberia. It is obvious that 
important pieces of legislation were enacted to make criminal justice services accessible. 
What is unclear is the impact of this legislative reform. This may become clearer in 
discussing other research questions.  
Infrastructure development 
The third approach was identified by 10 participants including Participants 001, 
004, 005 and 012. It is infrastructure development. These participants identified 
providing infrastructure as an approach that was used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system. The following statements capture some Participants’ perspectives: 
Participant 001 said the following about the approach to develop infrastructure: “… 
improving infrastructure, particularly in areas where the corrections system was 
nonexistent…”. Participant 004 indicated that infrastructure support to make criminal 
justice services accessible included providing “an office, a telephone, transport, in a few 
cases even accommodation …”. Participant 005 noted that “one of the big changes was 




Project funding”. Participant 011 stated that “… go around the country, there are facilities 
in the localities” and Participant 012 noted that “… police stations were built in the 
counties; there had been infrastructure in the counties, but primarily in the county 
capitals”.  
Justice and security hubs 
 The Justice and Security Hubs project was a major intervention used to 
decentralize criminal justice services in Liberia. This intervention was touched on by 
almost all Participants, it straddled infrastructure and institutional reform and 
development. According to Participant 024: 
… the Justice and Security hubs was an initiative from a Joint Program which  
started in 2011 coming out of Liberia’s Priority Peacebuilding Plan, which was  
putting a focus on decentralization of services or provision of services at the local  
level. And a large degree of funding, comparatively speaking, in terms of making  
funds available in Liberia at that time … was coming in from the Peacebuilding  
Fund, which was put specifically to support decentralization in terms of criminal  
justice … in addition to the various actors and infrastructure that I was talking  
about (i.e., things like the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit), which  
was a centralized office working in Monrovia for a number of years initially, was  
also extended to … certain counties to provide some support for survivors of  
SGBV. 
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) confirm the finding that infrastructure was 




system. The authors observed that decentralization in Liberia has focused on 
“rudimentary activities” (p. 372) like rebuilding infrastructure at the county level. 
Inadequate infrastructure for the criminal justice sector is not exclusive to postconflict 
societies. For example, the Government of Brazil decided to construct prisons to deal 
with overcrowding in Brazil’s prisons (Silvestre, 2016). Silvestre (2016) however 
concluded that in Brazil, the increase in the number of prisons did not successfully 
address the challenge of overcrowding in prisons. I made a similar finding in this study 
regarding Liberia. This is because Participants pointed out that new prison infrastructure 
did not limit overcrowding, citing this as an indicator of a dysfunctional criminal justice 
system. Whereas participants mentioned that infrastructure was built, it is important to 
use what existed after the war as the baseline (i.e., this should form the reference point 
and be an indicator of how much infrastructure was built in Liberia and whether the new 
infrastructure is capable of significantly improving access to justice in Liberia). This 
reality and Silvestre (2016) findings that in Brazil the increase in the number of prisons 
did not address the issue of overcrowding in prisons confirm the fact that improving 
infrastructure alone does not address challenges hindering the quest to enhance access to 
justice. There must be a combined approach (i.e., a holistic approach) to enhance access 
to justice in Liberia and other contexts.  
The hubs project is a unique intervention because it departed from building small 
scale infrastructure in communities across Liberia. As previously noted, the hub project 
adopted a regional approach in which Liberia was divided into 5 regions and large scale 




further away from the recipients of criminal justice services, this project was the biggest 
effort to expand criminal justice services outside Monrovia. This project had very 
laudable intentions, but it suffered implementation challenges leading to its modification 
after the pilot phase in Gbarnga and its eventual abandonment. Participants shared the 
following opinions about the hub project: Participant 022 stated that “… the hubs 
approach has come to a standstill. Originally, the idea was 5 hubs. But after the Gbarnga 
hub, after the investments were made … I think that the hub concept came to a standstill. 
But the decentralization itself continued”. According to Participant 008:  
the Gbarnga project would have been the forerunner to all the other areas. First,  
there was an implementation problem in terms of the construction itself. And so,  
it did not proceed as originally planned. There was a delay in its completion.  
And it consumed a lot more money than it was originally intended. And because  
of that, it did have an impact on the construction of the hubs in the other areas. 
Participant 005 indicated that: 
I think the most important thing, the elephant in the room, was the decision to use 
Peacebuilding Fund money to finance the hubs and construct hubs in the regions. 
… where they completely ignored the fact that the system runs on a county basis. 
Participant 021 stated that: 
the justice and security regional hub; initially the plan was to have 5 in place. …  
But unfortunately, in the middle of implementation, the infrastructure aspect was  
not taken forward because the lesson learnt from the first construction took longer  




Peacebuilding Commission Chair) spoke with the government and government  
bought into the idea and saw the need to prioritize service provision rather than  
the physical infrastructure. So currently we have not had infrastructure in all areas  
except for Bong County. 
On the hub project, Participant 008 indicated that; “I think we have passed that stage 
now”.  
The reviews of the hub project questioned the judgement of the decision makers 
at the time. The quest to decentralize the criminal justice system outside Monrovia is not 
the source of concern raised by participants, it is the approach (i.e. dividing the country 
into regions, contrary to the structure of the state). The other concern is putting up large 
scale infrastructure and in locations which, though compared to Monrovia was closer to 
the recipients of criminal justice services, but practically and in most cases inaccessible 
by the population due to poor road networks and the long distances that ordinary citizens 
have to travel, sometimes on foot to access services.  
Below, in Figure 5, is a map of Liberia with the location of the Gbarnga hub and 
the proposed locations of the 4 other hubs. The Gbarnga hub was to service three counties 
Bong, Nimba and Lofa. The map provides an opportunity to appreciate the distance that 
litigants and criminal justice actors had to travel to access justice or provide justice from 
the Gbarnga hub. The impact of the heavy rains on the criminal justice system’s 
operations and the fact that ordinary citizens have to travel on foot for long distances to 
access criminal justice services is confirmed by Bacon (2015). These Liberian challenges 




it is practically impossible to decentralize an overly centralized criminal justice system 
immediately to the community level. It required time and other resources that were not 
readily available. Therefore, it is unfair to entirely blame decision makers for their 
decision to decentralize through the hub project. However, with hindsight, a combination 
of having criminal justice services and relatively small scale infrastructure sited on a 
regional basis close to the population to deal with the challenges already identified, like 
heavy rains and bad roads, would have been a preferable approach. This may have been 
resource heavy but would have had a greater positive impact. Priority could have been 
given to locations that were affected most by the challenges of access to the criminal 










Institutional reform and development 
 This is the fourth approach that I found to have been used to make Liberia’s 
criminal justice services accessible. Under this approach, institutions are revived, 
reformed and in some cases, established.  
Participants identified interventions that were undertaken to develop Liberia’s 
criminal justice institutions. One of them is human resources development (i.e., training, 
mentoring and capacity building/development). According to Participant 001 “capacity 
building was undertaken for the systems to become functional.” According to Participant 
003, “training was an approach to develop criminal justice institutions”. Participant 004 
mentioned “training of judges, training of lay persons as magistrates, … training of police 
officers, the training of correction officers, ….” Participant 013 indicated that 
“the Judicial Training Institute is also training magistrates that is also helping to increase 
the number of judges, magistrates and defense attorneys.” Participant 014 stated that 
“there has been police training, ... The law school is training more lawyers.” According to 
Participant 016: 
… they were recruiting a lot of qualified lawyers to enter the justice system. All  
the County Attorneys in the country except for the county of Montserrado were  
non law school graduates while the law required that you needed to be a law  
graduate before you can practice law in Liberia.  
This Participant also stated that “... moves were followed by the Judiciary where they 




in the counties.” Participant 008 observed that “… the problem within these kinds of 
institutions is staffing. So, we had to go in and look at appointments, the issue of tenure 
….”  
Participants also identified the creation of new offices/institutions within the 
criminal justice system as a category of interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system. According to Participant 013, “… for the police, we have the Women and 
Children Protection Section which has been decentralized. We also have the Professional 
Standards Division for complaints which has been also decentralized.” Participant 009 
stated that “the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit … works with Criminal 
Court E to ensure the prosecution of sexual violence everywhere. … before the war, it 
was mostly done in magisterial courts. … .” 
Institutional reform is an endeavor that receives a lot of attention in criminal 
justice system reform, particularly in postconflict settings where systems and institutions 
have broken down and qualified human resources are either inadequate or non-existent. 
Fyanka (2014) observed that, as part of efforts to reform Liberia’s police, additional 
police officers were recruited, trained and deployed outside the capital, although with 
almost no resources to work. Schroeder and Chappuis (2014) stressed the point that 
security sector reform takes various forms including strengthening oversight of the 
security sector and professionalizing institutions within the sector. Gribanova and 
Vulfovich (2017) highlighted the importance of designing policies that are geared 
towards creating safe, inclusive and just cities. Addressing the prevalence of gender and 




criminal justice institutions. According to Bacon (2015), in Liberia, interventions to 
reform the criminal justice system and make it accessible included establishing a 
specialized court, with jurisdiction across the entire country, to try sexual and gender 
violence cases and the decision to establish units of the Women and Children Protection 
Section across Liberia. The researcher also noted the establishment of the Sexual and 
Gender Based Violence Unit, a specialized prosecution unit, dedicated to prosecuting 
sexual and gender related cases. Bacon (2015) also found that between February 2009, 
when Liberia’s specialized court was established to try sexual and gender-based violence 
related cases, and July 2011, only 34 out of the 200 cases reported had been prosecuted. 
Bacon (2015) further noted that out of the cases prosecuted, only 16 convictions were 
secured (i.e., 50% conviction rate). This conviction rate could arguably be seen as 
positive for persons using the rate of conviction as an indicator. However, prosecuting 34 
out of 200 cases is discouraging given the number of interventions put in place and the 
amount of resources committed to deal with sexual and gender-based violence related 
cases. In any case the criminal justice system is not in place only to convict, hence using 
the conviction rate as an indicator of success is flawed, inappropriate and misleading.  
 Establishing County and District Security Councils is one institutional 
arrangement to provide an avenue for members of the local community to discuss and 
find local solutions to security challenges confronting them in their communities. These 
councils serve as early warning mechanisms and provide an opportunity for ordinary 
citizens to participate in the governance process. According to participants, the councils 




opportunity to participate in decision-making to have a say in their affairs. Participant 
007 stated that “… County and District Security Councils were set up … to get the local 
people involved.” Participant 006 indicated that:  
One of the other strategies was to have a localized approach to improving 
responses and information exchange around what was happening. So, the County 
and District Security Councils were established. … with representatives of 
typically the security agencies, which also had representatives from the broader 
criminal justice system coming together and … tried to have a better 
understanding of what crime and security in the counties were like; trends that 
were recurring and perhaps looking at what best responses were required ...  
Participant 011 also mentioned that “the establishment of the County and District 
Security Councils actually came out of the consultation. That was part of the efforts 
aimed at inclusiveness”. Participant 013 stated that:  
… the feedback that we are getting is that that initiative is well placed. Because  
disputes that have created frictions in years are being resolved as a result of the  
County and District Security Councils bringing the people together. And areas  
where the conflict will erupt … and create insecurity, they are able to resolve it. 
Participant 013 also stated that: 
… the National Security Reform and Intelligence Act … talked about creating  
County and District Security Councils. … . When there are issues and the Council  
meet, and a justice institution is supposed to take that up, they are then mandated  




overcrowding of the corrections, the issue is brought up … 
Liberia’s County and District Councils are akin to community safety mechanisms.  
According to Gordon (2014), community safety mechanisms are an approach 
towards security and justice sector reform. Various jurisdictions label these mechanisms 
differently. Bastick and Whitman (2013) found that in Sierra Leone and Haiti, they are 
known as local security committees. Using community safety mechanisms could promote 
inclusion and address the challenges associated with the top bottom approach which 
characterizes donor led security sector reform interventions (Gordon, 2014 & Homel & 
Masson, 2016). It also contributes to increasing the chances of such interventions being 
sustainable, it promotes efficient, transparent, effective and accountable security sector 
institutions and improves the relationship between the government and the governed 
(Gordon, 2014). Gribanova and Vulfovich (2017) asserted that the proximity of city 
authorities to citizens and their familiarity with the local context put city authorities in a 
better position to develop solutions for crime prevention. Accordingly, crime prevention 
policies must adopt a decentralization approach, principally because they require 
proximity of actors for implementation (Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017). The fact that the 
County and District Security Councils promoted peace in Liberia supports Arnusch 
(2010) assertion that not incorporating persons at the community level into security sector 
reform processes, in Liberia, could turn potential champions of security sector processes 
into spoilers (Gordon, 2014). Arnusch (2010) also claimed that in Liberia, community 
safety mechanisms which had filled the void in the absence of state justice and security 




security sectors (Gordon, 2014). Though I found that the participation of local 
communities and actors in Liberia’s criminal justice decentralization  
process left much to be desired, there was no evidence, in this study, of Arnusch (2010) 
assertion. It is obvious that the community safety mechanisms referred to by Arnusch 
(2010) were not creatures of legislation (i.e., they were created by communities and not 
the state). This does not negate the veracity of Arnusch (2010) claim because my study 
was conducted almost a decade after the Arnusch (2010) research. The reason being, the 
National Security Reform and Intelligence Act, established the security councils, was 
enacted in 2011 i.e., a year after Arnusch (2010) was published. I will argue that, the fact 
that Liberia eventually formally establish the County and District Security Councils as a 
community safety mechanism, affirmed Arnusch (2010) assertion about the merits of 
having them as part of security sector, and by extension, justice sector, reform in 
postconflict societies.  
Despite the positive case made for using community safety mechanisms, the 
literature highlights several limitations and cautions their use. They include the concern 
that incorporating community safety structures into security sector reform programming 
may institutionalize community structures and this may lead to the structures losing their 
essence and character. This is because the wide range of community concerns that these 
structures are designed to address risk being securitized (Gordon, 2014). Secondly, the 
bottom up approach to security sector reform that is associated with engaging community 
safety structures to security sector reform programming may result in these structures 




establishing them (Gordon, 2014). Donais (2008) also indicated that when community 
structures are incorporated into security sector programming, donor support for operating 
the structures may undermine the quest for local ownership of the activities of these 
structures and negate the reason for establishing them (Gordon, 2014). Also, Donais and 
Knorr (2013) citing Campbell (2011) stressed the point that the power differentials 
between community actors and those at the state/national level may result in a co-
optation of the community (Gordon, 2014).  
The aforementioned limitations, though valid, appear to focus on community 
safety mechanisms that are not sanctioned by the government or are a result of 
arrangements at the local level. The membership of Liberia’s security councils is a 
mixture of state and nonstate actors but tilted towards state actors. This suggests a 
combination of a top bottom and bottom up approach to security sector reform.  
In this regard, though the composition of Liberia’s community safety mechanism 
gives a character of a hybrid (i.e., state and community structure) the said limitations and 
caution are relevant and need to be kept in mind by stakeholders as they have the 
potential of influencing the process in Liberia.  
RQ 2: How Nationally Owned and Inclusive was the Decentralization Process of 
Liberia’s Criminal Justice System between 2011 and 2017? 
The second research question gauged participants perception of the extent to 
which in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system, national and local ownership 
principles were upheld. Participants expressed mixed views, leading to my finding, 




justice system was driven by both national and international influences the international 
influence was stronger. 
Table 11 
Findings - Research Question 2 
 
Research Questions  Findings 
RQ 2: How nationally owned and 
inclusive was the process to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system between 2011 and 
2017? 
Process to decentralize the criminal justice system 
was a combination of national and international 





Participants answered a number of interview questions to aid me answer this 
research question. For instance, participants were asked to identify the actors involved in 
the process of decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system.  
They identified the following actors: Western and developed countries like 
Australia, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States 
of America. For instance, Participant 005 mentioned Sweden and the United States of 
America and Participant 007 identified Germany, Japan and China. In some cases, these 
countries supported the process through their development cooperation agencies such as 




(SIDA) and Irish AID. Some African countries like Ghana and Nigeria also supported the 
process. Another category of actors that participants identified are supranational or 
intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and its agencies, funds and 
programs, the European Union, the African Union and the Economic Community of West 
African States. Participants also mentioned international nongovernmental organizations 
such as the National Democratic Institute, The Carter Centre, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross and the Norwegian Refugee Council. Local nongovernmental and civil 
society organizations including Prison Fellowship Liberia, the Liberia National Bar 
Association, Liberia National Law Enforcement Association, the Catholic Justice and Peace 
Commission, Prison Watch and the Trial Judges Association were also identified. 
 From the list of actors mentioned, it is evident that Liberians, Western/developed 
countries, neoliberal institutions, developing countries, nonstate actors (including local 
nongovernmental organizations) were involved in the process of making criminal justice 
services accessible across Liberia. Few participants mentioned local communities and 
nongovernmental organizations as actors in the process. Indeed, Participant 024 described 
the involvement of local communities and nongovernmental organizations as “… few and 
far between”. The noninvolvement of citizens and local civil society organizations in the 
decentralization process reflects on the neglect/refusal and unwillingness of drivers of the 
process to engage with Liberia’s and local communities/organizations as opposed to an 
inability and/or unwillingness of ordinary citizens and local organizations to participate in 




organizations in the decentralization process is a determinant of how nationally owned and 
inclusive the process was. This will be examined in the ensuing discussions. 
Involvement of civil society, local organizations and traditional leaders 
Participants assigned multiple reasons for involving civil society and local 
organizations in the decentralization process. Six Participants including Participants 015, 
019, 021, 025 and 029 indicated that they were involved to promote oversight and 
accountability over the criminal justice system and the decentralization process. For 
instance, Participant  015 stated that, “… civil society has been involved, by raising 
concerns in respect of law violations; giving reminders as to what should be done; ... 
Making contributions with respect to how the restructuring should be done ...” Participant  
019 stated that: “… the way Liberia is … and also because of the government's bureaucracy 
and corruption, at the end of the day, it seems the only option to really get to the people is 
really through the CSOs.” Cubitt (2013) supports the finding that involving civil society in 
the process was to enhance oversight of the process and the criminal justice system. 
According to Cubitt (2013) involving civil society in interventions to reform the justice and 
security sectors serves as a check on possible abuses of power by the state and its agents 
(Gordon, 2014).  
The second that 4 Participants including Participants 005 and 013 gave for 
involving local communities and organizations is to provide criminal justice services. In 
this regard, Participant 005 stated that “we did have NGOs being there in terms of service 
provision. You have had a number of NGOs over the years in partnership with UN 




system.” According to Participant 013, “… you know, the Government cannot provide 
for the entire country and so civil society  
players are there to support Government’s efforts.” Bacon (2015) supports the finding 
that local nongovernmental organizations and by extension citizens were involved in 
providing criminal justice services. Bacon (2015) found that, in Liberia, only 2% of cases 
go to the formal justice system to seek justice while 45% of cases are resolved through 
the customary justice system. Isser et al, supported this assertion by stating that in 
Liberia, only 50% of sexual-related offenses are reported, out of which 28% are reported 
to informal settings (e.g., family heads, traditional leaders, elders and secret societies). 
Also, Denney (2014) asserts that in the developing world, nonstate actors play a 
prominent role in the lives of citizens because they are accessible, relatively less 
expensive in their charges and able to deliver the “locally valued currency of justice” (p. 
254). Denney (2014) cited Albrecht and Kyed (2011) who asserted that “80 per cent of 
disputes in the global South are resolved by nonstate means” (p. 253). In Sierra Leone, 
traditional chiefs are responsible for providing justice and security services to over 80% 
of Sierra Leoneans and 85% of crimes and conflicts in Sierra Leone are first reported to 
traditional authorities (Jackson, 2013 & Denney, 2014).  
The third reason, that 11 participants, including Participants 007, 008, 009, 012, 
014 and 016, provided for the involvement of local organizations and communities is to 
promote national ownership and inclusiveness. Nonstate actors play an important role in 
the criminal justice system in postconflict settings, hence they cannot be ignored from 




the following views in support of this assertion: Participant 014 stated that “… there has 
always been some portion of civil society involvement. Sometimes, civil society 
organizations are invited. Whenever they have the criminal justice conference, civil 
society is invited.” Participant 016 asserted that “they  
(CSOs) have not been scouted for. I think that they see a need and they try to help.” For 
Participant 009, “civil society organizations are invited because they represent the 
ordinary people.”  
There is evidence from the literature that supports the fact that the quest to 
promote national ownership and inclusiveness leads to involving local and civil society 
organizations. For instance, Nathan (2007) asserted that international efforts to reform 
the justice and security sectors must engage local actors as this will increase the chances 
of local actors not resenting the reforms and will sustain the interventions after 
international development assistance has ceased to flow (Gordon, 2014). The United 
Nations (2008) advocates that national ownership should involve “nationally led and 
inclusive processes in which national and local authorities, parliaments and civil society, 
including traditional leaders, women’s groups and others, are actively engaged” 
(Gordon, 2014, p. 128).  
According to 6 participants, including Participants 009, 018, 019 and 021, 
nongovernmental agencies, individuals, local communities and civil society groups were 
involved in decentralizing the criminal justice system to promote public outreach and 
awareness. In connection with this, Participant 019 stated that “We worked through 




009 stated that “there were civil society organizations involved in outreach especially 
when it comes to that, it was people like Carter Centre, Prison Fellowship, and national 
and international NGOs.” According to Participant 018 “… we worked more on 
awareness; making people aware of their rights in order for them to be able to exercise 
them and to ensure enforcement because when you are not aware you have these rights, 
exercising them will be difficult.” Homel and Masson (2016), van Tongeren (2013) and 
Whitman (2013) support these findings. These authors recommended establishing 
mechanisms in communities to provide, amongst others, an avenue for information 
sharing about security and safety (Gordon, 2014). 
The fifth reason, ascribed by 1 participant (i.e., Participant 008) is to implement 
projects on behalf of donors. Many reasons account for this. They include reluctance on 
the part of donors to use government agencies to implement projects. This is because of 
the capacity constraints and corruption that often characterize these agencies in 
postconflict settings. Participant 008 stated that:  
So, if the Americans or the Europeans want to support the hub for instance, they  
have to do it through institutions. And some of them want to do it but they don’t  
want to give the money to the government. You see, that is another problem. They  
don’t want to put that money into the national budget so that the government can  
do it. No! So, they put up these for companies and institutions to apply and the  





Whereas this reason is attributable to only one Participant, it could be argued that 
it is a view shared by all Participants who attributed the involvement of the local 
community and civil society to activities related to making the criminal justice system 
accessible. For instance, civil society organizations providing criminal justice services or 
creating awareness in communities may often be doing so in implementation of donor-
funded projects.  
The last reason assigned by participants for involving civil society and local 
organizations in the decentralization process is to promote sustainability. Participant 011 
stated that “… by virtue of you being a part of a process even helps to bring about some 
form of sustainability.” Although only one Participant assigned this reason, it could be 
argued that the quest for sustainability is linked to the quest for national ownership and 
inclusiveness. This argument increases the number of participants assigning this reason 
from 1 to 12 participants. This in sync with Gordon (2011) call for interventions to 
reform the security sector to be locally owned (Gordon, 2014). According to Gordon 
(2011), this is the surest way to increase the chances of the project addressing community 
needs and yielding the desired results (Gordon, 2014). Oosterveld and Galand (2012) 
illustrated the consequences of not carrying the populace along in designing and 
implementing criminal justice reforms by referring to the ill fate suffered by a project to 
reform Timor-Leste’s formal court system. Blease and Qehajia (2013) cited how the 
process to prepare Kosovo’s National Security Strategy failed to uphold national 
ownership principles (Gordon, 2014). Jackson (2010) cited the United States’ efforts to 




unreflective of their history and culture by the local population, a situation which 
negatively affected the project’s outcomes and its sustainability (Gordon, 2014). 
 A distinction must be drawn between an intention and the reality. The fact that 
almost half of this study’s participants assigned the quest to promote local ownership and 
sustainability as the reasons for involving the local population does not necessarily mean 
that the objective was met. In fact, the level and nature of their involvement are important 
ingredients for carrying the population along in the reforms. From Participants 
statements, it is difficult to find evidence that supports a deliberate and extensive 
involvement of the local population and organizations in the decentralization process to 
rake in the benefits of local ownership and sustainability. 
From the number of participants who assigned various reasons for involving the 
local community and civil society organizations, it is obvious that the quest to promote 
national ownership and inclusion is the foremost reason for involving civil society 
organizations in decentralizing the criminal justice system. Promoting oversight and 
accountability is the second highest reason assigned by participants. Despite the 
overwhelming number of participants who cited national ownership, a close review of 
what participants said in support of the quest to promote national ownership and 
inclusiveness showed that to a large extent, participants invited themselves to the process 
(i.e. there was no deliberate process to involve them) the quest for national ownership 
was not actively manifested in the views expressed by participants. Their involvement 
was to inform them about what was happening and not to consult them. Indeed, 




community as being “minimal” and “very little”. Importantly, although, authors like 
Gordon (2014) acknowledged that sustainability is an element of national ownership, the 
fact that only 1 participant mentioned it is worrying and questions the extent to which the 
various actors in the decentralization process considered sustainability as a major reason 
for involving individuals, local communities and organizations. Later in this chapter, I 
will examine the place of sustainability in the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system.  
The fact that superficial consultation of local actors is unlikely to engender local 
ownership and sustainability is suggested by 17 participants, including Participants 001, 
003, 005, 008, 009, 019, 023 and 024, who indicated that individuals, local communities 
and especially traditional leaders were not involved in the process. According to 
Participant 023 “the international community came with funding. They needed to 
showcase to their donors that the Government is willing to accept the hub concept. So, 
they meet behind closed doors and whatever they talked about nobody knows.” 
Participant 009 indicated that “in the beginning in Gbarnga, it took us a while to get 
people to understand because there was no outreach. Before outreach started, there was 
construction …” Participant 003 said “one of the things here is that the traditional 
authorities wanted to have a say within the system. They didn’t like the part of the system 
where they were being dictated to.” Participant 008 indicated that “in my opinion, I don’t 
think the customary justice system, or the extent of the customary justice practices was a 
factor in the decentralization process.” In fact, this Participant suggests a deliberate 




associated with involving them. These realities led 11 participants, including Participants 
010, 014, 021 and 029, to conclude that the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system was elite driven and/or Monrovia centric.  
Denney (2014) explained the apparent reluctance to involve traditional authorities 
and the traditional justice system in efforts to make criminal justice services accessible in 
postconflict countries. According to Denney (2014), development partners supporting 
reforms of the justice and security system in fragile societies gear their efforts to build 
institutions and systems that replicate Western institutions, and this excludes nonstate 
actors. This is because of the obligations of the Weberian state model in the affairs of 
citizens. As a result of this notion, donors naturally prefer to focus on supporting state 
actors and neglect nonstate actors. International actors like the Department of 
International Development (DFID) in Sierra Leone, neglecting and/or refusing to design 
their programmatic interventions to suit the context for which they are being 
implemented, runs contrary to Kelsall (2008) “going with the grain” of African 
development (Denney, 2013 p.7). This leads Kelsall (2008) to observe that the imposition 
of such externally driven approaches for Africa’s development are yet to yield the desired 
results (Denney, 2013). This approach is an application of Western principles that do not 
suit the context (Denney, 2013). Kelsall (2008) observations are confirmed by Denney 
(2013), who found that as a result of DFID’s approach to security sector reform in Sierra 
Leone, the results of the interventions were limited.  
There are challenges associated with working with traditional authorities to make 




programming and implementation. For instance, in Sierra Leone, chiefs contributed to the 
situation leading to the country’s civil war (Denney, 2013). Leonard (n.d), acknowledged 
this challenge and recommended that “The challenge is not to terminate existing local 
and informal Social Contracts for the sake of Western models of security, but instead to 
make local governance more responsive and effective in a manner that accommodates the 
legitimacy of local institutions” (Ansorg, 2017 p. 141). Inherent in this recommendation 
is an advice that the dynamics on the ground in postconflict settings must be respected 
and managed in a manner that facilitates program implementation and observes Western 
values at the same time. This approach may be a useful middle path but operationalizing 
it may suffer practical challenges that may lead to undertaking justice sector reform in 
postconflict countries through a Western prism.  
I have dwelt on not engaging with traditional authorities in the decentralization 
process in the last two paragraphs. This follows my conclusions that citizens were not 
consulted. Admittedly, this may have created an impression that citizens and traditional 
authorities are being used interchangeably. In spite of the fact that traditional authorities 
are citizens, nonstate actors and operate at the local level, I am not equating the lack of 
local engagement of citizens in the decentralization process solely with not engaging 
traditional/customary justice though there is an overlap.  
As previously noted, participants identified Western countries and institutions as 
actors involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. Western approaches 
to reforming criminal justice systems in postconflict societies are manifested in building 




(Denney, 2014). Seeking to approach the processes through the lenses of the Weberian 
state model is synonymous to a blind transplantation of Western cultural practices and 
systems into postconflict societies, which are usually not Western, developing or failed 
states. The contexts are different and blindly engaging in such transplantation enhances 
the chances that it will not flourish in the new context.  
In postconflict countries, nonstate actors have a huge amount of legitimacy which 
is grounded in religion and culture. This is not the case in Western modelled justice and 
security institutions, which are seen by the population in postconflict societies as alien 
and untrustworthy (Denney, 2014). In view of the place and role of traditional leaders in 
the justice and security sectors in postconflict settings, Baker (2005) advocated for 
engaging traditional authorities as a condition precedent to successful police and justice 
reform in Sierra Leone (Denney, 2013). Swenson (2018) informed readers that the 
progress made by nonstate actors in dispute resolution has resulted in some experts 
calling for forming coalitions with actors that are beyond the formal institutions to 
implement justice sector reform activities. Bacon (2015) shared this view in the context 
of Liberia. Dinnen and Peake (2013) indicated that, in Sierra Leone, policing services and 
other formal government institutions/services are concentrated in the urban centers and 
citizens in the rural areas rely on the customary law/justice system to resolve their 
disputes. This view is shared by Ansorg and Haastrup (2016), who believe that the 
Western approach to security sector reform in postconflict settings in Africa is elite and 
male driven and neglects females and female related organizations (Ansorg, 2017). It is 




(2017) as exceptions to the practice where security sector reform is an elite driven 
enterprise. Ansorg (2017) also expressed concern over the negative impact on creating 
security in postconflict countries which arises from international development actors 
being disinterested and not being cognizant of local/traditional institutions. This is 
because, potentially, local institutions can secure peace and stability in postconflict 
settings (Ansorg, 2017). Westernman (2017) shares this view as the author posited that 
the goal of security sector reform in postconflict situations is to create a workable and 
sustainable security system that, amongst others, creates a democratic relationship 
between the legitimate authorities of the country.  
In this regard, Egnell & Halden (2009) argued that the approach adopted by 
Western countries bars any possibility of adopting other practical and potentially more 
effective approaches to reform the justice and security systems in postconflict settings 
(Denney, 2014). As previously noted, Denney (2014) found that, in Sierra Leone, despite 
the huge role traditional leaders play in providing justice and security, the British 
Government funded programs to reform the security sector failed to actively engage 
them. Denney (2014) attributed this approach to factors including the influence of 
Western values on the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development’s 
(DFID) programming, the fact that DFID dealt only with state actors and not informal or 
nonstate actors like chiefs, and the nationality of technical staff recruited to implement 
programs (i.e., most of them are citizens of donor countries who are mostly Western). 
Denney (2013) argued that it is relatively easier to find the values that Western 




dealing with them. This rationalization is questionable as there is evidence that Western 
institutions have extended assistance to state actors whose respect for human rights and 
international law principles leave much to be desired (Denney, 2013). The absence of 
uniform standards in dealing with state and nonstate actors led Denney (2013) to observe 
that:  
The distinction made between the human rights abuses committed by states and 
those committed by informal actors is further indicative of the prism of political 
liberalism and bureaucracy through which DFID understands the world and 
models its development assistance. Justice, security, democracy and human rights 
thus become most effectively served by a centralized state authority, properly 
structured and rule-bound by legal-rationalism. Chiefs, conversely, represent 
unaccountability and a lack of oversight, rendering them unmanageable forces 
(p.20). 
Tailoring interventions to fit the specific needs of the micro and macro level.  
Conceptually, ownership of the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice 
system should not be limited to the micro (i.e., national) level. It should transcend to the 
macro (i.e., local) level as well. The existence of ownership and inclusion at the national 
level and not at the local level indicates an elite and/or externally driven process. 
Tailoring peacebuilding interventions to suit a particular context requires, inter alia, that 
each part of the geographical area affected by the conflict is treated as unique (i.e., the 
application of a one size fits all approach to peacebuilding across a particular postconflict 




(Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). In this regard, participants shared their 
perspectives on whether interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system 
were tailored to suit the requirements/imperatives of the context at both national and local 
levels. Six participants, including Participants 004, 008 and 011 indicated that some 
consideration was given to the Liberian context. 
For instance, Participant 004 claimed that: 
Yes, it did influence the decision. The point about influence and implementation is the 
challenge. You influence the decision, you plan what you want to do, and in the 
implementation process, you don’t do it with the strength of the influence. 
Eight participants including Participants 002, 021, 025 and 029 indicated that a 
nonhomogenous approach was adopted to decentralize criminal justice services across the 
various geographical locations in Liberia. In support of this assertion, Participant 029 
stated that “I think each part was treated as unique. So, the needs in Bong are different 
from the needs in Margibi or probably in Lofa. So, it is dependent on the individual 
circumstances of a specific geographical area.” Twenty three participants, some of them 
foreigners) including Participants 001, 004, 005, 006, 020, 021, 023, 026 and 027 were of 
the view that no consideration was given to the Liberian context and that the 
decentralization process was externally driven by foreign actors. To back this claim, 
Participant 001 stated that “I will say it is externally driven. … because it was forced to 
take place, Liberians were influenced where they went.” According to Participant 020: 
… law enforcement cannot be devoid from the culture. You can bring the  




quite applicable. I believe that one of the mistakes that was made was the  
international practices without consideration of the culture …  
Participant 029 stated that “no attention was given to that. Though they recognized those 
traditional criminal justice systems that were in place, but then they were cautioned not to 
try and refine or reform the processes around that …” 
These views confirm the earlier finding that the local communities and groups 
were not consulted and that it was an elite driven process. However, 4 participants 
indicated that the process was nationally owned and driven. Participant 026, for example, 
said that “I think that it was nationally driven.” 
One size fits all approach adopted across Liberia 
Contrary to the views held that the approach to make criminal justice services was 
not homogenous, 12 participants including Participants 001, 003, 004, 005, 006, 014 and 
019, said that a homogenous approach (i.e., a one size fits all approach was adopted in the 
decentralization process). Participant 001 stated that: “… it was a homogeneous country; 
everything was the same.” Participant 004 stated that: 
we had a fair approach. A, B, C, D criminal justice services or facilities. But that  
should not have been the case. We should have done some form of positive  
discrimination to bring the counties that were at the lower, lower level up to a  
certain level … 
Participant 005 noted “I will say I saw very little sensitivity in terms of local 
cultures in any of the reform processes.” In the words of Participant 013 “a one size fits 




Majority of the perspectives expressed by participants confirm the absence of 
context specific interventions, local ownership and nonconsultation of the local 
communities, a situation Chanaa (2002) describes as the “conceptual-contextual divide” 
(Schroder & Chappuis, 2014, p.135). The finding that international efforts to decentralize 
criminal justice services in Liberia ignored national and local ownership principles is 
mirrored by the findings of Dursun-Özkanca (2018) in evaluating how much local 
ownership considerations influenced Kosovo’s foreign funded rule of law programs. 
According to the researcher, a top down approach was adopted by the European Union 
and United Nations in addressing only serious crimes and this neglected the local 
community. In this case, local ownership was restricted to some aspects of the reform 
process. It is worth stressing that this is not to suggest that adopting a top-down approach 
is necessarily a bad thing.  
Designing and implementing security sector reform interventions to suit the 
context for which they are intended has been an enduring challenge for reform efforts and 
has hindered the implementation of security sector reform programming (Schroder & 
Chappuis, 2014). This assertion informed Ginty (2010) conclusion that security sector 
reform is an imposition of Western ideas (Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014). No wonder 
authors like Ansorg (2017), Dinnen and Peake (2013), Gordon (2014) and Westernman 
(2017) believe that designing and implementing untailored interventions has, in some 
cases, been deliberate, to satisfy parochial objectives. This claim also confirms the fact 
that reforming the justice and security sectors, particularly in postconflict settings, is an 




(Gordon, 2014 & Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). For these reasons, Kostovicova (2008) 
recommended that security sector reform processes must be joint exercises to provide 
technical solutions to development problems and create relationships between the 
government and the governed (Gordon, 2014). According to Peake, Scheye and Hills 
(2007) these imperatives are ignored in security sector reform processes, so the politics of 
the process is on the altar of finding technical solutions to the problems (Schroder & 
Chappuis, 2014). 
 Participants assigned two reasons for the one size fits all approach adopted to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. Participant 022 cited Liberia’s legal 
framework and the structure of the country. According to this Participant, “Liberia is one 
country. It is also a small country. The legal framework applies to the country as a whole. 
And the same laws apply to people everywhere.” The second reason was provided by 3 
Participants (i.e., Participants 005, 008 and 014). According to these Participants, a 
homogenous approach was used to promote unity (i.e., addressing concerns over 
entrenching ethnicity) and equality. In support of this claim, Participant 005 said “I think 
there was a fear partially of enhancing tribalism, given the importance of tribes or clans 
in the Liberian society and also in some cases strong long disputes between different 
groups …”  
Evidence and consequences of conceptual contextual divide in Liberia.  
According to participants, not tailoring interventions to suit the Liberian context 
had the following consequences: Five participants, including Participants 006, 008, 021  




the flagship project for making Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible, has been  
abandoned due to implementation challenges. The following statements made by  
participants reflect their perspectives of the hub project: Participant 021 stated that: 
the justice and security regional hub; initially the plan was to have 5 in place. … But 
unfortunately, in the middle of implementation, the infrastructure aspect was not taken 
forward because the lessons learnt from the first was that construction took longer than 
we expected. And so, our partners from the United Nations (i.e., the Peacebuilding 
Commission Chair) spoke with the government and the government bought into the idea 
and saw the need to prioritize service provision rather than the physical infrastructure. So 
currently we have not had infrastructure in all areas except for Bong County. 
Participant 022 noted that “… the hubs approach has come to a standstill. … after the 
Gbarnga hub after the investments were made … I think that the hub concept came to a 
standstill. But the decentralization itself continued.” Participant 006 stated that: 
The first hub in Gbarnga; it was designed to actually look at all the elements of  
the criminal justice system; from policing, right through the criminal justice  
system to prisons and it was done on a regional basis. But it was set up and  
designed that it would provide a decentralized service in 3 counties. … It came  
with mixed reviews but if we spoke honestly about it, we would say that the cost  
benefit analyses didn’t really deliver what it was intended to deliver. As we know,  
the sustainability of justice and security services was very hard on Liberians at the  
time. So, it was mixed results; whilst there was improved access to justice and  




the premise of having the ability to strengthen and extend to other counties, but it  
actually, didn’t deliver as intended. Notwithstanding, there were improvements.  
According to Participant 008:  
the Gbarnga project would have been the forerunner to all the other areas. First,  
there was an implementation problem in terms of the construction itself. And so,  
it did not proceed as originally planned. There was a delay in its completion. And  
it consumed a lot more money than it was originally intended. And because of  
that, it did have an impact on the construction of the hubs in the other areas. 
Reviewing participants' comments on the hub project leads to the conclusion that in 
Liberia, the hub project is one manifestation of what Chanaa’s (2002) referred to as 
“conceptual-contextual divide” (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014, p.135). 
Seven participants, including Participants 005, 016 and 021 identified the third 
impact of not designing and implementing context specific interventions. According to 
these Participants, ignoring the context results in a non-judicious use of resources and 
creates challenges for sustainability.  
Three participants including Participant 005 and 009 also identified the design 





Decentralization process was a combination of context specific and externally  
driven interventions (i.e., hybrid local, national and internationally driven 
efforts/approaches). Seventeen participants including Participants 003, 005, 006, 009, 
010, 011, 012 and 029, claimed that interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal 
justice system were informed by the needs of Liberia and external/international interests. 
According to these Participants, this approach was manifested in the homogenous and 
nonhomogenous approaches adopted to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
For these Participants, the choice of approaches/interventions was a hybrid between the 
imperatives of the context and demands from international partners who were funding the 
process and projects. The following statements capture participants perspectives on this:  
Participant 005 claimed that the hub project was based on a regional structure akin 
to the decentralized police structure, but which is different from how the judiciary and the 
prosecution’s decentralized structure: 
The structure of the reformed police was a regional structure, whereas the  
judiciary retained the prewar county based structure. So, you had a little bit of a  
disconnect between the chains of command; in the judiciary process, the County  
Attorneys (prosecutors), the judges, and then the police structure which was semi  
decentralized. 
According to Participant 029: 
Driving this process was not just a Liberia thing. Remember, we had the UN  
mission here; we had the United Nations Police working along ... The setup was  




are looking at it. They supported everything to make sure they built capacity to  
ensure that they left a working system. … Was there extreme sensitivity put in it?  
To an extent! Could there have been further efforts to minimize unintended  
consequences? Yes! 
Participant 011 stated that “it was a nationally driven affair with the support of our 
international partners … They said, Yes, I will put money there, but I require this and 
that. So, the only precondition was that, the only way it can happen is when you go their 
way.” Participant 006 stated “I think a bit of both.” Participant 012 noted that “It’s both 
in a way because the external factors and parties saw some inadequacies in the delivery 
of the services that should make the criminal justice system viable.” Participant 020 
indicated that “We (i.e., Liberians) had lots and lots of meetings as it relates to how to 
make the system functional and also participated in activities to make it functional ...” 
Participate 029 held a similar opinion: 
 I will say both externally and nationally driven. Externally driven given the fact  
that most of the funding came from international donors, they had their own 
objectives and what they wanted to achieve. And of course, the Government also 
has its own plan.  
  The views expressed above are those of most participants. This is an indication that 
the approach to decentralize criminal justice services in Liberia was a hybrid between local 
needs and international demands. This is in keeping with recommendations in the literature 
on how to mitigate the variance between practicalizing the quest for national ownership in 




instance, Murdoch (2015) canvassed a middle path that upholds the practice of allowing 
programming to reform the criminal justice system in postconflict settings not to ignore 
standards, principles and practices from the West, because this will enhance the impact of 
the reforms. Gordon (2014) cited Donais (2009) who claimed that despite the case made 
for upholding local ownership principles in such reforms, upholding these principles need 
not be total and immediate (i.e., making local ownership principles influence programming 
in justice and security sectors in war ravaged societies is a process and not an event; this 
process cannot be forced but requires an element of being deliberate and right timing).  
There is also a need to keep a balance between the level of national ownership 
and quantum of international demands required at each stage of the process. Jackson 
(2011) and Caparini (2010) claimed that a hybrid between the top down approach and the 
bottom up approach are critical to operationalize security sector reform in a substantive 
and inclusive manner (Gordon, 2014). Mac Ginty (2011) affirmed this view as the 
researcher also noted that a hybrid approach fulfils the imperatives of “local ownership” 
“participation” and “sustainability” (p. 133) in security and justice sector reforms in after 
conflict settings (Gordon, 2014). Supporting this claim, Homel and Masson, (2016) 
called for a connection between the top bottom and bottom top approaches. Krawczyk 
and Muhula (2018) recommended adopting a bottom up approach to accountability to 
engender citizen participation in local government and decision making in Liberia. I will 
discuss the outcome of adopting the middle path approach to decentralizing criminal 
justice services in Liberia in discussing research question 3. Suffice it however to note for 




approach was adopted, as earlier noted, I found that local communities and organizations 
were hardly consulted but, in some cases, they were informed about the decentralization 
process. This raises questions about the presence and quality of the middle path approach 
adopted in Liberia. By quality I am referring to how much of the decision making and 
implementation was influenced by Liberia and Liberians. From the findings on the 
involvement of local communities and civil society organizations, it is evident that in 
Liberia the so called hybrid between local requirements and external or international 
influences was skewed in favor of the demands and interests of the international 
community, hence raising doubts about how middle the path/approach was in Liberia.  
However, the practical challenges highlighted by Oosterveld and Galand (2012) 
on how the urgency associated with implementing such reforms makes it difficult to 
engage in extensive public consultations must not be ignored (Gordon, 2014). Despite 
Donais (2009) positing that timing is key in meeting the requirements of the hybrid 
approach, there should be minimum standards or requirements for upholding local 
ownership principles, at every stage of the process and that should be benchmarked and 
form the basis for regular monitoring.  
RQ2.1: How can International Actors Support Nationally Owned and Inclusive 
processes to Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal Justice System? 
In discussing the findings under Research Question 1, international actors were 
found to have been actively involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
As previously noted, the literature reveals that international support to decentralize 




nationally owned the interventions must be context specific; designed and implemented 
at the micro and macro levels. This must be done from a position of knowledge (i.e., both 
technical knowledge and knowledge of the context). Knowledge of the context is 
acquired from extensive consultations with various shades of opinion and interest groups 
at national and local levels and these consultations must continue to inform the 
decentralization process.  
The following findings are gleaned from recommendations made by participants 
on how international actors can support nationally owned and inclusive processes to 
make criminal justice services accessible in Liberia. Table 12 presents recommendations 
(i.e., 12 of them) made by participants. 
Table 12  
Findings - Research Question 2 (1) 
Research Question Findings 
RQ 2.1 How can international actors 
support nationally owned and inclusive 
processes to decentralize Liberia’s 
criminal justice system? 
i. The international community should 
understand the context and avoid a pure 
legalistic approach to decentralize 
Liberia’s criminal justice system. 






iii. The quest to advance national 
ownership and implement Liberia 
specific interventions must permeate all 
programming 
iv. Adoption of a holistic approach to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice 
system 
v. International development actors, 
must have a long-term approach and be 
patient when supporting access to 
justice processes in postconflict 
countries 
vi. Need for conceptual clarity of 
distinction between national ownership 
and local ownership 
vii. International development 








vii. International development actors 
must support the design and 
implementation of geographic specific 
interventions to decentralize Liberia’s 
criminal justice system 
ix. The government’s ability to sustain 
interventions that are implemented to 
make criminal justice services 
accessible in Liberia when international 
development support ends should be 
considered when  
making choices on which interventions 
to adopt to make the criminal justice 
system accessible 
x. Liberia’s government to take the lead 
in the decentralization process 
xi. Build a professional criminal justice 







xii. Actors involved in making Liberia’s 
criminal justice system accessible must 







First, participants recommended that international actors should design and implement 
interventions that are Liberia specific. Participants identified condition precedents to 
successfully implementing this recommendation. They are:  
● That national ownership principles must permeate all programming (i.e., national 
ownership principles should be central to the entire decentralization process); 
● That there is the need for a conceptual clarification of the distinction between 
national ownership and local ownership. Schroder and Chappuis (2014) 
acknowledged the challenges associated with conceptualizing what national and 
local ownership is.  According to the authors the vagueness inherent in the 
concepts arise from the fact that, there is no clarity on whose interests should 
influence the analysis. Similar views are shared by Krogstad (2013) who indicated 
that there is still an absence of consensus on what constitutes local ownership 




● That the context must be understood and an overly legalistic approach to 
decentralization should be avoided. Understanding the context requires that 
foreigners must be knowledgeable about the context in which they work.  
Participants had mixed views on how well foreigners who supported and/or 
worked to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system understood Liberia and the 
criminal justice system they were working to make accessible. Only Participants 001, 002 
and 014 indicated that foreign/international actors were knowledgeable about Liberia and 
its criminal justice system. Even this Participant stated that “… for those who had stayed 
a little longer they got to understand Liberia and its people …” Participant  002 indicated 
that “I would say they did as most of them had worked and stayed in Liberia for good 
period of time since the inception of the mission and the mission had the capacity to keep 
records to ensure continuity.” Participant 014 claimed that: “the thing is, most of the 
people that I know that worked with the criminal justice system in Liberia were Africans 
and had some sort of similar challenges in their own country.” It is instructive to mention 
that Participant 001 and 002 attribute the knowledge of the context to the fact that it had 
been acquired over time. It could be argued that these knowledgeable foreigners were 
initially not knowledgeable, and this affected the design, implementation and outcome of 
the interventions they championed to make the system accessible. Inherits in Participants 
001 and 002 statements was an acknowledgment that not all foreigners were 
knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal justice system. Participant 014 impliedly 
indicated that foreigners from African countries were knowledgeable because they came 




that no two contexts are the same must not be lost. This becomes more acute when 
dealing with a postconflict setting where the dynamics are different. Also, these 
knowledgeable Africans who worked in Liberia may have been working for 
organizations who had their own approach and interests, and this would have affected 
how much the fact that they came from countries with similar challenges like Liberia’s 
influenced their work and its outcomes. 
 Sixteen participants, including Participants 001, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 
009, 011 and 027, indicated that foreign/international actors were not knowledgeable 
about Liberia and its criminal justice system. They said so in the following statements: 
Participant 003: “I don’t think they really understood Liberia entirely. ... I can tell you 
that most of them did not understand Liberians. They thought Liberians were not 
intelligent.” According to Participant 001, “those of us who did not come from the 
American legal system, we struggled with the American system, and were not able to 
make a big impact.” On the same issue, Participant 005: 
No! Because every single … international tends to think that whatever they do 
back home, is just as applicable to Africans as it was to anybody else; we think 
that the system that we have grown up with the way to do things.  
Participant 007 stated: 
Our culture is a bit complicated and sometimes people don’t know what they are 
expected to do in everyday activities. These internationals came with their own 




will be making a very big mistake. Liberia’s culture is complex, and the people 
are complex too. 
Participant 011 said that “no, they did not understand Liberia”. Participant 016 stated 
that, “I think they understood Liberia to a limited extent. I don’t think they understood 
the culture, history because they had a fixed solution approach”. Participant 021 stated 
that: “I think there were some that didn’t understand”. Though referring to another 
context, the finding that foreigners who supported the processes were not knowledgeable 
about Liberia and its criminal justice system is shared by Denney (2014).  Denney (2014) 
attributes the standardized approach adopted by donors to reforming the justice and 
security sectors to the small pool of international experts (e.g., former police officers and 
lawyers) who are engaged to reform these sectors as well as these experts being 
knowledgeable about the design and functions of Western justice and security systems. 
Six participants including Participants 018 and 020, indicated that 
foreigner/international actors were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal 
justice system. For instance, Participant 018 stated: 
I think they understood to a point like all other projects. … They understood the  
challenges Liberia faced; in terms of resources, manpower, and capacity; how to  
fill up those gaps there are major laws that needed to be passed to reform the  
society.  
According to Participant 020: 
To a little extent they did. What they had as their advantage was the fact that they  




as to how to intervene here in Liberia. I mean they didn’t really understand  
Liberia’s context 100 per cent but they understood how to engage and solve issues  
From the number of views expressed, participants were of the view that the knowledge of 
the foreign experts that supported the decentralization process of Liberia’s criminal 
justice system, about Liberia and the criminal justice system, left much to be desired. 
This certainly affected the design, implementation and results of the interventions they 
championed to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible.  
A second recommendation was made by 4 participants including, Participants 
016, 027 and 029. Participant 027 stated that the international community should 
understand the context (i.e., Liberia) and avoid a purely legalistic approach to 
decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system. In some respect, this 
recommendation is akin to the approach adopted in the design and implementation of 
police reforms in Bougainville where New Zealand, the main international actor 
supporting criminal justice system reform/development, supported an approach that 
departed from the orthodoxy of postconflict criminal justice system reform in which 
international experts impose a top bottom approach from textbooks and blueprints from 
other jurisdictions (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Also, recommending an approach that is not 
entirely legalistic re-echoes Peake, Scheye & Hills (2007) assertion that security sector 
reform processes are political processes as well, hence actors should refrain from 
adopting a purely technical approach to reform (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). 
For the third recommendation, participants called on international actors to design 




implementation and operationalization of the process and system. A criminal justice 
system cannot be described as citizen centered if women are ignored. Such a system is 
incomplete and unresponsive. To successfully design and implement a citizen centered 
criminal justice system, priorities to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice system 
must be identified through a Liberia owned and led process with international support 
being channeled to support those priorities. Ironically only 6 participants; including 006, 
019 and 020; out of the 30 participants in this study made this recommendation despite 
the general criticism that local actors were excluded. I expected to see this 
recommendation being made by majority, if not all, participants. Researchers like Gordon 
(2014) recommend the establishment of citizen centered criminal justice systems. 
According to this researcher, “Efforts focusing on building state institutions and 
structures, without sufficiently paying attention to developing relations between the state 
and its people, will not, it is argued, benefit peacebuilding in the long term” (p.126). 
Gordon (2014) assertion highlighted the utility of recommendations made by participants 
on promoting ownership and sustainability. Bacon (2015) found that in Liberia donors 
were not keen to work with the traditional justice system because they concentrated their 
interventions in the capital even though the majority of the citizens, of which women 
outnumbered men, lived in villages outside the capital.  
Fyanka (2014) supported the view that there is the need to ensure that priorities are 
nationally identified in an inclusive manner. Accordingly, Fyanka (2014) advocated for 
programmatic interventions to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system to be influenced 




chances of a positive impact and reduces the challenges of promoting sustainable 
peacebuilding. Ansorg (2017) also noted that to ensure the acceptance and sustainability 
of reform efforts in postconflict settings, there is the need for the local population to be 
informed about the reforms. Having a citizen centered criminal justice system has several 
advantages including promoting national ownership, designing context specific 
interventions and increasing the chance of the interventions being sustained after 
international development assistance has run out.  
Participant 014 (i.e., only 1 participant) also recommended that international 
development actors must support the design and implementation of geographic specific 
interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. Bacon (2015) and Jackson 
(2017) support this recommendation. Jackson (2017) for instance, noted that the work of 
the international community working in postconflict countries is concentrated in the 
capital cities because donors are not willing to work in parts of the country where the 
state lacks legitimacy. This reason is not applicable to Liberia because during the period 
that this study is focusing on (i.e., 2011- 2017), the Liberian government was generally in 
control of the entire country. However, there is the possibility that international 
development assistance focused less outside the capital because of the inaccessible nature 
of those geographical locations, particularly during the raining season and other resource 
challenges. Another possible reason is the fact that the systemic challenges of the 
criminal justice system had to be resolved by the leadership of these institutions who 
were based in the capital. Indeed Bacon (2015) noted that in Liberia the inaccessible 




access to the formal criminal justice system in those locations and this affected access to 
justice for women as they had to undertake long journeys, sometimes over days, often on 
foot, to access services provided by the formal justice system.  
Participants also recommended promoting the traditional justice system. This 
recommendation was made by 4 participants including Participants 001, 023 and 027. 
This recommendation came from few participants despite the suggestions by many 
participants that the traditional justice system was neglected in the decentralization 
process notwithstanding its prominence as a dispute resolution mechanism for many 
Liberians. This irony may be a reflection that the majority of participants, although 
knowledgeable about the place of the traditional justice system, are not in the category of 
the population that ordinarily patronizes the services provided by this system of justice. 
As previously noted, in Liberia, donors were reluctant to work on or with the customary 
justice system (Bacon, 2015). Denney (2014) made similar findings about DFID’s 
support in Sierra Leone. According to Baker and Scheye (2007) international actors and 
approaches to reform the justice system, in postconflict settings, erroneously assume that 
the absence of a formal justice system amounts to a lack of access to justice, that citizens 
in postconflict settings prefer seeking justice from the formal justice system and that the 
formal justice system is more sustainable compared to the customary justice system 
(Jackson, 2013). The customary justice system in Liberia is strong and prominent in the 
affairs of the citizenry, particularly those residents in the rural areas. The system is 
accessible, credible and cheaper. Although the traditional justice system may in some 




peril of Liberians, the government and its partners, including the international 
community. 
Three participants including Participants 014 and 025 called for the adoption of a 
holistic approach to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. The criminal justice 
system is made up of various parts that work together to get the system function. The 
tendency in postconflict settings is to pay attention to security, law and order. This results 
in resources being channeled to support the police to the neglect or near neglect of other 
parts of the criminal justice system. As a result of this, there is an uneven development of 
the various parts of the system and this negatively affects the functionality of the entire 
system. As will be demonstrated in discussing research question 3, in Liberia, 
participants indicated that the Liberia National Police was the largest recipient of 
resources and corrections and the prisons system received the least, a fact that negatively 
affected the system’s functionality. The finding that in Liberia most of the resources was 
spent on security related activities is mirrored by Jackson (2013) who found that in Sierra 
Leone, there was a focus on security (i.e., the police) and less on justice and this 
adversely affected reforms of the justice part of the criminal justice chain. This reality in 
postconflict justice and security sector reform makes a strong case for a holistic and well 
coordinated approach to reforming the criminal justice system. 
Participants also recommended that consideration should be given to the 
Government’s ability to sustain interventions to make criminal justice services accessible 
in Liberia, particularly when international development support ends. This consideration 




Paradoxically, this recommendation was made by only 1 participant, (i.e., Participant 10) 
even though participants acknowledged the need for interventions to be sustainable and 
they admitted that this was lacking in Liberia’s reform processes. Perhaps the number of 
participants making this recommendation is an indication that participants adopted a 
realistic view on the sustainability question, the reason being that in postconflict 
environments like Liberia, the government’s ability to effectively assume financial 
responsibility for sustaining interventions put in place with resources from abroad has run 
out is doubtful and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Liberia’s economic situation 
became worse because of the drop in world prices of rubber, Liberia’s main export, and 
the impact of the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease, which resulted in the exit from Liberia 
of some foreign private investors (World Bank, 2016). These factors have affected the 
country’s finances and its ability to maintain existing projects and programs.   
Related to the recommendation on sustainability is Participant 025 counsel. This 
Participant advocated for international actors to support Liberia’s government to take the 
lead in the decentralization process. This recommendation is at the heart of seeking to 
ensure that internationally supported projects in Liberia are sustainable and owned by 
Liberians. Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) supports this recommendation as the researchers 
asserted that adopting a sustainable approach to decentralization is the surest way to reap 
maximum benefits from decentralization. To achieve this, projects and programs must be 
nationally owned/driven and tailored to fit the context where they are being implemented 




Their recommendation called on international development assistance actors to 
establish genuine partnerships. Specifically, it called on international actors not to tell 
recipients of their assistance what they should do, it also called for a deliberate effort to 
build trust. Two participants (i.e., Participants 006 and 007) invited the international 
community to resist the natural tendency, as funders of efforts to decentralize Liberia’s 
criminal justice system, to be overly prescriptive in their interventions. The fact that 
international actors are overly prescriptive in their assistance is reinforced by Denny 
(2014) who criticized the practice in overseas development assistance where blueprints 
are replicated in various postconflict settings whether they were successful or not. This 
recommendation seeks a shift from the norm and wants to see national ownership and 
interventions tailored for Liberia rather than using blueprints from other contexts. Though 
practically difficult to implement for varied reasons, including the interests of 
international development assistance actors and the dynamics in postconflict settings, 
implementing this recommendation remains possible. As previously noted, Bougainville 
is a setting in which this approach was successfully adopted by New Zealand (Dinnen & 
Peake, 2013). This may be just one example, but it is still a practical manifestation that 
the approach is doable and requires the political will particularly on the part of 
international actors.  
Three Participants (i.e., Participants 018, 021 and 022) recommended that 
international development actors must have a long term approach and be patient when 
supporting access to justice processes in postconflict countries. This recommendation 




systems of postconflict societies, accessible is a process and not an event. As noted by 
Jackson (2013), reforming the legal system takes time and a lot of investment, hence all 
actors, including those spearheading the reforms and the intended beneficiaries, must be 
prepared to endure. In this regard, the quest to show progress and/or to quickly move to 
other conflict affected settings, for whatever reasons including competing demands on 
scarce resources or the pursuit of national interest, must be resisted as this results in 
unfinished business, raises questions about sincerity, results in imprudent use of foreign 
taxpayers’ money and increases the chances of postconflict settings sliding back into 
conflict because the triggers of the conflict and the mechanisms to avert a recurrence 
have not been properly dealt with and/or put in place. This is why this recommendation is 
appropriate and must guide international development actors in deciding when to 
withdraw their support to criminal justice reform in conflict ravaged countries. It must 
however be acknowledged that the tendency for recipients of international development 
assistance to be inordinately dependent on external resources is high and this becomes 
entrenched with the effusion of time (i.e., when international development assistance 
becomes the norm and dependency a way of life), recipients make no efforts to assume 
their sovereign obligations. Since international development assistance is finite and 
assuming responsibility for providing criminal justice services is part of the Social 
Contract, a balance must be struck between dealing with the challenge of creating a 
dependency culture and leaving unfinished business behind. This balance should be 





Another recommendation gleaned from the data collected called for building a 
professional criminal justice system insulated from Liberia’s partisan politics. This 
recommendation was made by Participant 006. This recommendation does not advocate 
for a criminal justice system insulated from politics but rather from partisan politics. This 
distinction is important because, at a certain level, the criminal justice system all over the 
world encounters politics. It must be acknowledged that in postconflict, settings factors 
like the lack of trained human resources, effective oversight and accountability, and 
interference by politicians in the affairs of state agencies, affects the ability of these 
agencies to be professional and this affects ownership and sustainability of the reform 
process. The criminal justice system is operated by human beings, for the system to 
provide services to everyone who seek the same, the human and other resources of the 
system must be professional and equipped. There should also be a legal framework 
providing a professional criminal justice system/institution.   
When I discussed research question 1, participants alluded to the enactment of 
legislation for some criminal justice institutions and the various institutional development 
initiatives adopted to make the criminal justice system accessible. All these suggest that 
efforts were made to professionalize Liberia’s criminal justice system. However, building 
a professional criminal justice system in Liberia like other advanced countries remains a 
work in progress even so requires time. The pace and the success of building a criminal 
justice system insulated from partisanship depends on the political class and their 
commitment to building a professional criminal justice system. The population must 




public confidence in the criminal justice system and, in a postconflict setting, contribute 
to peace and stability. It will also justify the investments of donors.  
Participant 004 recommended that actors involved in making Liberia’s criminal 
justice system accessible must learn lessons from similar contexts. At the heart of this 
recommendation is an invitation to ensure that interventions are tailored to suit the 
Liberian context. This recommendation also advocates that the phenomenon of 
international actors and experts replicating blueprints used in other contexts must cease. 
Researchers like Ansorg (2017), Bacon (2015), Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017), Denney 
(2013), Dinnen and Peake (2013), Gordon (2014), Schroeder and Chappuis (2014), and 
Westernman (2017) support this recommendation. This recommendation, among others, 
means that experts deployed to support efforts to make criminal justice services 
accessible in Liberia and by extension other postconflict countries must learn from 
previous experiences and avoid repeating mistakes. It is important that this 
recommendation is not understood to mean that participants were calling for a blind 
replication of interventions that have worked in other settings or a jettisoning of 
interventions that failed in other contexts. The reasons being that, it may well be the case 
that an intervention that failed in one context will have a positive impact in another. For 
this recommendation to be effective, international experts must be knowledgeable about 
Liberia and the criminal justice system they are seeking to make accessible. The most 
effective way to understand Liberia is to genuinely and actively involve Liberians at all 
stages of the process and to allow the knowledge gained to influence policy choices and 




Linked to the immediately preceding recommendation is one made by Participant 
008, who called on the Government of Liberia to evaluate its previous engagements with 
the international community and learn lessons. This recommendation seeks to evaluate 
the engagement between Liberia’s Government and its international partner, with the aim 
of informing future dealings. This examination is vital to ensure ownership and to 
maximize the benefits of the relationship.  
Four participants (i.e., Participants 004, 022, 023 and 029) recommended the 
development of the capacity of criminal justice system actors, the traditional justice 
system and civil society organizations. In this regard, Participant 023 indicated that:  
I think in my mind, even though they have done quite a number of crusades, there 
had to be more training for criminal justice practitioners; the police, prosecutors 
and judges. So now we are training judges and clerks because, in that way, the 
courts become more functional and people can begin to trust the courts and there 
could be accountability. 
Participant 029 said “ensure that people are trained to deliver services.” Participant 004 
stated that:  
… any criminal justice system in the world, no matter how you design it, if it has  
no qualified professional men and women of high integrity, it can’t work. … Most  
of the time in many postconflict societies that is what we find... you design  
something, and you don’t have the men and women qualified, with experience to  
run it. .... so, you bring in foreigners who simply don’t know the system, who  




systems, and also the traditional justice system which you find across the rural  
part of Liberia. Liberia is a dual system, and the dual system can only work if you  
have qualified professionals. 
The last recommendation was made by Participant 019. It is a call to promote 
South-South cooperation in decentralizing Liberia’s decentralization process. This 
Participant recommended that attention should be paid to promoting South South 
cooperation to explore options to realize their objectives. Actors in decentralizing 
Liberia’s criminal justice system include a few countries from the Global South. These 
countries have similar challenges and are potentially in a better position to assist Liberia 
make the right policy choices to make her criminal justice system accessible. However, 
the reality is that most countries from the Global South lack the resources to lead 
international assistance in postconflict settings. Where they are involved, it is on a very 
low scale or they are coopted or employed by the West and other developed countries 
and/or neo-liberal institutions. In which case, they are required to design and implement 
interventions that affirm their paymasters’ interests and choices, thus no change in 
approach occurs. Williams (2018) shared this view with respect to the peacekeeping 
model that the international community has adopted in Somalia.  
I now turn to discuss the findings of this study relating to research question 3. 
RQ 3: How has Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System Affected the 
System’s Functionality and Liberia’s Peace and Stability 
As previously noted, Liberia’s criminal justice system, like other criminal justice 




and oversight mechanisms. These parts play independent but mutually reinforcing roles 
to get the system to function. Where one or more of these parts malfunctions, it affects 
the system’s ability to function as a whole. The goal of decentralizing Liberia's criminal 
justice system is to make the system’s services available to the population across Liberia 
(Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). The availability of the services provides an opportunity for 
the population to seek redress for their grievances Nyei (2014). It also shows the presence 
of the state in the lives of the population and contributes to Liberia’s peace and stability 
(Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016).  
State of Liberia’s criminal justice system prior to the war 
In determining how decentralizing the criminal justice system has affected the 
system’s functionality, there is the need for a baseline to compare the current state of 
access to Liberia’s criminal justice system to.  In this regard, participants asked to share 
their views on the state of the criminal justice system prior to Liberia’s civil war. The 
period prior to the war is used as the baseline because although Liberia’s conflict ended 
about eight years prior to 2011 (i.e., the reference year of this study) efforts to 
decentralize criminal justice services were intensified from 2011 with the hub projects. 
As stated earlier, the hubs project which was part of the strategy leading to the exit of the 
United Nations’ peacekeeping operation. Participants shared the following views:  
According to Participant 024, prior to the civil war, the criminal justice system 
was decentralized from Monrovia to the county capitals. Participant 008 indicated that 
the criminal justice system lacked infrastructure and human resources, and this affected 




system, Justice of the Peace Courts were established to operate outside magisterial 
districts. Participant 012 claimed that decentralization of the criminal justice system was 
hindered because the legal framework did not support real decentralization. Participant 
008 also described the criminal system as a system that provided services only in 
Monrovia. Participant 009 indicated that traditional justice was the primary source of 
justice in Liberia’s rural areas.  
The foregoing views paint a picture of a criminal justice system which was 
accessible to only a few, located in Liberia’s capital and to some extent the county 
capitals. To a very large extent, the criminal justice system could be described as 
designed and working only for inhabitants of Monrovia who were mostly the elite, with a 
traditional justice system providing justice for inhabitants of Liberia’s rural communities 
and perhaps some major cities (Bacon, 2015). While this may on the face of it appear 
discriminatory, it needs to be acknowledged that Article 65 of Liberia’s Constitution 
provides for a dual justice system that should operate across Liberia. The courts are 
required to apply both statutory and customary law in the administration of justice. 
Hence, the traditional justice system being the source of justice in rural areas will is not 
in itself discriminatory. However, there is evidence from data collected of a deliberate 
effort to encourage Liberians to use the formal justice system although it lacked a 
presence in many parts of the country. Participants like 024 alluded to this and described 
it as deliberate efforts to undermine the traditional justice system in favor of the formal 




Criminal justice system is showing signs of basic functionality and contributing to 
Liberia’s peace and stability 
The picture painted by participants about the reach of the criminal justice system 
prior to the civil war served as the baseline for determining how the decentralization 
process has affected the criminal justice system’s functionality. Broadly, participants 
indicated that decentralization has made the criminal justice system manifest very basic 
signs of functionality and is contributing to Liberia’s peace and stability. This finding is 
informed by the mixed views that participants shared on the current state of Liberia’s 
criminal justice system’s functionality. One view expressed by 3 participants including 
Participant 004 was that the criminal justice system is yet to be functional because, 
according to Participant 004, many citizens are yet to have access to the criminal justice 
system. Two participants including Participant 016, indicated that the criminal justice 
system lacks basic logistics, another 2 participants including Participant 021, indicated 
that in spite of the efforts to decentralize the criminal justice system, the system remains 
ineffective. Participant 020 (i.e., 1 participant) claimed that the criminal justice system is 
plagued with challenges that are affecting its functionality. These challenges include 
inadequate funding, human resources and infrastructure.  
Participant 020 went further to explain how factors like the Ebola Virus Disease 
and the downturn in Liberia’s economy affected the decentralization of the criminal 
justice system and 3 participants including Participants 016 and 022 described the process 
of decentralizing the criminal justice system as being characterized by selective justice 




criminal justice services are yet to reach the vulnerable population. Another 2 
participants, including Participant 021, described the criminal justice system as being 
beleaguered with high levels of pretrial detainees. Participant 013 described as poor the 
siting of the hub in Gbarnga, far away from the population (i.e., the recipients of the 
services it provides). This is because its location was affecting the system’s functionality. 
Related to this, another 3 participants indicated that the hub in Gbarnga was 
dysfunctional due to the existence of a legal framework that does not support it and 
inadequate human resources. Participant 016 lamented over the lack of coordination 
amongst criminal justice institutions. Participant 022 indicated that there was a lack of 
public confidence in the formal justice system. Inadequate legal literacy amongst citizens 
was cited by 1 participant. Participant 005 mentioned the lack of constitutional and 
judicial reform and the multiplicity of institutions established with duplicitous mandates 
as an indicator and reason for the dysfunctional criminal justice system. Explaining this, 
Participant 005 indicated that foreign organizations and international experts supporting 
the decentralization process established multiple institutions in an uncoordinated manner. 
According to this Participant, this was often driven by the personal preferences of 
officials/organizations involved and has resulted in the duplication of functions and a 
dysfunctional system.  
Resourcing parts of the criminal justice chain 
 Resources are important to build a functional criminal justice system. As 
previously noted, depending on how much resources are allocated to reform the various 




parts of the chain, the entire chain, including the part that receives most of the resources, 
may remain nonfunctional. In this regard, participants had the opportunity to share their 
views on resource allocation in the decentralization of the criminal justice system. 
Participants indicated that there was no equity in the allocation of resources to 
decentralize the various parts of the criminal justice chain. Sixteen participants including, 
Participants 007, 018, 019, 021, 016, 020 and 024 indicated that most of the resources 
were allocated to the police, the  
judiciary being the second highest recipient of resources and corrections getting the least. 
In the words of Participant 024  
I think this is common in most countries; the law and order part of the justice 
system is given greater focus … I think that being a postconflict environment; 
certainly, the focus is on maintaining peace and stability. There was quite a 
significant focus on the law and order side of things.  
This claim is supported by Jackson (2013) who found that in Sierra Leone, the 
postconflict reconstruction efforts placed premium on security and less on justice (i.e., 
more on the police) and this had an adverse effect on the outcome of the reforms of the 
justice part of the criminal justice chain across local and central levels of the country’s 
structure. The reforms in Sierra Leone focused on the police and neglected other parts of 
the criminal justice chain (Jackson, 2013). In spite of this, Howlett-Bolton (2008) 
asserted that the Sierra Leonean police was ineffective (Jackson, 2013). This proves the 




results in a dysfunctional criminal justice system despite the resources channeled to 
support that part of the chain.  
Comparing the state of the criminal justice system prior to the war and its current 
state suggests that there is very little difference between the two periods. For instance, the 
finding that specialized services were yet to reach the vulnerable in Liberia is confirmed 
by Bacon (2015) who found that in 2011 out of 71 female officers of the Women and 
Children Protection Section (i.e., a specialized unit of the Liberia National Police 
dedicated to respond to sexual and gender related offenses) only 5 (7%) were located in 
rural communities. Participant 022 confirmed the presence of the traditional justice 
system in rural Liberia and the preference of the majority of  
Liberians for this system of justice. This Participant referred to the outcome of a public 
perception survey conducted in 2018 which found that over 70 % of respondents 
preferred and used the traditional justice system. Dinnen and Peake (2013) found that, 
similarly, in Sierra Leone, policing services and other formal government 
institutions/services are concentrated in the urban centers and citizens in the rural areas 
rely on the customary law/justice system to resolve disputes. The lack of adequate 
infrastructure and human resources in Liberia is striking because in discussing research 
question 1, infrastructure and human resources were found to be two of the approaches 
adopted to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. It is either that there was a real 
dearth in human resources and infrastructure, so the results of all the efforts after the civil 
war to address these challenges have only been a drop in the ocean. The other possible 




positively affects the system’s functionality. Also, a combination of all the factors 
identified above could explain participants’ claims of inadequate human resources and 
infrastructure in Liberia’s criminal justice system despite efforts to improve them. The 
finding that human resources and infrastructure were inadequate in Liberia’s criminal 
justice system is supported by Fyanka (2014) who found that policing was ineffective in 
Liberia because there was a disconnect between efforts to reform the police, inadequate 
human resources to support the criminal justice system’s operations and an absence of the 
criminal justice system across Liberia, especially in Liberia’s rural parts. Krawczyk and 
Muhula (2018) also found that weak human resource capacity is a challenge confronting 
decentralization in Liberia. Unfortunately, the hub concept, which was intended to be the 
most far reaching effort to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible, received 
mixed and often negative reviews by participants and this may be part of the reason  
why infrastructure and human resources remains a systemic challenge. These 
explanations should not be interpreted to mean that the challenges of any criminal justice 
system, particularly in postconflict settings, can be resolved overnight. I will therefore 
argue that even if the hub project and other interventions yielded the desired results, some 
of the challenges or indicators used by Participants to describe the criminal justice system 
as dysfunctional would have been present, though, perhaps in less prominent quantities. 
As has been revealed above, the inequitable allocation of resources to support the various 
parts of the criminal justice system in the decentralization process and the fact that the 




Decentralization has made Liberia’s criminal justice system functional 
Despite the views expressed above, some participants were of the opinion that 
decentralization has made the criminal justice system functional. In this regard, 2 
participants, including Participant 009, observed that the criminal justice system “is 
functioning better because … I feel that more cases are being heard. So, justice is not as 
delayed as it was before.” Sixteen participants including, Participants 006, 011, 015, 018, 
021, 026 and 027 indicated that decentralization has enhanced access to, and oversight of, 
the criminal justice system and enhanced the rule of law in Liberia. According to 
Participant 027 “if decentralization had not happened, we would still have been dealing 
with a system where in large parts of the country, you do not have a court, you do not 
have lawyers, … there’s been a lot of progress.”  
Participant 024 indicated that: 
I don’t think anyone who’s been in Liberia in 2003 and came back again in 2018 
could doubt the progress made, in terms of the functionality of the justice system 
in that way, I think that by and large the police are able to respond, not the way 
that will be expected for them to respond to individual cases and things like that, 
but I certainly think that there is a better perception of the security that the police 
can provide.  
Participant 011 (i.e., 1 participant) indicated that legislative reform has enhanced the 
criminal justice system’s functionality and 2 participants (i.e., Participants 024 and 027) 
indicated that the criminal justice system is functional, but the benefits of decentralization 




 The number of participants who indicated that the criminal justice system was 
functional exceeds those who indicated that the system was showing signs of 
functionality. On the face of it, these findings appear contradictory. However, if they are 
interpreted within the wider context of the data collected, particularly the various 
indicators that participants cited as evidence of a dysfunctional criminal justice system, I 
am of the opinion that these apparent opposing perspectives are reconcilable and can be 
rationalized. Given the gestation period of criminal justice reform in postconflict settings, 
the state of Liberia’s criminal justice system prior to the war and the state of affairs at the 
time of collecting data, I have concluded that decentralization has resulted in Liberia’s 
criminal justice system showing basic signs of functionality. The reason being that 
participants who indicated that they system was functional may have been measuring the 
state of affairs to what it was before, which is natural but not an appropriate indicator to 
inform programmatic interventions that seek to make the system really accessible.  
As previously noted, the criminal justice system is made up of various parts, who 
play individual but reinforcing roles to get the system to function. In this regard, 
participants were asked whether the various parts of the criminal justice chain were 
playing their respective roles in the criminal justice system. I posed this question to test 
participants perspectives on the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
Answering this question, 6 participants, including Participant 005, 010, 012 and 029, 
indicated that the various parts of the criminal justice chain were working together. For 
instance, Participant 012 stated that “yes there is collaboration, coordination and 




including Participants 001, 009, 022, 023 and 024 said that parts of the criminal justice 
chain are not working and/or partially working together. In the words of Participant 024: 
I think they are working together better than they had been. I think that there are 
still limitations … I still think that they still see each other as competitors for their 
resources. I do think they are more aware of each other’s needs and limitations. I 
think that they are more aware that they can function more effectively if they were 
together. 
Since working together is a work in progress in every criminal justice system, 
expectations should be measured in postconflict settings. To increase the chances of this 
improving in Liberia, there is the need to improve how the parts of the criminal justice 
chain and criminal justice institutions work together. They need to see themselves as 
complementary and not competitors. There should be a reward and sanction system as 
well as a mechanism to actively encourage this to happen. The mechanism must have the 
capacity and political support to get criminal justice institutions to work as a system. The 
need for such a mechanism to be capacitated is supported by Krawczyk and Muhula, 
(2018) who found that in Liberia, these public institutions have weak coordination 
capacity. 
How decentralization has affected Liberia’s peace and stability 
Jackson (2017) claimed that there is agreement among researchers that a link exists 
between decentralization and conflict though there is no consensus over the nature of the  
relationship. Schultze-Kraft, Markus and Morina (2014) held similar views as they 




the evidence to support a nexus between decentralization and development is minimal 
even in stable environments (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016).  
Participants 001 and 026 (i.e., 2 participants) claimed that decentralization of the 
criminal justice system has contributed to Liberia’s peace and stability and another 2 (i.e., 
participants 008 and 021) indicated that the decentralization process is helping to address 
the root causes of Liberia’s civil war. According to Participant 026: 
Yes, it has. Because we were able to deploy more lawyers, judges, more cases are  
being heard at the local level, and now when people have issues, they are able to  
go to the court rather than put the law into their own hands. So, if you look at the  
issue of mob violence, even though it is still happening, it has reduced  
considerably. Most of the cases in the various courts are being dealt with there in  
a faster way as compared to before. 
Participant 021 stated that “yes, for the purpose of stabilization; for the purpose of 
sustaining our peace and in the light of consolidating our peace and also for the purpose 
of meeting elements of the Sustainable Development Goals.” This Participant also 
claimed that “… in a way it helped to accelerate the process of addressing citizen 
concerns.” Peace and stability are manifestations of the rule of law. This is supported by 
Hamann (2012) who claimed that “Decentralisation will make a contribution to 
establishing rule-of-law structures if the population concerned is given a genuine 
possibility of participating and if it strengthens the responsibility and accountability of  
the individual” (p. 37/569). The fact that Liberia continues to enjoy peace and stability 




Jackson (2017) also asserted that, the presence of a strong local government in 
postconflict settings engenders lasting peace. Manor (2006) backed this assertion as, 
according to this researcher, making decentralization an important part in postconflict 
reconstruction increases the chances of public services reaching the poor and governing 
inclusively (Jackson, 2017).  
Decentralizing the criminal justice system could result in the extension of the 
state’s authority and presence into parts of the country which have never felt the presence 
of government (Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016; Escobar-Lemmon & 
Ross, 2014; Hamann, 2012; Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018; Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & 
Alzate, 2016; Tang & Huhe, 2016;). Extending the justice system in postconflict settings 
assures the private sector of the security of their investment, hence encourages private 
investment (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). According to Denney (2014), the World Bank 
claimed that a reformed criminal justice system encourages the population to resort to the 
criminal justice system to address their grievances. The United Nations also emphasized 
the point that reforming the criminal justice system is a contribution to enduring peace 
and development (Gordon, 2014). Bigdon and Hettige (2003) claimed that 
decentralization has the potential to mitigate conflict because it provides a peaceful 
approach “to manage inter-group tensions, increases representation and participation, and 
improves service delivery, all of which reduce the likelihood of conflict” (Jackson, 2017, 
p. 751). Ligthart and van Oudheusden (2011) augured that a link exists between 




Romeo (2002) decentralization is a way of “demilitarizing politics in divided societies” 
(Jackson, 2017, p.752).  
Where the conflict trigger is inequality or marginalization, decentralization has been 
found to contribute to enduring peace (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). In Sierra Leone, 
decentralization was used as a tool for stabilization and resulted in progress in its 
postconflict recovery phase (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016 & Jackson, 2017). Schroder and 
Chappuis, (2014) hold the view that in postconflict environments justice sector reform is 
seen as a tool for stabilization. According to Jackson (2007), Sierra Leone’s central 
government operated a system that focused only on the capital, neglecting the rest of the 
country, and this led to the civil war (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). 
Despite assertions about the case made for decentralization in postconflict 
reconstruction, it must be pointed out that authors like Edwards and Yilmaz (2016) posit 
that there is an absence of agreement on the advantages of decentralization in postconflict 
reconstruction and stabilization. According to Edwards and Yilmaz (2016), one theory 
indicates that decentralization deepens internal conflicts and the other argues that 
decentralization mitigates conflict. Brinkerhoff (2005) and Schou and Haug (2006) 
shared similar sentiments (Jackson, 2017). The root causes of a particular conflict is an 
important determinant of how decentralization will affect peacebuilding processes in that 
society (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). Where ethnicity (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016) or 
political rivalry Bigdon and Hettige, (2003) cited in Jackson (2017) is the conflict driver, 




that fiscal decentralization in Indonesia fueled violence because of the local elite’s quest 
for control over resources (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016).  
According to the report of Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Liberia’s civil war was largely driven by exclusion of the indigenous population by the 
settlers. Like Sierra Leone, Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that 
this resulted in a system of government which treated Monrovia, inhabited by the settlers, 
positively differently from the indigenous population who lived outside the capital 
(Government of Liberia, 2010). This system had been perpetuated for well over a 
century, leading to numerous conflicts with the 14 year civil war being the most serious. 
Given the triggers of Liberia’s civil war, it can be argued with a great degree of certainty 
that the fruits of the quest to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice within a larger project 
to decentralize public services will lead to peace and stability in Liberia. This is because, 
decentralizing the criminal justice system does not result in the distribution of resources, 
particularly money, as Bertrand (2004) noted was the case in Indonesia (Edwards & 
Yilmaz, 2016) and there is consensus that the criminal justice system must be accessible 
across. However, the methodology used to decentralize criminal justice services can 
derail the benefits of decentralization. For instance, in Liberia, the finding that the 
traditional justice system and leaders were deliberately ignored in the process to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system, must be watched as this could be the 
Achilles Heel of the efforts to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. Table 13 
presents participants views on how decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice has affected 




Table 13  
Findings - Research Question 3 
 
Research Questions Findings 
RQ 3: How has 
decentralizing Liberia’s 
criminal justice system 
affected the system’s 
functionality and Liberia’s 
peace and stability?  
 
i. Decentralization has made Liberia’s criminal justice 
system functional (but two participants said the benefits 
are yet to be felt) 
ii. Decentralization of the criminal justice system has 
contributed to Liberia’s peace and stability and is helping 
to address the root causes of Liberia’s civil war 
 
Research Question 3 (1). How can the Functionality of Liberia’s Criminal Justice 
System be Improved? 
In discussing research question 3, I concluded that the functionality of Liberia’s 
criminal justice system still leaves much to be desired. To answer this research question, I 
solicited participants views on what should be done to improve the system’s 
functionality. The primary objective of answering this research question was to solicit the 
perspectives of participants, the majority of whom are Liberian, to proffer solutions that 




reform in postconflict societies. Participants made 2 broad recommendations and several 
subrecommendations. Implementing the subrecommendations would aid the 
implementation of the broad recommendations. The 2 main recommendations are that 
there is the need to further reform and develop Liberia’s criminal justice 
institutions/system and that there is the need to change the approaches and attitudes used 
to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible. Table 14 presents recommendations 
on how to improve the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system.   
 
Table 14 
Findings – Research Question 3 (1) 
RQ 3.1: How can the 
functionality of Liberia’s 
criminal justice system be 
improved? 
i. Undertake institutional reform and development of 
Liberia’s criminal justice institutions/system. 
ii. All actors involved in the decentralization process 
must change their attitude towards the process.  
 
Reform and develop Liberia’s criminal justice institutions/system 
 This recommendation is an acknowledgement that institutions of Liberia’s 
criminal justice system still require reform and development. This is an indication that 




time, particularly in postconflict settings. Hence, despite the resources and time that have 
been committed to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible, there is still work to 
be done. Going forward, the reform process requires that some of the approaches that 
have been used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system should be pursued. 
Participants also recommended a change in approach and in the attitude of actors 
involved in the process. Participants recommended the following actions to reform and 
develop Liberia’s criminal justice system: -  
Participant 005 (i.e., one Participant) called for a complete overhaul of Liberia’s 
criminal justice system. This recommendation highlights the need to focus on dealing 
with the systemic challenges plaguing and clogging Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
According to this Participant, the process of making the criminal justice system 
accessible has over focused on improving infrastructure with less attention being paid to 
addressing the systemic challenges of the justice system. This recommendation also 
emphasizes the need for a holistic approach to criminal justice reform and confirms 
Silvestre (2016) finding about the negative unintended consequences of the Brazilian 
government’s decision to focus heavily on building prison infrastructure to deal with the 
huge prison population and not addressing other challenges within the criminal justice 
system.  
Three participants, including Participant 029, called for steps to be taken to 
address the infrastructure gap in the criminal justice system through the construction of 
small-scale infrastructure closer to the population they are expected to serve. In this 




unsustainable.” Closely related to the need to improve infrastructure is the 
recommendation made by 3 participants including Participants 014 and 029 that logistics 
for the criminal justice system need to be improved.  
Five participants, including Participants 001, 008 and 017, called for the 
allocation of adequate financial resources to implement initiatives to decentralize 
Liberia’s criminal justice system. Decentralization processes require resources to 
implement. With limited resources particularly in postconflict countries like Liberia. This 
reality casts doubts on the possibility that adequate resources can be provided to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. It is my considered view that calling for 
the provision of adequate resources to fund the decentralization of Liberia’s criminal 
justice system is, respectfully, a wishful request which has almost no certainty of being 
realized. Liberia’s government will have to find creative ways of being efficient in using 
its limited resources. It is in this light that the orthodox approach to criminal justice 
reform in postconflict societies must be questioned and/or revised. Maximizing the use of 
limited resources requires, among other things, tailoring interventions to suit the context. 
It also requires a middle path between the quest by international actors, who are 
supporting the process, to promote certain interests and values and the realities on the 
ground. Keeping this balance must be done through a thoughtful process, with innovation 
as a guiding principle. It requires a  
departure from the norm and being exhibiting some degree of altruism, a call though 




The third recommended action calls for reforming the criminal justice system’s 
legal framework. Participant 029 and 3 others shared this view. According to this 
Participant, “some of the laws are archaic and so there is a need to look at it and ensure 
that they reflect the common reality.” The foundation of the rule of law is certainty and 
this is partly achieved through legislation which is published and enforceable. Having 
legislation which does not reflect the demands of the time makes the quest to entrench a 
rule of law culture in Liberia a mere slogan. Because of the civil war, Liberia is 
confronted with criminal conduct that hitherto was unknown to it and its legislation is not 
in touch with this reality.  
During Liberia’s civil war, normal processes like law reform slowed down or 
came to a standstill and existing legislation was overtaken by changes that occurred. To 
address this requires legislative reform and intervention. One issue requiring legislative 
reform that Participant 029 identified is the need to reform the Judiciary Law to increase 
the duration of Court Terms to enable courts sit for longer periods, thereby increasing 
access to justice. Another area that participants want attention to be given to is for judges 
of the formal justice system to collaborate with the traditional justice system to dispense 
justice. This will require policy and legislative reform and an overhaul of the criminal 
justice system’s processes. 
Participants 008, 009, 014 (i.e., 3 participants) recommended the enhancement of 
coordination within the criminal justice chain. To this end, Participant 008 observed that: 
It is not enough to strengthen prosecution if you cannot strengthen the judicial 




mean? The police have a role to play with that; the judges have a role to play with 
that; the prosecution has a role to play with that. So, we need to have a system 
that will look at all the various organizations and we bring them up 
simultaneously; all of them have to operate in a parallel way … 
Participant 009 stated that: 
We got institutionalized blockages in our holistic system. If we are looking at the  
system in holistic manner; starting from the police going all the way to the  
prisons, we had institutionalized blockages. And ensuring working together as one  
and trying to unblock the system in all of these parts would help the functioning  
or dysfunction of the system. 
Participant 027 (i.e., 1 participant) recommended the improvement of the 
knowledge of the population about the criminal justice system. This Participant called for 
improved communication and legal literacy amongst the population. This 
recommendation seeks to improve the interaction between the criminal justice system and 
the population and the population’s appreciation of their rights and obligations as well as 
how the criminal justice system works. A population whose legal literacy skills are 
enhanced will potentially be an effective partner of the system and contribute to making it 
functional, accountable and accessible.  
The last recommendation was made by 2 participants including Participant 015. It 
advocates for technology to be used to make the criminal justice system accessible. 
Participant 015 recommended the use of technology to perform law enforcement 




be used so that scarce human resources that are being used to perform traffic control 
duties can be freed up to perform other duties. Holmberg (2014) and Jacot-Descombes 
and Niklaus (2016) shared this recommendation. However, Participant 022 cautioned 
against unbridled use of technology to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. This 
Participant stated that:  
I am personally not in favor of pushing for some sort of digital revolution, maybe  
also, because I have seen expensive attempts including in Timor Leste where  
millions were invested and didn’t really lead to any meaningful efficiency. …  
Electricity is still a big problem. Finance is a big problem. Facilities like offices  
are not there to accommodate expensive equipment. And again, I will also bring  
up the sustainability issue, we buy very expensive equipment for instance solar  
panels. So, what happens when the machines break down in places like Grand  
Kru. … You don’t need anything fancy. Mobile phones are a very important tool  
of communication in this country. Coverage is quite good. I think it is important  
and also, cheap. It is important that staff in the field will also have phones and that  
they are able to communicate; not that they are not communicating; they are with  
their superiors in Monrovia. … So, I think that it is a bit early especially outside  
the capital. I don’t see how this could work. 
This Participant’s caution does not reject the use of technology to make Liberia’s 
criminal justice system accessible, it only advocates for circumspection in determining 
the level of sophistication of the technology that is deployed. This recommendation is 




to enhance access to justice. Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017) claimed 
that, in postconflict societies, technology can be used for case management as was done 
in Rwanda. Also, technology can be used to make the judiciary accessible (Parkin & 
Wedeking, 2016).  
Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) advocated for replacing the traditional 
approaches to incarceration with technology for certain offences, excluding sexual 
offences. The researcher argued that this may contribute to reducing recidivism and aid 
rehabilitation. According to Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) technological incarceration 
could reduce the cost of incarceration by half or one third. Using technology to 
incarcerate has disadvantages including breaching the rights of convicts. Whereas the use 
of technological incarceration may come with advantages, the infrastructure required to 
implement this form of incarceration is undeveloped even in the Western world let alone 
a postconflict republic like Liberia. Hence, using this approach in Liberia is imprudent or 
to say the least requires time, resources and further advancement/development of the 
country. Creating, operating and maintaining a website that provides vital information to 
the population is one way to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice system with the 
aid of technology. However, in a society where illiteracy is rife and internet penetration 
low, this will be beneficial only to the elite.  
The caution expressed by Participant 022 should not be discounted. Even though 
the world is moving towards digitizing a lot of processes, in the name of national 
ownership and tailoring solutions to suit the Liberian context, an attempt to digitize 




measured but at the same time bold. A realistic balance needs to be kept between the 
need and/or quest to digitize and the ability of such interventions to be sustained with 
public resources generated within Liberia. 
All actors must change their attitude and approach 
The second broad recommendation participants made, called for an attitudinal change by 
all actors working to make criminal justice services accessible in Liberia. These include 
overseas development actors. As will be revealed in the actions suggested to implement 
this recommendation, participants all called for a departure from the orthodox approach 
used to reform criminal justice systems in postconflict societies. The following are the 
specific actions that participants identified to be taken to implement the second 
recommendation.  
First, 2 participants (i.e., Participants 008 and 018) advocated for national 
ownership of the decentralization process (i.e., Liberians need to own the processes to 
enhance the system’s accessibility to the population). In this regard, Participant 008 said 
“Liberia also needs to support local ownership.” Practically, this should, in part, translate 
into Liberians owning the process and the international community supporting them to be 
in the driver’s seat. It will not be easy nor immediate but needs to be done. At what stage 
that this is done (i.e., the timing) is important.  
The second action that 8 participants including Participants 010, 015 and 016 
advocated for, was to ensure that processes to enhance access to the criminal justice 
system are sustainable. In support of this recommended action, Participant 016 stated that 




have conducted a lot of training for qualified personnel to be able to sustain those 
systems.” Participant 015 believed that “what is critical right now is the issue of 
sustainability. How can the government strategize to sustain what they themselves need 
to put in place?” As previously noted, a major challenge confronting Liberia’s criminal 
justice system is the inability of the government to sustain projects that were initiated and 
supported through international development assistance. This challenge is a recurring 
theme associated with criminal justice reform processes supported with international aid 
in postconflict societies (Denney, 2014). Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) acknowledged 
the link between ensuring that interventions to decentralize public services are 
sustainable and reaping the maximum benefits of the decentralization process. In this 
regard, Dinnen and Peake (2013) and Bacon (2015) claim that decentralization processes 
that are nationally owned/driven and tailored to fit the context where they are being 
implemented are projects that are likely to pass the sustainability test.  
Participant 024 called for a focus on the population who are the intended 
recipients of criminal justice system services, an approach this Participant observed was 
missing in Liberia. This Participant claimed that:  
I also think that our focus was so much on the providers of the service rather than  
the recipients of the service. … there was very little focus on their responsibilities  
as the police, as the judiciary, as the prosecution and much more on what their  
needs were. And I think that the international community facilitated that thinking  
and also encouraged competition between the different institutions of the criminal  




 As previously mentioned, Kostovicova (2008) asserted that security sector reform 
processes require creating relationships between the governed and the government so the 
governed have a “say in it” (Gordon, 2014). This recommendation has the added 
advantage of bolstering public confidence in the criminal justice system. Chappuis and 
Heiner (2009) also observed that in Western liberalism, security sector reform provides 
the basis for statehood to create “people-centered security” (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014, 
p.134). Gordon (2014) noted that “Efforts focusing on building state institutions and 
structures, without sufficiently paying attention to developing relations between the state 
and its people, will not, it is argued, benefit peacebuilding in the long term” (p.126). 
Denny (2014) promotes an approach to security sector reform that focuses on the end 
user of justice and security services. According to this researcher, this approach 
recognizes the relationship between providers of justice and security services. Knight 
(2009) also called for security sector reform processes to have a Social Contract element 
since this will create a situation where the focus is on the relationship between the state 
and the citizenry (Gordon, 2014). A citizen or user centered approach will move the 
debate from whether to deal with state and nonstate actors to an integrated approach to 
reforming the justice and security sectors (Gordon, 2014). Adopting the end-user 
approach to security sector reform results in a bottom-up approach to security sector 
reform and takes criminal justice reform processes out of the hands of the elite in 
postconflict societies (Gordon, 2014). The call that security sector programming should 
abandon the dichotomy between state and nonstate actors is a positive one because, 




the ground in postconflict countries as opposed to the current theoretical approach that 
inordinately promotes the Weberian approach to state building. 
Two participants called for the deployment of criminal justice officials outside 
Monrovia. This recommendation is linked to the previous one relating to an approach that 
seeks to focus on the users of the criminal justice system. In this regard, Participant 018 
observed that “pretrial detentions are still there but lawyers are not encouraged to deploy 
outside where the services are decentralized.” As noted earlier, Bacon (2015) found that, 
in Liberia, donors focused their attention in the capital even though the majority of the 
population was located outside the capital. Jackson (2017) shared similar views because 
the author indicated that the international community supporting reforms in postconflict 
countries are not enthusiastic about extending their support beyond the capital. 
Practically, this approach of the international community adversely affected the interests 
of Liberia’s rural population because they did not benefit from the support provided to 
the formal justice system and the traditional justice system that supported them did not 
receive the desired support from the international community’s support.  
However, the international community cannot bear the entire blame; if national 
actors believed in supporting the traditional justice system and matched this interest with 
demands on their international partners, the neglect of the traditional justice system 
would not have been so palpable. As claimed by Participant 005, some of Liberia’s elite 
appear to be inwardly embarrassed about being associated with the traditional justice 
system. Supporting and involving the traditional justice system in dispensing justice, 




potential of addressing the challenge of access to justice in Liberia’s rural areas and 
Liberia as a whole.  
According to Denney (2014), a working relationship between both systems of 
justice is manifested in a situation where a judge of the formal justice system refers a 
matter to the traditional justice system for arbitration and chiefs refer electoral related 
matters that are before them to the police. For this to occur and be effective, actors within 
both systems of justice must be trained, this is even pertinent in operationalizing Article 
65 of Liberia’s constitution which enjoins the courts to apply both customary and 
statutory laws in the administration of justice. Five participants including Participants 
004, 022 and 029 called for training of personnel delivering justice services. For instance, 
Participant 029 invited Liberia’s authorities to “ensure that people are trained to deliver 
services.”  
Collaboration between state and nonstate actors in postconflict settings to provide 
access to justice is in line with Denney (2014) and Jackson (2013) who called for 
abandoning the approach to criminal justice reform that draws a dichotomy between state 
and nonstate actors with foreign actors gravitating towards working more or only with 
state actors. Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan (2008), shared this view because they 
noted that in postconflict countries nonstate and state actors collaborate to provide public 
services under a framework described as “hybrid or non-Weberian political formations” 
(Podder, 2014, p. 215). Jackson (2017) also noted that “… in postconflict environments 




providers; that may include armed actors - is critical in terms of providing services like 
security” (p. 751).  
When the population does not feel the presence of the state, nonstate actors step in 
to fill the void, hence working with nonstate actors in postconflict reform processes is not 
only sensible but an imperative. In other words, attempting to create a security 
architecture along the Weberian style in postconflict settings is futile, an imprudent use of 
scarce resources and flies in the face of national ownership principles (Denney, 2014; 
Podder, 2014 & Homel & Masson, 2016). Collaboration amongst actors in the criminal 
justice system including the traditional justice system requires that they communicate. 
This is acknowledged by 2 participants. Dandurand (2014) stated this recommendation. 
According to this research, due to the complexities of the criminal justice system, actors 
within the system must collaborate and communicate to be effective and generate the 
public’s confidence in the system. There is however a caveat that, when involving 
nonstate actors, all sections of the society including women and youth must be 
represented (Gordon, 2014) because the reform processes must resist any attempts to 
preserve discriminatory practices that characterized the preconflict and conflict periods 
(Jackson, 2013). This recommendation is also supported by Dinnen and Peake (2013) 
who found that, in Bougainville, police reform processes actively engaged women, and 
this resulted in an increase in the number of women police officers.  
 Related to the recommendation for a citizen centered criminal justice system is 
the call by Participant 025 for the efforts to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice 




recommendation affirms the soundness in the decision to abandon the hub project as 
initially conceptualized for an approach that focuses on service delivery whilst building 
small scale infrastructure to house and dispense criminal justice services. Services 
provided by paralegal have been used to make criminal justice services accessible in 
postconflict countries (Swenson, 2018).  According to some participants, attempts to 
establish a paralegal scheme has been largely resisted in Liberia. According to Participant 
024:  
I think one of the principal things is the paralegal systems that have been used or  
established effectively in other parts of Africa but also specifically within West  
Africa. I think that in terms of accessibility and in terms of decentralization and  
actually, improving people’s access to the justice system and understanding of the  
justice system. I think there is obvious resistance to that in Liberia. But  
nevertheless, I do think that there is something that could be learned from that,  
there are similar problems across all of those systems and across other countries  
as well where there aren’t enough lawyers. You just don’t have enough in the  
formal system to process the kind of people that are coming into the system. And  
therefore, you need to go out. And I think there are some really interesting  
approaches in other places. Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and other bits and pieces…  
Liberia has got absolutely no real justification for refusing to take this stuff  
forward. 
Swenson (2018) referred to paralegals as barefoot lawyers. Paralegals work with 




who have proved effective in providing access to justice in postconflict countries 
(Swenson, 2018). The United Nations has endorsed using these barefoot lawyers to 
enhance access to justice in postconflict countries (Swenson, 2018). In Sierra Leone, they 
actively providing services that enhance the population's access to the criminal justice 
system. They provided legal literacy skills, advice on how to navigate the criminal justice 
system and mediation (Denney, 2014 & Jackson, 2013). Stomseth, Wippman and Brooks 
(2006) claimed that “Paralegal assistance seems to offer that ever-elusive commodity: a 
do-no-harm intervention with capacity to improve both the state and nonstate justice 
sectors in almost any setting, including postconflict societies'' (Swenson, 2018, p. 52). 
According to Maru (2006), paralegals are cost effective services that are sustainable 
(Swenson, 2018). Baker (2010) also indicated that in postconflict environments, 
paralegals bring state and nonstate justice together (Swenson, 2018). In Timor-Lestor, 
Swenson (2018) found that paralegals assisted in resolving disputes in a shorter time 
compared to the formal justice system.  
There are challenges that are associated with using paralegals to enhance access to 
justice. According to Swenson (2018), lines of accountability between paralegals and 
certain actors like their donors, local/traditional authorities and state authorities are 
blurred, and this creates multiple lines of accountability and management. Secondly, 
decisions arrived at by paralegals are not binding, hence may result in delays in bringing 
closure to disputes and fuel impunity (Swenson, 2018). This is because the powerful in 
society will disobey their orders thus affecting the vulnerable in society, especially 




forums for dispute resolution and creates an opportunity for abuse by litigants who may 
mischievously engage in forum shopping (Swenson, 2018). The lack of human resource 
capacity to operate paralegal schemes and the fact that they usually operate in remote 
locales, away from the eyes of oversight structures, may affect the quality of justice they 
dispense (Swenson, 2018). In connection with the challenge of lack of oversight, 
Castillejo (2009) found that in Sierra Leone, the presence of other nonstate actors, like 
civil society organizations, working on access to justice issues provided oversight over 
paralegals (Jackson, 2013). For paralegal programs to be successful, they must be 
supported by the elite and powerful in the community (Swenson, 2018).  
As earlier noted, Participant 024 claimed that lawyers in Liberia, who are part of 
the elite in every society have been reluctant to support the introduction of a paralegal 
scheme in Liberia. This is in spite of the access to justice challenges confronting 
Liberians. Given the reasons provided by Participant 024 for the resistance, it is evident 
that Liberian lawyers are engaging in an act of self-preservation. The unsuccessful 
attempts to introduce a paralegal program in Liberia despite the highlighted benefits, 
confirmed Swenson (2018) assertion that support from the society’s powerful and elite is 
a condition precedent for establishing and implementing a successful paralegal scheme in 
postconflict settings. What is at stake in Liberia is a conflict between satisfying the 
parochial interest of a few which is packaged as seeking the interest of the larger society. 
The quest for, and right to, justice that is sought by most of the population has been 
ignored. The inability of the formal justice system to provide access to justice in the 




collaboratively to get various actors on board, failing which leadership is required to 
uphold the interest of the majority of citizens for access to justice (i.e., to introduce a 
paralegal scheme in Liberia while addressing the excesses associated with its 
introduction).  
The interests at stake in the discussions to introduce a paralegal program in 
Liberia is one instance where the conceptual challenge of what constitutes national 
ownership is manifested. This confirms Gordon (2014) and Schroder and Chappuis 
(2014) assertion about the interest driven nature of criminal justice system reform even in 
postconflict settings. The debate over introducing a paralegal scheme in Liberia also 
highlighted the battle between national and local ownership and what happens in such 
contests (i.e., often national ownership prevails). Residents of Liberia’s local 
communities, who are mostly the poor and vulnerable will be better off receiving 
paralegal services, but at the national level there is opposition and the voice at the 
national level being that of the powerful and elite is, so far, holding sway. This must 
change! The desire to introduce a paralegal program in Liberia to enhance access to 
criminal justice services, is an example of an instance where programs that have been 
successfully implemented in other contexts can be tailored and implemented in another 
context with similar challenges.  
Two participants including Participant 016 and called for coordination and 
oversight of the criminal justice chain. According to this Participant, “There are a lot of 
complaints that cases are brought to the police station and the police charges money or 




police officers that fail to abide by the law.” It is important that criminal justice reform 
processes are holistic and coordinated to ensure the judicious use of resources and that all 
parts of the criminal justice system receive the required attention. These will increase the 
chances of reaping the intended consequences of the decentralization process. As noted 
earlier, the consequences and manifestations of an uncoordinated criminal justice reform 
process was found in Sierra Leone where the postconflict reconstruction process focused 
heavily on security and less on justice and this adversely affected the justice part of the 
chain and, as observed by Howlett-Bolton (2008), the effectiveness of the police was also 
negatively affected (Jackson, 2013). As part of a holistic and coordinated approach to 
decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system, oversight mechanisms need to be 
strengthened. Effective oversight and accountability are features of every modern 
criminal justice system operated by countries who are developing a democratic culture 
(Nall & Mamayek, 2013). When criminal justice systems are decentralized, their 
interaction with the population increases and this increases the chances that human rights 
abuses will occur, particularly in postconflict countries. This creates a compelling reason 
for Liberia to enhance oversight and accountability of its criminal justice system. For a 
postconflict society, these challenges have implications for building enduring peace and 
stability and can also defeat the purpose of having an accessible criminal justice system. 
Establishing an effective oversight and accountability mechanism contributes to 
enhancing public confidence in the criminal justice system. The need for democratic 




researcher recommends that security sector reform processes in Liberia must be designed 
and implemented in a manner tailored towards civilian oversight over the sector.  
In furtherance of the overarching recommendation for attitudinal change 
Participant 11 called on international partners to remain credible and consistent in the 
decentralization process. This Participant indicated that:  
But let me just say this; partnership goes with confidence first and credibility. In  
many instances where you see the goalposts being shifted in the middle of the  
game and the rules changing in the middle of the game, there is an issue that  
should be addressed. If it is not addressed, they become a problem with the  
partnership. 
Credibility is key in every partnership, more so when it comes to upholding national 
ownership principles in delivering international development assistance. Being consistent 
requires that international actors stay committed to genuinely upholding national 
ownership principles in the assistance they deliver. It also ensures that when agreements 
are made between international actors and recipients of their assistance, parties stick to 
their commitments with enough room to jointly change course should there be a change 
in the situation. The need to remain credible and consistent is also required of national 
actors. According to Gordon (2014), the fact that local actors lack the political will to 
support reform processes is acknowledged by Heaped (2012). Underlying this absence of 
political will are interests of local actors that may be adversely affected by the ongoing 
reforms (Gordon, 2014). Jackson (2013) affirmed the need for consistency and 




by drawing the attention of those leading the reforms and the intended beneficiaries, to 
accept the fact that the process is time and resource consuming and requires endurance.  
Theoretical Framework 
 The results of this qualitative study validated the theoretical frameworks used to 
conduct this research and brings clarity to the research questions. Structural 
Functionalism and Realism theories were used to conduct this study. Realism is used to 
analyze the behavior of states (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). According to Realist 
Theory, states are emboldened by their power to act in pursuit of their national interests. 
The following assumptions underpin the Realist Theory: that the international system is 
state centric; that the conduct of states in international politics is conflict driven, hence 
anarchic; that states are sovereign and have different capabilities and sizes; that states are 
rational and unitary actors in pursuing their national interest; and that a state’s power 
determines, predicts and explains its actions. Structural Functionalism theorists claim that 
social entities such as organizations, are organisms that are comprised of different parts. 
Each part plays a unique role(s) and these parts work together to contribute to keeping the 
organism alive and functional (Babbie, 2015). In this regard, where a part malfunctions, 
the ability of the organism to function according to its design to achieve the objective(s) 
for which it is designed is adversely affected and makes the organism incapable or 
ineffective (Babbie, 2015).  
 This grounded theory qualitative study found that the majority of the actors 
involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system were states, quasi-state 




and/or developed countries and institutions oriented towards the neoliberal ideology. 
These states committed resources to support Liberia’s postconflict recovery processes, 
including enhancing access to the criminal justice system. The processes championed by 
these actors promoted neoliberal institutions and values. Institutions that were created and 
the reforms that were undertaken sought to or replicated neoliberal institutions without 
due regard to the specificities of the Liberian context. For example, the traditional justice 
system, which is the primary source of justice for most of the Liberian population, at best 
received negligible attention, even though the huge resources committed to reform the 
formal justice system are yet to yield the desired results. I also found that nonstate actors, 
ordinary citizens, traditional leaders and civil society organizations were hardly consulted 
in the decentralization processes. As indicated in the literature, this is a common 
occurrence in postconflict reconstruction because international actors seek to promote the 
Weberian style of security sector reform which has a state centric approach (Denney, 
2014). The recurrence of this mistake in security sector reform in postconflict 
reconstruction has resulted in authors like Schroder and Chappuis, (2014) questioning the 
appropriateness of the Weberian-style model in postconflict peacebuilding processes. 
That approach furthers the interests of the countries funding the reforms, hence the 
likelihood that they will abandon it despite its apparent inappropriateness, in favor of 
approaches that suit the Liberian context, is almost nonexistent and confirms the realist 
theorists’ explanation of how states behave.  
With respect to the appropriateness of Structural Functionalism for this study, it is 




making Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible focused more on the police and less 
on other parts of the criminal justice chain. This approach had a negative impact on the 
criminal justice system’s functionality. The benefits of investing in the Liberian National 
Police were acknowledged by participants in a recently conducted public perception 
survey whose report is yet to be published. Results of the survey indicates that the 
performance of the police was rated higher than other parts of the criminal justice chain. 
However, the same report highlighted participants dissatisfaction with the entire criminal 
justice system and expressed a preference for the traditional justice system. Thus, 
confirming the fact that where one part of the system is strengthened, in Liberia’s case 
the police and the others neglected, no or little progress is made. This raises the question 
about the extent to which resources committed to reform Liberia’s police were 
judiciously used, vis-à-vis the functionality of the criminal justice system.  
Focusing relatively more on the police and less on the other parts of the criminal 
justice chain, confirms assertions by proponents of the Structural Functional Theory that 
the inability of a part of the system or organism to function makes the entire system 
dysfunctional. For the avoidance of doubt, the disproportionate amount of support 
channeled to the police compared to the other parts of the criminal justice chain is not the 
sole reason why Liberia’s criminal justice system was found to be far from functional. 
Other reasons for this state of affairs have been revealed in discussing research questions 




From the foregoing, it can be concluded without equivocation that participants 
reinforced the underpinning assumptions of both theoretical frameworks used for this 
study and confirmed the appropriateness of the choice for this study.  
Limitations 
 The following limitations were associated with this study: first, despite the fact 
that the majority of participants indicated that ordinary citizens were informed but not 
consulted in the decentralization process, the majority of Liberians who took part in this 
study were the elite and actively involved in the decentralization process, hence their 
perceptions that the process was not inclusive may be reflecting their position, as elite 
Liberians vis-à-vis the international actors and not in relation to ordinary Liberians vis-à-
vis their involvement in the process. Thus, talking to ordinary Liberians may have 
enriched this study’s findings. Therefore, this study may have perpetuated the elitism 
associated with the process to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice system. 
Whereas the majority of the participants being Liberian could be the basis of answers that 
reflected the true state of affairs, these participants belong to the elite, schooled and 
socialized in Western liberal thinking, and this certainly shaped their perspectives, 
perspectives that may not be shared by ordinary Liberians who form the majority of the 
population. Also, at the time of collecting data, there a government had just assumed 
office and some participants may have been dissatisfied with the direction the new 
government was leading the country in general, and the criminal justice sector in 
particular, and this could have clouded their judgement and their answers. Also, some of 




earlier on, and so may not have been current on the happenings of the criminal justice 
sector. Some of the participants may also have shared perspectives that were outside the 
period that this study focused on. It must however be noted that changes in the criminal 
justice system, particularly in postconflict settings, have a long gestation period so 
sharing views that are not so further away from the period under review will not 
fundamentally affect the accuracy of the perspectives shared nor my findings. 
Furthermore, the fact that a relatively limited number of foreigners participated in this 
study and this deprived this study of other perspectives from foreigners who implemented 
international development assistance programs. The inability to recruit more foreigners to 
participate in this study was due to a number of factors including the fact that they were 
often bound by confidentiality requirements linked to their employment contract and/or 
they were not available or disinterested. In addition to the said limitations, participants 
were disproportionately drawn from parts of the criminal justice chain and this may have 
skewed answers in favor of parts of the chain they worked for. The last limitation of this 
study arises from the limited number of female participants. This deprived the study of 
the views of women who form most of Liberia’s population, belong to the vulnerable 
group, were active in the peace process and would be the prime beneficiaries of an 
accessible criminal justice system.  
Recommendation for Future Research 
The following recommendations are made for future research: 
1. Conduct a similar study as this study but use quantitative and/or mix-method 





2. What kind of criminal justice system does Liberia need and can afford? 
3.  What will be the impact of efforts to promote the rule of law culture in Liberia if 
the customary justice system is resourced and receives stronger backing from 
Liberia’s elite to use it as a system of justice?  
4. What will it take to prepare formal justice actors to accept traditional justice 
actors as partners in justice delivery?  
5. What will it take to have a citizen centered criminal justice system in Liberia?  
6. Beyond paying taxes, how can the private sector contribute to decentralization of 
the criminal justice system, without the system feeling beholden to them? 
7. Conceptual clarity on what constitutes local and national ownership. 
8. Conceptual clarity on terminology (i.e., referring to indigenous systems of justice 
as informal justice systems rather than customary or traditional justice or even 
non-formal justice systems). 
Recommendations 
 Making criminal justice services accessible in postconflict societies is a complex 
endeavor with many actors involved and a multiplicity of interests to be satisfied. It is a 
process and not an event. It evolves and requires patience. Desires for quick fixes and 
showing impact/progress are natural but unrealistic and unhelpful. Despite the high level 
of interest national actors demonstrate and no matter how much resources are channeled; 
their absorptive capacity is limited but grows over time. Where this is forced, negative 




citizens, particularly the vulnerable, being the worst affected. If the objectives of 
reforming criminal justice systems in peacebuilding efforts are going to be achieved all 
actors should be seen as important parts of a system working in various but reinforcing 
ways towards the ultimate objective of enhancing access to justice. This requires genuine 
partnership, not devoid of seeking to satisfy parochial interests, but also not sacrificing 
the primary goal of enhancing access to criminal justice services for all, no matter the 
geographical location in Liberia. Seeing change will require several actions, most of them 
I identified during discussions regarding research question 3(1). 
Within the afore-stated realities, the following recommendations are made for all 
actors in Liberia’s criminal justice decentralization process:  
First, there is the need for an evaluation of all approaches that have been used to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. This should involve all actors with the 
Government of Liberia in the lead. The evaluation should be honest and thorough, and its 
findings should inform the way forward as well as the design and implementation of a 
strategic plan to enhance access to justice in Liberia.  
A nationally led and inclusive conversation to answer the question: what kind of 
justice system including the criminal justice system does Liberia need and can afford? 
should be convened, with appropriate time and resources allocated for its preparations. 
Women, youth, civil society, ordinary people and traditional authorities must be 
represented in this dialogue and their views taken on board. This conversation must be 
informed by the past and promote Liberia’s national interest and uphold its international 




Liberia’s unique identity. This exercise should not be overly legalistic; so, must have 
perspectives of sociology, anthropology, history, reality and political judgement, which 
must culminate into designing a criminal justice system that is citizen centered and 
reflects Liberia’s history, culture and post-civil war demography.  
Efforts to uphold and operationalize the constitutional imperative of operating a 
dual justice system in Liberia must be intensified with study tours undertaken to 
jurisdictions with similar challenges/systems/structures as Liberia. In this regard, I 
strongly recommended that Liberia’s authorities and its partners undertake a study tour to 
Bougainville to have a first-hand opportunity and feel of the system operating there. This 
will help clarify the conceptual challenges relating to how to involve the traditional 
justice system in dispensing criminal justice services in Liberia. This is because, from the 
data collected, there is an absence of conceptual clarity on how this can be done in a 
modern democratic state. Traditional leaders must be recognized as allies in dispensing 
justice in Liberia. This recognition should create partnerships. It will be long, painful and 
require enormous amounts of resources but in the long run worthwhile. Extending the 
criminal justice system’s reach to adequately cover the entire country will remain a work 
in progress in our lifetime. Even when this becomes a reality, the reasons for the 
population’s preference for the traditional justice system over the formal justice system 
will not have been addressed, hence the traditional justice system will continue to be a 
prominent forum and source of justice. This questions’ the prudence of the decision to 
channel limited resources on decentralizing the formal justice system which is not the 




The traditional justice system is steeped in culture, religion and tradition and 
inherent in this are cultural notions of fairness. Whereas, it is true that there are human 
rights violations that arise from its practices, the same can be said about the formal justice 
system. Efforts must be made to address these human rights violations and the temptation 
resisted to unnecessarily use foreign standards of human rights and fairness to harshly 
judge the traditional justice system. There is no doubt in my mind that, parallels of 
international human rights standards can be found within local traditions and cultures. 
Alternatively, efforts to find a hybrid between international standards and values vis à vis 
those arising from indigenous Liberian culture should be undertaken. This outcome will 
have to be allowed to evolve so should not be forced.  Liberia’s traditional justice system 
should be allowed to operate in a modern state within reasonable legal limits. It should 
interact/work with the formal justice system. However, it must always be remembered 
that the traditional justice system loses its identity when it is overly codified, hence a lot 
of caution must be taken in determining how the traditional justice system operates 
within a modern democratic state. In this regard, a middle path approach must be 
adopted. Certainty and predictability are cardinal principles of the rule of law. Arguably, 
the absence of codification of processes of the traditional justice system is not 
synonymous or amount to, an absence of certainty and predictability. It is worth stressing 
that in recommending a middle path does not mean that I am advocating an alternative or 
additional system of justice for Liberia. I am only advocating for an operationalization of 
Article 65 of Liberia’s Constitution as envisaged by its framers of having a dual justice 




Third Party Policing should be actively used in Liberia. I did not find this 
approach to policing being used in Liberia, in spite of indications by Mazola (2018) of a 
shift towards using this approach in law enforcement. Liberia’s traditional and religious 
leaders have an enormous amount of social capital which the police lack. The police can 
harness the moral authority that these leaders have to carry out their functions.  
Liberia and its partners must actively explore South South cooperation in seeking 
support and options to make the criminal justice system accessible. This would be helpful 
for Liberia as there is a greater chance that technical support and advice from Third 
World countries are more likely to be practically aligned to Liberia’s challenges, thus 
also addressing the challenge of sustaining these interventions when international 
development assistance ceases.  
There is also the need for urgent, coherent and holistic constitution and law 
reform in Liberia. This recommendation is linked to previous ones on holding a national 
conversation on Liberia’s justice system and the need to operationalize Liberia’s dual 
justice system. Legislative reform is a huge undertaking and requires a deliberate effort 
and dedicated resources. It should harmonize overlapping legislation, address the 
systemic challenges which are making the criminal justice system weak and 
dysfunctional. It must repeal archaic legislation and bring Liberian legislation and 
practice in conformity with Liberia’s international obligations. In this regard, the 
Legislature is an important actor which must be involved very early in the process. The 
role of the Legislature rarely came up in the data I collected. This is of real concern for a 




this perceived lack of relevance of the legislative body in the criminal justice reform 
process. Another actor who was not mentioned, but very relevant for implementing this 
recommendation, is Liberia’s Law Reform Commission, which is charged with leading 
and coordinating criminal justice system reform.  
Participants cited the high levels of pretrial detainees and overcrowding in 
Liberia’s prisons as indicators of a dysfunctional criminal justice system. This situation 
does not only suggest a dysfunctional criminal justice system but also amounts to an 
abuse of the rights of inmates. It is also an unnecessary charge on the taxpayer. 
Therefore, in addition to addressing the weaknesses in legislation and practices that are 
causing this challenge, serious consideration should be given to reintroducing and/or 
strengthening processes or approaches like restorative justice, alternatives to 
incarceration, parole, probation, noncustodial sentencing and community service into 
Liberia’s criminal justice system. Effective oversight of the various parts of the criminal 
justice system is important for addressing the issue of overcrowding in Liberia’s prisons. 
Therefore, steps should be taken to strengthen oversight mechanisms of the criminal 
justice system.  
Civil society and members of the community must be strengthened to actively 
participate in the reform processes. They must be considered partners in the process and 
must be consulted and not informed about the process as was revealed by participants as 
the practice. They must assist in being the watchdogs and hold the government and its 
international partners accountable. For this to happen, they must be knowledgeable and 




cooptation and defeat the objectives of supporting them. However, if the objectives of 
decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system are to have a chance of being achieved, 
this is an important recommendation that must be implemented. This recommendation 
does not seek to replace the need for the classical oversight mechanism that every 
criminal justice system must have. The point that Liberia’s criminal justice chain requires 
strong oversight cannot be overemphasized. A number of the pointers that participants 
provided as indicators of a dysfunctional criminal justice system and some of the 
challenges of the criminal justice system can be addressed by effective oversight 
mechanisms. 
Peacebuilding efforts in Liberia must adopt the territorial peace approach. This 
approach has the objective of ensuring that interventions to decentralize Liberia’s 
criminal justice system do not adopt a one size fits all approach across the country 
(Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate, 2016). It calls for a macro level approach to 
decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. Treating the entire country as the same 
and replicating elements of the entire criminal justice chain without regard to the 
specificities of the various geographical areas defeats the quest to promote local 
ownership. According to Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) the territorial peace 
approach fuses elements of decentralization, access to justice and security as well as rural 
development. 
Technology should be employed to make Liberia’s criminal justice system 
accessible. This recommendation must be implemented with considerable caution. 




technology including in the criminal justice system. As previously noted, Liberia should 
explore using technology for record keeping, case management, traffic management and 
security, DNA testing and other forensic support for investigations, and creating websites 
with information such as legal texts, cause lists and decided cases. This can enhance 
access to the criminal justice system and improve the administration of justice.  
Implications for Social Change 
 In this study, I found that the decentralization process was not inclusive as it did 
not consult ordinary Liberians, civil society and traditional leaders. I also found that the 
decentralization process has resulted in some semblance of functionality although there is 
still a long way to go. However, the existence of the state/government through the 
presence of criminal justice institutions, although limited, was found to be contributing to 
Liberia’s peace and stability. Participants called for a change in attitude and approach in 
how international development assistance is delivered and received in reforming 
Liberia’s criminal justice system. Specifically, the need to ensure that nonstate actors 
such as traditional leaders and the traditional justice system are involved in the process 
and that interventions are context specific and sustainable, were highlighted as important 
changes required to making the criminal justice system functional and ensuring Liberia’s 
peace and stability. Liberia’s traditional justice system has been identified as an 
important player in justice delivery that is being suppressed by officialdom partly due to 
human rights abuses associated with its processes and the contempt that some members 
of the privileged class have for this system of justice. Specific recommendations were 




 These findings offer an opportunity for all actors supporting processes to enhance 
access to criminal justice services to pause and rethink their approach. International 
development actors must focus on local ownership and sustainability and act according to 
the tenets of both concepts (i.e., local ownership and sustainability). This will require a 
balance between the quest to achieve their national interest objectives and ensuring that 
resources committed to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system result in tangible 
benefits to Liberians. The outcome of implementing this recommendation may result in 
taxpayers in donor countries being satisfied with the progress their resources are bringing 
to Liberia.  
The findings and recommendations of this study call for a fundamental shift in 
how criminal justice reform processes are implemented in postconflict countries. If acted 
upon, they will reduce the threshold of how much national interest considerations inform 
such endeavors and potentially create an opportunity for ordinary citizens to actively 
participate in decision making on issues affecting them. This will increase accountability 
in public service, a culture which is nearly absent in postconflict settings. This will, in 
turn, reduce the dependency of recipient countries on international development 
assistance, enhance progress towards a democratic culture and contribute to enduring 
peace. Ultimately, access to the criminal justice system in Liberia will contribute to 
achieving SDGs 11 and 16, which seek to make cities and human settlements inclusive, 





This study investigated the approaches that have been used to decentralize 
criminal justice services in Liberia, how inclusive and nationally driven/led the process to 
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice has been, and the impact of decentralization on the 
functionality of the criminal justice system and on Liberia’s peace and stability. It also 
focused on soliciting participants views on how to enhance the functionality of Liberia’s 
criminal justice system. This study contributes to filling the gap identified in the literature 
and has the potential of enhancing social change if the recommendations are 
implemented. The need for national ownership and inclusive processes in criminal justice 
reform in postconflict settings has eluded many peacebuilding efforts. The call for 
attitudinal change in how these interventions are delivered through international 
development assistance is known but this change is yet to occur. Peacebuilding efforts in 
a postconflict setting are shared efforts and change in attitudes and approach is necessary 
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Appendix A: Invitation To Participate in Study on Local Ownership of Decentralization 
of Criminal Justice Services in Liberia 
Dear XXX, 
I am a student in the Criminal Justice PhD program in Walden University. As part of 
the requirements leading to the award of a doctorate in criminal justice, I am required to 
conduct a study and write a dissertation on my area of study.  
In this regard, I am conducting a qualitative study in which I am seeking to answer 
three research questions. They are: What approaches have been used to decentralize 
criminal justice services in Liberia between 2011-2017? Have the approaches to 
decentralize criminal justice services in Liberia been influenced by Liberia’s peculiar 
context? and what has been the impact of decentralizing criminal justice services on the 
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system? The title of the study is National 
ownership in decentralization of criminal justice services in postconflict societies: 
Liberia in retrospect (2011-2017). 
To assist me answer the said research questions, I am seeking persons who are 
experts on the subject of my research to participate in an interview. From my previous 
work in Liberia’s criminal justice system, I am aware that you are/were involved in the 
process of decentralizing the services of Liberia’s criminal justice system during the period 
under review. Would you be interested in participating in this study? 
The process will include you completing an Informed Consent statement which is 
attached to this e-mail; and allowing me to conduct an in-person interview or an interview 




Please let me know if you would like to participate. I hope to collect data for this 
study within the first two quarters of 2019.  
You can contact me by phone +233244635418, e-mail samuelopoku-
agyakwa@waldenu.edu if you have any questions. 
  Thank you.  




































Appendix C: Interview Guide/Questions To Answer the Research Questions 
1. Can you please briefing tell me about yourself and your involvement in the 
decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017? 
2. Was Liberia’s CJS decentralized prior to the civil war? Why do you hold this 
view? 
3. Is there a difference between the current structure of the CJS compared to the pre-
civil war era? 
4. What kind of criminal justice services were decentralized in Liberia between 
2011-2017?  
5. What are the approaches that have been used to decentralize CJS services, in 
Liberia, between 2011-2017? i.e. between 2011-2017, what has been done to 
make Liberia’s CJS accessible? 
6. Who are the actors/partners supporting the process of making Liberia’s CJS 
accessible?  
7. Were nonstate actors involved in the decentralization of the CJS? If no why not?  
8. Did Liberia’s circumstances influence the choice of approaches to decentralize the 
criminal justice system? 
9. If yes, who are the nonstate actors involved in decentralization of CJ services in 
Liberia? E.g. are they national, religious, cultural, etc? 





11. How involved has the local community or ordinary citizens been in decentralizing 
the CJS?  
12. Would you say the approach to decentralize CJ services treated the various 
geographical parts of Liberia as homogenous or each part was treated as unique? 
And what was the reason for the approach chosen?  
13. In decentralizing the CJS, would you say the various parts of the system received 
the required or equal attention? i.e. would you say that decentralization was across 
the criminal justice chain? Why do you hold this view? 
14. In deciding how to decentralize the CJS, was consideration given to the presence 
of the customary justice system/practices in Liberia and how this system could 
impact the decentralize process, why do you say so?  
15. If yes, how did this consideration influence the choices made to decentralize the 
criminal justice system? 
16. Was the process to make the CJS accessible nationally driven, an external 
imposition or both? Why do you say so? 
17. Were the processes that were undertaken to make the CJS accessible and the 
institutions that were built/created suitable for the Liberian context? Why do you 
say so?  
18. Have these processes to make the criminal justice system accessible and outcomes 




19. Did the foreigners/internationals who worked on reforming Liberia’s CJS, 
understand Liberia and the CJS they worked to make accessible? Why do you 
hold this view? 
20. How should the international community that supported the decentralization of 
Liberia’s CJS have approached the decentralization process?  
21. What Liberian solutions can be used to further decentralize Liberia CJS?  
22. Do you know of other approaches that have been used in other countries to make 
the CJS accessible that can be used to decentralize Liberia’s CJS? 
23. Are the various parts/components of the CJS working together across the criminal 
justice chain? 
24. What has been the impact of decentralization on the criminal justice system on the 
system’s functionality? i.e. how has decentralization impacted the operations of 
the CJS?  
25. How do you think the functionality of Liberia’s CJS can be enhanced?  
26. Is there anything else you want to tell me about national ownership and 











Appendix D: Demographics of Participants 
 
Participant number Liberian/Foreigner Gender 
001 Foreigner Male 
002 Foreigner Female 
003 Liberian Male 
004 Foreigner Male 
005 Foreigner Male 
006 Foreigner Male 
007 Liberian Female 
008 Liberian Male 
009 Liberian Female 
010 Liberian Male 
011 Liberian Male 
012 Liberian Male 
013 Liberian Male 
014 Liberian Male 
015 Liberian Male 
016 Liberian Male 
017 Liberian Male 
018 Liberian Female 
019 Liberian Male 
020 Liberian Male 
021 Liberian Male 
022 Foreigner Male 
023 Liberian Male 
024 Foreigner Female 
025 Foreigner Male 
026 Liberian Male 
027 Liberian Male 
028 Liberian Female 
029 Liberian Male 
030 Liberian Male 
 
 
 
